Australia's data centre boom shows no sign of abating, and has prompted a stream of policy development and regulatory change from both Commonwealth and State Governments in response. This includes policy papers setting out Government expectations for organisations looking to operate, develop and invest in data centres across the country, and uplifts to key security frameworks in order to keep pace with rapidly evolving threat vectors.
Building on our recent article examining the Commonwealth Government's Expectations of data centres and AI infrastructure developers, this article discusses:
- Key State-level developments, including the NSW Government's Data Centre Consultation Paper (NSW Consultation Paper), released in March 2026, and Victoria's Sustainable Data Centre Action Plan (Victorian Action Plan), issued in January 2026 as part of the Victorian Government's AI Mission Statement; and
- Regulatory developments and policy pressures, from Australian data sovereignty considerations and national security concerns to environment & planning considerations (including water scarcity and waste management) and energy use and grid capability.
The message is clear: investment and growth is welcome, but not without guardrails.
NSW and Victorian guidance
We have set out below a high-level summary of the relevant NSW and Victorian papers as they relate to data centre investment:
| Paper | Description |
| NSW Consultation Paper |
The NSW Consultation Paper sets out a principles-based framework to guide the regulation and development of data centres across NSW. As the consultation process has now ended, the NSW Government is expected to issue a framework to facilitate data centre investment in NSW while managing risks for the community.
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| Victorian Action Plan |
The Victorian Action Plan was issued as a key initiative under the Victorian Government’s AI Mission Statement which sets out the Victorian Government’s plan to responsibly develop and adopt artificial intelligence. This includes a focus on attracting investment in data centres and digital infrastructure.
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Key policy drivers in respect of data centre investment in Australia
The Commonwealth Government’s and certain State Governments’ papers in respect of data centres include insights into key policy drivers as well as the challenges associated with encouraging investment in this area. We discuss below some of the legal and policy issues relevant to Australia’s current regulatory landscape. It is important to note that there will likely be movement in each of these areas, as Governments attempt to respond to rapidly evolving security, societal and environmental concerns.
Australian data sovereignty
Data sovereignty refers to the concept that data is subject to the laws and governance of the country in which it is collected, processed or stored.
As outlined in our recent article, the Commonwealth Government’s Expectations of data centres and AI infrastructure developers identifies data sovereignty as a core national interest concern, requiring data centre operators to “protect sensitive and personal data, prepare for threats and disruptions, and limit physical and digital access to their data centres to those with a right to it”.
The strategic importance of onshore data centres lies in ensuring that data stored in Australia is not subject to compulsion of disclosure to or by foreign Governments, and to ensure such data remains subject to the laws of Australia.
Australian data sovereignty also has particular relevance under Australian privacy law, including the following Australian Privacy Principles (APPs) under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth):
- APP 8 (Cross-border disclosure of personal information) requires an APP entity, before disclosing personal information to an overseas recipient, to take steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach the APPs in relation to that information.
To mitigate the time and expense associated with ensuring appropriate technical and contractual safeguards are put in place to ensure an overseas entity complies with the APPs, APP entities may instead engage with service providers with the capability to store and process personal information in Australian data centres. - APP 11 (Security of personal information) requires an APP entity to take such steps as are reasonable in the circumstances to protect the personal information it holds from misuse, interference and loss, as well as unauthorised access, modification or disclosure.
An APP entity is obliged to ensure the security of the personal information it controls, regardless of whether such information is provided to a third-party service provider. Onshore data sovereignty can be a practical way for an APP entity to strengthen its compliance posture under APP 11 by simplifying risk management and reducing cross border uncertainties.
Australian data sovereignty may also present benefits for APRA-regulated entities which may seek service providers with Australian data hosting and storage capability to mitigate the cost and effort associated with its obligation under CPS 230 (Operational Risk Management) to notify APRA before entering into material offshoring arrangements as required.
Hosting certification framework
The Hosting Certification Framework (HCF) is administered on a whole-of-government basis by the Minister for Cyber Security under the Home Affairs portfolio. It aims to protect sensitive government information by defining controls through which key matters such as ownership, management, operational aspects, and importantly supply chains for data centre providers and cloud service providers, can be assessed and certified. The HCF is a critical aspect of the Government’s policy approach to security and risk management frameworks for data centre providers and cloud service providers which handle sensitive Commonwealth data and information. It uses a standardised approach to ensure that government systems and information are managed securely and that appropriate risk management standards are deployed in respect of relevant hosting and infrastructure framework.
We understand that HCF certification at a facility level is becoming a strategic driver for deal flow, impacting both asset valuations and deal structures. Achieving ‘Strategic’ level certification unlocks access to a broader customer base, including stable Australian Government anchor tenancies and hyperscalers which on-provide hosting and cloud services to government agencies.
In response to the rapidly evolving cyber threat landscape, the HCF is being updated to implement stronger security standards for both new and existing providers. These reforms are based around identified stakeholder challenges with the existing HCF, and may include a simplified certification process, improved compliance and assurance and greater clarity around obligations.
