On July 10, 2026, the Quebec Court of Appeal unanimously confirmed that a person accused of civil contempt has the right to benefit from the protection provided by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore to be tried within a reasonable time.

However, the court refused to transpose the 18- and 30-month ceilings established in Jordan1 to civil contempt. In the court’s view, if the contempt is sufficiently penal in nature to trigger the constitutional guarantees of section 11 of the Charter, the specific realities of civil procedure dictate the enforcement of the flexible and contextual analytical framework derived from the Morin decision.2

Unlike the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Jordan, the Court of Appeal does not provide for any transitional test in this case. For lawyers and litigants involved in ongoing contempt proceedings, this is an opportune time to revisit their files and assess, without delay, their vulnerability to a challenge based on section 11(b) of the Charter.

Overview of the facts

In 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered a major criminal law decision in Jordan.3 It established ceilings beyond which judicial delays are presumed to be unreasonable, namely 18 months for cases heard by a provincial court and 30 months for those heard by a superior court.

In Quebec, contempt of court proceedings—that is, remedies aimed at sanctioning non-compliance with a court order—are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure4 and heard by the Superior Court. However, due to their quasi-criminal nature and the severe sanctions they may entail, including imprisonment, it is recognized that the accused person benefits from the constitutional protections provided for in section 11(b) of the Charter,5 including the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

In 2018, the Superior Court granted Ville de Montréal’s application in a civil dispute against Gestion Tasa inc. and La Maison Sami T.A. Fruits inc. (Sami Fruits), ordering these companies to cease their activities that do not comply with the municipal zoning by-law.

Due to the persistent failure to comply with this order, Ville de Montréal served a subpoena for contempt of court on November 9, 2021, and filed a second one on September 30, 2022. These two subpoenas targeted different inspection periods, but essentially raised the same complaints, namely the ongoing violation of the injunction.

The case had followed a particularly winding procedural path, marked notably by applications to exclude evidence, the joinder of the two subpoenas for contempt, an attempted voluntary intervention by a third party and multiple case management proceedings. On July 23, 2024, Sami Fruits filed an application for stay of proceedings with the Superior Court, invoking an unreasonable delay within the meaning of section 11(b) of the Charter and alleging that the ceilings set in Jordan had been exceeded.

On January 27, 2025, the Superior Court concluded that the total delay of 930 days was unreasonable, finding that the principles established in Jordan applied to civil contempt. The trial judge applied the 18-month ceiling—a first in Canada to our knowledge—and ordered a stay of proceedings for the two subpoenas for contempt. Ville de Montréal appealed this judgment.

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning

The Court of Appeal partially allowed Ville de Montréal’s appeal. In a unanimous decision written by Justice Schrager, with which Justices Healy and Immer agree, the court quashed the first subpoena for contempt (from November 9, 2021) but reinstated the second one (from September 30, 2022). The court’s reasoning is structured around the following main issues.

First, the court confirmed that the right to be tried within a reasonable time, guaranteed by section 11(b) of the Charter, applies to contempt proceedings in civil matters. Relying on the 1992 Supreme Court6 decision, the Court of Appeal mentions that contempt of court is quasi-criminal in nature due to the severe consequences it can entail. A person served with a subpoena for contempt is therefore a “person charged with an offence” within the meaning of section 11 of the Charter and must be entitled to all of the protections it guarantees.

The court specified that it is the criminal consequences of the charge of contempt that trigger the enforcement of the Charter, and not the presence of a government actor as a party to the dispute. In doing so, it expressly rejected the approach adopted by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Lymer v. Jonsson,7 which had made the application of constitutional protections conditional upon the presence of a government actor in the dispute. Justice Schrager mentions that it is impossible to adopt the Alberta Court of Appeal’s reasons on this point since the Supreme Court has already applied the Charter to persons accused of contempt in civil matters despite the absence of a government actor.

However, although the court found that section 11(b) of the Charter applies, it refused to introduce the Jordan ceilings into the sphere of civil matters. After a thorough analysis, the court concluded that these ceilings were designed specifically to address systemic flaws within the criminal sphere that hindered the efficient processing of cases—and that these flaws cannot be transposed to civil matters. The court instead adopted the more flexible analytical framework of Morin,8 which is based on a multi-factor and discretionary assessment.

The inapplicability of the ceilings in Jordan

The Court of Appeal explained that the ceilings in Jordan do not apply in civil matters primarily because they were designed to address the specific problems of the criminal justice system: its increasing complexity and systemic flaws regarding procedural delays. The court found  that there is no evidence of similar systemic delays in prosecuting civil claims in general or in cases of contempt of court.

The court pointed out that these elements are irrelevant in civil matters and that elements that are part of a civil procedure are different from the ones that apply in a criminal procedure, which make the strict application of ceilings particularly difficult. The court cited the example of the voluntary intervention of a third party, the possibility of appealing interlocutory judgments, and the different roles of the parties in each of the two systems.

Finally, the court considered that it would be inconsistent to adhere to predetermined ceilings if the applicable time limit varies anyway depending on the context, as suggested by the trial judge.

