Background
Asset‑freezing obligations are set out in various sanctions regulations of the European Union. In essence, these rules require the freezing of all funds and economic resources that belong to, or are owned, held, or controlled by, a designated person. While this obligation appears straightforward at first glance, its practical implementation frequently gives rise to complex questions of interpretation. Examples include:
- Must assets be frozen even if they belong to a non‑designated company, but that company has a designated shareholder?
- Does the freezing of a designated person’s depositary receipts prevent that person from attending and voting at a general meeting of depositary receipt holders?
These examples illustrate a broader challenge: asset-freezing obligations are not always interpreted uniformly. In practice, national competent authorities across EU Member States have, in certain instances, adopted differing approaches to the scope and effects of such measures. This divergence in interpretation adds a further layer of legal uncertainty for market participants seeking to ensure compliance.
The need for clarity on such complex issues of interpretation has become even more pressing following the adoption of Directive (EU) 2024/1226 (the “EU Sanctions Directive”) in April 2024. The EU Sanctions Directive established EU‑wide minimum rules on criminal penalties for sanctions violations. Under these rules, intentional breaches of asset‑freezing obligations must now be prosecuted as criminal offences in all EU Member States. In Germany, for instance, intentional violations may result in imprisonment ranging from three months to five years (cf. Section 18 para. 1 no. 2 of the German Foreign Trade Act; see our latest update here).
On 12 March 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) addressed both of the above questions in its judgments in Cases C‑84/24 (EM System) and C‑465/24 (SBK Art), which were delivered in preliminary ruling proceedings under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”). The key aspects of the two CJEU judgments are summarised below.
CJEU Judgment C 84/24 – EM System (12 March 2026)
In 2020, two banks froze the accounts of the Lithuanian company EM System. EM System itself was not designated; however, its 50% shareholder had been added to Annex I of the EU’s Belarus sanctions Regulation (EC) No. 765/2006. EM System challenged the measure before the Lithuanian courts, which ultimately referred several questions on the interpretation of the asset freezing obligation to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU. The central question was whether the assets deposited in the bank accounts of a non‑designated company (here: EM System) must be frozen when a designated shareholder holds 50% of its shares.
In its judgment of 12 March 2026, the CJEU clarified this point, holding that “[…] assets deposited in the bank accounts of a company which is not included on the list in Annex I to that regulation but in which a person included on that list has a 50% shareholding must be presumed to be funds held or controlled by that person and, therefore, must be frozen […].” The CJEU accordingly indicated that a 50% shareholding by a designated person gives rise to a presumption that the freezing obligation is triggered. At the same time, however, the CJEU stressed that, where a non‑designated person’s funds have been frozen on the grounds that they are presumed to be held or controlled by a designated person, they must be afforded an effective opportunity to challenge the freezing measure before the competent national authorities and, where necessary, subsequently before the national courts. According to the CJEU, this is essential to safeguard the non designated person’s right to effective judicial protection. Against this background, the judgment reflects a broad interpretation of the EU’s asset freezing obligations and clarifies that, under certain conditions, the assets of non designated entities may also fall within the scope of the freezing requirement. For companies, banks and other entities subject to the scope of EU sanctions, this means that they may need to integrate these new broad presumptions and requirements into their internal processes, carry out detailed ownership and control assessments of business partners, and implement enhanced sanction-related due diligence measures.
Beyond this substantive clarification, another noteworthy aspect of the judgment is the CJEU’s express reliance on the Council’s “Sanctions Guidelines” and “Best Practices” when interpreting the scope of the freezing obligation. This approach appears reasonable, as the Council is primarily responsible for adopting EU sanctions regulations, and its interpretive materials may therefore provide more direct insight into the legislator’s intention than guidance issued by other EU institutions. In Case C‑109/23 (Jemerak), Advocate General Laila Medina even stated in her Opinion that the European Commission’s extensive sanctions FAQs were “of no consequence”. Overall, the EM System judgment is therefore likely to reinforce the central role of the Council’s interpretive instruments in the practical application of EU sanctions law.
It also remains to be seen if national authorities will update their own sanctions guidance in light of the new CJEU judgment. The Deutsche Bundesbank – the competent authority for financial sanctions in Germany – has already referred in its sanctions FAQs to the pending “EM System” case before the CJEU, making it particularly interesting to observe if, and how, it will adjust its interpretative guidance in response.
CJEU Judgment C 465/24 – SBK Art (12 March 2026)
In 2022, a Dutch trust foundation administering shares in the Croatian Fortenova Group refused to allow SBK Art – an indirect subsidiary of Sberbank, which had been listed in Annex I to the EU’s Russia sanctions Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 – to attend and vote at meetings of depositary receipt holders. SBK Art held a substantial share (below 50%) of the depositary receipts. The Dutch trust foundation took the view that allowing a designated person (or an associated entity) to exercise meeting and voting rights attached to depositary receipts would constitute a prohibited “use of funds” under the EU’s asset-freezing obligations. After conflicting decisions from the courts in the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court, Netherlands) referred two questions to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU: (i) whether the “freezing of funds” prevents the exercise of participation and voting rights attached to depositary receipts, and (ii) whether the nature of the agenda items or the holder's intended vote are relevant.
In its judgment of 12 March 2026, the CJEU first clarified that depositary receipts are “funds” within the meaning of Article 1(g)(iii) of Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014. The CJEU then held that the exercise of rights attached to those instruments – specifically, the rights to attend and vote in meetings – amounts to a “use of funds” within the meaning of Article 1(f) of Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014. Adopting a broad interpretation, the CJEU reasoned that voting, even indirectly, entails consequences for the underlying funds. This is because decisions at such meetings affect the company's functioning and the estimated value of the instruments held. The asset-freezing obligation therefore prevents, in the CJEU’s words, "absolutely and unconditionally" a designated person or associated entity or person from exercising participation and voting rights.
In this context, the CJEU rejected two narrower interpretations. First, it dismissed prohibiting voting only where specific agenda items could change the frozen funds because the effects of a vote on fund value may not be easily ascertainable, risking the sanctions' effectiveness. Second, the CJEU rejected conditioning the prohibition on the holder's declared voting intention because voting rights are exercised freely and a sanctioned holder cannot be bound to vote as indicated. On proportionality, the CJEU acknowledged the significant interference with the right to property under Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but held this is inherent in restrictive measures, which are temporary and reversible, and justified by the objective of maintaining peace and international security. The CJEU also pointed to the derogation mechanisms in Articles 2a and 4 to 7 of Regulation (EU) No. 269/2014 as a safeguard for affected persons.
In essence, the CJEU establishes that asset-freezing obligations extend beyond the mere disposal or transfer of assets to encompass governance rights attached to financial instruments. More broadly, the judgment underscores the need for robust sanctions screening and may require adjustments to corporate governance frameworks where designated investors are involved.
Outlook
The CJEU’s judgments of 12 March 2026 in EM System (C-84/24) and SBK Art (C-465/24) both clarify and broaden the scope of EU asset-freezing obligations. In both cases, the CJEU adopted a purposive interpretation aimed at safeguarding the effectiveness of EU sanctions. For companies, the combined effect of these CJEU judgments is likely to result in increased efforts to review ownership and control structures, governance frameworks and sanction-related controls. Companies with designated shareholders may need to undertake more detailed analyses of control arrangements and be prepared to provide evidence capable of rebutting presumptions of control where relevant. At the same time, they must ensure that designated persons are excluded from relevant forms of participation in governance processes. Overall, the decisions mark a shift towards greater legal certainty, but also towards stricter compliance expectations, requiring market participants to adopt a more cautious approach to EU sanctions.