Protective Security Policy Framework
The Protective Security Policy Framework (PSPF) sets out the key Australian Government security policies and prescribes what Australian Government entities are required to do to protect their people, information and resources.
In the context of data centres, the PSPF mandates where security classified information can be stored and hosted. Data centres that meet specific security zone requirements can attract a wider customer base, such as government customers and hyperscalers providing cloud services that host security classified information for government agencies.
FIRB considerations
The Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) is tasked with addressing risks to Australia’s national interest. FIRB approval has been a well-established hurdle for ‘foreign persons’ for some time now. In recent years however, foreign investment into and control over organisations and assets has been brought into sharp focus by technological change and a rapidly evolving threat landscape where foreign investment may be used as a vector for malicious activities. The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) (FATA) contains ‘national security interest’ considerations which sit alongside ‘national interest’ considerations. The FATA empowers the Treasurer to examine transactions on a ‘call in’ basis and respond to any national security concerns by imposing new conditions, varying existing conditions, or even requiring the divestment of previously approved investment.
The national security interest test requires the mandatory notification of certain proposed investment in areas including the acquisition of national security land and proposals to start a national security business. These transactions are generally notifiable at any monetary threshold where a ‘direct’ interest is acquired by a foreign person. Critical data and processing assets, which commonly include data centres (and certain related activities) are often caught. The FIRB assessment process for national security businesses is often more thorough than a standard application, with longer processing times for applications. It is not unusual for conditions to be imposed by FIRB in connection with any approval.
Relevantly for data centre operators, it is not just the act of data storage itself which is important, but also the nature of the data to be stored within the data centre. For example, a foreign person wishing to acquire an interest in a data centre operator which stores data classified above the ‘Protected’ level would likely be required to seek FIRB approval of the proposed acquisition on the basis that the business is a national security business. This implements a new layer of due diligence in such transactions for both buyers and sellers.
ACCC considerations
In addition to FIRB approval, the new mandatory merger control regime must also be considered by potential tenants of data centre sites. This is because the acquisition of an interest in land (which extends to data centre leases and licences) can trigger the need for an Australian Competition and Consumer Commission filing due to the large transaction value of many data centre deals. If notifiable, the transaction cannot close without an ACCC waiver or approval.
Security of Critical Infrastructure
In parallel to the changes to FIRB approvals in recent years, the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Cth) (SOCI Act) has also undergone changes prompted by increased regulatory attention to the relationship between critical infrastructure assets and data storage and processing.
A key element of these changes has been to expand the scope of data storage systems classified as part of a ‘critical infrastructure asset’, which now includes systems:
- Where business critical data is stored, or processed;
- Which are used in connection with the corresponding critical infrastructure asset and where material impacts on the data storage system could have a relevant impact on the asset; and
- Where the responsible entity for the critical infrastructure asset owns or operates the data storage system.
Unless the asset is certified at the ‘Strategic’ level under the HCF, such systems are required to be included in a Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Plan (CIRMP) prepared by the responsible entity for the asset (generally, the operator of the asset).
The SOCI Act enables the Government to compel a responsible entity to vary its CIRMP to address ‘serious deficiencies’ (i.e. which pose a material risk to national security, the defence of Australia, or Australia’s social or economic stability).
It also provides for enhanced cyber security obligations where a data storage or processing asset has been designated as a ‘system of national significance’ (including obligations to develop incident response plans, conduct cyber security exercises, vulnerability assessments and ongoing threat monitoring).
Despite these recent changes, a 2026 Independent Review of the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Independent Review) conducted on behalf of the Department of Home Affairs highlighted the need for further amendments to the SOCI Act to remove complexity while becoming more responsive to evolving threats. Some of the perceived gaps under the current Act which were highlighted for redress included:
- AI and quantum risks (including AI enabled attacks and offshore AI dependencies);
- Physical threat vectors, including drones and space-based service dependencies;
- A greater focus on physical security, personnel security, and an all-hazards approach to supply chain resilience; and
- A greater focus on foreign ownership, control or influence risks generally, while noting that foreign ownership risks are predominantly managed through the FATA.
In response to the Independent Review, the Government has announced proposed measures to enhance the Ministerial Directions Powers in Part 3 of the SOCI Act, including:
- Improving clarity, operability and efficiency of the existing framework to provide for more timely Ministerial directions;
- Establishing a dedicated conditions power through which Government can impose specific ongoing controls on reporting entities where existing controls are not sufficient to manage identified national security concerns;
- Implementing a vendor-risk direction power through which Government can impose restrictions on the use of high-risk vendors, products or services which represent a material risk to national security;
- Implementing a new power to temporarily delay continuous disclosure requirements to prevent broader harm, for example where disclosure of a cyber security incident would threaten Australia’s national security or public safety; and
- Increasing civil penalties for non-compliance with a Ministerial direction from 250 penalty units to 2,000 penalty units, commensurate with the existing penalties for carriers and carriage service providers
Please see the Public Consultation Paper - SOCI Act Ministerial Directions Reforms for further detail.
