# NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT

# Asia M&A Deal Points Study

September 2019

Norton Rose Fulbright LLP

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Welcome to Norton Rose Fulbright's 2018 Asia Private M&A Deal Points Study, analysing 36 private cross-border M&A transactions in Asia with a combined value of close to US\$4 billion for the 2018 calendar year.

During the year, Norton Rose Fulbright was involved in a large number of cross-border deals in the Asian market, and our study provides unique insights into the key trends for private M&A deals in Asia generally. The study also analyses trends on a jurisdictional basis for Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, mainland China and Malaysia.

The results provide a useful tool for deal teams in Asia, and those exploring opportunities to invest in Asia, to understand market practice for cross-border deals in this dynamic region.

We hope you enjoy reading the results of our 2018 Asia Private M&A Deal Points Study. Please contact a member of our M&A team in your nearest Norton Rose Fulbright office if you have any questions.



# Introduction





Top 10 in Hong Kong M&A League Table for Legal Advisors by deal count in 2018 Full Year Bloomberg

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## 2018 overview



## 36 sale agreements

Value of deals US\$3,939 million Average deal value US\$109 million



## Who we acted for

Seller: 39% Buyer: 42% W&I Insurer: 11%

Other: 8%



## Type of transactions

Share sales: 92% Business sales: 8%

4 Asia private M&A deal points study 2018

\* Unless otherwise indicated, in this study percentages are rounded to nearest whole number and deal values are rounded to the nearest million.



## **Share sale features**





# Seller's ultimate country of origin (by deal number)





# **Buyer's ultimate country of origin and investment amount** (by deal number)

| Country of origin        | % deals | Total investment amount<br>(US\$) | % by value | Where are they investing? | (%)  |
|--------------------------|---------|-----------------------------------|------------|---------------------------|------|
| United States of America | 14%     | 949 million                       | 24%        | Australia:                | 73%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | USA:                      | 22%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Singapore:                | 4%   |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Other:                    | 1%   |
| United Kingdom           | 14%     | 149 million                       | 4%         | Hong Kong:                | 100% |
| Singapore                | 14%     | 67 million                        | 2%         | Singapore:                | 48%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Philippines:              | 29%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Malaysia:                 | 23%  |
| China                    | 11%     | 1,251 million                     | 32%        | United Kingdom:           | 69%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | China:                    | 30%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Hong Kong                 | 1%   |
| Other                    | 47%     | 1,523 million                     | 39%        | Hong Kong:                | 36%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Taiwan:                   | 35%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Thailand:                 | 17%  |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Singapore:                | 7%   |
|                          |         |                                   |            | Other:                    | 5%   |



# Target jurisdiction and amount invested (by deal number)

| Target jurisdiction                                   | Total amount<br>invested<br>(US\$m) | % deals |
|---|-------------------------------------|---------|
| United Kingdom  | 865m                                | 3%      |
| Australia   | 697m                                | 3%      |
| Hong Kong   | 696m                                | 31%     |
| Taiwan  | 530m                                | 3%      |
| China   | 386m                                | 14%     |
| Thailand  | 265m                                | 8%      |
| United States of America                              | 173m                                | 3%      |
| Singapore   | 60m                                 | 17%     |
| Other (including Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia) | 54m                                 | 18%     |



# **Industry (by deal number)**





# **Pricing and valuation**

We advised Renhe Commercial Holdings Company Limited on its HK\$6.3 billion acquisition of the land and properties on which Renhe Commercial operates its agricultural wholesale markets in Hangzhou, China.

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# Consideration





# **Completion accounting**





# Locked box

## **19%**

#### of deals used locked box

Locked box typically used for **higher value deals** (The average deal value was US\$205 million compared to an average deal value of US\$86 million for "non-locked box" deals)

Use of locked box **more common in Asia** than Australia - shows preference or price certainty among both buyers & sellers

## Jurisdiction breakdown

% of deals with locked box





## **Earn out**

## 17%

#### of deals contained earn-out provisions

Earn out is usually more common for **lower value, more speculative deals** the average deal value of US\$54

Some key features

- Holdback period: range from 14 54 months
- The triggers for earn-out payment were calculated by reference to general revenue (50%) or EBITDA targets (17%), or specific targets (33%)

## Jurisdiction breakdown

% of deals with earn-out





# Conditionality

We advised Hyperion Insurance Group Ltd in relation to the US\$120 million acquisition by Howden Broking Group Limited of 60% of the issued share capital of IPG Asia Holdings Limited.

