Welcome to our first update of 2026, keeping you up to date with the latest developments, key takeaways from recent cases and tax trends.

In this edition of Tax Insights, we highlight six of these developments, chosen for their potential impact on our clients’ business including four recent cases.

HMRC publishes provisional guidance on the revised rules relating to capital gains rollover relief on share exchanges and reorganisations

One of the measures announced at the 2025 UK Budget was the broadening of the anti-avoidance rules applying to capital gains rollover relief on share exchanges and reorganisations. In summary, the main anti-avoidance provision will now cover “arrangements relating to an exchange or scheme of reconstruction” where the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, is to “reduce or avoid” liability to capital gains tax (CGT) or corporation tax. The revised rule will apply to all shareholders, removing the previous carve-out for shareholders holding not more than 5 per cent of any class of shares or debentures in the company being disposed of. Further details on the proposed changes can be found in the December edition of our newsletter (here).

On 12 December 2025, HMRC published provisional guidance outlining the purpose and intended effect of the new rules, along with clarification on how clearance applications received pre-26 November 2025 will be handled.

Summary of the provisional guidance

HMRC confirmed that the amendments to the anti-avoidance measures are designed to reverse the Court of Appeal’s decision in Delinian, in which the Court held that although tax avoidance was a purpose of the arrangements in question, it was not a main purpose. The guidance explains that “[t]he revised wording puts the focus of the purpose test on the particular arrangements that are put in place to avoid tax” and that “the revised rule is intended to deter and, where necessary, counteract, situations where additional features have been included in a commercial transaction in order to obtain a tax advantage.”

The guidance also explains that HMRC’s new power to make “just and reasonable” adjustments in response to any reduction or avoidance will be exercised so that “only the shareholders seeking a tax advantage will be affected”. This explains HMRC’s rationale for removing the minority shareholder carve-out: shareholders who are not seeking to reduce or avoid tax should (in theory) be unaffected, but the flipside to this is that all shareholders are now potentially within in scope and not just those holding more than 5 per cent.

The guidance also confirms that the revised rule will not apply where CGT is deferred; however a deferral that reduces or eliminates a CGT charge will fall within its scope (for which see further commentary below).

HMRC clearances

The provisional guidance clarifies several points regarding clearance applications:

  • Clearance applications granted before 26 November 2025: Clearances granted before 26 November 2025 will remain valid until 26 January 2026. If the transaction is not completed by that date, a new application should be submitted if clearance is required.
  • Clearance applications received before 26 November 2025: HMRC will continue to review applications received before 26 November 2025 under the previous (pre-Budget) rules. If clearance is granted, parties will have 60 days to complete the transaction from the date of notification of clearance by HMRC.
  • Clearance applications received after 26 November 2025: Any application received on or after 26 November 2025 will be reviewed under the revised rules – even if it relates to a change to a previously cleared transaction.
  • Scope of clearance: Clearances will apply only to the specific facts and circumstances outlined in the original application and associated correspondence with HMRC. Any post-clearance changes to the transaction may (in the normal way) invalidate the clearance.

Remaining issues

Despite these clarifications, a number of concerns remain on the impact of the revised rules. These include:

