Summary
- Australia’s new merger regime became mandatory on 1 January 2026. The new regime involves mandatory pre-notification of acquisitions and is complex. Notification risks were exacerbated by automatic voiding of acquisitions if notification to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) was required but missed. The regime unintentionally captured some acquisitions of minority interests.
- On 15 September 2026, the Treasury Laws Amendment (Strengthening Accountability for Tax Adviser Misconduct and Other Measures) Act 2026 (Amending Act) was enacted into law. The Amending Act amends Australia’s new merger regime by partially removing automatic voiding and making important refinements to the control test. These reforms materially de-risk merger notification in Australia.
- Going forward, an acquisition is no longer void simply because notification was missed. Instead, the ACCC must apply to the Federal Court to declare any such acquisition void. However, acquisitions are still automatically void if implemented while a statutory stay (or ‘standstill’) applies, meaning any ‘gun jumping’ after ACCC notification can still automatically void an acquisition.
- The amendments are not retrospective. Any acquisitions completed between 1 January 2026 and 15 September 2026 that were not notified to the ACCC when they should have been are still automatically void. Future transactional due diligence will need to screen for the risk of automatic voiding for acquisitions completed in this period as parties may not be aware that their acquisition became void.
- Two further amendments have also occurred. The rules for when a minority investment amounts to control have been narrowed, so that some acquisitions previously notified on a precautionary basis may now fall outside notification requirements. The ACCC will also be able to extend the 12-month window for completing an approved deal.
Key concerns leading to the changes
Australia’s new merger regime under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) commenced from 1 July 2025 and became mandatory from 1 January 2026. The new regime significantly amended Australia’s approach to the review of acquisitions by the ACCC, including a requirement for mandatory notification of acquisitions exceeding various thresholds irrespective of competition effects. Please see our previous client updates.
The new merger regime is complex with many nuances and some ambiguities. Some of these have now been resolved by amendments to the merger notification requirements as well as explanatory ACCC guidance. However, a key concern has involved an acquisition being deemed automatically void if it should have been notified to the ACCC but was not (“non-notified acquisitions”).
Automatic voiding has been widely regarded as the ‘number one’ concern with the new merger regime since its enactment, given it has necessarily required notifying parties to take a highly conservative approach to notification. This risk has resulted in parties erring towards ACCC notification if there was any doubt at all, thereby inflating the number of notifications. The new approach now brings Australia closer to the approach taken in many other comparable mandatory merger regimes.
A further concern has been the breadth of the regime as to whether notification to the ACCC is required where a party acquires a minority interest but enters into shareholders agreements and other documentation that could deem joint control to exist. Given drafting ambiguities, parties again adopted a conservative approach and have notified such acquisitions to the ACCC where there was doubt. These issues have arguably resulted in excessive ACCC notifications for acquisitions raising no material competition concerns.
In October 2025, the Government announced key refinements to the merger control regime including adjustments to the automatic voiding provisions and wider exemptions for low-risk business activities. The Amending Act now gives effect to some of those announcements and makes what is described as “critical changes to the merger primary law framework".
Automatic voiding is partly removed, but risks remain
Australia’s new merger regime has now been amended to remove automatic voiding for non-notified acquisitions that are “put into effect” after 15 September 2026. After that date, a non-notified acquisition is no longer automatically deemed void simply because notification to the ACCC should have occurred, but was missed. This amendment is welcome and aligns Australia’s approach to the approach taken in many other comparable mandatory merger regimes around the world.
Instead, the ACCC must apply to the Federal Court to declare any such acquisition void. The Court must declare the acquisition void unless it considers it undesirable to do so, such as if to do so would cause significant harm to innocent third parties. This is known as a ‘court-supervised voiding model’, as an alternative to the previous automatic voiding. Non-notified acquisitions can also still attract civil and pecuniary penalties of up to the greatest of AUD100 million, three times the benefit obtained, and 30 per cent of adjusted Australian turnover.
