This article was co-authored with Shaun Buckton.
On 5 March 2026, Justice Lee of the Federal Court of Australia handed down the decision in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bekier (Liability Judgment) [2026] FCA 196 (ASIC v Bekier & Ors). This is a landmark case run by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) alleging breach of duty by the CEO, the General Counsel, the CFO, the Chief Casino Officer as well as the chair of the Board and all non-executive directors of Star Entertainment Group Limited (Star). Star is an ASX listed company that manages gaming properties across Australia, most notably Star Casino in Sydney.
ASIC alleged that the defendants failed to exercise care and diligence under section 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) in response to serious legal and reputational risks posed by Star’s continued dealings with junket organisations allegedly engaged in money laundering activities.1 The allegations against the CEO, CFO and General Counsel also related to Star sending misleading correspondence to its principal banker, National Australia Bank Ltd (NAB).
The decision in ASIC v Bekier & Ors has significant implications for the scope of directors’ duties under the Corporations Act, particularly as they relate to the duties of the CEO, General Counsel and non-executive directors.
Norton Rose Fulbright acted for ASIC in these proceedings, and, in this article, we share our insights into the key learnings that can be derived from this decision.
Summary of the findings
His Honour Justice Lee made the following findings:
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The CEO contravened his duty under section 180(1) on four separate occasions. The CEO contravened the Corporations Act by:
- Failing to inform the Board of key matters, including serious deficiencies in Star’s processes for assessing the probity of junket organisations and evidence of potential money laundering activity occurring within Star Sydney casino.
- Failing to take adequate steps to find out more information concerning misleading correspondence sent by Star to the NAB.
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The General Counsel contravened her duty under section 180(1) on three separate occasions. The General Counsel contravened the Corporations Act by failing to inform the CEO and the Board of:
- Her knowledge of potential money laundering activities occurring within Star’s Sydney casino.
- The potential criminal links of junket organisations with whom Star dealt.
- Misleading correspondence sent to the NAB.
Prior to judgment, ASIC had already settled its case against the CFO and Chief Casino Officer. The Chief Casino Officer was ordered to pay a penalty of $180,000 and was disqualified from managing corporations for a period of 18 months. The CFO was ordered to pay a penalty of $60,000 and was disqualified for a period of nine months.
No contraventions were established against the non-executive directors. However, his Honour did critique the conduct of the Board, which is discussed in detail below.
Key learnings and takeaways
While the factual circumstances which gave rise to ASIC’s case against the directors and officers of Star are unique, there are important takeaways that emerge from the Federal Court’s decision.
Lessons for Chief Executive Officers
His Honour’s findings against the CEO can be grouped into three categories.
Inform the Board
The first and most significant observation is that CEOs are under an ongoing duty to raise matters that pose a serious risk to their company with the Board for detailed consideration. This duty cannot be delegated entirely.
Three of the four contraventions against the CEO were found on the basis that the CEO failed to properly inform and make recommendations to the Board concerning key matters (see the high-level description of these matters under ‘Summary of the findings’ above).
The CEO is an important conduit of information to the Board, and serious dysfunction can emerge when the Board are not sufficiently informed and thereby enabled to oversee the operations of the company.
Maintain an understanding of systems and processes, and continually update this understanding
The second is that CEOs need to maintain an understanding of their company’s systems and processes for managing risks posed to their company. This is particularly so where external reviews (like the KPMG review in the present case) expose gaps or deficiencies that require rectification. A CEO must carefully action recommendations made by an external adviser and should ensure that the Board is kept abreast of the progress made to address these recommendations.
Identifying weaknesses in processes may also require a CEO to revisit decisions that have been made in reliance on those defective processes. The CEO was expected to take these steps in ASIC v Bekier & Ors.
This is because the review conducted by KPMG indicated that recent decisions to approve lines of credit to junket organisations may not have been appropriate, given that Star did not adequately assess the source of wealth of these organisations.
The law does not necessarily mandate a historical audit of past decisions, but a CEO needs to carefully weigh the risk of reliance on processes that have been identified as defective, and whether this exposes the company to present or future harm.
Balance competing considerations and risks
The third observation is that CEOs (particularly those of large organisations) are faced with multiple competing issues that demand their attention, and a reasonable officer assuming this role must appropriately triage these issues so that they are resolved in a timely manner.
In ASIC v Bekier & Ors, the CEO did not take steps to identify the full extent of Star’s misleading communications to NAB in March 2020, and, in his defence, submitted that Star was responding to the existential risk posed by COVID-19 to its continued business operations.
His Honour was of the firm view that dishonest communications sent to Star’s principal banker was a very serious matter, and that, notwithstanding competing considerations, it was incumbent on the CEO to recognise the gravity of the conduct he had been informed of, take further steps to identify the full extent of Star’s communications to NAB and inform the Board.
Lessons for General Counsels
Are General Counsels officers for the purposes of the Corporations Act?