  1. Transaction timing: In many cases, the deadline for completing cleared transactions – either by 26 January 2026 (where clearance was granted before 26 November 2025) or within 60 days of the clearance being granted (where the application was submitted before 26 November 2025) – is insufficient, particularly for transactions requiring regulatory or antitrust approval which can take considerably longer.
  2. Deferral of a tax liability: As noted above, the provisional guidance confirms that the revised rule will not apply in principle where CGT is deferred. However, there are situations where parties enter into genuine commercial arrangements that could have the result of deferring or eliminating a tax charge. For example, if individual sellers are compensated through an earn-out structured as a debenture which is convertible into securities if the earn-out targets are met, this can defer their CGT liability. If the targets are not met and the earn-out is never paid, no CGT charge would arise. The concern is that such arrangements could trigger the revised anti-avoidance rule, despite being commercially driven.
  3. Shareholders’ arrangements and tax treatment: The parties to a non-public transaction will often outline the UK tax treatment of the deal to affected shareholders. For public company takeovers, this information is usually included in the circular. This process was relatively straightforward under the previous rules, as the company may be aware of the intentions of the major shareholders. This process becomes more challenging under the revised rules. The broader scope captures arrangements relating to an exchange or scheme of reconstruction where a main purpose of reduce or avoid tax, but the transaction parties can only attest to their own purposes. In addition, the carve-out for minority shareholders has also been removed, raising the question of whether all shareholders should now be consulted to benefit from the clearance.
  4. Impact on schemes of reconstruction involving the transfer of a business: There is a concern that the revised rules will have an unintended impact on schemes of reconstruction involving the transfer of a business (section 139 TCGA 1992). If as part of a section 139 scheme of reconstruction a shareholder enters into arrangements relating to the shares issued to them, and those arrangements have a main purpose of avoiding or reducing liability to CGT, corporation tax, or income tax, the section 139 treatment is disallowed. Crucially, even if the other shareholders have not entered into such arrangements and do not benefit, relief is withdrawn for all shareholders, meaning everyone is affected. This appears to be an unintended and commercially undesirable outcome of the revised rules.
  5. Clearance timing: Given these issues (and the wider scope of the new rules), we anticipate that more parties will seek clearance from HMRC to gain transaction certainty. This could lead to HMRC taking the full 30-day period to process applications and requiring more time to deal with any further queries.

Looking ahead, we hope HMRC will issue further guidance to address the outstanding uncertainties and, where necessary, amend the draft legislation to ensure it operates as intended. This would provide clarity for taxpayers whilst still allowing the Government to deliver on its policy objectives.

Remote Working and PE Risk: New OECD guidance

The OECD’s 2025 update to the Model Tax Convention (the Update) provides helpful clarity on how permanent establishment (PE) rules apply in the context of international remote working. With the acceleration of video communication technology, and particularly following the Covid-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in the number of people seeking to do their job in a jurisdiction that is different to that in which their employer is based. This may be for part of the time (for example where an employee has a holiday home in a different jurisdiction) or, increasingly, permanently (for example where a company hires a new employee who is the best candidate for the job but happens to be located in a different jurisdiction). This can lead to a number of tax and regulatory issues, including the question of whether the location of the employee in another jurisdiction can give rise to a taxable presence for the employer in that jurisdiction. The previous OECD commentary was published in 2017 and had not anticipated the upsurge in remote working and digital nomads that has been since the Covid-19 pandemic.

While Article 5 of the Model Tax Convention itself remains unchanged, the Update offers detailed commentary on when an individual’s home or other relevant place could be considered a ‘fixed place of business’ thus creating a PE for their employer. These changes respond to the growing prevalence of globally mobile workers and are intended to provide greater certainty for tax authorities and businesses assessing PE position and PE risk respectively.  In the context of the OECD Model Treaty, the general view is that updates to the OECD Commentary should be applied to double tax treaties already in force, even though they may have been agreed by the respective jurisdictions some time before the Commentary changed. This makes sense as the alternative would be to require multiple countries to issue their own updates to the treaties themselves; we would anticipate that in due course countries will issue their own domestic guidance to reflect the Update.

Employer Requirement

The previous OECD Commentary published in 2017 discussed whether a home office would create a PE by focusing on whether it was ‘at the disposal’ of the individual’s employer. This could occur where there was an implicit (in addition to simply an explicit) requirement for the employee to work from home. However, the concept of an implicit requirement caused uncertainty and resulted in divergent practices amongst tax authorities.

The commentary in the Update places less emphasis on being at the disposal of the enterprise.  Instead, the Update attempts to provide more objective measures of when an employee working from another jurisdiction might give rise to a PE. These are grouped by reference to the degree of use of the relevant place by the individual and the commercial reason for the use of that location.  The Update also provides five specific examples of common circumstances which are likely to prove practically useful for businesses contemplating employees wishing to work remotely from other jurisdictions.

