In its recent decision in Deckers UK Limited v Up & Running (UK) Limited [2026] EWCA Civ 553 (Deckers v UR), the Court of Appeal has handed down a significant judgment on the proper approach to “by object” infringements of competition law.

The Competition Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal) had found that Deckers UK Limited’s (Deckers) arrangements for the distribution of its HOKA running shoes amounted to unlawful resale price maintenance (RPM). On that basis, the Tribunal found that Deckers had infringed the Chapter I prohibition pursuant to section 2 of the Competition Act 1998 and could not benefit from the EU vertical block exemption that was in force at the relevant time.

The Court of Appeal overturned the Tribunal’s judgment, finding that the Tribunal had applied the incorrect legal test to determine whether the rules imposed by suppliers on their distributors infringed competition law. The judgment clarifies the need to consider all elements of the established legal test, including the economic context in which an agreement operates, before concluding that conduct restricts competition “by object”.

In this article we set out the background to both the first instance and appeal decisions, and explore the Court of Appeal’s findings. We also highlight some key takeaways which will be particularly relevant for suppliers who sell to chosen retail partners.

Background

Factual Background

The appellant, Deckers, sells the “HOKA” brand of specialist running shoes through its own UK retail stores, online, and via a network of distributors across the UK. Deckers operates a selective distribution system, whereby it selects who can supply its HOKA-branded products.

Up and Running (U&R), a UK retail business selling specialist running shoes and accessories, was approved by Deckers to sell HOKA products in its stores and on its existing website. However, U&R wanted to create an anonymised website to sell excess stock that it had accumulated during the Covid-19 pandemic at discounted prices. Deckers refused approval for the proposed website on the basis that it was inconsistent with its brand strategy and contrary to its retailer terms and conditions. U&R launched the website anyway, and as a result, Deckers terminated its contract.

Tribunal Judgment

The Tribunal found that Deckers’ refusal to approve the website, and the termination of U&R’s contract, amounted to a “by object” infringement of competition law on the basis that it found the objective or purpose of the termination included an intention to prevent undue discounting of HOKA branded shoes via U&R’s anonymised website. Specifically, the Tribunal viewed Deckers’ conduct as a form of RPM, which is where a supplier restricts the freedom of a reseller to determine its own resale price (e.g. minimum or fixed price).

The Tribunal considered that this form of RPM was a “hardcore” restriction which could not benefit from the exemption in the EU Vertical Block Exemption1(the VBE) then in force.2 A “hardcore” restriction is when a contractual clause is so harmful to competition that it prevents the entire agreement benefitting from the automatic exemption that the VBE regulation may otherwise provide.

Court of Appeal

The Court of Appeal upheld Deckers’ appeal, holding that the act of termination did not amount to a “by object” restriction, and in any event, Deckers’ conduct would have been exempt under the VBE.

Notably, the CMA intervened in the appeal because it thought it important to clarify how the legal test for “by object” restrictions should be applied.  Significantly, the CMA agreed that the Tribunal had erred in its formulation of the test.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

1) Correct legal test for “by object” restrictions

As established by EU case law, to decide if an agreement restricts competition “by object” (meaning that the agreement is so obviously harmful that its actual effect on competition does not need to be proven), courts will in all cases examine the following four cumulative components:

  1. the content of the agreement: i.e. the scope of the restriction or agreement in question. This might involve drawing conclusions about the legal scope of a contract or the extent of a concerted practice.
  2. the objective or purpose of the restriction in question, which should be analysed objectively. Where subjective intention exists, this does not automatically make a restriction unlawful if, when applying the broader test, the restriction would not have a sufficient adverse effect on competition.
  3. its legal context: this includes decisional practice; whether the agreement is horizontal or vertical; and, whether there are legal or regulatory barriers to entry.
  4. its economic context: this includes market shares; the nature of the goods or services affected; and the actual conditions of the functioning and structure of the market(s) in question, e.g. the nature and extent of inter-brand competition.

Here, the Court of Appeal found that the Tribunal had erred by eliding the second limb, i.e. the objective or purpose behind Deckers’ restrictive conduct, with the other components of the test. The Court found that it was clear from the case law that all limbs must be assessed to determine if there is a sufficient degree of harm to competition.  The “mere existence” of a restrictive objective will not automatically make it a “by object” restriction.3

2) Importance of economic context

In addition to clarifying the legal test, the Court of Appeal stressed the importance of economic context in this case.  Once assessed, the Court concluded that the agreement showed no real capacity to harm competition to a sufficient degree. It considered the following factors:

  • Classification of the agreement as horizontal or vertical: an agreement between a supplier and distributor (vertical) generally poses “a systematically lower risk to competition” than an agreement between competitors at the same level (horizontal).4 Deckers’ restriction affected intra-brand competition (i.e., among distributors of the same HOKA brand), rather than inter-brand competition (i.e., between different brands or manufacturers of running shoes). Given that the evidence suggested inter-brand competition was strong, there was less of a concern about the impact of the restriction upon intra-brand competition.5
  • Product market definition and the parties’ markets share in the relevant product market: defining the market and understanding each party's position within it helps assess the realistic potential for competitive harm.
  • Market structure and barriers to entry: the fact that many suppliers had entered the potentially relevant markets6 suggested that there were no significant barriers preventing new entrants or limiting price competition.
  • Content or scope of the restriction and its real-life capacity to harm competition to a sufficient degree: the stock U&R wished to sell via the anonymised website was a one-off tranche of surplus stock, which was too niche to cause meaningful harm to competition in the wider product market.

