Just as insureds and insurers were getting up to speed with the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 (“ECCTA”), the scope of corporate criminal liability has expanded again with s.250 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 (the “CPA”), which came into force on 29 June 2026.
Our white-collar crime and investigations colleagues have recently written on the CPA here, here, and here. This piece comments on these recent statutory developments from an insurance perspective and examines the potential implications for insurers and insureds.
The CPA contains a single provision that represents a major shift in the UK’s corporate criminal liability regime. Somewhat hidden within a wider package of local policing powers and antisocial behaviour measures, s.250 CPA materially changes the basis upon which criminal liability can be attributed to a corporate entity. Corporate criminal liability is no longer confined to identifying the company’s “directing mind and will”; the key question is now whether a senior manager, acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority, committed a criminal offence.
The significance of this change cannot be overstated. Previously, the complexity of large corporate structures and the dispersal of decision-making often made it difficult to attribute wrongdoing to the company itself. S.250 CPA extends the range of criminal offences for which a company can be found liable, making it easier for prosecutors to convict companies.
Key details: What insurers and insureds need to know
S.250 CPA repeals sections 196–198 of ECCTA and replaces them with a single provision that extends the senior manager attribution model to all criminal offences.
Expansion of underlying offences
Under ECCTA, the statutory route for attributing criminal liability to organisations where a senior manager committed a crime was confined to a limited number of economic crimes. These crimes, as set out in Schedule 12 of ECCTA, include bribery, fraud, false accounting, money laundering, tax evasion, and sanctions violations.
The CPA substantially expands the range of criminal offences for which a company can be held liable. Corporate liability may now arise in relation to any criminal offence, including breaches of environmental and health and safety laws, gross negligence manslaughter, modern slavery and human trafficking offences, data protection and computer misuse offences, perverting the course of justice, and offences against the person.
Attribution
The wording of s.250 CPA, on its face, is clear and simple: “where a senior manager of a body corporate or partnership (“the organisation”), acting within the actual or apparent scope of their authority, commits an offence under the law of England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland, the organisation also commits the offence.”
This is fundamentally different from the former “directing mind and will” identification doctrine, which required prosecutors to identify a controlling individual who embodied the company’s will. Under s.250 CPA, no such exercise is needed: once the authority threshold is met, the organisation is deemed to commit whatever offence the senior manager commits.
The practical significance of this change is that corporate liability tracks the underlying offence’s own requirements, including whatever mens rea (or strict liability character) that offence carries; no free-standing corporate fault element needs to be proved. The only questions are whether the individual who committed a crime is a “senior manager” and whether they acted within “actual or apparent scope of authority.”
Senior manager
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The definition of "senior manager" under the CPA mirrors that contained in the now-repealed section 196 of ECCTA. A senior manager is defined as an individual who plays a significant role in:
- the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of the activities of the body corporate or partnership are to be managed or organised; or
- the managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities.
A "senior manager" under the CPA is not the same as a Senior Manager Function holder under the Senior Managers and Certification Regime, which is currently being reformed.
Whilst the definition is broad in scope, the Serious Fraud Office has indicated that it expects this to be litigated. By way of guidance, the Government’s Explanatory Notes (for ECCTA) state that that “senior manager” covers both those in the direct chain of management as well as those in, for example, strategic or regulatory compliance roles, and is not limited to individuals who perform an executive function or are board members and emphasise that the “definition looks at what the senior manager’s roles and responsibilities are within the organisation – the level of managerial influence they might exert – rather than their job title”.
The wide definition looks at substance over form, potentially encompassing the concept of a "shadow” senior manager: an individual whose informal delegation, historical pattern of conduct, or perceived role is sufficient to ground the authority threshold, even where the organisation's formal governance documentation would suggest otherwise. For insurers, the practical consequence is that risk assessment and claims investigation cannot rely solely on formal reporting lines or governance charts; both must account for how authority is actually exercised and perceived within the organisation, since it is this perception-based inquiry, rather than the individual's formal position, that may ultimately determine whether the organisation is exposed under s.250 CPA.
