Washington is lifting Belarus sanctions – Brussels is not. Since September 2025, the United States has progressively lifted sanctions on Belarus, exchanging relief for the release of political prisoners. The European Union has not followed suit. The result is a widening transatlantic disparity that multinational companies should not overlook: a transaction cleared by the Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) can still trigger asset-freeze violations, import bans, and circumvention liability under EU law. This briefing maps the key divergences – potash, aviation, banking, trade restrictions, and Russia-related circumvention risk – and sets out what companies with any EU nexus need to know before acting on U.S. sanctions relief.
Introduction
EU sanctions against Belarus have been in place since 2004, initially targeting officials linked to the disappearance of opposition figures. The United States introduced its first measures in 2006 against individuals undermining democratic processes. Both regimes tightened and eased sanctions at various points between 2008 and 2021 in response to political developments.
Since 2022, sanctions have been significantly expanded due to Belarus’s logistical and territorial support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including allowing Russian troops to operate from Belarusian territory. While the EU has adopted sanctions packages that largely mirror its Russia sanctions regime, the United States has substantially broadened its measures against Belarus.
The U.S. has recently eased restrictions under specific conditions: In September 2025, OFAC issued General License (GL) 11, authorizing all transactions involving Belavia, Belarus’s national airline, following the release of 52 political prisoners. Belavia was formally removed from the SDN List in November 2025, alongside GL 12 (concerning Lukashenko’s presidential aircraft). In December 2025, GL 13 authorized transactions with Belaruskali, Belarusian Potash Company (BPC), and Agrorozkvit. On 26 March 2026, OFAC issued a sweeping package that included the delisting of the three potash entities from the SDN List, the rescission of Directive 1 under EO 14038 (sovereign debt restrictions), and GL 14 authorizing transactions with Belinvestbank. Each round of easing followed Belarusian prisoner releases – most recently approximately 250 prisoners in March 2026. The stated U.S. objective is to secure the release of 900 additional prisoners, which could lead to the removal of roughly 80% of U.S. sanctions on Belarus.
The European Union, by contrast, continues to apply a comprehensive and consistent sanctions regime. Belavia and the three potash entities, for instance, remain subject to asset freeze restrictions under EU sanctions.
This raises an important question: How would ongoing business operations and new investments in Belarus, following the recent and potential further easing of U.S. sanctions, be treated under EU sanctions law?
Core areas of U.S. easing, EU divergence and consequences for multinationals
- Potash
U.S. Easing: In December 2025, OFAC issued GL 13 authorizing transactions with Belaruskali, BPC, and Agrorozkvit. On 26 March 2026, all three entities were formally removed from the SDN List.
EU Divergence: The EU’s position remains unchanged. EU law still bans the import, purchase, or transfer of Belarusian potash into the EU. All three entities – Belaruskali, BPC, and Agrorozkvit (as a BPC subsidiary caught by the EU’s ownership and control rules) – remain subject to EU asset freezes. This means that EU persons cannot make funds or economic resources available to them, regardless of the U.S. delisting.
Consequences: In practice, U.S. delisting does not restore market access for companies with any EU nexus. Any business that relies on EU-based banks, insurers, or shipping agents remains prohibited from transacting with these Belarusian potash entities, as EU sanctions continue to apply in full. Third-country buyers also face reputational risks when sourcing potash through these channels.
- Belavia
US Easing: In September 2025, OFAC issued GL 11, authorizing all transactions involving Belavia. Separately, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) restored the airline’s access to Boeing spare parts and maintenance services.
EU Divergence: The EU continues to prohibit all Belarusian carriers from entering or overflying EU airspace, a measure imposed in June 2021 following the forced diversion of Ryanair flight FR4978 and the arrest of journalist Raman Pratasevich. Belavia has been designated under EU asset-freeze sanctions since December 2021, which prevents European lessors, insurers, and maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) providers from conducting any business with the airline. This restriction is reinforced by the fact that the principal aviation insurance and reinsurance markets are located in the EU and the UK.
