On 12 March 2026, Advocate General Medina delivered an opinion1 which, if followed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), may open the door for litigants in national proceedings to rely on a wider range of findings made by the European Commission (EC), beyond the markets or parties concerned by the litigation. The principle could extend to disputes over benchmarks in other industries and, absent guardrails, challenge national courts in their role as the finder of fact in competition litigation.

Dispute before the national court

In 2005, a borrower entered into a mortgage loan agreement with a lender in Italy. The agreement provided that the interest rate for the loan would be determined by reference to a third-party financial benchmark. In separate proceedings, agreements among several banks in the panel which was responsible for setting that benchmark were subsequently investigated by the EC, and found to have infringed EU competition rules prohibiting anti-competitive agreements between competitors.

The borrower brought proceedings against the lender in the District Court of Oristano seeking a recalculation of the interest rate on the mortgage loan and declaratory relief as to the credit owed to him. When the court rejected the claim at first instance, the borrower appealed to the Court of Appeal of Cagliari, which stayed the proceedings whilst a request for a preliminary ruling was sought from the CJEU concerning the legal effects of the EC’s infringement decision on the mortgage loan agreement.

As interpreted by the AG Medina, the question before the CJEU was whether the finding by the EC that an interest rate benchmark has been manipulated in a specific market, giving rise to an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, may render void a clause contained in an agreement concluded in a different market and referring to that benchmark during the infringement period. Under EU competition rules, agreements which infringe Article 101 TFEU are void, including as against third parties.

The Opinion noted certain limitations which successive judgments of the CJEU have introduced for that rule. For example, its application extends only to agreements that form part of the restrictive agreement to which the EC’s decision refers – either directly or, if otherwise, where they are necessary for the implementation of that agreement. These limits aim to “prevent a cascading effect” by adhering to the “principle that liability for infringements of EU competition rules is personal in nature”.

By contrast, the mortgage loan agreement in question was not concluded to implement or give effect to the restrictive agreement found by the EC in its infringement decision. AG Medina concluded that the mortgage loan agreement merely made reference to the third-party benchmark for the purpose of determining the variable interest rate applicable to the loan made to the claimant, and “bore no relation to the unlawful conduct established by the Commission”.

Probative value of the EC’s decision

Although AG Medina concluded that the EC’s decision did not have legal effect of rendering void the mortgage loan agreement, she was much more reluctant to find that the decision had no evidentiary value in the proceedings before the national court. In this regard, Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 (Article 16) precludes national courts, when ruling on agreements under Article 101 TFEU, from adopting decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the EC.

In her Opinion, AG Medina advised that Article 16 codifies the CJEU’s case law regarding the principle of legal certainty, and that the uniform application of EU competition rules requires that conflicting decisions be avoided.  In the context of a civil action for damages, national courts are bound by the EC’s findings that an agreement is prohibited, as well as the temporal and geographic scope concerning the liability of the companies investigated in relation to the conduct at issue.

On AG Medina’s analysis, however, the issue in dispute between the parties did not require the national court to make a ruling on an agreement under Article 101 TFEU. The issue therefore fell outside the scope of Article 16. As AG Medina also noted, the EC had made no finding of specific effects of the anti-competitive behaviour at stake, as it had concluded the conduct under investigation was a restriction “by object” (i.e., so inherently harmful to competition that the EC did not need to prove it did in fact have an anti-competitive impact on the market).

It is at this juncture that AG Medina, drawing on the principle of legal certainty, nonetheless rejected the proposition that the national court could disregard the EC’s decision, even when determining an issue entirely of national law to which Article 16 did not apply. She reasoned that acts of the EU institutions form an integral part of the Member States’ legal systems and so cannot be ignored in the context of litigation before national courts (moreover where, as here, the EC’s findings had been confirmed on appeal).

Our analysis

The novel point of law which arises in this case is whether the CJEU will extend the binding force of an EC decision in circumstances where the Opinion has concluded the ordinary provisions of EU law that bind national courts do not apply. Those provisions bind national courts when making a ruling under Article 101 TFEU in relation to an agreement which is already the subject of an EC decision. The key question for the CJEU will be whether national courts should also be bound in litigation proceedings with a much less direct connection to the EC decision.

According to the Opinion, the EU principle of legal certainty leads in essence to an outcome with similar legal consequences to Article 16, even where that provision does not apply to the dispute before the national court. AG Medina concluded that the principle requires national courts to take into account the factual and legal findings made in the EU proceedings when they are relevant to national disputes, even when such disputes are being decided outside the specific framework of EU law and relate to agreements that are separate to the agreement found by the EC to have restricted competition.

If followed by the CJEU in its judgment, the Opinion may open the door for litigants in proceedings before national courts to rely on a wider range of findings made by the EC, beyond the markets or parties concerned by the litigation. This is particularly important where the EC’s decision addresses specific effects of the conduct (a point of distinction from the facts which AG Medina observed in the present dispute). As regards benchmarks, such effects might include the extent of any rise or fall.

Second, the approach does not appear to be limited to financial benchmarks. Instead, it could extend to commodities benchmarks commonly used in relation to energy, metals, or agricultural products, if the EC has already adopted a decision.

The obligation in Article 16, which codifies the principle of legal certainty, does not only apply to adopted EC decisions, however. It also concerns EC decisions “contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated”, and so requires national courts to take into account ongoing investigations, even if at a relatively early stage. The Opinion could have repercussions for ongoing litigation, therefore, where EC enforcement policy shifts to address a sudden market shock affecting benchmarks2, and leads to a stay of proceedings by analogy with the provisions of Article 16.

Finally, assessing the probative value of EC findings for litigation proceedings having only a limited connection to the parties or markets which the EC’s decision concerns may pose significant challenges for national courts, as well as issues of procedural fairness for defendants, outside the guardrails otherwise imposed on claimants.3 This risk is increasingly relevant in competition litigation as claimants seek to introduce administrative or judicial findings from other proceedings to support their claims.

Next steps

The delivery of the Advocate General’s Opinion marks the formal end of the oral phrase of the preliminary ruling procedure, after which the judges begin their deliberations. While AG Opinions are advisory only, they are influential in the development of the CJEU’s case law. CJEU judgments are ordinarily delivered within months of the AG Opinion, which might be expected in this case during the second half of 2026.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Opinion of AG Medina delivered on 12 March 2026, SR v FT SpA, Case C-60/25, ECLIC:2026:199 (the Opinion) (link here).

  2. 2

    For a recent statement regarding such shocks, see the speech delivered on 12 March 2026 by Teresa Ribera (EC Vice-President and Commissioner for Clean, Just, and Competitive Transition) regarding oil benchmarks (link here).

  3. 3

    See the Opinion at paragraphs 29 and 35 concerning the limits of the rule deriving from Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003.

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