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# **Conditionality – MAC**

## 36%

#### of deals had a MAC as a condition

- Broad MACs used for higher value deals (The average deal value was US\$184 million compared to an average deal value of US\$23 million for limited MACs and an average deal value of US\$81 million for deals without MACs)
- Use as renegotiation tool if potential MAC arises?
- MAC conditions typically less common in Hong Kong (and this year less common in Singapore and Malaysia too)

## Jurisdiction breakdown

| 5%     |  |
|--------|--|
| 31% 64 | 64% of deals had no MAC<br>31% of deals had broad MAC<br>5% of deals had limited MAC |
|        |  |

=0/

|                     | НК  | China | Japan | Singapor | re Malaysia |
|---------------------|-----|-------|-------|----------|-------------|
| % of deals no MAC   | 72% | 57%   | 50%   | 80%      | 100%        |
| % deals broad MAC   | 28% | 43%   | 50%   | 20%      | -           |
| % deals limited MAC | -   | -     | -     | -        | -           |



# **Conditionality – regulatory approvals**

## **39%**

#### of deals had this condition

8% of deals had a very buyer-friendly general condition that "all necessary" governmental waivers and approvals are obtained

## Jurisdiction breakdown

|   | НК  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|---|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| % of regulatory approvals condition (any)                         | 17% | 43%   | 25%   | 40%       | 100%     |
| % with very "buyer-friendly" broad regulatory approvals condition | -   | 14%   | -     | 10%       | -        |





# **Conditionality – breach of warranty**

## **31%**

#### of deals had this condition

• Seen across the spectrum of deal sizes (most common in deals in the range of US\$200 million to US\$500 million)

#### Jurisdiction breakdown

% of deals with breach of warranty condition





# **Other common conditions**



Key employees retained Condition seen in 11% of deals



Due diligence Condition seen in 11% of deals



Competition authority clearance Condition seen in 11% of deals 53 I

Pre-Completion restructuring Condition seen in 22% of deals



Purchaser finance Condition seen in 14% of deals





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private sale and purchase agreement and a subsequent mandatory tender offer.

## Warranties – disclosure materials



#### Accuracy warranty – in 47% of deals

#### **Completeness warranty** – in 36% of deals



Jurisdiction breakdown % of deals with completeness warranty



# Warranties – anti-bribery and corruption

## **53%**

#### of deals had ABC warranties

- 100% of deals with Malaysian targets had ABC warranties
- Otherwise, target jurisdictions varied
- Seen in deals of all sizes, but common in higher value deals (the average deal value was US\$143 million compared to an average deal value of US\$72 million for deals without the warranty)

## Jurisdiction breakdown

% of deals with ABC warranty





## Warranties – management accounts

## **64%**

#### of deals had management accounts warranty

Less common in Chinese deals (43%). Chinese sellers were reluctant to give it: no Chinese sellers gave a management accounts warranty. Also uncommon with Chinese buyers: only seen in 25% of the deals

#### Jurisdiction breakdown

% of deals with management accounts warranty





# Warranties – management accounts (cont.)

## Standard to which management accounts were warranted

## Jurisdiction breakdown

|  | НК  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia | All deals |
|--|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| Fairly presents                                      | 33% | -     | 67%   | -         | -        | 22%       |
| Prepared with due care and attention/reasonable care | 42% | -     | 33%   | 29%       | -        | 30%       |
| Reasonable view                                      | 17% | 100%  | -     | -         | -        | 22%       |
| Prepared on a consistent basis with past practice    | 8%  | -     | -     | 29%       | -        | 13%       |
| True & fair view (audit standard)                    | -   | -     | -     | 43%       | -        | 13%       |



# Warranties – audited accounts

## 75%

of deals had warranties relating to audited accounts

## 25%

of deals which did not contain audited accounts warranties explained by:

