This article was first published in the July 2026 issue of Butterworths Journal of International Banking and Financial Law.
The UK Jurisdiction Taskforce (UKJT) has published its Report on Control of Digital Assets (the Report). The Report is an accessible but authoritative guide, bringing together legal and technical expertise. It will serve as a reference for judges and legal practitioners grappling with the future development of digital asset law.
Control is a key concept for digital assets following the entry into force of the Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025 (the Act). The Act enables the recognition of a “third category” of property that includes certain digital assets. The existing two categories are:
- “choses in possession”: things that can be possessed; and
- “choses in action”: legal rights that can be enforced in court.
English courts have long recognised that certain digital assets — in particular those created using distributed ledger technology (DLT) — may constitute property. But development of the law of digital assets was hampered by the rule that the existing two categories of property were exhaustive and the fact that neither category was appropriate for digital assets. The Act broke this logam by saying that these two categories are not exhaustive, so that digital assets may be placed into a new third category.
For choses in possession, the courts use the helpful concept of “possession” to act as intermediary between legal rules of property and physical facts about objects in the real world (choses in action, existing purely in the legal world, need no intermediary concept). For digital assets, instead of possession, control plays this intermediary role. Control is the concept that intermediates between the underlying nature of digital assets in the digital world and the legal rules of property that are developed in relation to them. That is why an understanding of both legal rules and underlying digital asset systems is necessary to develop ideas of control and why the Report is so valuable in supporting that understanding.
In its work on digital assets which recommended statutory reform that culminated in the Act, the Law Commission described this concept of control and recognised that further work would be needed to delineate its borders. The Law Commission recommended the establishment of a technical expert group to create a factual reference that would then be used by participants in the legal system to develop legal rules. This led to the establishment of the UKJT's Control Panel which has produced the Report.
There are two crucial pieces of background information against which the Report should be judged. First, in contrast to some other work of the UKJT, the remit of the Report is not to set out a statement of the law but to give practical explanatory guidance as to how legal principles can be applied as a matter of fact to complex and evolving technologies. That is, the Report does not contain all the answers — rather it allows courts and legal practitioners to frame the questions properly. Secondly, the Report addresses the concept of “control” as related to the Law Commission's reports on digital assets, not to be confused with other concepts of control such as, for instance, those relevant to rules on financial collateral or to the taking of security generally. Control here means specifically the factual relationship between a person and a digital asset that is analogous to the concept of possession for tangible assets. It is unfortunate that the word “control” is gradually being overloaded with related but distinct legal meanings, but it is probably too late now to pick a different word.
The Report approaches the technical aspects of control by concentrating on foundational concepts and giving examples, rather than attempting a comprehensive account of the vast body of knowledge underlying digital assets. It builds intuition by first considering physical objects and then traditional intangibles, such as a bank account. Superficially, knowing the password to an online bank account resembles control of a digital system. But, crucially, an account-holder deleting an account entry or even a bank changing its own entries in a digital ledger does not actually have any effect on the underlying debt. In contrast, control over a private key does give the owner genuine control, in that they can move the underlying digital asset, independently of any court decision, just as the person in possession of a tangible object can move it in the real world. Operation of a private key which directly interacts with the blockchain is much more complex than applying passwords to online bank accounts. The Report highlights this critical distinction, which has led astray courts in other jurisdictions.
The Report goes on to consider variations of control found in the digital asset ecosystem, including types of custody and shared control. Starting with variations of individual control, it describes mediation through software, hardware or an administrator. Numerous examples are given, even including a valiant attempt to explain asymmetric encryption through a simple analogy. Moving on to shared control, it explains multi-signature arrangements, protocol governance, key sharding and mediation of control through smart contracts. There is a more detailed analysis of smart contracts generally, introducing them as a new layer of control that can be used as an implementation of shared methods of control or that can act as a proxy enabling upgradeable DeFi arrangements. In line with the Report's focus on fact as opposed to law, smart contracts are seen purely as tools of automation rather than legal arrangements, although there is a reference to smart legal contracts.
When moving on to delegated control, the Report starts to deal with the thorniest factual scenarios. The operation of blockchain exchanges is set out, with the crucial observation that customer-exchange interactions may occur at a level completely removed from the underlying blockchain. This is also where different forms of custody are listed, including key transfer, key sharding and staking. Perhaps this is where the absence of legal analysis is most keenly felt: the rights and liabilities of exchanges and effective methods of custody and security are tricky legal issues in urgent need of clarification.
Layered control is given a separate description. This includes wrapped assets, bridges between blockchains and key guardians. In fact, many of the techniques described in the earlier chapters may be seen in terms of layering — it is a paradigm that is useful to analyse methods of control. At the fundamental level, there is always a blockchain operating according to asymmetric key infrastructure, but the layers built on top can transform this into different forms of control.
The Report ends with a description of privacy, dealing with ways to introduce concealment and ambiguity and concluding with a mention of quantum-based technology that seems fitting in its focus towards the future.
In setting out a comprehensive list of aspects of control, the Report frequently revisits the same techniques: smart contracts, for instance, are treated under governance, custody, multi-signature arrangements and in many other places as well as having their own section. Although there is a systematic approach in building up from direct blockchain control to the interposition of additional layers of indirection, concepts such as custody are relevant at many different levels. In this way, the structure of the Report is encyclopaedic rather than narrative — suitable as a reference and glossary for those puzzling through the intricacies of any particular set of circumstances.
Permissioned systems and variations of it, such as governed blockchains (permissionless blockchains with a fundamentally embedded smart contract acting as a “constitution” that acts as a gateway to all those dealing with that blockchain) are dealt with lightly — the focus is on the permissionless paradigm. In this, it reflects the complexities of the technology. But it is notable that this does not necessarily correspond to the centre of gravity of many implementations in the financial markets, where private permissioned blockchains are common.
The strength of the Report, and essential to appreciating its significance, is that it is not a legal opinion. It does not embark on exploration or suggestion as to the legal issues facing digital assets: how legal ownership is transferred, what proprietary remedies are available and so on. Rather, it is a technical reference, but one written by both legal and technical experts and accessible to all those interested in the digital asset ecosystem. Successful applications of the concept of control of digital assets will engage with fine details of complex fact-situations to fulfil its role as a sensitive interface with the underlying legal rules.
Attention will now turn to the concrete legal issues surrounding digital assets that still need clarification under English law. How to create a trust or security over digital assets, what remedies are available for involuntary alienation of digital assets and — perhaps most intractable — how to determine where a digital asset is located for conflicts of law purposes are some of the questions that need urgent answers.
The Report is exactly what is needed to explain this complex technology and promote an ongoing technically literate engagement. When used by legal practitioners and the courts, it will help steer the incremental development of the English common law of digital assets.