This article was co-authored with Suwen Fang.

Introduction

An important segment of the Australian renewable energy M&A market is the acquisition of and divestment of pre-Final Investment Decision (FID) projects, which is the sale of a project at the time where most of the project value remains at risk. This is driven by various factors; larger players seeking to scale pipelines, the increase in development costs and complexity resulting from (among other things) larger projects, and supply chain constraints that make it harder for smaller developers to carry projects to FID alone.

In most of these transactions, a material portion of the consideration is contingent and deferred – payable through milestone payments, disposal payments or earn-outs, reflecting that value is delivered progressively as milestones are achieved.

This generates a clear tension. A seller, having most consideration payable only after divestment, wants assurance that the purchaser will progress the project. A purchaser, bearing all development risk and cost, expects freedom to develop as it sees fit, including by changing design, timeline or strategy.

This tension is sharpened by asymmetry of scale. Where a smaller developer sells to a larger platform, trailing payments are often very material to the seller. Whereas the purchaser’s strategy will typically be evaluated on a portfolio basis, which may result in deprioritising a project in favour of other assets.

Inevitably, the question arises: to what extent should a purchaser be required, post-completion, to continue developing the project in a manner that preserves the seller’s economic interest?

The spectrum

Post-completion development obligations sit on a spectrum. At one end, a purchaser is bound by detailed, benchmarked objectives. At the other, there are no obligations, and a seller relies entirely on commercial alignment to incentivise development.

Between those poles, the market has settled on a range of positions balancing seller protection against purchaser flexibility. We set out below positions observed in the Australian market, from most prescriptive to least. Wider deal structures that shape development incentives are discussed in Part 4 below.

Description Practical application Purchaser flexibility Purchaser flexibility
1 Prescribed development to industry standard Purchaser must develop using commercially reasonable endeavours, measured against Good Industry Practice and specific milestones. Highest
A purchaser’s conduct is measured against an external industry benchmark.
Most Constrained
A purchaser is bound by an external standard and milestone targets.
2 Time-limited development obligation Purchaser must achieve specified milestones (or reach FID) within a defined period. If the longstop passes without achievement, consequences are triggered (eg acceleration of payments or termination of exclusivity). High
Operates as de facto development obligation for a purchaser even without an express one. The time constraint compels action.
Constrained
Purchaser retains discretion over how to develop but not whether or when. Must reach milestones or face consequences.
3 Good faith development toward sale or exit Purchaser must use reasonable endeavours, in good faith, to develop with the intention of achieving an exit or sale. Moderate
Development is tied to the prospect of an exit or sale occurring.
Constrained
A purchaser’s obligations are directed toward exit or sale but broader development discretion is retained.
4 Reasonable endeavours (qualified) Purchaser must use reasonable endeavours to progress development in good faith, qualified by development risks, cycle, maturity and economics. Often time-limited (typically aligned with the contingent consideration period). Moderate
Obligation exists but qualifications give a purchaser significant discretion.
Moderate
A purchaser can adjust approach but cannot deprioritise relative to comparable portfolio projects.
5 Handback obligation If the purchaser elects to abandon the project (or fails to meet a longstop), it must offer to return the project to the seller. Moderate
Seller recovers the development opportunity if the purchaser walks away.
Moderate
Provides a clean exit but at the cost of forfeiting the asset. A purchaser cannot hold and do nothing indefinitely.
6 Information rights only No binding development obligation. Purchaser provides periodic updates, expressly disclaimed as representations or warranties. Low
Seller has visibility only, with no contractual lever to compel development.
High
Purchaser has full discretion over development decisions.
7 No post-completion obligations No obligations regarding development. Complete purchaser autonomy. None
Protection is entirely economic, not contractual.
Maximum
Purchaser has complete autonomy over development, sale or abandonment.

Competing interests

Where the consideration is contingent on milestones being achieved, the seller has a direct financial interest in the purchaser progressing the project. However, from a purchaser's perspective, it is managing the inherent uncertainty of development including grid connection timelines, regulatory environment, offtake and procurement pricing, all of which may change materially between acquisition and FID. In this context, purchasers may consider that even relatively high level obligations to develop a project using ‘good faith’ or ‘reasonable endeavours’ impose too high a burden and limits their ability to act in their own commercial best interests.

Sellers also have practical concerns. For instance, they worry about deferral or abandonment of projects, particularly where a purchaser has a portfolio of projects, and there is risk that one project is advanced at the expense of another.

Less tangible, but often significant in driving insistence on substantive development obligations, are competitive and reputational interests. Sellers who are subject to a non-compete restraint can find themselves locked out of a market if the purchaser is not obliged to develop. Sellers may also have reputational interest in the project continuing, particularly where their name is associated with a project locally.

The role of deal structure

Post-completion development obligations are not the only mechanism addressing this tension. How the purchase price is structured, and protections around it, are often equally important.

Milestone payments and disposal payment sharing both tie the seller’s consideration to progress. Where payments are contingent on milestone achievement, a seller does not get paid unless the purchaser develops. Disposal sharing reinforces this; where a seller receives a percentage of net proceeds on any on-sale within a defined period, the purchaser is incentivised to maximise value before exit. In both cases, the structure aligns incentives without prescribing how to develop.

Sellers commonly seek post-completion controls on disposals and changes of control, including consent rights, pre-emptive rights, and restrictions on change of control of the project company or its holding entity. These serve a dual purpose: protecting the payment framework and ensuring counterparty risk does not change without consent.

Sellers may also negotiate credit protections in respect of milestone payment obligations, particularly where the purchaser is a special purpose vehicle or counterparty credit risk is a concern. These typically include parent company guarantees, bank guarantees, and change of control rights.

Credit enhancements can be complex in a sale context. Parent company guarantees need to be swapped out on a change of ownership, giving sellers leverage in negotiations. Security, such as charges over project assets, is less common but may be appropriate where the purchaser group is not sufficiently creditworthy.

These structures do not, however, address the risk of outright abandonment. Where the purchaser has acquired 100 per cent of the project company, a return mechanism can address this gap. If the purchaser abandons, it must offer to return the project to the seller for a nominal amount on an ‘as-is, where-is’ basis with no trailing liability. Some transactions make the return mandatory; others make it optional.

Other protections commonly sit alongside these structures, including information rights, restraint reciprocity, and arm’s-length on-sale requirements. These obligations, like development obligations themselves, should be time-limited, typically five years from completion. Once the contingent consideration window closes, the seller has no remaining economic interest to protect.

Conclusion

There is no single correct approach to post-completion development obligations. Where a transaction lands on the spectrum depends on the commercial context, risk appetites and the relative commercial strength and market position of the parties.

The positions and structures described above clearly illustrate that the transaction terms must work together. From a seller’s perspective, it can be hard to measure compliance with development obligations, making enforcement difficult. However, overly prescriptive obligations on purchasers can be difficult to negotiate and have the potential to strain the post-completion relationship.

The optimal deal structure is generally one that balances commercial interests. In our experience, this is best achieved by having sensible milestone payments that provide value to the seller while still incentivising development, combined with a handback mechanism that applies where the purchaser is genuinely unwilling to continue to develop, providing the purchaser with a clean exit.

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