- <100% interest acquired / being an existing shareholder</li>
- Delivery of a valuation report was a CP to completion
- Business sale
- No requirement for audited accounts in target's jurisdiction

## **70%**

of agreements which contained audited accounts warranty also included monthly management accounts warranty

#### Jurisdiction breakdown

% of deals with audited accounts warranty





# Warranties – consequences of breach

## 36%

of deals had indemnity backing for breach of warranty

• Larger deal value (average US\$184 million)

## 64%

of deals did not

• Smaller deal value (average US\$68 million)

#### Who is resisting giving indemnity backing?

- US, UK and Japanese sellers all resisted
- All Chinese sellers gave indemnity backing

#### Who really cares about this?

- Japanese and US buyers sought it
- 75% of Chinese buyers didn't have indemnity backing
- No UK or Australian buyers received indemnity backing

## **26** Asia private M&A deal points study 2018

## Jurisdiction breakdown

% of deals with indemnity backing for warranties



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# Limitation of liability – monetary liability caps

|                         | <us\$50m< th=""><th>US\$50m -<br/>US\$100m</th><th>US\$100m -<br/>US\$200m</th><th>US\$200m -<br/>US\$500m</th><th>&gt;US\$500m</th><th>All deals</th></us\$50m<> | US\$50m -<br>US\$100m | US\$100m -<br>US\$200m | US\$200m -<br>US\$500m | >US\$500m | All deals |
|-------------------------|---|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-----------|-----------|
| Max aggregate liability | 100%  | Uncapped              | 60%                    | 100%                   | 55%       | 100%      |
| Title                   | 100%  | 100%                  | 100%                   | 100%                   | 59%       | 100%      |
| General                 | 40%   | 17%                   | 20%                    | 25%                    | 14%       | 30%       |
| Тах                     | 40%   | Uncapped              | 18%                    | 25%                    | 20%       | 30%       |

\* Very few of these deals were subject to any cap.



# Limitation of liability – monetary liability caps (cont.)

|                         | НК   | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia | Median –<br>all deals |
|-------------------------|------|-------|-------|-----------|----------|-----------------------|
| Max aggregate liability | 100% | 100%  | 20%   | 100%      | 75%      | 100%                  |
| Title                   | 100% | 59%   | 100%  | 100%      | 100%     | 100%                  |
| General                 | 30%  | 18%   | 20%   | 30%       | 30%      | 30%                   |
| Тах                     | 28%  | 30%   | 20%   | 40%       | 30%      | 30%                   |

## A significant number of deals (19%) had no monetary liability caps at all

|                   | НК  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia | All deals |
|-------------------|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|-----------|
| No liability caps | 17% | 57%   | -     | -         | -        | 19%       |



# **Limitation of liability – general comments**



Title warranties Generally set at 100% of purchase price irrespective of deal value



General warranties Tended to be higher for smaller deal values (range 40% - 100%) but lower for higher deal values (10% - 30%)



## **Tax warranties**

Generally set at or just above general warranties irrespective of deal value



# Limitation of liability – time limits (general)

|          |         | Title warranties<br>(months)                               | General warranties (months)  | Tax warranties<br>(months)                               |
|----------|---------|--|--|--|
| Uncapped |         | 22% of deals had uncapped time limits for title warranties | 19% of deals had<br>uncapped time limits<br>for general warranties | 31% of deals had uncapped time limits for tax warranties |
| Capped   | Mode    | 12 & 36  | 18   | 36 (followed by 72)                                      |
| deals    | Average | 36.7   | 21.1   | 50.7   |
|          | High    | 84   | 36   | 84   |
|          | Low     | 12   | 12   | 12   |