The Court of Appeal also acknowledged that the level of evidence needed to prove sufficient harm to competition is context-specific and is affected by prior decisional practice.7  In this case, it considered that a selective distribution agreement (where a supplier chooses its retailers based on certain criteria) sits at the "least problematic end of the spectrum".8 When viewed in its proper legal and economic context and taking into account its content or scope, Greene LJ found no basis for the Tribunal’s conclusion that Deckers’ act of termination had the object of restricting competition.

3) Discretionary contractual clauses in distribution agreements

The Court of Appeal also emphasised Deckers’ decision to rely on its contractual clause with U&R to terminate supply, which it considered afforded a margin of discretion to the supplier.

Deckers imposed website approval requirements on distributors and required that retailers’ domain names must be the same as their physical stores. It also prohibited sales through third-party marketplaces.

The Tribunal had treated the existence of the discretion to refuse permission for distributors to sell shoes via a website as an object restriction in and of itself, because it had the potential to be used for a restrictive purpose,9 and pursued no legitimate aim except to create a restriction on intra-brand competition.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the Tribunal’s approach because it had failed to analyse how the clause operated in its legal and economic context, namely that it was legitimately designed to protect the integrity of Decker's selective distribution agreement, and the act of termination was caused by its concern about undue levels of discounting.

4) “Hardcore” restrictions under the VBE

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal held it was wrong for the Tribunal to treat Deckers’ conduct as a form of RPM falling outside the safe harbour provided by the VBE.

The Court found that Deckers’ conduct (i) did not undermine U&R’s ability to price freely or below recommended resale prices through its branded websites and physical stores; and (ii) it did not deny customers from actively or passively accessing HOKA goods through those same channels.

Importantly, the Court of Appeal made clear that, even where restrictive conduct does technically fall within a “hardcore” category under the VBE, this does not raise a presumption that it will automatically restrict competition. The ordinary legal and economic contextual analysis (as part of the four-part test outlined above) must still be carried out.10

Key Takeaways

The Court of Appeal’s decision offers practical reassurance for suppliers operating selective distribution systems, as well as clarity for retailers navigating those arrangements. The key points to take away are as follows:

  • A restrictive intention is not enough on its own. The fact that a supplier had a restrictive motive, for example, a desire to prevent discounting, does not automatically mean an agreement is a breach of competition law.
  • The bar will vary depending on the type of agreement. The Court acknowledged that the level of scrutiny applied will depend on context, including how courts and regulators have previously approached similar arrangements. Selective distribution agreements sit at the less problematic end of the spectrum of vertical agreements.
  • Economic context matters, and can be decisive. Factors such as the parties' market shares, barriers to entry, and whether the restriction affected competition between brands (inter-brand) or only among distributors of the same brand (intra-brand) can result in an assessment that there is no sufficient degree of harm.
  • Supplier approval clauses are not unlawful just because they could be misused. A clause designed to protect the integrity of a distribution system, applied proportionately, will not be treated as anti-competitive simply because it gives the supplier a degree of control.
  • A "hardcore" label under the VBE (now replaced by the VBER in the EU) does not end the analysis. Even if a restriction technically falls within a "hardcore" category under the EU or UK11 vertical agreements rules, this does not create an automatic presumption that it harms competition. A full assessment of the surrounding legal and economic circumstances must still be carried out.

Suppliers running selective distribution systems can take comfort from this decision, provided they follow sensible principles to ensure compliance with competition law: set clear and objective criteria for retailer approvals; ensure retailers retain genuine freedom to set their own prices and discount through authorised channels; and apply any restrictions narrowly and proportionately.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    EU Vertical Block Exemption set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 330/2010.

  2. 2

    This has now been replaced by the Commission Regulation (EU) 2022/720 of 10 May 2022.

  3. 3

    Deckers v UR at [107].

  4. 4

    See Deckers v UR at [124] to [135].

  5. 5

    Deckers v UR at [130].

  6. 6

    The potentially relevant markets were (a) the wholesale supply of specialised running shoes in the UK; (b) the purchase of specialised running shoes by retailers from wholesalers (or manufacturers) in the UK; and (c), the retail supply of specialised running shoes in the UK (potentially split by sales in-store and sales online). See Deckers v UR at [125].

  7. 7

    Deckers v UR at [113].

  8. 8

    Deckers v UR at [134].

  9. 9

    Deckers v UR at [108].

  10. 10

    Deckers v UR at [121].

  11. 11

    In the UK, following Brexit, the retained version of Regulation 330/2010 was separately replaced by The Competition Act 1998 (Vertical Agreements Block Exemption) Order 2022 (SI 2022/516), which came into force on 1 June 2022.  This is the UK's standalone equivalent (often called the "UK VABEO").

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