Consequences: European aviation lessors and insurers that are domiciled in London, Dublin, and continental centres are prohibited from providing aircraft, insurance, or maintenance services to Belavia. The airline is excluded from EU airspace, which removes its most commercially significant pre-sanctions routes and requires circuitous routing for westbound or southbound flights. Following the imposition of EU sanctions, Belavia’s fleet was reduced from approximately 30 aircraft to around 19. Fleet renewal through Western channels remains unavailable.
- Belinvestbank
US Easing: OFAC GL 14 (26 March 2026) authorized all transactions with Belinvestbank, Belinvest-Engineering, CJSC Belbizneslizing, and their subsidiaries indefinitely. Concurrently, OFAC rescinded Directive 1 under EO 14038, lifting the prohibition on dealings in Belarusian sovereign debt with maturity exceeding 90 days issued by the Ministry of Finance and the Development Bank of the Republic of Belarus.
EU Divergence: In March 2022, the EU prohibited SWIFT services to Belagroprombank, Bank Dabrabyt, and the Development Bank; Belinvestbank was added in June 2022. In July 2025, the EU converted these restrictions into a prohibition on any transaction with these Belarusian credit institutions or Belarusian entities more than 50% owned by them. In October 2025, the EU added BelVEB, Belgazprombank, Alfa-Bank (Belarus), Sber Bank (Belarus) and VTB Bank (Belarus) to the sanctions list under the Russia sanctions regime, bringing nine Belarusian banks under a total transaction ban. The EU also continues to prohibit dealings in Belarusian sovereign debt with maturity exceeding 90 days issued after 29 June 2021.
Consequences: Dollar-denominated transactions authorized by OFAC cannot clear through Euroclear, Clearstream, or any EU-regulated correspondent bank. Multinational banks with EU branches face conflicting obligations: the U.S. permits these transactions, but the EU prohibits them. Most global banks will default to the more restrictive regime. On sovereign debt, European clearing and settlement systems remain unavailable for newly issued Belarusian sovereign instruments. Investors with EU-regulated custodians or fund structures cannot hold such instruments regardless of OFAC’s position.
- Business Services and Trade Bans
US Easing: The US has not imposed a blanket services ban on Belarus comparable to the EU regime, nor has it imposed comparable across-the-board trade bans on Belarusian commodities.
EU Divergence: Since June 2024, the EU has progressively aligned its Belarus sanctions with the Russia sanctions regime, significantly broadening both import and export restrictions. On the import side, the EU maintains bans on Belarusian crude oil, iron and steel, gold, diamonds, helium, coal, mineral products, cement, rubber, wood, and tobacco, and has extended these to mirror the expanding list of Russian-origin goods prohibited from entering the EU. On the export side, the EU imposes comprehensive bans on dual-use and advanced technology items, goods contributing to Belarusian industrial capacity, maritime navigation equipment, oil refining and LNG technology, aviation goods, and luxury goods, as well as related technical and financial assistance. The EU has also imposed a comprehensive ban on providing certain business services to the Belarusian government, including accounting, auditing, consulting, public relations, architectural, engineering, legal advisory, IT, advertising, and market research services, as well as specified software for enterprise management and industrial manufacture. In transport, the EU prohibits Belarusian road transport operators from operating within the EU, bans Belarusian ships from entering EU ports, and prohibits the transit of dual-use goods, military items, and other sensitive products via Belarus. The EU has also imposed mandatory “no-Belarus” clauses in contracts prohibiting the re-export of certain controlled goods to Belarus, and due diligence requirements on EU suppliers of common high-priority items.
Consequences: The alignment of EU import and export restrictions with the Russia sanctions regime means that an ever-widening range of goods can neither be imported from nor exported to Belarus by any EU person or from EU territory, even where no comparable U.S. restriction exists. This covers Belarusian-origin commodities on the import side, and dual-use items, industrial equipment, aviation components, and luxury goods on the export side. The EU services ban applies to EU-headquartered multinationals irrespective of the U.S. position. The EU import and transport bans on Belarusian goods and carriers remain fully enforceable regardless of the absence of equivalent U.S. trade restrictions. The mandatory “no-Belarus” clause creates direct contractual compliance obligations for third-country customers of EU suppliers.