Environment and planning
Another significant part of the conversation on Australia’s policy settings for data centres is converging around common themes in planning approvals, sustainable water use and cumulative impacts.
As the data centre build-out continues at speed in metropolitan centres of NSW, Victoria and Queensland, each State is likely to adopt distinct tools in response.
Approvals
According to a University of Sydney, Submission to the NSW Legislative Council Public Works and Accountability Committee: Inquiry into Data Centres, 27 March 2026, NSW channels most data proposals through the State Significant Development pathway assessed against data‑storage-specific Secretary’s Environmental Assessment Requirements that have increasingly required deeper analysis of cooling options, air quality, noise and urban heat.
Victoria is aiming to streamline data centre development through its Development Facilitation Program, Industrial Land Gateway Service and 10‑year industrial land plan, complemented by initiatives led by Invest Victoria and an Investment Coordinator‑General.
Queensland has not released a statewide policy, but South East Queensland’s Digital Plan foreshadows a regional SEQ Data Centre Strategy to identify precincts with suitable land, energy and water services.
Water scarcity
Water is emerging as a defining constraint which must be proactively addressed by data centre developers. Data centres are large water users and require high levels of water reliability, including at peak usage times.
Forecasts for future demand from the sector are likely to cause regulators to guide industry towards recycled or non potable sources and performance based design choices for water usage.
According to Water Services Association of Australia, Data Centres and Water in Australia, December 2025, enquiries to Australian water utilities have included proponents seeking up to 40 million litres per day (20 times the largest customer or equivalent to 70-80,000 households) and estimates of total water demand from data centre development in Sydney range from 1.9 percent of all supply by 2030 to 15-30 percent of the city’s supply by 2035.
NSW’s Data Centre Consultation Paper and Victoria’s Sustainable Data Centre Action Plan both steer proponents toward sites where water can support growth sustainably, including use of recycled water where feasible.
Data centre siting considerations and cumulative impacts
The growth of data centre development in metropolitan centres is also a source of potential land use conflicts with other uses of industrial-zoned land and nearby sensitive land uses.
The siting of data centres in industrial precincts will need to be determined with regard to factors such as:
- Compatibility with other nearby forms of industrial development that also have strategic economic importance;
- Proximity to high-capacity power, substations and fibre routes;
- Proximity to sensitive residential areas given acoustic emissions; and
- Site constraints related to heavy floor loads, ceiling heights and space for external equipment.
The assessment of cumulative impacts from data centre development is another consideration to be addressed by developers and local and State planning, environmental and water authorities. Where multiple data centres are clustered in the same precinct, noise from cooling systems, diesel testing and heat rejection can compound. This gives rise to potential environmental risks that may need to be considered holistically rather than on a project-by-project basis. Appropriate management of potential environmental impacts is also a key consideration in obtaining and maintaining social licence for such proposals.
Energy use and grid capability
Electricity is increasingly a determining factor for the location and economics of data centre development. Access to high capacity grid power, complemented by on-site generation (traditionally diesel, but increasingly storage and solar) is a non-negotiable for data centres.
Power network operators are keen to accommodate data centres due to the long-term revenue that flows from those connections. At the same time, however, those networks have universal obligations to keep the lights on for all system users under a (mostly) regulated revenue model.
The Australian regulatory and policy landscape is currently in a state of flux in response to the unquenchable demand for power raised by data centre growth. While on the one hand data centres are great pioneer energy users that can underpin the build out of the grid for the benefit of a broader group of users, data centres are also contributing to grid constraints and can create system risk. The Australian Energy Market Operator is looking at new technical operating requirements for data centres, while economic regulators and network companies are considering whether there might be a more optimal approach to cost contributions for system augmentations and upgrades.
In addition to power delivery, is the ensuing negotiation of power offtake. Data centres (and their tenants) are increasingly exploring sophisticated power procurement arrangements, inclusive of renewable power matching and direct hedge participation.
Conclusion
Australia’s data centre sector sits at the intersection of significant economic opportunity and complex regulatory challenge. As Commonwealth and State Governments have made clear, investment is welcome — but the policy landscape demands that developers, operators and investors engage proactively with an evolving set of expectations spanning national security, data sovereignty, environmental sustainability and energy system resilience.
The NSW and Victorian proposals for data centre investment reflect a recognition that data centre growth must be coordinated with broader infrastructure planning, community expectations and environmental constraints. At the Commonwealth level, the interplay between various reforms, including the proposed SOCI Act reforms, FIRB’s national security lens and the new mandatory merger control regime, create a multi-layered compliance environment that participants must navigate.
Looking ahead, each of these regulatory settings is likely to continue to evolve as Governments respond to emerging threats (including AI-enabled cyber risks and quantum vulnerabilities) and constraints around water scarcity and grid capacity intensify. For investors and operators, early engagement with these frameworks, careful site selection and a willingness to meet heightened transparency and sustainability expectations will be critical to securing approvals and maintaining social licence in what remains one of the most attractive data centre markets in the Asia-Pacific region.