As Justice Schrager stated: [translation] “trying to put the civil justice system in the shoes of the criminal system in order to apply Jordan, particularly the presumptive ceilings, is, in my opinion, of no real use. Both systems face distinct difficulties and processing times.”9

The chosen analytical framework: the Morin decision

Rather than applying rigid ceilings, the Court of Appeal adopted the approach set out in the Supreme Court’s Morin decision, with the necessary changes for its application in a civil contempt context. This analytical framework is based on four factors10 : (1) the length of the delay, (2) the periods waived by the parties, (3) the reasons for the delay — including delays inherent to the nature of the case, the procedural acts of the parties, the limits of institutional resources and delays attributable to third parties — and (4) the prejudice suffered by the accused person.

The court pointed out that this analysis “is not by the application of a mathematical or administrative formula but rather by a judicial determination balancing the interests which [section 11(b)] is designed to protect against factors which inevitably lead to delay.”11

The Court of Appeal provided several clarifications regarding the application of this framework to civil contempt matters. Regarding the assessment of the reasons for the delay, it noted that certain delays inherent to civil procedure are not attributable to any of the parties and must be excluded from the analysis. Similarly, if the delay does not appear to be exceptional, a thorough examination will not be necessary. As for the prejudice, the court indicated that in exceptional cases where the delay is clearly excessive, the judge may infer that the litigant has suffered prejudice by the very fact of the delay. In other cases, it will be up to the accused to demonstrate it. Finally, society’s interest in preserving the authority of the courts must be balanced against the prejudice suffered by the accused.

Applying this framework to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal reached different conclusions for each of the two subpoenas. For the first one (November 9, 2021), the 930-day delay was clearly unreasonable: a request to exclude an infiltration report alone, to which the appellant eventually acquiesced, had resulted in a 21-month delay. The prejudice was manifest and was inferred from the length of the delay itself: the risk of losing evidence for the defense, the persistent threat of a C$100,000 fine, and the accumulation of attorneys’ fees. The court therefore quashed this first subpoena.

Conversely, for the second subpoena (September 30, 2022), the Court of Appeal calculated a period of 560 days, addressed separately. The court considered that this delay was not unreasonable given the complexity of the case, the multiple days scheduled for the trial, and the numerous proceedings related to preliminary issues raised by both parties. Furthermore, no concrete prejudice was established at this stage, as the alleged offences were not that far back in time. Finally, the collective interest in preserving the authority of the courts favoured a trial on the merits, as the respondents were accused of having continuously breached a Superior Court order. The Court of Appeal therefore reinstated this second subpoena.

Authors’ comments

This judgment indicates that the authority of the courts and the right to a trial within a reasonable time are not competing values, but complementary ones. Justice that is too slow risks losing its legitimacy, and a justice system unable to enforce its orders risks losing its authority. The decision charts a course between these two pitfalls and, as such, constitutes a lasting contribution regarding contempt of court in Quebec.

On the one hand, the judgment unambiguously confirms that the right to be tried within a reasonable time, guaranteed by section 11(b) of the Charter, applies to contempt proceedings, even when the dispute is solely between private parties. The Quebec Court of Appeal thus rejected the contrary position adopted by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Lymer v. Jonsson.12

On the other hand, the ceilings in Jordan are inapplicable to contempt of court proceedings. The Court of Appeal preferred the flexible and discretionary framework of Morin, which is better suited to the particularities of civil procedure. The St-Amour c. Major decision,13 in which the Superior Court applied the 30-month ceiling to a civil contempt case in 2017, should therefore no longer be followed as regards this point.

In practical terms, this decision requires parties wishing to initiate contempt of court proceedings to ensure the promptness of the process. The Morin framework requires constant vigilance: a manifestly excessive delay will create a presumption of prejudice and may lead to the cancellation of the subpoena for contempt.

It should be noted that on July 9, 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in the case of Lymer v. Jonsson.14 This judgment could provide decisive clarifications regarding the analytical framework for delays in matters of civil contempt, both from the perspective of enforcing the Charter and the possible transposition of the Jordan ceilings to civil matters. In the meantime, the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Gestion Tasa15 now constitutes the reference in Quebec law for questions of time limits regarding contempt of court.

The authors would like to thank Maxime Saucier-Lafond, articling student, for his contribution to preparing this legal update.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    The 2026 QCCA 954 decision overturns the conclusions that previously prevailed following the reasoning of the Superior Court in Ville de Montréal c. Gestion Tasa inc., in which the trial judge applied, for the first time in Canada, the 18-month ceiling from Jordan to civil contempt proceedings. For this purpose, we refer you to our previous article on this subject published on February 24, 2025: A first in Canada: The 18-month ceiling established by the Supreme Court in Jordan said to apply to civil contempt of court cases | Canada | Global law firm | Norton Rose Fulbright.

  2. 2

    R. v. Morin, 1992 CanLII 89 (SCC), [1992] 1 SCR 771, p. 787.

  3. 3

    2016 SCC 27 (CanLII), [2016] 1 SCR 631.

  4. 4

    Articles 57 to 62.

  5. 5

    The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11.

  6. 6

    2025 ABCA 423, leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted on July 9, 2026, no. 42227.

  7. 7

    Supra note 2.

  8. 8

    Supra note 1 at para 80.

  9. 9

    Supra note 1 at para 82.

  10. 10

    Supra note 1 at para 83.

  11. 11

    Supra note 7.

  12. 12

    2017 QCCS 2352.

  13. 13

    Supra note 7.

  14. 14

    Supra note 1.

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