In Tonzip Maritime (Singapore) PTE Ltd (formerly Tonzip Maritime Ltd) v 2 Rivers PTE Ltd (formerly Coral Energy PTE Ltd) (The “Catalan Sea”) [2026] EWCA Civ 641, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by Owners, finding that they were entitled to refuse Charterers’ orders because, in the Owners’ reasonable judgement, compliance with those orders would “expose” them to a “real risk” of sanctions liability.

In considering whether the Owners’ judgement was reasonable, the Court treated the Owners’ decision-makers as “one voice” and assessed their judgement against all the material available to them.

This is a welcome decision for Owners navigating sanctions risk under time pressure and, often, with limited information.

Facts

The dispute concerned a charterparty on an amended ExxonMobil VOY2005 Form (containing an EPS Sanctions Clause) for the carriage of oil from Russia to Turkey.

During the charter, the Owners learned that the shipper was Neftisa, a Russian company, and subsequently carried out sanctions screening checks. The report from these screening checks revealed that Neftisa was “associated to a sanctioned individual”, Mr Gutseriev.

The report also contained links to sources which included a Kommersant article reporting that Mr Gutseriev had transferred the ultimate beneficial ownership of Neftisa to his brother around the time that Mr Gutseriev was sanctioned. The Owners did not click on these links.

Sub-clause (c) of the EPS Sanctions Clause in the charterparty provided: “Owners shall not be obliged to comply with any orders…which in the reasonable judgement of the Owners is prohibited by sanctions or will expose the Owners, the vessel or its managers, crew, the vessel’s insurers or reinsurers to sanctions. In the event that such risk arises in relation to a voyage the vessel is performing, the owners shall be entitled to refuse further performance and the Charterers shall be obliged to provide alternative voyage orders” (sub-clause (c)).

The Owners refused to load the cargo on this basis, and, in an attempt to change their minds, the Charterers provided various documentation. This included a letter on Neftisa headed paper; and copies of legal opinions from the Moscow offices of Herbert Smith Freehills LLP and Baker McKenzie LLP.

The Owners remained unpersuaded and maintained their refusal to load the cargo.

In response, the Charterers purported to cancel the charterparty, which the Owners treated as a repudiatory breach and sued for damages.

High Court

The Judge rejected the Charterers’ argument that the Owners had to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that sanctions would be breached before they could refuse an order. Instead, the Court held that the natural and ordinary meaning of sub-clause (c) was that a reasonable apprehension of sanctions risk was sufficient.

However, the Court dismissed the claim finding that no such reasonable apprehension had in fact arisen on the evidence.

For more detail on the High Court decision, see our briefing at Spotlight on sanctions: Enforcement, judicial developments and policy shifts | United Kingdom | Global law firm | Norton Rose Fulbright.

Court of Appeal

The Owners appealed and the Charterers cross appealed.

Key Issues:

  1. What was the natural and ordinary meaning of sub-clause (c)?
  2. Had the Judge erred in concluding that the Owners’ judgement was not reasonable?

Natural and ordinary meaning of sub-clause (c) of the EPS Sanctions Clause

The central question was whether “will expose the Owners to sanctions” required the Owners to have concluded, on the balance of probabilities that sanctions would be contravened (the Charterers’ position and basis of their cross-appeal).

The Owners argued that it was sufficient that they had reasonably judged there to be a real risk of a breach of sanctions if they complied with the order.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Owners and dismissed the cross appeal. Notably, sub-clause (c) distinguished between orders that were “prohibited by sanctions” and orders that would “expose” Owners to sanctions. For the former, the Court accepted that this involved a reasonable determination on the part of the Owners that the voyage was more likely than not to trigger the application of sanctions. The latter, however, required a reasonable judgement that compliance would “expose” the Owners to sanctions and this was a judgement as to something different.

Further, sub-clause (c) addressed both the scenario in which the sanctions issue had arisen when the order was given, or before compliance, and the scenario in which the Owners were already complying with the order when the sanctions issue arose. For the latter, sub-clause (c) specified that “in the event such risk arises in relation to a voyage the vessel is performing…” The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court that this “such risk” wording was strong support for the Owners’ construction: they did not have to reach a judgement that sanctions would, more likely than not, be contravened; a reasonable judgement that there was a real risk was sufficient.

The Court also placed weight on the commercial context in which sub-clause (c) operated. Owners must often make decisions based on limited information and under time pressure, in circumstances where sanctions issues are not straightforward and can be dependent on facts that are not publicly available. Against this background, the Court of Appeal found it commercially unlikely that the parties had intended to restrict Owners’ ability to act to circumstances where they could establish, on the balance of probabilities, that sanctions would be breached.

Reasonableness of the Owners’ Judgement

The Court of Appeal found that the Judge at first instance had erred in concluding that the judgement of the Owners as to the existence of a sanctions risk could not have been reasonable if the Owners had not also reached a positive conclusion that Mr Gutseriev’s control of Neftisa continued.

The correct test was whether the judgement of the Owners, that following the order would have given rise to a real risk of sanctions liability, was an objectively reasonable one.

The Court of Appeal assessed the information before the Owners and concluded that the Owners’ judgement was reasonable. Specifically:

  • Mr Gutseriev had had a majority ownership in Neftisa, the transfer to a family member could create a risk of non-arms’ length dealing, there was no information on the consideration (if any) received for this transfer and the Refinitiv report obtained by the Owners stated that Neftisa was associated to a sanctioned individual.
  • The package of information provided by the Charterers was dependent on factual assumptions (while the risk of exposure depended on whether those assumptions were correct or not) and did not offer an independent perspective.

Taking into account further information (which had informed the Judge’s decision at first instance) did not alter the reasonableness of the Owners’ judgement. An Infospectrum report only offered a tentatively more positive assessment on unsourced terms, while a Kommersant article clearly flagged a sanctions risk perceived by some lawyers.

Taken as a whole, the information before the Owners’ decision makers clearly flagged a real risk of sanctions exposure.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision in this case provides important clarification on the operation of sanctions clauses in charterparties. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the operation is heavily dependent on the precise wording used, and as such careful drafting is significant. When the wording requires a reasonableness assessment, the Court will consider the information available to the Owners’ decision-makers as well as the commercial reality that decisions must often be made under time pressure and with incomplete information.

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