Unfortunately, automatic voiding is not removed entirely. Automatic voiding continues for acquisitions that have been notified to the ACCC, and the parties have put into effect the acquisition while a statutory stay (also known as a ‘standstill’) remains in force. This still creates a serious risk for parties in the context of potential ‘gun jumping’ and is examined in more detail below. In an Australian context, ‘gun jumping’ refers to parties proceeding to implement an acquisition prematurely before it has received an ACCC clearance.
Automatic voiding also still applies if an acquisition has historically been notified to the ACCC and received an ACCC clearance, but the parties have delayed the acquisition such that the 12 months period for the ACCC clearance has lapsed. The lapse of an ACCC approval is colloquially known as the ACCC determination becoming ‘stale’. However, the Amending Act now creates a mechanism to seek a formal extension of that 12 months period.
A further risk is that the removal of automatic voiding for non-notified acquisitions is not retrospective. Any non-notified acquisitions completed between 1 January 2026 and 15 September 2026 that were not notified to the ACCC, when they should have been, are still automatically void (and were deemed automatically void from the date they were first put into effect). Future transactional due diligence will need to screen for the risk of automatic voiding for non-notified acquisitions completed in this period, particularly as parties may not even be aware that their acquisition became void.
Given these amendments, three key risks should be factored into transactional activity in Australia going forward.
Risk one: Due diligence for Voided Cohort
Risks arise in relation to any non-notified acquisitions that were put into effect, or purported to be put into effect, between 1 January 2026 and 15 September 2026, that should have been notified to the ACCC under the new merger regime but were not. We colloquially refer to these as the “Voided Cohort”, noting they only comprise those non-notified acquisitions put into effect during that period that were not notified to the ACCC but should have been.
The Voided Cohort remains governed by the original formulation of the merger regime. Under that formulation, a non-notified acquisition that was put into effect without ACCC clearance was deemed automatically void. Government has not implemented a retrospective fix for the Voided Cohort, so all such non-notified acquisitions remain void.
Parties may not even realise that their non-notified acquisition has become void. The complexity and expansive scope of the merger regime mean that this is a real issue - there will be some acquisitions that should have been notified to the ACCC in that period that were not. In practice, this issue is likely to be encountered rarely, but the consequences of voiding are so severe this risk cannot be dismissed. This means that the Voided Cohort will need to become the subject of transactional due diligence in Australia going forward.
Specifically, Australian M&A due diligence checklists (both vendor and acquirer due diligence) will need to include a new standing question.
“For every acquisition completed by the target group between 1 January 2026 and 15 September 2026 was the acquisition required to be notified to the ACCC? If so, was it notified?”
Where the answer is uncertain or deemed voiding is identified, further consideration may be required.
Unlike many regulatory risks, this voiding issue cannot be solved by future compliance. If an acquisition has already been voided, the consequences can be extraordinarily complex, including potential exposure to large pecuniary penalties and flow-on consequences for legal title and subsequent transactions. Legal advice should be sought.
Where an acquisition has been automatically voided, the CCA does allow the Federal Court to make orders addressing the consequences of the voiding. Applications for those orders are subject to a six-year time limit for the Voided Cohort.
Risk two: Premature implementation while before ACCC
A second risk arises in relation to acquisitions that are notified to the ACCC, but that are subject to 'gun jumping' during the period that they are being considered by the ACCC. Specifically, the parties ‘put into effect’ the acquisition before the ACCC has provided a formal regulatory clearance that the acquisition may occur.
An acquisition is still automatically void if implemented while a statutory stay (or ‘standstill’) applies, meaning any ‘gun jumping’ after ACCC notification can still automatically void an entire acquisition. Again, the parties may not necessarily be aware of the gun-jumping or the resulting automatic voiding, creating potentially serious legal complications and risks.
The concept of ‘put into effect’ does not necessarily mean completion. In determining whether an acquisition has been ‘put into effect’, regard is had to the practical circumstances of each matter. Examples of ‘putting into effect’ that are specified in the Explanatory Memorandum include terminating the employment of key employees, closing key facilities, and integrating IT systems.
To avoid an acquisition being put into effect, the conventional approach is to include a condition precedent in the Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA), Share Sale Agreement (SSA) or relevant transaction document(s). The condition precedent is intended to trigger a statutory ‘safe harbour’ in section 51ABL of the CCA in which an acquisition does not become binding until the condition is met.