Applying the orthodox position in Shafron v ASIC (2012) 247 CLR 465, his Honour found that the General Counsel was an officer who owed duties to Star under section 180(1) because she was also the Company Secretary. Importantly, section 180(1) applied to all aspects of the General Counsel’s role. The General Counsel was not permitted to draw a distinction between the functions she performed as Company Secretary, versus the advice she provided as Star’s General Counsel.
While not a new principle, this is an important reminder to general counsel also performing the role of company secretary that they are liable as officers of the corporation, and directors’ duties apply to all facets of their roles.
An independent reporting line to the Board
Similarly to the case against the CEO, the General Counsel’s breach of duty relates to a failure to inform the Board of key matters (see the high-level description of these matters under ‘summary of the findings’ above).
In her defence, the General Counsel argued that she had informed the CEO of these matters and that she was not required to take any further steps. His Honour rejected these submissions. As Star’s most senior lawyer, the General Counsel owed separate duties to the administration of justice and to promptly advise her client of risks. Her client was Star and not its CEO, which required the General Counsel to inform the Board (as the decision-making body of her client) of matters that exposed Star to legal, regulatory or reputational harm.
General Counsel who perform the role of Company Secretary need to be particularly mindful that the company is their client, and to pay due regard to the professional obligations that flow from their special position as an in-house solicitor.
Lessons for non-executive directors
His Honour did not find that ASIC made out its allegations against the non-executive directors. This arose, in part, because of the inherent tension between management’s duty to inform and the Board’s duty to make inquiries. The strength of the adverse findings against senior management meant that the Board were misinformed about matters affecting the company. Accordingly, the non-executive directors did not receive enough information to enable them to further test management.
Notwithstanding this outcome, his Honour did level criticism at the non-executive directors. There are a number of important takeaways which are set out below.
The Board can control the volume of information it receives
His Honour was not influenced by arguments from the non-executive directors that they could not adequately discharge their duty by identifying red flags in the information presented to them because of the sheer volume of the Star board packs.
Referring to the decision in ASIC v Healey, his Honour emphasised that it is incumbent on the Board to exercise control over the material it is provided and the Board must direct management to prepare confined sets of material that can be reviewed by non-executive directors.
His Honour remarked that volumes of Board packs were continuing to increase, and non-executive directors must be alert to this tendency of management to adopt an all-inclusive approach to the preparation of these packs. Please refer to paragraph 386 below:
Why, then, does the volume continue to grow? One suspects the answer lies in both director indiscipline and management psychology. Without imposing upon management the discipline of synthesising and summarising material to make it practical for the pack to be delivered manually, the temptation exists for those preparing the pack to chuck in everything. In this sense, the pack is doing two jobs at once. Officially, it is supposed to inform the Board; unofficially, it serves to insulate the preparers from potential criticism.
Non-executive directors cannot adopt a passive role
Throughout the judgment, his Honour repeatedly stated that non-executive directors must apply an inquiring mind to the material they are presented with, and where appropriate, test management if it appears that they are not being frank or candid.
Non-executive directors cannot otherwise perform this supervisory function without pressing management and posing difficult questions. The non-executive directors of Star were criticised for failing to adopt this approach. See, for example, paragraph 1951 of the judgment below:
But one cannot fairly review all that material without a sense of disquiet. It is not a portrait of directors actively pressing management with difficult questions as to whether the business was being conducted ethically, lawfully, and to the highest available standard. The contemporaneous minutes disclose little by way of sustained scrutiny or insistence upon explanation in circumstances where risks were obvious…
This does not mean that non-executive directors cannot rely on the information provided by management. However, non-executive directors are not entitled to merely passively receive this information without sufficiently testing it.
This was particularly so in the context of Star, which is not an ordinary enterprise. The standard of care and diligence expected of non-executive directors under section 180(1) is contextual, shaped by the circumstances of the company and, where a company (like Star) is exposed to more serious risks than other organisations, the level of attention and independent inquiry that a non-executive director must apply also increases.
Conclusions and recommendations
Despite the unique factual circumstances of ASIC’s case against the directors and officers of Star, this is an important decision for executive and non-executive directors and officers.
To summarise the above:
- CEOs are expected to routinely inform the Board of risks and should not prefer their own judgment on key issues, particularly where the company might be exposed to harm.
- CEOs must understand their company’s systems and processes, including in the context of making decisions that rely on these processes being properly followed.
- CEOs are expected to balance and appropriately prioritise risks, and triage issues that require immediate attention, notwithstanding competing demands.
- Where a General Counsel also holds the role of Company Secretary, their duties as an officer of a corporation apply to all aspects of their role.
- A General Counsel and Company Secretary’s obligations as a solicitor colour their duties as an officer of a corporation and require disclosure of risks and the provision of advice to the company through its board. The General Counsel is not merely an employee with a fixed reporting line that overrides this core duty to their client and the administration of justice.
- Non-executive directors must test information provided to them by management and call out discrepancies and red flags, particularly when it becomes apparent that management are not being frank or candid.
- The Board can (and is expected to) control the information provided to it so that the non-executive directors can apply an inquiring mind to the material they are presented with.
Footnotes
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A junket is an arrangement between a casino and a junket operator to facilitate a period of gambling by a group of players.