Now that the 2025/2026 domestic football season has drawn to a close, thoughts will soon (World Cup aside) turn to the potential challenges of next season. With this in mind, support for stadium facilities and the years-long stalemate within the football pyramid as to the distribution of broadcasting revenues each hint at a potential off-the-field challenge: sticking within the white lines of subsidy control law, designed to maintain a level playing field, in professional football. In this post, we explore this interaction more closely.

Background

In January 2023, the UK’s subsidy control regime commenced, taking the place of the EU’s state aid rules.

Under the subsidy control framework, which is more flexible than its EU predecessor, a subsidy is financial assistance given by a public authority that confers an economic advantage on an enterprise (which might include a football club). Public authorities must assess whether subsidies satisfy the subsidy control principles, which require that subsidies are proportionate, justified, and designed to address a market failure, while avoiding undue distortion of competition and investment, among others. Oversight is mainly provided by the Competition and Markets Authority (through its Subsidy Advice Unit), which provides advice on subsidies above certain financial thresholds1, as well as through transparency requirements and the possibility of legal challenge.

Legal challenges in the three-and-a-half years since the regime came into effect have been relatively limited.2 We have, however, seen a recent uptick in cases before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), which is also the venue for appeals of many of the decision-making powers of the Independent Football Regulator (IFR).

There is plenty of scope for football to provide the CAT with another subsidy control case to add to the list.

Broadcast revenues

The Premier League, the English Football League and the National League have been deadlocked for years, unable to agree a new deal on the distribution of broadcasting revenues throughout the pyramid. The current deal was penned in 2019 but is, according to seemingly all involved, in need of replacement.

The IFR’s Chair, David Kogan, speaking earlier this year at the Financial Times’s Business of Football Summit, warned those clubs “enjoying the good times at the top” that they “must surely see that any money passed down through the leagues is an investment”.

Historically, revenue has been distributed throughout the pyramid on terms agreed within the industry between the relevant parties. Under the Football Governance Act 2025, however, the IFR has “backstop” powers to order the distribution of broadcasting revenues if the parties involved are unable to reach agreement. Were the IFR to make such an order, it would need to consider the application of the subsidy control framework, particularly so in light of a recent judgment indicating regulatory frameworks are, in principle, within the scope of the subsidy control regime.3

The subsidy control regime could be relevant because “subsidy” is defined so broadly (“financial assistance” takes many forms and “public resources” may include ‘private’ funds where their transfer is directed by a public authority, like a regulator4) and because revenue distribution profoundly impacts competition. The final design of any redistribution framework would need to be considered against the definition of a subsidy. The potential competitive impact is particularly salient for clubs in and around the relegation zone in the Premier League, who are and would be supporting Championship teams (including their direct rivals fighting for promotion). These “divisions” between the parties involved create risk of a subsidy challenge.

Ground use and development

Another area where the link between subsidy control and football has already been made is in the support provided by local and regional authorities for football facilities. It intuitively makes good sense for local authorities to invest in or otherwise support local clubs given the benefits which can be realised for local economies. However, local authorities and recipient clubs need to be aware of the potential for subsidy scrutiny to arise.

A recent example with Wrexham AFC is already well publicised. The club, the recipient of more media attention than most others outside of the top flight, has been the subject of reports in the Guardian5 earlier this year on exactly this topic. There, it was suggested that the necessary procedural steps (under the subsidy control framework) had not been taken prior to the award of a grant from the local council. If this was the case, and a challenge had been brought, the club might have found itself embroiled in litigation alongside the local authority.6

The “Sky Blue” series of cases (under the EU state aid regime, rather than the present subsidy control regime) demonstrates the potential duration and complexity of subsidy litigation. “Sky Blue” involved several high-profile challenges to financial support provided by Coventry City Council to the operators of the Ricoh Arena (Coventry City’s home ground) on the basis the support constituted unlawful state aid. There, a critical issue was whether the local authority had acted like a “private market operator” (for example, a private sector lender), an issue which requires careful analysis and evidence and which has a direct analogue in the UK’s subsidy control regime.

Conclusion

As financial tensions in football grow and the IFR prepares to publish its final licensing rules, subsidy control is one of a number of areas which may play an important role in shaping the legal and regulatory landscape of professional football in the UK. Regulatory intervention and public funding may now attract legal scrutiny, creating real litigation risk. Stakeholders across the game will therefore need to engage closely with subsidy rules to ensure a level playing field is maintained.

We recently provided an overview of UK subsidy control, available here; do reach out if you would like to discuss further.

1 Varying depending on the sector in question.

2 See our summary here: https://connections.nortonrosefulbright.com/post/102l4dl/subsidy-scrutiny-the-cats-emerging-role-in-subsidy-control.

3 See our commentary here: https://connections.nortonrosefulbright.com/post/102mq6q/subsidy-control-challenge-against-the-gambling-commission-what-can-we-learn-from

4 Section 2(3) of the Subsidy Control Act 2022.

5 See, for example: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2026/apr/17/government-grant-wrexham-afc-ryan-reynolds-rob-mac.

6 See, for example, the hefty (and not fully recoverable) legal bill run up by Camelot as an intervenor in a case against the Gambling Commission regarding an alleged unlawful subsidy granted to Camelot, which we wrote about here: https://connections.nortonrosefulbright.com/post/102mq6q/subsidy-control-challenge-against-the-gambling-commission-what-can-we-learn-from.

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