However, the concept of ‘putting into effect’ is not necessarily confined to the mechanics of the acquisition documents. It is entirely possible that employees could take steps outside contract that may amount to ‘putting into effect’ an acquisition. For this reason, it is important that parties engaging in acquisitions in Australia ensure that employees with knowledge of an acquisition are aware of the ‘gun jumping’ risks, ideally by ensuring appropriate protocols are in place.
Risk three: The 14 days post-clearance trap
One of the least intuitive features of the new merger regime unfortunately survives the reform. As currently drafted, once the acquirer receives an ACCC determination to provide a clearance, it must wait 14 calendar days after the date that “the statement of the Commission’s reasons for making the determination is included on the acquisitions register” (“14 Days After Publication”). Only after the expiry of 14 Days After Publication is the acquisition treated as ‘finally considered’ by the ACCC.
This 14 Days After Publication waiting period does not apply to ACCC waivers, but does apply to all notifications that have been made under the ACCC’s Phase 1 merger review process (including Phase 2 reviews and public benefit determinations). The period is intended to allow sufficient time for interested parties (e.g., so-called ‘spoiling parties’) to appeal the ACCC’s decision to the Australian Competition Tribunal. After the 14 Days After Publication period has passed, a manual check with Tribunal is required to confirm no such appeal has been lodged.
This 14 Days After Publication waiting period is a consequence of nuanced drafting, and so it is not self-evident in the CCA, but it has been explained in the ACCC’s associated guidance. The ACCC also now states, when advising the acquirer of a clearance decision, that the acquirer must wait 14 Days After Publication before it can put into effect the acquisition. As such, the issue should hopefully be evident to parties at the time.
However, if an acquisition is put into effect during the 14 Days After Publication waiting period, the acquisition will be deemed automatically void even though the ACCC has cleared it. In essence, the way the CCA is drafted is that this is still ‘gun jumping’ and so the same consequences arise as set out in Risk Two above.
As such, it is important that employees are informed that an ACCC clearance announced in public is not a green light to proceed with any steps involving ‘putting into effect’ the acquisition. Rather, the parties must still wait for the requirements of the condition precedent in the acquisition documents to be met. The condition precedent must be drafted in such a way that it picks up the concept of ‘finally considered’ in the CCA, and so accounts for the 14 Days After Publication.
Important further amendments to the control test
Under the Australian merger regime, one of the criteria for notification of acquisitions of shares, units in a unit trust, or interests in managed investment schemes, is that the acquirer must obtain control of the target via the acquisition. Necessarily, this requires that no control existed before the acquisition, but control existed after the acquisition. Such acquisitions, if they do not result in control, are not required to be notified to the ACCC, subject to the crossing voting thresholds mentioned below.
Satisfaction of the requirement for obtaining control is not determinative of a requirement to notify the ACCC, as the other requirements for notification must still be met, such as the monetary thresholds and a connection to Australia.
Further nuances were introduced from 1 April 2026 as a result of which the control test was satisfied merely because the acquirer crossed 20 per cent or 50 per cent voting thresholds. The amendments introduced by the Amending Act do not affect the requirement to notify as a result of crossing the voting thresholds, and are more relevant to screening for any requirement to notify where the 20 per cent and 50 per cent voting thresholds are not otherwise crossed.
To explain further, the concept of ‘control’ was originally defined expansively to refer to section 50AA of the Corporations Act, hence the capacity of one entity to determine the outcome of decisions about another entity’s financial and operating policies. In applying this section, the practical influence must be considered as well as any practice or pattern of behaviour.
While the original version of section 50AA contained in the Corporations Act excludes joint control, the CCA modified this by enabling control to be imputed from joint control arising with ‘associates’. The definition of an 'associate’ was expansive, resulting in requirements for notification arising in unusual scenarios. For example, a person acquiring a minority interest (say 1 per cent) could, at least on one interpretation, have been deemed to have joint control with an associate (and therefore ‘control’ under the CCA) if they entered into certain types of shareholders agreements.
