Background
The concept of acting in concert is among the most significant and debated concepts in German and international capital markets law. It refers to situations in which multiple shareholders coordinate their conduct with respect to a listed company. Such coordination may arise through a formal agreement or through other forms of coordinated conduct.
Where shareholders are deemed to be acting in concert, the voting rights held by the relevant parties are generally attributed to one another under Section 34(2) of the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz, WpHG) and Section 30(2) of the German Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (Wertpapiererwerbs- und Übernahmegesetz, WpÜG). This may result in the crossing of notification thresholds under the WpHG and, where the parties jointly reach or exceed the 30 percent control threshold, may also trigger a mandatory takeover offer under the WpÜG. Given the broad wording of the relevant provisions, their interpretation has long presented considerable challenges in practice.
The issue is particularly important where notification obligations under Sections 33 and 34 WpHG have not been complied with. Failure to make the required disclosures may result in the suspension of key shareholder rights, including voting rights and the right to challenge shareholder resolutions. In addition, BaFin may impose substantial administrative fines. As a result, determining whether coordinated shareholder conduct constitutes acting in concert is of critical importance for investors, issuers and their advisers.
In its judgment of June 16, 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), relying on a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of February 12, 2026 in Valora Effekten Handel (C-864/24), fundamentally reassessed the attribution rules applicable under Section 34(2) WpHG. The judgment may have significant implications for shareholding disclosure requirements, BaFin's supervisory practice and the interaction between the WpHG and the WpÜG.
Facts and decisions of the lower courts
The proceedings concerned a challenge brought by five shareholders against resolutions adopted at the 2019 annual general meeting of listed company Valora Effekten Handel AG. The courts found that the claimants had collectively held more than 10 percent of the company's share capital and voting rights at least during the 2017 annual general meeting. However, they had not submitted the voting rights notifications required upon exceeding, and later falling below, the relevant disclosure threshold.
The Mannheim Regional Court dismissed the action, holding that the claimants had breached their disclosure obligations and had therefore lost the right to challenge the resolutions. Both the Regional Court and, on appeal, the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe concluded that the shareholders had acted in concert within the meaning of Section 34(2) WpHG. The Higher Regional Court relied on various indicia of coordinated conduct, including common addresses, coordinated participation at shareholder meetings, shared objectives regarding board composition, and extensive personal, institutional and economic links among the shareholders.
The BGH decision
Before deciding the appeal, the BGH referred a question to the CJEU concerning the compatibility of Section 34(2) sentence 1, alternative 2 WpHG with Article 10(a) of the Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC, as amended). Specifically, the BGH sought clarification as to whether voting rights may be attributed on the basis of coordinated conduct occurring "in another manner", even in the absence of an agreement between the parties.
The CJEU held that Article 10(a) of the Transparency Directive permits attribution only where there is an agreement between the relevant parties. A national provision extending attribution to situations involving merely coordinated conduct without such an agreement is incompatible with EU law. The court further held that the exception allowing Member States to maintain stricter rules must be interpreted narrowly and applies only where those rules have a direct connection to takeover bids.
Based on the CJEU's ruling, the BGH reached several important conclusions.
1. Coordinated conduct without an agreement can no longer justify attribution under Section 34(2) WpHG
Section 34(2) WpHG distinguishes between:
- coordination based on an agreement; and
- coordination occurring "in another manner".
The BGH held that only the first category is compatible with Article 10(a) of the Transparency Directive. The second category exceeds the scope permitted under EU law because it allows attribution on the basis of factual coordination alone, without a binding agreement. Consequently, Section 34(2) sentence 1, alternative 2 WpHG must no longer be applied.
The judgment may also raise broader questions regarding the compatibility of other attribution rules under the WpHG that extend beyond the attribution grounds expressly specified in Article 10 of the Transparency Directive. Although this issue was not decisive for the outcome of the case, the BGH's reasoning may have implications beyond Section 34(2) WpHG.
Importantly, the decision does not affect Section 30(2) WpÜG. Although the wording of that provision mirrors Section 34(2) WpHG, it forms part of the takeover law framework and therefore falls within the exception for rules directly related to takeover bids recognised by the CJEU.
2. Requirements for an "agreement"
The CJEU and the BGH clarified that attribution under Article 10(a) of the Transparency Directive requires an agreement between the parties. Such an agreement requires:
- a meeting of minds between the parties, which need not be in writing;
- a commitment to exercise voting rights in a coordinated manner;
- a long-term common policy with respect to the management of the issuer; and
- a sufficient degree of commitment over a period of time, rather than occasional or isolated coordination.
3. Remittal to the Higher Regional Court
The BGH set aside the appellate judgment and remitted the case to the Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe for further consideration. The court must now determine whether, beyond the coordinated conduct previously identified, the shareholders had in fact entered into an agreement meeting the requirements established by EU law. The BGH noted that evidence of actual coordination may indicate the existence of such an agreement, but is not sufficient on its own
Practical implications
The decision represents a significant departure from the previously prevailing assumption that the attribution rules under Section 34(2) WpHG and Section 30(2) WpÜG should be interpreted consistently. Attribution based solely on coordinated conduct "in another manner" can no longer be applied under the WpHG. In addition, other attribution provisions under Section 34(1) WpHG may now require reassessment in light of the Transparency Directive.
BaFin had already responded to the CJEU's judgment by announcing that, for the purposes of voting rights notifications under the WpHG, it will attribute voting rights only in situations expressly provided for in the Transparency Directive. BaFin also indicated that certain attribution grounds contained in Section 34(1) WpHG would no longer be applied because they have no equivalent under EU law.
By contrast, BaFin has confirmed that it will continue to apply the attribution regime under Section 30 WpÜG unchanged, taking the view that the takeover rules remain compatible with EU law.
While BaFin's guidance provides an initial indication of its supervisory approach, questions remain regarding the interpretation of the current statutory framework, particularly under Section 34(1) WpHG. Further clarification may emerge through future regulatory guidance or legislative reform.
A particularly noteworthy consequence of the judgment is the growing divergence between the attribution regimes under securities disclosure law and takeover law. This development may reignite discussions regarding so-called "creeping acquisition" strategies, which may trigger a mandatory offer once the 30 percent control threshold is reached but may no longer generate disclosure obligations at lower shareholding levels under the revised WpHG interpretation.