In Yuen v Li[2026] EWHC 532 (KB), the High Court has struck out a claim for conversion of a digital asset, rejecting the opportunity to develop English law further after the entry into force of the Property (Digital Assets etc) Act 2025 (the Act).

Background

The claim concerned a large amount of bitcoin allegedly moved from a cold wallet by the owner’s wife during the breakdown of their marriage. The bitcoin was now distributed over a large number of wallets to which the husband did not have access.

The owner sought to recover his bitcoin or compensation. The problem he faced was that English law has no single remedy for infringement of proprietary rights. Instead, there are several causes of action available in different overlapping circumstances. As digital assets are a new type of property, the appropriate cause of action was not clear, so the owner pleaded multiple causes of action including conversion, unjust enrichment, causing loss by unlawful means and proprietary restitution.

Decision

Cotter J, giving the judgment of the High Court, struck out the claim for conversion. This is a curious result: given the novelty of the situation, with proprietary remedies being considered for the first time since the entry into force of the Act, and the uncertainty as to what cause of action is appropriate.

In particular:

  • Cotter J held that OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, which held that conversion did not apply to choses in action, was “a clear block” to extending conversion to digital assets. The obvious, indeed almost unavoidable, response to this is that digital assets are not choses in action, the purpose of the Act is precisely to distinguish between those types of property and that a decision given not only before the Act but before the creation of bitcoin can hardly be authority for a rule on digital assets. Apart from this, the principal argument in OBG v Allan against the extension of conversion to choses in action was that conversion should not apply to pure economic loss. But removal of digital assets may cause loss other than pure economic loss. In this, digital assets resemble choses in possession more than choses in action. Accordingly, the reasoning in OBG v Allan, if applied to digital assets, would not necessarily preclude the application of conversion.
  • Cotter J considered that he was following the recommendations of the Law Commission in their Reports on Digital Assets to deny the applicability of conversion. But, in fact, striking out the claim is the exact opposite of what the Reports suggest. The final Report states that ‘wholesale’ application of conversion to digital assets through a further statute would not be desirable. Rather, it suggests that new principles of tortious liability should be developed by judges, drawing on or by analogy with the existing rules on conversion. The passage of the Act is intended precisely to enable this judge-led incremental development. Striking out a conversion cause of action is contrary to this approach.
  • Striking out one cause of action does not remove the confusion as to which is applicable. Cotter J referred to previous authorities such as AA v Persons Unknown [2019] EWHC 3556 and Jones v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 2443 and the variety of remedies that were apparently available: “causes of action used were deceit, unjust enrichment and … a constructive trust. The court also ordered a propriety [sic] injunction.” (para. 58). But the approach used in these interim applications was later doubted by Piroozzadeh v Persons Unknown [2023] EWHC 1024 (Ch), which highlighted the uncertainty as to the appropriate form of proprietary relief.
  • Cotter J recognised that this confusion leads to difficulties in knowing how to plead a claim that would develop by analogy with conversion. He appeared undecided as to whether a new cause of action was needed: “the need for such a cause of action is currently unclear to me” (para. 75). His mooted alternative was ‘proprietary restitution’ and he agreed “it would offend common understanding of property rights (and the analysis of the Commission) were the Claimant not not [sic] able to gain recovery of the Bitcoin [sic] … and/or damages for its value” (para. 77). But he does not appear to realise that proprietary restitution might not be available given how the bitcoin have been transferred and stored, noting elsewhere that “the bitcoin storage is not a familiar area to me” (para. 85).
  • Striking out conversion leaves a clear gap in the available remedies – the claimant may end up with no recourse at all. The causes of action that Cotter J allowed to proceed depend on the defendant still having access to the new bitcoin wallets. There is no cause of action that clearly applies if nobody now has access to the new wallets – if the bitcoin has been ‘burned’. Given the early stage of proceedings, this set of facts cannot be excluded and, in any case, may occur in a future dispute.

Key takeaways

Overall, striking out the conversion claim is an unfortunate course of action. Following the entry into force of the Act, we are reliant on informed judicial development of the common law. The opportunity here was to start that development in an area that the Law Commission has specifically identified as needing new and carefully calibrated rules. If England is to thrive as a jurisdiction of choice for the digital asset ecosystem, opportunities to do so must not be lost.

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