  1. Degree of Use

If an individual works from their home (or ‘other relevant place’ – such as a second home, holiday let or rented desk) for less than 50 per cent of their total working time for an enterprise over any twelve-month period commencing or ending in the fiscal year concerned, that place will generally not be considered a fixed place of business of such enterprise and therefore should not give rise to a PE.

If an individual exceeds that threshold, whether that place will be considered a PE depends on the broader ‘facts and circumstances’. A major consideration here is whether there is a ‘commercial reason’ for the individual’s physical presence in the Contracting State where the home (or other relevant place) is located.

  1. Commercial reason

A commercial reason will be considered to exist where the physical presence of the individual in that other Contracting State will itself facilitate the carrying on of the business of the enterprise.

The Update sets out several situations in which an individual’s presence makes a commercial reason more likely to exist:

  • improves relationship management with customers, suppliers and associated entities (e.g. in-person meetings);
  • provides access to local resources or business-relevant expertise (e.g. regular meetings with the research and development team);
  • substitutes for premises that the enterprise would otherwise require in that location (e.g. a rented office); and
  • enables performance of services for customers located in the other Contracting State where such services require the physical presence of personnel of the enterprise (e.g. training on the customer’s premises).

The mere presence of factors that might appear to imply a commercial reason exists, such as the fact that the country is in a different time zone or merely having customers or suppliers in the other Contracting State, should not lead to an automatic conclusion that a commercial reason exists.

Importantly, the Update confirms that no commercial reason will exist where the arrangement is driven solely by employee-focused motives, such as attracting or retaining staff, or reducing office costs. The Update is clear that there needs to be a link between the individual’s physical presence in the other Contracting State and the enterprise’s markets or operations in the same location.

Where no commercial reason exists for carrying out an enterprise’s activities from an individual’s home (or other relevant place) in the other Contracting State exists, that location would not be considered a place of business of the enterprise unless other facts and circumstances indicated otherwise.

The Update notes that different factors will apply where the individual is the only or primary person conducting the business of an enterprise, such as a self-employed consultant working in the other Contracting State for an extended period and carrying out most of their business activities from a home office there would be likely to constitute a fixed place of business of their consultancy business in that state.

Practical Implications

The Update arguably reduces the likelihood of a PE arising from short-term, temporary remote working, but more importantly provides clarity on what are increasingly becoming common scenarios. In particular, it notes the difference between hiring an individual in a particular jurisdiction because that is where they happen to be located, and hiring a person in a jurisdiction because it would be useful to have a person in that jurisdiction.  Where employees work abroad on a long-term and sustained basis to support local markets or group operations, a PE may still be triggered. Enterprises with cross-border remote working arrangements should therefore consider taking the following steps:

  • reassess working arrangements to manage PE risks not only in the context of the new guidance but also the domestic law and practice of the host Contracting State;
  • review and (where necessary) update policies on remote working arrangements; and
  • maintain a clear record of the working patterns of individuals, the nature of their activities and the commercial rationale for remote work, as these factors influence whether a home office constitutes a fixed place of business.

Should a PE arise then enterprises may be liable for corporate tax costs, payroll tax obligations and other tax compliance obligations in the host Contracting State. In such circumstances, obtaining tax rulings should be considered where available to ensure certainty and mitigate exposure.

Final Thoughts**

Whilst the OECD’s updated commentary on Article 5 provides employers managing cross-border working arrangements with helpful guidance and greater operational clarity,  its practical impact may have some limitations. The guidance remains ‘relevant but not exhaustive’ meaning other factors may still influence PE determinations. It is also the case that it helps to define a PE for corporate tax purposes; the determination of whether there are payroll tax implications for the enterprise does not necessarily follow the same principles. Importantly, the updated commentary is not binding and the changes may lead to different outcomes based on interpretation under domestic law and treaties. The guidance is also caveated by reference to the fact that it acknowledges that there could be scenarios where the factual circumstances would override the bright-line tests set out in the guidance. Overall, a clearer and more practical framework suited for modern remote working practices is welcomed although further development of these principles is likely to be necessary in future.

