The COVID-19 pandemic has seen governments across the world restricting civil liberties and movement to new levels. To aid the safe lifting of current public health restrictions, new technologies are being developed – contact tracing apps – and rolled out to automate labour intensive tasks critical to containing the spread of the virus. Our contact tracing survey summarises the principal regulatory and policy issues applicable to contact tracing across a range of key jurisdictions in real time.

Is technology being used by the government to monitor and control the spread of COVID-19 (e.g. contact tracing app, CCTV, cell phone location data, credit-card history)?

The Government has selected a contact-tracing app developed by a well-known software house. On 29 April the Italian Government issued a law decree setting out inter alia the rules governing the adoption of such app (Law Decree no. 28 of 30 April 2020, the Decree). After a beta test in four regions, the app has been made available in the whole of Italy since June 15.

What are considered to be the major privacy concerns in relation to the app in your jurisdiction (in relation to its use (a) by the government; and (b) by private sector organisations)?

The Data Privacy Authority considers that the Decree on the app complies with its previous comments on this topic and with EDPB guidelines.

Main privacy concerns lie in data minimization, data security, re-identification risk and actual prevention of use of such data for other purposes. The Decree addresses a wide-spread concern about ownership and localization, providing that the data controller shall be the Ministry of Health, and that data shall be stored in servers on the Italian territory.

Private sector apps to be used in the workplace need to comply with strict Italian rules on remote monitoring of employees, as well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>App details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. What is the name of app</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immuni</td>
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<td>2. Is the app voluntary?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>3. Is there any suggestion that use of the app and a clean result may be necessary to enter workplaces or any commercial or public buildings (or is this explicitly or implicitly prohibited)?</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Decree prescribes that not using the app cannot lead to any adverse consequence, but no further details are provided.</td>
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<td>4. What information is required to register for the app? Is the information collected considered excessive?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
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<td>The Decree sets the principle according to which the app shall process only the scope of data necessary to alert proximate users of contacts with infected users and easing the adoption of health assistance measures in their favour. Currently the app does not require an account to be created. Users only need to declare they are at least 14 years old and provide the province of domicile. It may be amended in later versions.</td>
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</table>
5. Is GPS or Bluetooth used?

**Bluetooth**
Use of localization data is prohibited under the Decree.

6. Is data stored on a centralised server?

**Yes and no**
A semi-centralised system is adopted, whereby a centralized server stores the keys uploaded by infected users (together with some additional data), while the keys of contacts are stored locally on each device.

The app downloads keys of positive users periodically to check them against the contacts on the device.

7. Does the identity of the infected user get captured centrally?

**Unknown**
Final details about the app are not available yet.

8. Is the identity of the infected user disclosed to proximate users or public health authorities? Is it disclosed to anyone else?

**No**
COVID-19 patients are asked by health authority whether they use the app. If they do, they are invited to flag themselves as infected in the app to alert their contacts without disclosing their identity.

9. Is consent needed to share data with other users/ upload the data to a centralised system?

**Yes**
Final details about the app are not available yet. Data will be processed by public health authorities.

10. Is the identity of the proximate users disclosed to public health authorities? Is it disclosed to anyone else?

**No**
Identity of proximate users is not disclosed. Proximate users are alerted by the app by comparing data of contacts stored on their device with the infected users data downloaded from the system.

11. Does the app incorporate “privacy by design” and was a privacy risk assessment completed?

**Yes**
Pursuant to the Decree, a data processing impact assessment has been carried out.

12. How long will the data be kept for, are there clear lines around timing?

**14 days**
Keys of contacts are stored on each device for 14 days. The same retention period applies to keys uploaded by infected users on the centralized server. In any event, no data can be retained until the end of the state of emergency and in any case not later than 31 December 2020.

13. Has data security been addressed expressly (e.g. encryption)?

**Yes**
In general terms, the Decree requires a ‘suitable level of security” to be adopted. Anonymization or (if not possible) pseudonymization is required.

14. Are there clear limitations regarding who may have access to the data?

**Yes**

15. Are there clear limitations on the purposes for which the government may use the data?

**Yes**
Data collected through the app can only be used for alerting persons that entered into close contact with persons that tested positive to coronavirus and protect their health (except for further use of aggregate or anonymised data for other purposes of public health, prevention, statistics or scientific research).

16. Is the government of your country bound by privacy laws in respect of the contact tracing data?

**Yes**

17. Has the regulator commented/ provided guidance on the technology?

**Yes**
The Italian Data Processing Authority has issued an opinion on the Decree, a note on the DPIA, and authorization to the Ministry of Health in its quality of data controller for the data processed through the app.

18. Are there any private sector initiatives you are aware of to use/ integrate the app or the information from the app (e.g. to reflect the results back to workforces)?

**Yes**
Media reports suggest tests are being carried out by some Italian companies for using such an app at the workplace (e.g. in automotive manufacturing plants).
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