In Adcamp LLP v Office Properties PL Ltd & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 50, the Court of Appeal refused to allow the claimants to amend their claims to substitute a defendant after the expiry of the limitation period. The Court held that the correct interpretation of the relevant rule allowing the addition or substitution of parties after the expiry of limitation (in CPR 19.6(3)(b)) means that it only applies where the original claim and the new claim are the same in substance. As the claimants were seeking to change the identity of the person they were claiming against, the new claim was not the same in substance.
The effect of this decision is that once a limitation period has expired, it is not possible to substitute a defendant where the wrong defendant was sued by mistake, unless that mistake is only as to their name, rather than their identity. Claimants with claims nearing the end of their limitation period should take particular care to ensure they start proceedings against the correct defendant.
Background
The Court of Appeal considered two appeals simultaneously. Both arose from claims of professional negligence in advice given by the law firm Pitmans LLP (Pitmans).
In 2018, the partnership business of Pitmans was acquired by Bircham Dyson Bell LLP, which then changed its name to BDB Pitmans LLP (BDB). Subsequently, Pitmans changed its name to Adcamp LLP, but for simplicity the Court of Appeal continued to refer to this firm as Pitmans.
In both cases, the claimants alleged negligence by Pitmans but issued proceedings against BDB knowing that BDB had not done the work complained of but mistakenly believing that BDB had acquired Pitmans’ alleged liability to the claimants. After limitation expired, the claimants sought to add or substitute Pitmans as defendant.
The High Court permitted the substitution of Pitmans for BDB as defendant in both cases. Pitmans and BDB both appealed, arguing that the High Court had expanded the scope of the rule which allows new claims to be brought after limitation has expired.
Legal framework
The substitution of a party after the limitation period has expired is governed by section 35 of the Limitation Act 1980, which is brought into effect by CPR 19.6. These rules prohibit substitution after limitation has expired unless the addition or substitution of the new party “is necessary”. CPR 19.6(3) provides:
The addition or substitution of a party is necessary only if the court is satisfied that –
(a) the new party is to be substituted for a party who was named in the claim form in mistake for the new party (the “first gateway”) ;
(b) the claim cannot properly be carried on by or against the original party unless the new party is added or substituted as claimant or defendant (the “second gateway”)
It was accepted that the claimants could not rely on the first gateway in light of the earlier binding Court of Appeal decision in Adelson v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 701, which drew a clear distinction between a mistake as to a party’s name and a mistake as to a party’s identity. Only a mistake as to name falls within the first gateway. Here the claimants were aware that Pitmans had provided the advice complained of but intentionally brought the claim against BDB in the mistaken belief that BDB had taken on Pitmans’ liabilities – this was a mistake as to identity not name.
The question for the Court of Appeal was therefore whether the second gateway applied. The parties agreed that in order to apply, the original and new claim must be the same but disputed what was meant by the “same.” The defendants argued that it required the original claim and the substituted claim to be the same in every material respect, which was not the case on the facts.
Court of Appeal decision
The Court of Appeal granted both appeals, with Lord Justice Zacaroli giving the lead judgment.
In allowing the substitution, the High Court had relied on non-binding obiter comments by Leggatt J in Insight Group Ltd v Kingston Smith [2012] EWHC 3644 (QB), in which he considered the application of the second gateway to facts similar to the current case. Leggatt J considered that the second gateway would be engaged where a claimant had sued the wrong entity for negligence due to a mistaken belief about the transfer of liabilities because both claims would have asserted negligence in the provision of professional services by the firm. The claimants argued that the claims against BDB and Pitmans were the same because both were founded on Pitmans’ alleged negligence. Pitmans contended that the claim against BDB depended on additional facts, namely an alleged transfer of liabilities, which were not part of the claim against Pitmans.
The Court of Appeal disagreed with the claimants and the obiter comments in Insight Group. The authorities cited by Leggatt J in support of his comments did not assist because those cases where substitution had been allowed concerned the substitution of a new claimant, not of a new defendant. The question for the court was whether the two claims were in substance the same. In this case, substitution would involve a substantive change to the identity of the defendant.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that its interpretation of the second gateway meant that it would only apply to the substitution of claimants and not defendants where the wrong party was sued by mistake. However, the Court of Appeal emphasised that Parliament deliberately confined the circumstances in which parties may be added or substituted after limitation has expired as s.35 permits such amendments only in tightly defined situations and does not confer a general discretion to correct mistakes based on fairness. The Court of Appeal was concerned that a broad interpretation of the second gateway would create anomalies, potentially allowing claimants to defeat limitation defences even where they had consciously chosen to sue one party rather than another. Following Adelson, a qualifying mistake in the first gateway is one as to a party’s name, not identity. The Court therefore rejected an interpretation of the second gateway that would cover the type of mistake that was excluded from the first gateway.
Lord Justice Singh, in his concurring judgment, stressed that it was not appropriate to give an expansive interpretation to the second gateway to compensate for what is perceived to be too narrow an interpretation of the first gateway under Adelson. He emphasised that Parliament addressed mistake cases in the first gateway and that its scope should not be circumvented by artificially broadening the second gateway in order to avoid a perceived problem with the first.
This decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court.
Key takeaways
The Court’s interpretation of CPR 19.6(3)(b) and s.35(6)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 means that after the limitation period has expired, a claimant will not be able to substitute a defendant it has sued by mistake unless that mistake is one of name only, rather than the identity of the defendant. Where the end of a limitation period is approaching, claimants should therefore take particular care to identify and sue the correct legal entity, especially in circumstances where firms have rebranded, merged, or transferred practices. Assumptions that a successor has inherited historic liabilities may be unsafe.
The Court of Appeal also noted that the limits on substitution in the rules do not apply where a claim is properly brought within the limitation period, but it becomes necessary to substitute either party because of a subsequent transfer of the interest in or liability for the claim. Such an event gives rise to no limitation issue in the first place.
With thanks to Mia Powney for her assistance in preparing this post.
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