The Supreme Court has delivered a significant decision on a matter which involves a common area of dispute and in which corporate groups managing deal-related costs will be interested

For many transactions, part of the deal fees incurred may be in respect of VAT exempt deal fees paid to financial institutions. However, significant costs may be fees of other advisers such as accountants, lawyers and marketing professionals which are subject to VAT. Transactions in shares are typically exempt from VAT. VAT on professional fees incurred on a share sale will not be recoverable where the professional services have a “direct and immediate link” to the exempt share sale. The practical impact of this decision is to confirm that, generally, a link will exist and recovery of VAT will not be possible. The important point is to stop before a project is started and work out what kind of fees are to be incurred and to ask the advisers to pay attention to exactly what activities the assistance they are providing relate to and whether their fees are subject to potentially irrecoverable VAT.

In Hotel la Tour, the Supreme Court has unanimously confirmed that VAT on professional fees incurred on a share sale entered into to raise funds for a new hotel development was not recoverable; these costs had a direct link to the exempt share sale and not to the company’s general taxable operations.

Hotel la Tour was the sole parent of a subsidiary which operated a hotel in Birmingham. Hotel la Tour provided management services to its subsidiary for which it was paid. With ambitions to build a new hotel, it opted to sell its shares in the subsidiary to a third party to finance this project and engaged advisers to assist with market research, shortlisting prospective buyers, financial modelling and advising on tax compliance.

Hotel la Tour argued that the professional services were linked to its general hotel operating business as the share sale was undertaken to raise funds for that business and therefore linked to the making of taxable supplies.  This argument was accepted by the First-tier and Upper tribunals but was rejected by the Court of Appeal and has now also been rejected by the Supreme Court.

The “direct and immediate link” test

In reaching this final decision, the Supreme Court has provided some helpful clarification of how to approach the test established by case law of whether services have a “direct and immediate” link to the exempt share sale and/or the wider taxable activity of the business and of how, when considering this test, the “cost component” test should be applied.  There are four points made in particular for which the confirmation or clarification provided is helpful when applying this test:

  • The basic test asks whether there is objective link to the activity and does not work by reference to the taxpayer’s purpose. Even though Hotel La Tour’s only reason for selling its subsidiary was to fund a new taxable venture, this did not override the fact that the fees directly facilitated an exempt share sale. The Supreme Court are clear that the only circumstance in which the taxpayer’s purpose or subjective intention in entering into a transaction is taken into account is when applying this test in respect of pre-trading expenses incurred for a future taxable business (in the M&A context, consider for example, fees incurred by a Bidco which has not yet started to trade where the question of whether there is an intention to make supplies of taxable management services will be relevant when considering future recovery, even where that transaction is aborted). The test in other contexts looks at how the costs were actually used, and here they were used to carry out an exempt transaction which meant that the VAT was irrecoverable.
  • The requirement in the VAT Directive for VAT to be calculated “after deduction of the amount of VAT borne directly by the various cost components” and the description in a number of cases of VAT incurred as a “cost component” or “component of the price” of the taxable supply, does not mean that costs need to be built in to the price of the shares in order for a direct link to exist. The First-tier and Upper tribunals were wrong to give weight to this question. The Supreme Court also noted that the “cost components” notion was particularly inapt here as sales of shares are very rarely priced on a cost-plus basis. It is enough that the fees were incurred for the share sale for the fees to be treated as cost components of that transaction.
  • The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeal that whilst the ECJ in SKF accepts that there is a possibility that it is conceivable that a situation might exist in which puts might have a direct and immediate link with the general business rather than the share sale itself, even where the share sale is exempt, SKF does not introduce an assumption that inputs should be linked to the general business where the proceeds of a share sale are used to fund the overall business.
  • The Supreme Court was clear that Frank Smart (in which VAT was incurred on the acquisition of units of entitlement to single farm payments entitling the taxpayer to receive Government subsidies) can be distinguished on its facts as it relates to a fund-raising transaction which was outside the scope of VAT.)  The decision is not support for a more general purpose-based argument when identifying the transaction with which there is a direct and immediate link and does not support an argument that there is effectively no distinction here between out-of-scope and exempt transactions. Frank Smart does not alter the established rule that input VAT directly linked to an exempt share sale is not recoverable even if the sale funds taxable business activity. This distinction supports the principle (established in decisions of the ECJ in BLP and Midland Bank) that where input costs have a direct and immediate link to a specific output transaction, that link prevails and determines VAT recovery; you do not go on to consider whether there is also a link to overheads of the wider business.

