In Svella Connect Ltd v Virgin Media Ltd [2026] EWHC 2223 (TCC), the Court struck out the claimant’s claim for breaches of an alleged implied term of good faith in three framework agreements and an exit and settlement agreement. The decision is the latest in a number of cases that have considered the implication of good faith obligations following the seminal judgment in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trade Corporation Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), in which the Court suggested that a duty of good faith could be implied into ‘relational contracts’.

In Svella, the Court conducted a detailed review of the case law relating to implied duties of good faith and the concept of a ‘relational contract’. The decision is interesting because of the Court’s view of the limits of that concept. Pepperall J held that the critical question when deciding whether a good faith obligation should be implied into a contract is not whether the contract is relational, but whether the parties’ agreement has been fully set out in their contract and, if not, whether good faith should be implied in accordance with the orthodox principles governing the implication of contractual terms, i.e. whether such a term is necessary.

Background

The dispute relates to Virgin Media’s expansion of fibre optic data networks in the UK. Since 2023, Virgin Media has provided these network services to a sole customer, nexfibre, using various contractors operating under framework agreements.

Each financial year, nexfibre would publish its planned volume and location of work for the following year. Virgin Media would then negotiate with its framework contractors and provisionally allocate the anticipated work between them, which was subject to nexfibre actually calling down the work. Before any work was commissioned, framework contractors were invited to produce formal proposals for the installation work and these would be submitted to Virgin Media and nexfibre for approval.

Under this structure, Virgin Media entered into three framework agreements with NMCN plc, which were novated to Svella following NMCN plc’s administration in 2021 (the Framework Agreements).

Disputes arose between Svella and Virgin Media concerning a range of issues, including the rate to be paid to Svella and Svella’s performance. Following negotiations, the parties entered into an Exit & Settlement Agreement (ESA) in July 2024 under which Svella agreed to waive the claims it had intimated under two of the Framework Agreements, and Virgin Media would award further work under the third Framework Agreement subject to various conditions and requirements.

However, following nexfibre’s decision in November 2024 to scale back its plans for 2025, Svella was materially impacted as only a third of the work identified in the ESA was planned for 2025.

Svella commenced proceedings against Virgin Media. It argued that both the Framework Agreements and the ESA were “relational contracts”, in that they required a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence. On that basis, Svella claimed that implied terms of good faith arose under those Agreements requiring each party to act honestly, not conduct itself in a way that was calculated to frustrate the purpose of the contract and not act in manner that would be regarded as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people. Svella alleged various instances of breach of these good faith obligations.

Summary judgment application

Virgin Media applied for summary judgment in respect of the claims or, in the alternative, strike out. It denied that there was any basis for implying terms of good faith in the Agreements, arguing that such terms were neither necessary to give business efficacy to the parties’ agreements nor consistent with the express terms of the Agreements. Svella also appeared to argue that a term of good faith was implied because the contracts were relational; Virgin Media submitted that was wrong in law as some case on necessity was required. Virgin Media further denied breach of any such terms that were found.

Decision

Virgin Media’s summary judgment application was successful. Pepperall J held that there was no real prospect of Svella succeeding in its claims for breaches of implied duties of good faith in the Framework Agreements or ESA.

In reaching this decision, the Court first summarised the principles regarding the implication of terms. A term may be implied in fact where it is necessary to give business efficacy to the agreement in question. (Marks & Spencer v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Co (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72). A term may be implied in law either by statute or where it is a necessary incident of a particular type of contractual relationship.

The Court then undertook a comprehensive review of the authorities considering implied terms of good faith and relational contracts starting with Yam Seng in which Leggatt J observed that a duty of good faith may be implied in fact into a ‘relational contract’ which he described as a longer term relationship which “may require a high degree of communication, co-operation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties' understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements.”

This was considered further by Leggatt J in Al Nehayan v Kent [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm), where he decided obiter that an implied term of good faith could be implied in law because of the nature of a relational contract. In this latest judgment, however, the Court agreed with subsequent authorities which preferred the view that a duty of good faith arises as a matter of fact in the circumstances of the particular contract, rather than as a special rule for a relational contract.

The Court also considered Bates v the Post Office (No. 3) [2019] EWHC 606 (QB) which set out nine characteristics of a relational contract. However, the Court noted the danger in analysing whether good faith should be implied purely by reference to the Bates criteria. Pepperall J referred to recent authorities which considered the criteria a sense-check rather than a series of statutory requirements and emphasised that the courts should not veer from the traditional tests for the implication of terms.

The Court distilled the authorities into the following key principles:

  1. The label relational could be used to describe the quality of the agreed relationship, but it would not be determinative of arguments as to the implication of terms.
  2. When considering whether a duty of good faith should be implied, the critical question is not whether the contract is relational but whether the parties’ agreement has been fully set out in their contract, and if not, whether the pleaded term should be implied because it is necessary.
  3. The purpose of implied terms is to fill gaps left by the parties. A term could not be implied where the parties have already included provisions relating to that matter within the contract.
  4. In considering a proposed implied term of good faith in a long-term collaborative agreement, the courts may be assisted by using the Bates criteria as a sense check, but they are not an alternative to the proper application of the orthodox rules for the implication of a term in fact.

Applying this analysis to the Framework Agreements, the Court concluded that there was no gap in the Agreements such that it was necessary to imply a duty of good faith in fact. The Framework Agreements were comprehensive documents that already provided how the parties were to collaborate - clause 10.2 stated that the parties would “act in a spirit of mutual trust and cooperation”. In addition, the Framework Agreements did not create partnerships or joint ventures, and did not guarantee any work; Virgin Media was free to seek competitive bids and place work orders as it saw fit; and the agreements were terminable at will, alternatively for convenience.

Pepperall J also applied the Bates criteria as a sense-check and concluded that the Framework Agreements were not relational contracts and the criteria confirmed there was no basis for implying the duty of good faith in fact.

Finally, the Court held there was no basis for implying the term in law. These were not relational contracts and, in any event, proof of a relational contract does not give rise to a duty of good faith as a matter of law, “the touchstone remains necessity.”

The Court reached a similar conclusion in respect of the ESA and noted that, “it is inherently unlikely that duties of good faith should be implied into a carefully negotiated settlement agreement intended to bring to an end a troubled contractual relationship.”

Key takeaways

The judgment emphasises that the characterisation of a contract as relational will not be determinative as to whether a duty of good faith is implied. Applying orthodox principles governing the implication of terms, a party will need to satisfy the court that there is a gap in the terms of the contract and the implication of a duty of good faith is necessary to give efficacy to the contract. While parties to longer-term relationships may seek to argue for the implication of such a term, if their agreement comprehensively deals with their obligations and regulates their relationship, such an argument is unlikely to succeed. This decision therefore underscores that careful and detailed drafting can shield parties from the implication of additional obligations.

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