# Limitation of Liability – time limits (months, by deal value)

|         | <us\$50< th=""><th>US\$50m –<br/>US\$100m</th><th>US\$100m -<br/>US\$200m</th><th>US\$200m -<br/>US\$500m</th><th>&gt;US\$500m</th><th>All deals</th></us\$50<> | US\$50m –<br>US\$100m | US\$100m -<br>US\$200m | US\$200m -<br>US\$500m | >US\$500m   | All deals     |
|---------|---|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| Title   | 36.3  | 48.0                  | 33.5                   | 24.0                   | 46.0        | 36.7          |
|         | Uncapped: 25%   | Uncapped: -           | Uncapped: 33%          | Uncapped: 25%          | Uncapped: - | Uncapped: 22% |
| General | 21.3  | 27                    | 24.3                   | 16.0                   | 18.0        | 21.1          |
|         | Uncapped: 25%   | Uncapped: -           | Uncapped: -            | Uncapped: 25%          | Uncapped: - | Uncapped: 19% |
| Тах     | 46.4  | 60.0                  | 48.0                   | 38.3                   | 80.0        | 50.7          |
|         | Uncapped: 38%   | Uncapped: -           | Uncapped: 33%          | Uncapped: 25%          | Uncapped: - | Uncapped: 31% |



# Limitation of Liability – time limits (months, by jurisdiction)

|         | НК            | China         | Japan         | Singapore     | Malaysia    |
|---------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|-------------|
| Title   | Mode: 36      | Mode: 72      | Mode: -       | Mode: 12      | Mode: -     |
|         | High: 84      | High: 72      | High: 72      | High: 84      | High: 18    |
|         | Min: 12       | Min: 18       | Min: 12       | Min: 12       | Min: 12     |
|         | Av: 32.9      | Av: 49.5      | Av: 40.0      | Av: 30.0      | Av: 15.0    |
|         | Uncapped: 17% | Uncapped: 43% | Uncapped: 25% | Uncapped: 10% | Uncapped: - |
| General | Mode: 18      | Mode: 18      | Mode: -       | Mode: 12      | Mode: -     |
|         | High: 36      | High: 24      | High: 30      | High: 30      | High: 18    |
|         | Min: 12       | Min: 18       | Min: 12       | Min: 12       | Min: 12     |
|         | Av: 23.3      | Av: 20.0      | Av: 21.0      | Av: 19.2      | Av: 15.0    |
|         | Uncapped: 17% | Uncapped: 57% | Uncapped: -   | Uncapped: -   | Uncapped: - |
| Тах     | Mode: 36      | Mode: -       | Mode: -       | Mode: -       | Mode: -     |
|         | High: 84      | High: 84      | High: 84      | High: 84      | High: 60    |
|         | Min: 12       | Min: 36       | Min: 36       | Min: 24       | Min: 18     |
|         | Av: 40.7      | Av: 64.0      | Av: 60.3      | Av: 54.0      | Av: 39.0    |
|         | Uncapped: 28% | Uncapped: 57% | Uncapped: -   | Uncapped: 20% | Uncapped: - |



# Limitation of liability – de minimis and basket (by deal value)

|            | <us\$50m< th=""><th>US\$50m -<br/>US\$100m</th><th>US\$100m -<br/>US\$200m</th><th>US\$200m -<br/>US\$500m</th><th>&gt;US\$500m</th><th>All deals</th></us\$50m<> | US\$50m -<br>US\$100m | US\$100m -<br>US\$200m | US\$200m -<br>US\$500m | >US\$500m     | All deals     |
|------------|---|-----------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| De minimis | Mode: 0.1%  | Mode: -               | Mode: 0.1%             | Mode: -                | Mode: 0.1%    | Mode: 0.1%    |
|            | Av: 0.98%   | Av: 0.08%             | Av: 0.11%              | Av: 0.09%              | Av: 0.08%     | Av: 0.55%     |
|            | Uncapped: 50%   | Uncapped: -           | Uncapped: -            | Uncapped: 25%          | Uncapped: -   | Uncapped: 36% |
| Basket     | Mode: 2.0%  | Mode: -               | Mode: -                | Mode: 1.0%             | Mode: -       | Mode: 1%      |
|            | Av: 4.53%   | Av: -                 | Av: 0.78%              | Av: 1.1%               | Av: 0.8%      | Av: 3.08%     |
|            | Uncapped: 50%   | Uncapped:<br>100%     | Uncapped: -            | Uncapped: 25%          | Uncapped: 33% | Uncapped: 44% |