Actual or apparent authority
There is no requirement for the senior manager’s conduct to benefit, or be intended to benefit, the organisation. Liability arises solely from the senior manager acting within their actual or apparent authority. It is sufficient that the conduct in question was of a kind that fell within the senior manager’s authorised responsibilities or was an action they would ordinarily be expected to undertake as part of their role, even where the relevant conduct was undertaken for purely personal gain or was contrary to the organisation’s own internal policies or express instructions (although a company may be less likely to be prosecuted, on public interest grounds, where it has also been the victim of a crime). The question of whether a senior manager was acting within their authority is likely to be the subject of dispute, and may potentially create a conflict of interest between the entity and the senior manager, giving rise to a divergence that may well require separate representation.
Defences
A key difference from the “failure to prevent” offences is that s.250 CPA offers no statutory defence; the sophistication of the entity’s compliance procedures does not prevent attribution under s.250 CPA, although a strong compliance programme may be relevant to charging decisions, public interest assessments and sentencing.
Other options
The Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) regime has not been expanded in parallel with s.250 CPA (although the recent report of the Independent Review of Disclosure and Fraud Offences recommends an expansion of the DPA regime to individuals). DPAs are currently available only for specified economic crimes, including fraud, bribery and money laundering. The DPA mechanism allows prosecutors to suspend prosecution in exchange for conditions such as financial penalties, compliance reforms and cooperation. However, because DPAs remain unavailable for the broader non-economic offences now capable of attribution under s.250 CPA, prosecutors dealing with an attributed non-economic crime face a binary choice: prosecute, or not proceed at all.
Territorial scope
The Act contains a territorial exclusion, which provides that an organisation will not be liable under section 250 where both of the following conditions are met:
a. all the conduct constituting the offence occurs outside the United Kingdom; and
b. the organisation would not commit the offence if that conduct were the organisation's (rather than the senior manager's).
This means that if a particular offence is drafted to include overseas conduct by a UK company, then the company could be liable via senior manager attribution.
Coverage
Both D&O and Civil Liability policies typically define Claim to include criminal proceedings and may include cover for criminal investigations. Insureds may well therefore look to those policies for their investigation and / or defence costs, and want to understand what scope, if any, there is for recovery of criminal fines or penalties.
In considering these issues, there are some principles of English law (specifically concepts of illegality and insurability) that may sit alongside policy exclusions (including for conduct / wrongdoing, fines and penalties, and potentially disgorgement of fees or profits).
Investigation and defence costs coverage
A s.250 CPA prosecution may begin with investigatory interviews, moving to the charge of the relevant individual, the entity, or both, before trial and potentially appeal. There are therefore likely to be calls for investigation and/or defence costs cover by entities, in circumstances where individuals may also separately be incurring costs claimed under their D&O policies.
Prosecutors may now have more interest in pursuing a broader range of individuals than previously, such that insureds may be looking at the definition of Insured Person in their D&O policies, to ascertain whether “senior managers” for the purposes of s.250 CPA will be able to access D&O cover. The successful defence by an individual of any criminal charges is arguably now more of a company issue than it was previously. Limits could quickly be eroded, particularly where individuals seek independent legal representation from one another.
Insurers will, of course, need to look at the potential application of relevant exclusions when assessing the obligation to advance defence/investigation costs and potentially to seek to claw back such costs in the event of a final, non-appealable adjudication (or a written admission) establishing wrongdoing capable of triggering relevant exclusions.
Insurability and illegality
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Most policies expressly exclude criminal fines and penalties, whilst other fines may be covered to the extent they are "insurable by law." While some fines (such as FCA fines) are expressly uninsurable, the question of insurability is often one of public policy: can an insured recover for a loss arising from its own wrongdoing, or does the illegality defence apply? In assessing this, it is relevant to consider whether the insured's liability arises from intentional conduct (which will likely result in no cover), negligence (where coverage will depend on the degree of moral turpitude involved), or strict / no-fault liability (in which case cover may be available for a non-excluded fine or penalty).
The leading English authority on the recovery of penalties / costs arising from an organisation’s own conduct is Safeway Stores Ltd v Twigger [2010] EWCA Civ 1472. In Safeway, the Court of Appeal held that Safeway could not recover, from the directors and employees it considered responsible, either the fine imposed by the Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”) or the costs and expenses it had incurred in connection with the OFT investigation. Both sums were irrecoverable as a matter of law because the underlying anti-competitive conduct, carried out by the company's former directors, was attributed to Safeway itself. Having been deemed responsible for its own unlawful conduct, the company could not subsequently recover that loss from the individuals whose conduct had been attributed to it. Although not a criminal fine, the OFT penalty was treated as quasi-penal in nature, such that allowing recovery would have undermined its deterrent purpose.