Circumvention risks via the Eurasian Customs Union
The Eurasian Customs Union (established in 2010) between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan has substantially reduced customs border checks between Russia and Belarus. From a sanctions‑compliance perspective, this increases the practical risk that goods, technology, or funds that lawfully enter Belarus (including pursuant to any non‑EU sanctions relief) may subsequently be diverted onward into Russia (and vice versa), thereby potentially undermining the effectiveness of EU restrictive measures targeting Russia.
This is precisely the type of diversion and circumvention risk that the EU’s restrictive‑measures regimes for Belarus and Russia seek to prevent and mitigate through a coordinated approach. In particular, the EU has progressively aligned and reinforced key restrictive measures concerning Belarus in light of Belarus’s support for Russia’s actions, and it has also introduced measures addressing circumvention via Russia’s SWIFT equivalent, the System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). In addition, the EU has introduced parallel anti‑circumvention contractual requirements under which exporters – when exporting specified categories of sensitive goods and technology to most third countries – must impose contractual prohibitions on onward re‑export to Belarus and Russia.
Accordingly, supplies of controlled items to Belarus (or via Belarus) that are subsequently diverted onward into Russia can raise a broader compliance issue than “Belarus risk” alone: the same transaction may constitute circumvention of Russia‑related restrictive measures and may trigger both (i) breaches of the applicable substantive prohibitions (including restrictions on indirect supply) under the Russia regime and (ii) non‑compliance with mandatory contractual “no‑re‑export” safeguards required under both the Belarus and Russia regimes.
Conclusion and recommendations
The progressive easing of US sanctions on Belarus does not open a corresponding commercial window for companies with EU exposure. Across every sector examined in this briefing – potash, aviation, banking, and professional services – the EU’s restrictive measures remain fully in force. Belaruskali, BPC, and Agrorozkvit are still subject to EU asset freezes and potash import bans; Belavia remains excluded from EU airspace and cut off from European lessors, insurers, and MRO providers; Belinvestbank and eight other Belarusian banks are subject to comprehensive EU transaction bans that prevent clearing through Euroclear, Clearstream, or any EU-regulated correspondent bank; and EU services, trade, transport, and export and import prohibitions – the latter now comprehensively aligned with the Russia sanctions regime – apply irrespective of the absence of equivalent US measures. Any new investment or business activity in Belarus therefore requires strict compliance with EU regulations as an absolute precondition, and a strategic review of project structures – in particular to eliminate or ring-fence any EU nexus – is essential.
The practical implication is that companies with EU exposure must apply the "most restrictive rule" principle across jurisdictions. A transaction permissible under US law may still violate EU sanctions if any element – a bank, insurer, port, clearing system, counterparty, or beneficial owner – triggers EU jurisdiction. Because a substantial part of global financial, insurance, and logistics infrastructure is EU- or UK-regulated, the EU's position functions as the effective floor for multinational compliance programmes. The additional circumvention risk created by the Eurasian Customs Union – under which goods or funds lawfully entering Belarus may be diverted onward into Russia – reinforces the need for robust due diligence and contractual safeguards, including compliance with the EU’s mandatory “no-Belarus” and “no-Russia” re-export clauses.
Before acting on any U.S. sanctions relief, multinational companies should address the following questions:
- EU sanctions applicability: Does any element of the proposed transaction – including counterparties, financial intermediaries, insurers, ports, or clearing systems – trigger EU jurisdiction?
- Ring-fencing the EU nexus: Can the transaction be structured to exclude all EU-regulated elements – including EU-domiciled banks, insurers, lessors, clearing houses, and transport operators – so that EU restrictive measures are not engaged?
- Counterparty sanctions status: Has it been confirmed that the Belarusian counterparty (and its beneficial owners) is not subject to an EU asset freeze, transaction ban, or other designation under both the Belarus and Russia sanctions regimes?
- Controlled goods and services: Can the project proceed without exporting or importing any goods or technology subject to the EU’s comprehensive export and import restrictions which have been aligned with the Russia sanctions regime, without services subject to the EU professional services ban, and without reliance on EU-prohibited transport routes?
- Russia circumvention risk: Have risks of onward diversion to Russia via the Eurasian Customs Union been adequately assessed, including compliance with the EU’s mandatory “no-Russia” and “no-Belarus” contractual re-export clauses and due diligence obligations on common high-priority items?