# Limitation of liability – de minimis and basket (by jurisdiction)

| НК            | China   | Japan   | Singapore   | Malaysia  |
|---------------|---|---|---|---|
| Mode: 0.10%   | Mode: -   | Mode: 0.10%   | Mode: 0.10%   | Mode: -   |
| Av: 0.73%     | Av: 0.12%   | Av: 0.10%   | Av: 0.50%   | Av: 0.45%   |
| Uncapped: 39% | Uncapped: 57%   | Uncapped: -   | Uncapped: 20%   | Uncapped: -   |
| Mode: 1.00%   | Mode: -   | Mode: -   | Mode: -   | Mode: -   |
| Av: 4.22%     | Av: 1.20%   | Av: 0.80%   | Av: 1.87%   | Av: 1.79%   |
| Uncapped: 44% | Uncapped: 57%   | Uncapped: 25%   | Uncapped: 30%   | Uncapped: -   |
|               | Mode: 0.10%<br>Av: 0.73%<br>Uncapped: 39%<br>Mode: 1.00%<br>Av: 4.22% | Mode: 0.10% Mode: -   Av: 0.73% Av: 0.12%   Uncapped: 39% Uncapped: 57%   Mode: 1.00% Mode: -   Av: 4.22% Av: 1.20% | Mode: 0.10% Mode: - Mode: 0.10%   Av: 0.73% Av: 0.12% Av: 0.10%   Uncapped: 39% Uncapped: 57% Uncapped: -   Mode: 1.00% Mode: - Mode: -   Av: 4.22% Av: 1.20% Av: 0.80% | Mode: 0.10% Mode: - Mode: 0.10% Mode: 0.10%   Av: 0.73% Av: 0.12% Av: 0.10% Av: 0.50%   Uncapped: 39% Uncapped: 57% Uncapped: - Uncapped: 20%   Mode: 1.00% Mode: - Mode: - Mode: -   Av: 4.22% Av: 1.20% Av: 0.80% Av: 1.87% |



# Limitation of liability – basket and retention threshold





# Limitation of liability – seller knowledge qualifier



In **78%** of deals a selection of warranties were qualified by reference to Seller/ Warrantor knowledge.

- In 25% of these deals the qualifier was expressed to be on the basis of actual knowledge of seller
- In **75%** of these deals the qualifier was expressed to be on the basis of **constructive knowledge** (or both actual and constructive)

Use of "actual" knowledge places higher burden on the Buyer to prove "actual" knowledge.



## By jurisdiction

|                     | НК  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|---------------------|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Total qualified     | 72% | 71%   | 100%  | 80%       | 100%     |
| Actual              | 31% | -     | 25%   | -         | -        |
| Constructive / Both | 69% | 100%  | 75%   | 100%      | 100%     |




# Limitation of liability – buyer knowledge qualifier

 Generally, at common law, a Buyer will be unable to bring an action if it knew about a breach of warranty.

 Image: Comparison of the provision of the parties.

 Image: Comparison of the parties of the parties.

 Image: Comparison of the parties.

In 36% of agreements, Buyer knowledge limits Seller liability on warranty claims.

8% of these agreements were limited by the constructive knowledge of the Buyer.

92% of these agreements were limited by the actual knowledge of the Buyer.



# **Limitation of liability – public searches**

### **44%**

of agreements contained a limitation of liability for public searches, of which:

100% corporate searches (e.g., companies registry or similar)

63% court searches

13% "all registers open to the public"

### By jurisdiction

|   |                                  | НК   | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|---|----------------------------------|------|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
|   | % of agreements with limitation  | 33%  | 43%   | 75%   | 60%       | 100%     |
|   | Corporate searches               | 100% | 100%  | 100%  | 100%      | 100%     |
| • | Court searches                   | 83%  | 33%   | 67%   | 67%       | -        |
|   | All registers open to the public | -    | -     | -     | 33%       | -        |



# Limitation of liability – disclosure shield

**Seller disclosure** limited liability of Sellers in 78% of sale agreements.

- In 93% of these agreements, the disclosure applied against all warranties.
- In remaining 7% agreements, only certain warranties were disclosed against.