VAT grouping does not mean that the share sale should be regarded as outside the scope of VAT

Hotel La Tour also argued that the fact that it made inter-company management services to its subsidiary should be disregarded because it was VAT-grouped with its subsidiary.  On this basis it argued that it should not be regarded as carrying on an economic activity and that this meant that the share sale should be treated as outside the scope of VAT. The Supreme Court firmly rejected this VAT group argument. Intra-group supplies are disregarded for VAT to simplify the administration of VAT or to combat certain potential abuses, not to erase the economic reality of what occurred. The tests for determining whether a VAT group could be formed and whether a holding company was engaged in taxable activity were distinct. Hotel La Tour had been actively managing its subsidiary for a fee which was an economic activity and the share sale was therefore an in-scope (exempt) supply.

Practical impact

The decision makes it clear that the costs components test is not a significant factor and will not add weight to arguments for recovery. This is a clarification rather than a change to widely accepted principles. Whilst not new, it highlights the importance of pausing at the outset of a project and delineating and planning the scope of anticipated professional services and the need to instruct professionals to document this carefully. It also raises the importance of considering questions such as the level at which a disposal is made where entities are held in different jurisdictions. This planning should be undertaken on the understanding that, generally, VAT costs incurred on a share sale (regardless of whether that share sale is undertaken to raise funds for the wider taxable business) will not be recoverable, while more general advisory or restructuring costs might still qualify as overheads relating to taxable activities. This is perhaps particularly in circumstances where the transaction is aborted or its structure altered significantly during the planning stages.

Amortisation of goodwill: Two FTT decisions reinforce strict rules on amortisation relief

Two recent First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (FTT) decisions – Milton Park Holdings Ltd & Milton Park Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 01353 (TC) (Milton Park) and County Insurance Services Ltd v HMRC [2025] UKFTT 01440 (TC) (County Insurance) – provide important guidance on the treatment of goodwill under the UK’s intangible fixed assets regime and the circumstances in which amortisation relief is available. Both appeals were dismissed, Milton Park on accounting grounds and County Insurance on legal grounds, underlining the need to satisfy both in order to obtain relief. This is particularly where the goodwill has originated before the current regime was introduced in 2002.

  1. Milton Park: substance over form

Background

The dispute in Milton Park arose from a restructuring of a care home business originally operated by the Milton Park Partnership (MPP). As part of the restructuring, Milton Park Holdings Limited (MPHL) was incorporated and acquired MPP’s assets and business, including goodwill valued at £173 million which arose after the introduction of the current intangibles regime. A wholly-owned subsidiary of MPHL subsequently entered into a new partnership, the Milton Care Partnership (MCP), which was to run the business day-to-day. The commercial rationale for the restructuring was to enable the business to file abbreviated accounts with fewer public disclosure obligations.

Issue

MPHL’s accounts recognised the goodwill as an intangible fixed asset and amortised it on a straight-line basis over 20 years. HMRC challenged the treatment, arguing that MPHL’s accounts were not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) and that no goodwill should have been recognised.

The key question the Tribunal had to determine was whether MPHL had acquired a “business combination” in accordance with GAAP. This required MPHL to have control over both the net assets and the operations of MPP.

Decision

The FTT dismissed the appeal. Whilst MPHL acquired the net assets of MPP (a point which HMRC accepted), it did not acquire or retain operational control over the business.