Accordingly, where the conduct giving rise to the sanction is treated in law as the entity’s own wrongdoing, public policy considerations may preclude recovery, particularly where the sanction is intended to punish or deter unlawful behaviour. In this respect, attribution principles are closely linked to questions of insurability: the broader the scope for attributing misconduct to an entity, the greater the scope for the application of insurability and illegality defences to coverage.
Conduct exclusions
Similarly, with respect to conduct exclusions, the expansion of attribution principles under s.250 CPA is such that we may expect to see a corresponding expansion of conduct exclusions being triggered, given the wider pool of persons whose misconduct may be treated as the entity's own. In addition, the expanded attribution framework may diminish the protective effect of non-imputation clauses, which have traditionally operated on the assumption that only the knowledge of specifically designated insured persons is relevant for coverage purposes.
As set out above, a senior manager may still be treated as acting within their actual or apparent authority even where the relevant conduct was undertaken for purely personal gain, was dishonest, or was criminal. This is precisely the type of conduct that standard personal profit and conduct exclusions are designed to catch. However, because such exclusions typically only bite once there has been a final, non-appealable adjudication (or a written admission) establishing the relevant conduct, insurers are likely to be obliged to advance defence costs to both the entity and relevant “senior managers” for a considerable period before the exclusion can be said to apply.
Follow-on liabilities
Criminal investigations or prosecutions against individuals or organisations will often run alongside and / or prompt regulatory and / or civil actions against the organisation.
Examples include:
- shareholder actions stemming from stock drops when historical underlying criminal activity (or investigation into suspected criminal activity) is made public;
- customer or counterparty claims if they consider that the company’s criminal activity caused them loss; and
- regulatory investigations or proceedings, for example, as to the processes, procedures or culture that enabled that criminality to occur, potentially resulting in regulatory fines or penalties and / or a requirement or expectation that the organisation facilitate a compensation / redress scheme for affected third parties.
It is possible that any criminal findings will be used to establish facts for those follow-on actions (as was the concern with respect to Statements of Facts for the purposes of DPAs). However, it is important to consider whether any such criminal finding meets the relevant civil or regulatory test.
Indeed, once there has been a final adjudication establishing dishonesty, fraud, personal profit, or criminality, the conduct or personal profit exclusions discussed above may apply to subsequent claims against the entity relying on the same facts. The broadening of attribution under s.250 CPA means that conduct is more likely to be attributed to an entity, thereby potentially engaging these exclusions more frequently. However, the question of whether any particular exclusion actually applies still depends on a nuanced, fact-specific analysis of the precise wording. In particular, follow-on claims will need to be analysed to establish whether the claim is sufficiently linked to the underlying criminality by the exclusion's causal language (for example, where the exclusion is triggered by loss "based upon", "arising from", or "in consequence of" the excluded conduct), or whether the follow-on claim is instead caused by a distinct, intervening act - such as a stock price drop resulting from a market statement - that falls outside the exclusion's causal reach.
The question for insurers may therefore be the extent to which any such follow-on liabilities can be said to be sufficiently causally linked to the criminal behaviour, and the extent to which the follow-on liabilities are characterised as penal / quasi-penal (e.g. a regulatory fine) compared to compensatory in nature (e.g. shareholder actions).
Conclusion
S.250 marks a fundamental broadening of the UK’s corporate criminal liability regime. By extending the senior manager attribution model to all criminal offences , s.250 CPA significantly lowers the threshold for corporate prosecution. Crucially, no statutory compliance defence is available: a robust compliance programme cannot shield an organisation from liability once the authority threshold is met. For D&O and financial lines insurers, this represents a significant change in the frequency and breadth of potential exposure.
Fines and penalties following a s.250 CPA conviction will generally be excluded and / or uninsurable, making defence and investigation costs the focus. Insurers and insureds should pay particular attention to clawback provisions within their conduct and personal profit exclusions. The “senior manager” and “apparent authority” concepts mean that insured person definitions calibrated to directors and officers may leave gaps in individual cover, even where entity cover responds. Insurers and insureds will therefore want to assess policy wordings to understand how s.250 CPA exposures may trigger different policies.
We await the first charges and prosecutions against organisations under s.250 CPA but, given the breadth of underlying criminal offences, we expect coverage for such exposures is an issue that insurers will have to grapple with relatively shortly as well as being a question that many insureds are already asking.
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