|                                  | HK   | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|----------------------------------|------|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| % of agreements with limitation  | 72%  | 57%   | 100%  | 100%      | 100%     |
| % applied against all warranties | 100% | 100%  | 100%  | 90%       | 100%     |
| % applied against some only      | -    | -     | -     | 10%       | -        |

|  | НК  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|--|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| % of all deals                                       | 56% | 43%   | 100%  | 80%       | 100%     |
| % of deals where disclosure shield limited liability | 77% | 75%   | 100%  | 80%       | 100%     |

Disclosure letter used:

- in 58% of all deals
- in 75% of deals where disclosure shield limited liability

"Fairly disclosed" is the most common disclosure standard, followed by "disclosed" and "fully and fairly disclosed"





## Restraint





- Restraint period:
  - Mode: 2 years & 3 years
  - Low : 1.5 years
  - High: 7 years

#### **Restraint area**

| Target<br>jurisdiction | нк   | China | Japan   | Singapore                        | Malaysia |
|------------------------|--|-------|---|----------------------------------|----------|
| Most<br>common:        | Worldwide (i.e., any location where the business operates) | PRC   | Worldwide (i.e.,<br>any location where<br>the business<br>operates) | South East<br>Asian<br>countries | N/A      |



We advised Japanese power companies JERA Co., Inc. and TEPCO Power Grid on an agreement to invest up to £25 million in the UK battery storage developer and operator, Zenobe Energy. The investment is one of the largest direct investments from Japan into the UK battery storage sector.

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# **Deal protection**

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# **Deal protection – deposit**

| 19% of deals a deposit paid by the       |   | HK  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|--|---|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Buyer – mix of deal values               | % of all deals  | 17% | 14%   | -     | 30%       | -        |
|  | % of PP (median)  | 17% | 40%   | -     | 4%        | -        |
| Median deposit 17% of purchase           | % of PP (high)  | 50% | -     | -     | 9%        | -        |
| price (no mode)                          | % of PP (low)   | 1%  | -     | -     | 1%        | -        |
| Highest deposit 50%, lowest deposit 1%   | % of deals with deposit where deposit was non-refundable? | -   | -     | -     | 67%       | -        |
| Deposits were refundable in 86% of cases |   |     |       |       |           |          |



# **Deal protection – break fee**





# **Deal protection – guarantees**

Guarantees of **Buyer's** obligations given in 11% of deals

Guarantees of **Seller's** obligations given in 14% of deals

|   | HK  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|---|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Guarantee of<br>Buyer's<br>obligations  | 17% | 14%   | 25%   | 10%       | -        |
| Guarantee of<br>Seller's<br>obligations | 22% | 14%   | 25%   | 10%       | -        |

Generally more common in lower value deals

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### **Escrow**

# **Retention amounts**

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We advised petrochemical company IRPC Public Company Limited on its equity investment in Guangzhao Saiju Performance Polymer Ltd. by way of subscription of newly increased capital and the simultaneous establishment of a joint venture company in Thailand.

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# **Dispute resolution**

- Arbitration is preferred dispute resolution mechanism (61% of deals)
- Litigation dispute resolution in 39% of deals

#### Most common arbitration forums

- Singapore (SIAC) (41%)
- Hong Kong (HKIAC) (36%)
- England (LCIA) (14%)
- Hong Kong (ICC) (9%)

|             | HK  | China | Japan | Singapore | Malaysia |
|-------------|-----|-------|-------|-----------|----------|
| Arbitration | 56% | 71%   | 100%  | 70%       | 100%     |
| Litigation  | 44% | 29%   | 0%    | 30%       | 0%       |

#### Number of arbitrators

- 77% of deals had 3 arbitrators
  - Average deal value was US\$154 million
- 23% of deals had 1 arbitrator
  - Average deal value was US\$22 million



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### Norton Rose Fulbright

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Recognized for our industry focus, we are strong across all the key industry sectors: financial institutions; energy; infrastructure, mining and commodities; transport; technology and innovation; and life sciences and healthcare. Through our global risk advisory group, we leverage our industry experience with our knowledge of legal, regulatory, compliance and governance issues to provide our clients with practical solutions to the legal and regulatory risks facing their businesses.

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