Pleading the element of inducement for tortious interference with contract claims

In 1980, the New York Court of Appeals adopted §766 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the standard for a cause of action for tortious interference with contract in New York. Guard-Life v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg., 50 N.Y.2d 183, 189-90 (1980); see Alken Indus. v. Toxey Leonard & Assocs., 2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 31864(U), at *5 (Suffolk Co. Aug. 2, 2013). The Restatement defines tortious interference with contract as “intentionally and improperly interfer[ing] with the performance of a contract… between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §766 (Am. L. Inst. 1977). The requirement in this definition of “inducing or otherwise causing” the third person not to perform its contract has been extensively litigated in New York courts, which have required a somewhat heightened pleading standard for that element.

Read the full New York Law Journal article, "Pleading the element of inducement for tortious interference with contract claims."