Since the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) took effect in 2023, foreign state support has become a central focus in the EU’s scrutiny of M&A transactions. That same year, we observed that US authorities were also poised to require merging parties to disclose (in their merger control filings) information on subsidies received from jurisdictions designated as “foreign entities of concern.” In our view, this development put the EU and US on parallel tracks, albeit in markedly different ways.

Since then, the two paths have diverged. The EU has rapidly built a sophisticated regime for screening foreign subsidies. The US has had a bumpier road and its landscape remains in flux. Most notably, a federal court struck down the 2024 rules adopted by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to implement the Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2022 (MFFMA), prompting a fresh consultation on a revised merger filing form. This article examines these developments and their implications for deal teams.

The MFFMA directed the FTC to adopt rules requiring parties to Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) premerger notification filings to disclose subsidies received from designated “foreign entities or governments of concern.” The FTC’s updated HSR form, which contained the relevant information requests, remained in force for roughly a year. In February 2026, however, the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas vacated the rule in its entirety in Chamber of Commerce v. FTC, holding that the FTC had exceeded its statutory authority and acted arbitrarily by failing to demonstrate that the expanded filing requirements were “necessary and appropriate.”

In response, the FTC reverted to the pre-2025 HSR form and launched a new rulemaking process. Its request for public comment on improvements to the HSR form attracted 67 submissions. Although foreign subsidy disclosure was not the central focus of most of them, the submissions reveal a notable degree of consensus on the issue. Commenters such as the International Center for Law & Economics, Committee for Justice and TechFreedom emphasize that foreign subsidy disclosure is a statutory mandate rather than a matter of agency policy preference. At the same time, the US Chamber of Commerce, the American Investment Council and others stress that any such requirement must be carefully calibrated. Key themes include:

  • clearly defining what constitutes a reportable “subsidy” and ensuring any disclosure requirement is clearly bounded;
  • limiting disclosure obligations to subsidies that are necessary and appropriate for the competitive assessment, with a focus on subsidies in overlapping markets; and
  • introducing a de minimis monetary threshold below which subsidies need not be reported.

The consultation also prompted debate on whether the revised HSR form should include questions on any parallel review of the same transaction by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Several commenters distinguish the narrow MFFMA foreign subsidy mandate from broader CFIUS or sovereign wealth fund disclosures. The US Chamber of Commerce, for example, submitted that these topics go beyond the antitrust agencies’ “responsibility to gather information relating to foreign subsidies,” while the Lexington Institute characterized the proposal as “a mission creep” capable of setting “a dangerous and unnecessary precedent.” The ABA Antitrust Law Section likewise argued that CFIUS compliance information and sovereign wealth fund details are “not relevant to antitrust premerger review” and are “already generally available to the agencies.”

In the EU, foreign direct investment (FDI) screening, merger control and foreign subsidy screening are, in principle, three distinct processes. The EU merger notification form does not require merging parties to make any significant FDI-related disclosures, but the reverse is not necessarily true. FDI screening takes place at the national level and the extent of merger control-related disclosures required varies amongst EU Member States.

European foreign investment screening is itself undergoing significant reform following the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2026/1386 of 17 June 2026 on the screening of foreign investments in the Union (the New FDI Regulation). As outlined in our “Global rules on foreign direct investment: EU” report in September 2026, the New FDI Regulation makes FDI screening mandatory across the EU, requiring every Member State to operate a screening mechanism that meets minimum standards. The most notable changes include a common minimum sectoral scope, new rules promoting greater procedural alignment and a broader definition of notifiable investments. The New FDI Regulation also recognizes that EU merger control and national investment screening procedures may run in parallel. It underlines the need for a coherent interpretation of the Member States’ legitimate interests that permit them to take national measures in relation to a transaction reviewed by the European Commission under the EU Merger Regulation’s one-stop-shop regime.

Although the CFIUS debate in the US and FDI screening reform in the EU address different aspects of transaction review, together they illustrate a convergence of international regulatory attention on the nexus between foreign investment, state influence and merger control. The ongoing review of HSR notification requirements suggests that foreign subsidy disclosure requirements will return in some form to the US’ M&A scrutiny process, while CFIUS-related disclosures are likely to become the new bone of contention. These developments in US merger review together with the recent CFIUS executive policy initiatives, regulatory reforms and enforcement actions, as outlined in our “Global rules on foreign direct investment: US” report, are clear expressions of the “America First Investment Policy” under which “economic security is national security.” In this context, foreign state involvement in M&A is now a mainstream regulatory consideration, extending beyond the EU-China bilateral context that initially drove the policy debate. For transaction parties, the key question is therefore no longer whether these requirements will materialize, but how they will be calibrated and how the EU and US frameworks, alongside recent developments in China, will interact in practice.

Contact