Under GAAP, control requires the ability to direct financial and operating policies with a view to obtaining economic benefits. That power rested with MCP and its managing partner. MPHL’s rights such as the ability to terminate arrangements, ownership of the real property from which the business was operated and the purported entitlement to goodwill were either contingent, subject to the discretion of others, or unenforceable in practice. Through its partners, MCP managed nearly all aspects of the business and assumed its risks and rewards, recording all trading income and expenses. By contrast, MPHL’s accounts recorded no turnover from the care home.

Interestingly, there was some discussion around the importance of clauses in the partnership agreement purporting to reserve goodwill to MPHL. These were held to concern “legal” goodwill rather than “accounting” goodwill. The FTT reiterated the concept that legal goodwill is inseparable from the business out of which it arises and held that the legal goodwill relating to the MCP business belonged to MCP, not MPHL, notwithstanding any contractual provision to the contrary. The FTT emphasised that GAAP requires an assessment of substance over form and the commercial reality was that the business was that of MCP, not MPHL.

On this basis, MPHL was not entitled to recognise purchased goodwill in its accounts under GAAP and the corresponding tax deductions were not allowable.

Comment

The judgment provides important guidance on the interaction between UK GAAP and the intangible fixed assets regime and underscores the importance of substance-over-form analysis in determining GAAP compliance. Recognition of purchased goodwill depends on acquiring a business – not merely its assets – and retaining decision-making control  over its operations and economic benefits. Transferring operational control to another entity, even if that entity sits within the same group, may preclude the recognition of goodwill.

  1. County Insurance Services: timing of goodwill creation

Background

The Appellant, a specialist insurance broker, incorporated in 2013 and acquired the trade and assets of a related insurance partnership (the Partnership), including goodwill valued at £1.32 million. HMRC disallowed amortisation deductions for several accounting periods, issuing assessments totalling c.£107,000.

Issue

The case turned on whether the goodwill acquired in 2013 was an asset created on or after 1 April 2002  (which is a requirement to fall within the intangibles regime). Under section 884 CTA 2009, goodwill is treated as created before 1 April 2002 if the business was carried on at any time before that date by the related party. The Partnership had been operating since 1984. However the Appellant argued that significant changes in 2006/7 – such as disposal of its Independent Financial Adviser (IFA) arm, relocation from a high street to a business park, and a shift towards wholesale brokerage rather than retail – amounted to a cessation of the old business and commencement of a new one. HMRC disagreed, contending that these changes were part of the natural evolution of the same business.

Decision

The FTT dismissed the appeal, finding that the Partnership’s business prior to 1 April 2002 continued, albeit with a shift in emphasis. Although the IFA arm was sold and wholesale broking introduced, these changes represented a natural evolution rather than a “sudden and dramatic” termination and the start of a new business. Consistency in staff numbers, turnover, and ongoing insurance activities reinforced this conclusion. Accordingly, the goodwill was treated as created before 1 April 2002 and fell outside the scope of the intangibles regime with amortisation deductions therefore not allowable.

Comment

The FTT emphasised that businesses often evolve, but such changes do not necessarily amount to cessation. It is important to assess carefully whether changes are incremental or fundamental, as the latter is required to “reset” the goodwill creation date. The FTT’s discussion of when there is a cessation of a trade and cases such as Rolls Royce is also useful, as these are cases that are often considered in the context of the restrictions on corporation tax loss relief where businesses are usually seeking to argue the opposite – that there has been no such cessation or change in the nature of a trade.

Watts v HMRC: Further applications of the Ramsay principle

Summary

The Court of Appeal has dismissed an appeal concerning a claim for income tax relief on losses arising from transactions in gilt strips. This is another decision in the line that shows the willingness of the courts to look at the overall purpose of taxing legislation when faced with arguments based on the very particular wording of a particular statutory provision, following the Ramsay case and more recently the Supreme Court decision in Rossendale. A scheme based on a very specific interpretation of a detailed set of legislative provisions was held not to give a taxpayer a tax loss where no economic loss had in fact occurred.

