The UK introduced a new more extensive national security regime in 2022 when the National Security and Investment Act 2021 (NSI Act) came into force on January 4, 2022. This replaced the UK’s previous national security regime under which “relevant merger situations” subject to competition review by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) could also be reviewed for national security concerns.

A much greater number of transactions are being reviewed for national security concerns under the NSI Act regime given this captures a broader range of types of transactions than the previous regime, and introduced a new mandatory notification requirement for certain transactions. Relevant transactions that completed on or after November 12, 2020 can also be called in for a retrospective review.

NSI Act regime

Under the NSI Act, certain acquisitions of entities active in specified “sensitive” sectors require mandatory notification and clearance before being implemented. There are currently 17 such sectors, but this is expected to increase to 19 after planned reforms (see here for more on the reforms). Other types of transactions (including acquisitions of assets and IP) are subject to voluntary notification and can be called in for review if not notified. The Investment Security Unit (ISU) operates the regime, although the relevant Secretary of State is the ultimate decision-maker as to whether a transaction raises substantive concerns.1

Reflecting the wide breadth, transactions are caught regardless of the nationality of the acquirer or their ultimate owner (so even entirely UK transactions can require a review), indirect as well as direct acquisitions can be in scope if there is a relevant “trigger event” (see below), and relatively limited UK nexus is required. Intra-group arrangements can also be reviewed, although there are plans to exempt at least some types of internal reorganisations from the mandatory notification requirements.

Notification requirements

Mandatory notification is required for certain “trigger events” – the acquisition of more than 25 percent, more than 50 percent, or 75 percent or more of shares or voting rights in a qualifying entity active in any of the specified mandatory sectors, or the acquisition of voting rights enabling or preventing the passage of any class of resolution governing the affairs of such an entity. The mandatory sectors include a significant focus on technology and innovation (e.g. advanced robotics and quantum technologies), as well as obvious sectors such as defence, energy and transport.

Acquisitions of the above shareholdings or voting rights may be voluntarily notified if the qualifying entity is not active in one of the mandatory sectors. Other trigger events subject to voluntary notification are the acquisition of material influence over a qualifying entity (regardless of the sector in which it is active) or the acquisition of a right or interest in, or in relation to, a qualifying asset (e.g. land, ideas, IP, algorithms) providing the ability to use or control the asset (either entirely or to a greater extent). Transactions within the voluntary notification regime can be called in for review even if not notified, although certain time limits apply (see below). Parties may choose to voluntarily notify where they consider there is a degree of sensitivity, and to benefit from the legal certainty of an approval.

Review procedures

Notified transactions are subject to an initial assessment lasting up to 30 working days, and then either cleared unconditionally or called in for a full national security assessment. A full assessment takes another 30 working days, extendable by a further 45 working days and any additional period the parties agree. Transactions not notified but nonetheless called in for review proceed straight to a full assessment.

Problematic transactions may be subject to conditions, or blocked as a last resort. The substantive assessment focuses on three risk factors: (a) “target risk” (whether use of the target entity or asset may pose a risk to national security); (b) “acquirer risk” (whether the acquirer’s characteristics suggest a risk to national security from them having control of the target); and (c) “control risk” (whether the amount of control being acquired creates a risk to national security). Guidance on how these risk factors are considered is set out in the “section 3 statement” – the Secretary of State’s statement about exercise of the call-in power.

There are also significant sanctions for noncompliance with the regime, including turnover-based fines and criminal liability. Transactions that require mandatory notification and are completed without approval are automatically void (although it is possible to apply for retrospective validation), and the acquirer commits an offence (absent reasonable excuse).

Retrospective call-in

Although the NSI Act regime began on January 4, 2022, trigger events between November 12, 2020 (the day after the Bill was published which became the NSI Act) and January 3, 2022 may be called in for review. However, any remaining risk of call-in for such trigger events expires in early 2027.

For trigger events that take place after January 4, 2022 and are not notified, the deadline for call-in is six months from when the Secretary of State becomes aware of the trigger event. If the trigger event is within the voluntary notification regime, any such call-in is also subject to a final deadline of five years from when the trigger event occurred. However, the five-year deadline does not apply if a mandatory notification was required.

Other public interest or special reviews

The UK’s previous national security regime was set out in the Enterprise Act 2002 (which also sets out the UK’s competition-based merger control regime), under which fewer than 20 transactions were reviewed or notified for review on national security grounds. Five of those reviews started in 2021, indicating the increased sensitivity in this area (as evidenced by the new regime), despite historically low levels of reviews.

Although the previous national security provisions have now been removed from the Enterprise Act, reviews on other “public interest” (media plurality, financial stability or capability to combat or mitigate public health emergencies2) or “special public interest” (certain transactions in the newspaper or broadcasting sectors) grounds remain possible under the UK merger control regime set out in the Enterprise Act. In public interest cases, the CMA conducts the review and is responsible for the competition assessment, but the relevant Secretary of State decides whether the public interest factors require an in-depth (Phase 2) review and/or remedies. Special public interest cases are similar but there is no competition assessment.

There are also special UK regimes for water mergers and mergers between certain types of energy network providers. In addition, qualifying transactions by large tech firms (or their groups) designated with “Strategic Market Status” in respect of one or more digital activities under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (DMCC Act) are subject to mandatory merger reporting, and the DMCC Act also introduced a new prohibition on foreign powers acquiring control or influence over newspaper enterprises.

Comment

The NSI Act regime gives the UK Government much greater visibility over transactions raising potential concerns than the UK’s previous national security regime. BEIS predicted that around 1,000 to 1,830 transactions would be notified each year, which has proven accurate so far with the most recent data showing that 1,324 notifications were submitted during the period April 1, 2025 to March 31, 2026 (a 15 percent increase on the same period in 2024-25, and 46 percent more than 2023-24 – see here for more on the latest data and trends). The vast majority of reviews have raised no concerns at all, but will have provided the UK Government with a wealth of data on transactions across industries.

That said, the new standalone regime is showing itself to be more interventionist than had been the case under the previous national security regime. More than 50 transactions have required remedies during the first five years of the regime (most cleared with conditions, but some – less than ten – have been prohibited). As such, the new regime may deter some buyers from investing in sensitive sectors in the UK.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    The Secretary of State is the ultimate decision-maker on any NSI Act review, although the ISU operates the regime on a day-to-day basis. The ISU was originally within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Business Secretary was the relevant Secretary of State. However, the ISU moved to the Cabinet Office in 2023 and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster became the Secretary of State for the regime (when BEIS was split into several different departments). In July 2026, it was announced that the ISU would move to the new Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade (BIST), making the Business Secretary again the relevant Secretary of State.

  2. 2

    The UK’s ability to combat or mitigate a public health emergency was added as a public interest ground at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic – reflecting the UK Government’s concern that its ability to deal with a public health emergency may be undermined if businesses with critical capabilities become subject to foreign control. Examples included vaccine research companies, personal protective equipment manufacturers, internet service providers and food supply chain companies.

card-grid-item, aem-sourced
Global rules on foreign direct investment
/content/nrf-eds/en/insights/publications/2024/07/global-rules-on-foreign-direct-investment

Contact