The intent of the current reforms is to reduce the unintended consequences of deemed joint control by providing greater granularity as to when notification to the ACCC is required. The reforms achieve this by continuing to use a modified version of “control” as defined in section 50AA of the Corporations Act, but narrowing the definition of the concept of an ‘associate’ in the context of joint control. The amendments, in practical effect, screen out many instances where entities become associates by entering into an agreement, but where the agreement contains provisions that by their nature do not usually confer joint control.
Following the amendments, a person will not be treated as an associate “merely because” they are a party to an agreement which contains various specified matters, such as minority shareholder protection rights, dividend-policy agreements, arms-length financing arrangements, rights to dispose of securities, and professional advisory relationships. The Minister may adjust these categories by legislative instrument subject to disallowance and sunsetting.
Three points are important:
- First, the drafting of the legislation is complex, nuanced and prescriptive. Care will be required to ensure that all nuances of the drafting have been considered, including some key interpretative issues. Some judgement may be required in applying the law to the facts.
- Second, the carve-outs apply only on a ‘merely because’ basis. Standard shareholder rights do not prevent parties from becoming associates where the surrounding factual conduct points to other negating considerations.
- Third, the crossing voting power thresholds that deem control remain unchanged and continue to operate independently of the control test. In essence, if the 20 per cent or 50 per cent voting thresholds are passed, this is determinative of control and hence the more granular analysis becomes superfluous
The net effect of the amendments is to bring the Australian position closer to the treatment of joint control under the European Union merger regime, in which control turns on the possibility of exercising decisive influence over strategic decisions. Under the EU merger regime, rights of the kind normally accorded to minority shareholders to protect their financial interests do not, without more, confer control.
The practical consequence is that minority investment structures will still need to be carefully considered where an issue arises as to control, but there may be greater scope to avoid notification on the particular facts. Some acquisitions that have been notified on a precautionary basis may no longer require notification under the new drafting, although that assessment will continue to depend on the rights and conduct of the investors involved.
Extensions to the 12 months window for completion
The Amending Act introduces a further practical improvement. An ACCC clearance expires if the acquisition has not been put into effect within 12 months. If the parties proceeded with the acquisition after this period, the acquisition would be deemed automatically void even though the ACCC may have provided a clearance for it.
The reforms now allow the ACCC to extend the 12 months completion window by up to six months at a time, with no statutory limit on the number of extensions. In doing so, the ACCC must have regard to the reasons for the delay, any material change in market circumstances, and whether re-notification would be more appropriate.
For acquisitions delayed by other regulatory approvals or other reasons, the amendments provide greater flexibility and avoid the need for the parties to re-notify an acquisition after 12 months, if the ACCC grants the extension. This mechanism will be useful for acquisitions involving unexpected delays that may push out completion timetables beyond 12 months.
Practical recommendations
The enactment of the Amending Act is welcome, but we make the following recommendations:
- Update due diligence checklists: Any transactional due diligence in Australia going forward will need to screen for the Voided Cohort. The consequences of non-notified acquisitions having become automatically void between 1 January 2026 and 15 September 2026 are severe and remain.
- Beware the 14 Days After Publication requirement: Do not treat notification or publication by the ACCC of a regulatory clearance as permission to complete. Ensure that the transaction team and any employees in a position to put an acquisition into effect are aware of the need to wait 14 Days After Publication. Premature action faces a serious automatic voiding risk.
- Ensure that conditions precedent include the 14 Days After Publication requirement: Ensure that conditions precedent in transaction documents are carefully drafted so as to refer to the concept of ‘finally considered’, thereby incorporating the 14 Days After Publication requirement. If a condition precedent is badly drafted so that if the acquisition completes before the end of the 14 Days After Publication, then the acquisition may be deemed automatically void.
- Ensure competition protocols are in place: Any steps taken to put into effect an acquisition while it is before the ACCC create a serious voiding risk. An appropriate way to manage this ‘gun jumping’ risk is by implementing employee education and appropriate protocols.
- Consider minority and co-investment structures under the new rules: While the new rules are complex, they may avoid the need to notify acquisitions involving minority interests on a precautionary basis. Careful and granular analysis will be required.
In summary, the amendments moderate one of the merger regime's harshest consequences, but some important risks remain.