Background

Finance Act 1996 (FA 1996) used to contain specific rules dealing with the way in which an individual would be taxed on transactions in gilt strips. In particular, paragraph 14A Schedule 13 FA 1996 was introduced to enable individual to claim a tax loss in respect of certain types of loss suffered in relation to transactions in gilt strips. These rules provided that a loss sustained on a transfer of a strip would be given tax relief where “the amount paid by him for the strip exceeds the amount payable on the transfer, with the amount of the relief being the amount of that excess.

In 2003, Mr Watts entered into a tax planning scheme under which he purchased a UK Treasury gilt strip for £1.5 million using a short-term loan. As part of the scheme, Mr Watts created a trust of which he was a life tenant and beneficiary. He granted the trust an option to purchase the gilt strip for an exercise price of £150,400 and received £1,338,749 for the grant of the option (the Option).

The trust subsequently assigned the Option to a third party for £1,347,049. The third party exercised the Option, paying Mr Watts £150,400, bringing its total payment to acquire the gilt strip to £1,497,449.

Mr Watts received a total sum of £1,498,149 in respect of the grant and exercise of the Option and claimed a loss of £1,349,600 under paragraph 14A, arguing that the amount “payable on the transfer” and hence to be taken into account in the calculation under paragraph 14A was only the exercise price of £150,400. HMRC denied the relief.

Upper Tribunal and First-tier Tribunal Decisions

Both the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (UT) dismissed Mr Watts’s appeal. The key issue for the FTT and the UT to consider was the extent to which Mr Watts had sustained a loss for the purposes of paragraph 14A. The tribunals applied a purposive interpretation of the legislation concluding that the concept of “loss” or ‘amount payable on the transfer’ would not extend to an artificial loss devoid of commercial or economic reality, when viewing the overall purpose of the relevant legislation.

They held that the phrase “amount payable on the transfer” should be interpreted broadly to include both the payment for the assignment of the Option and the payment on its exercise.

The FTT concluded that the allowable loss was £6,300, reflecting the minor difference between the purchase price and the total amount received by Mr Watts.

Court of Appeal Decision

Mr Watts appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The court upheld the decisions of the tribunals and dismissed the appeal.

The court held that the transfer of the gilt strip from Mr Watts to the third party was effected by means of a unified, composite, transaction, having more than one stage and thus to apply the statute to only one of those stages would be to take an inadmissibly blinkered view. The third party was firstly required to take the assignment of the Option and then secondly to exercise it. It stated that it would be unduly artificial to view that the third party only had to pay £150,000 on (i.e. in return for) the transfer of the gilt strip, when in reality it had to pay close to £1.5 million to acquire it.

The court emphasised that Parliament cannot realistically have intended to allow taxpayers to generate artificial losses by splitting payments across multiple steps in a pre-ordained scheme.

The court clarified that the absence of express anti-avoidance provisions in the legislation did not exclude the application of the Ramsay1 approach to interpretation. The court also clarified that paragraph 14A does not call for an examination of the precise moment at which title passed according to the principles of property law and so discussion of the payment made in return for the actual transfer of the interest in the gilt strip was not necessary.

The court considered a number of previous cases on the interpretation of tax statutes in the context of tax avoidance transactions and considered that the approach taken by the UT was consistent with those cases.

Impact and Significance

Like Ramsay itself, this decision confirms that tax relief under specific statutory provisions applies only to genuine economic losses and not to losses generated through artificial arrangements where it is clear that the context of the relevant statute intended this result. The type of avoidance transaction that took place around the time that the transactions in this case took place typically relied on a specific interpretation of the specific language of a taxing statute. The architects of such schemes would argue that, given the complexity of the tax code as a whole, it was appropriate to examine the specific language in each part of the relevant statutory provision in order to determine the tax payable. However, it is now clear that the courts will not accept such a semantic approach and will instead review the overall purpose of the legislation and the overall context of the transactions undertaken in determining whether the taxing provisions will apply. This is therefore a somewhat unsurprising decision.

It reinforces the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation and the Ramsay principle. For a more detailed analysis on the development and application of the Ramsay Principle please refer to our article “Ramsay revisited: six principles”.

AD Bly Groundworks v HMRC (2025): Further guidance on the “wholly and exclusively” test from the Court of Appeal where there is a tax motive

A recent Court of Appeal decision is a reminder that even where the legislation does not contain a targeted anti-avoidance rule (TAAR) or unallowable purpose language, a tax motive can still be relevant to the question of whether the expected tax outcome can be achieved. In AD Bly Groundworks & Civil Engineering Ltd & Anor v HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the court upheld the Upper Tribunal’s rejection of large pension-related provisions as allowable deductions, as they were not “wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the trade” but instead were utilised primarily to reduce tax liabilities.

Background

Two companies, AD Bly Groundworks & Civil Engineering Ltd and CHR Travel Ltd, entered into Unfunded Unapproved Retirement Benefit Schemes (UURBS) on the advice of external accountants. Under these arrangements (which had been notified to HMRC under the DOTAS legislation), the companies made contractual promises to employees and directors to provide future pension-style benefits. The benefits were unfunded; no separate trust, fund or assets were set aside to meet these future liabilities. The companies provided for the liabilities in their accounts and claimed a corporation tax deduction for them.

HMRC issued a closure notice disallowing the deductions on two grounds: first, that the liabilities were not incurred “wholly and exclusively for the purpose of a trade” within the meaning of section 54 of the Corporation Tax Act 2009 (CTA 2009) but rather for the purposes of a tax avoidance scheme; and that, the arrangement fell within the anti-avoidance restrictions on “employee benefit contributions” under section 1290 CTA 2009.

The First‑tier Tribunal (FTT) held that the deductions should be disallowed under section 54 CTA 2009, and this decision was upheld by the Upper Tribunal (UT) on appeal.

The Court of Appeal decision

The Court of Appeal affirmed the previous decisions of the FTT and UT. For the expenditure to be deductible, it has to be incurred “wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the trade”. In practical terms, this requires that the purpose of the expenditure must be for the commercial operations of the business, rather than being driven by securing a tax advantage.

The Court of Appeal endorsed the tribunals’ approach to the “wholly and exclusively” purpose test (affirming the test in Scott Atlantic Management Ltd v HMRC [2015]) as being driven by a factual purpose analysis. In doing so, it affirmed the tribunals’ reasoning for rejecting the challenge on the basis that:

  1. The UURBS arrangements were promoter-driven and adopted principally as a tax-saving device, and not part of a genuine remuneration or pension strategy;
  2. There was no contemporaneous evidence of pre-existing concern with pension provisions or remuneration policy before the scheme was introduced which would explain the amount or timing of the provisions; and
  3. The size and mechanics of the provisions were tied to a percentage of the profits, rather than a specific known amount; there was no discussion of whether the amount provided for was sufficient or in line with market expectations.

On this factual basis, the Court of Appeal agreed with the findings of both the FTT and UT that the object of adoption of the scheme was to reduce taxable profits, rather than remunerate or provide pension provisions. At best, it was found that the pension provision was incidental to the dominant tax-saving purpose.

The Court of Appeal also briefly considered, but ultimately rejected, HMRC’s alternative argument that deductions should be disallowed under section 1290 CTA 2009. The Court of Appeal held that the UURBS does not fall within section 1290 on any natural interpretation of that provision and section 1291 CTA 2009 and the reference to "property" in section 1291 cannot be read as extending to any of the company's own assets, present or future, that might in due course be used to satisfy the unsecured liabilities under the UURBS.

Impact and significance

The decision is perhaps unsurprising given the facts found by the FTT but serves as an important reminder that even without a TAAR, a tax saving motive can be a relevant factor when applying the “wholly and exclusively” test. Generally, the fact that a taxpayer expects to get a tax deduction for a payment will not of itself generally mean that payment cannot be regarded as being for the purposes of a trade. We have seen through the TAAR case law that if the relevant set of rules do contain a TAAR, there needs to be a balancing exercise to determine whether something has an unallowable purpose. However, this case is a reminder that in some (usually rare) circumstances, the facts can be such that the overwhelming tax drivers mean any argument that an expense is for the purposes of a trade is unsuccessful.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC [1982] AC 300

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