In Credit Suisse Life (Bermuda) Ltd v Ivanishvili [2025] UKPC 53, the Privy Council made a significant change to the tort of deceit under English law. It held that a claimant does not need to prove conscious awareness of a representation in order to establish reliance. In this article, we set out the legal background to the tort of deceit, the key principles established in the Credit Suisse decision and the practical ramifications of the judgment.

To succeed in a claim of deceit, a claimant must prove:

  1. the defendant made a representation of fact or law (by words or conduct);
  2. the representation was false;
  3. it was made fraudulently;
  4. it was intended that the claimant would rely on it; and
  5. it caused the claimant to suffer loss.

A representation may be express (made in words) or implied (arising from conduct).

In recent years, English courts have increasingly suggested that, in cases of implied representations, a claimant must prove that they were consciously aware that a representation was being made at the time they acted. This development in the law can be seen in cases such as Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 1392 (Comm) and Leeds City Council v Barclays Bank plc [2021] EWHC 363 (Comm), where conscious awareness was treated as the “logical bridge” between representation and inducement/reliance.

Background to Credit Suisse

On the advice of his relationship manager, Mr Patrice Lescaudron, Mr Bidzina Ivanishvili (the former Prime Minister of Georgia) invested over US$750 million into two life insurance policies issued by Credit Suisse Life (CSL) (a Bermudan subsidiary of Credit Suisse). The policies were marketed as combining life cover with discretionary asset management provided by the Credit Suisse group.

However, Mr Lescaudron misappropriated these assets and concealed losses through fraudulent trading. Mr Ivanishvili brought a claim against CSL for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation.

At first instance, it was found that Mr Lescaudron’s recommendations impliedly represented that Credit Suisse was not managing, nor did it intend to manage, the accounts fraudulently. His actions were therefore found to be fraudulent.

However, the Bermuda Court of Appeal overturned this finding on misrepresentation. It held that the claim failed, as Mr Ivanishvili had failed to plead or prove that he was consciously aware of the implied representations. The Court of Appeal treated awareness as a necessary link between representation and reliance.

Privy Council decision

The decision was appealed to the Privy Council, who subsequently rejected the Court of Appeal’s approach. The Privy Council held that conscious awareness of a representation is not necessary to found a claim in deceit under English law.

The judgment emphasised that reliance involves two elements:

  1. The representation must cause the claimant to hold a false belief (reliance in belief); and
  2. The claimant must act on that belief to their detriment (reliance in action).

Although both elements of reliance require the representation to operate on the mind of the claimant, neither element requires the claimant to be consciously aware of the representation at the time they acted on it. The Privy Council observed that people frequently form and act on beliefs without any conscious awareness or thought. To insist that a claimant must have consciously decided something, undermines the purpose of the law of deceit.

The Privy Council illustrated this point with everyday examples, including a person on the street who puts their arm in the air to hail a taxi. By that conduct, the individual hailing the taxi makes a representation to the taxi driver that they can pay the fare. In a normal scenario, the driver would not pause to identify the representation. Instead, the driver assumes that payment will be made and acts on that assumption. This assumption is induced by the passenger’s conduct and might be exploited fraudulently, even though the taxi driver does not pause to consciously identify the representation.

The Privy Council identified several issues with the law’s previous position on misrepresentation. It rejected:

  1. the idea that awareness is the “bridge” between representation and reliance, as a representation may operate by subconsciously informing the individual’s actions; and
  2. that there is a distinction between acting on a representation and acting on an assumption.

A party may induce an assumption through conduct. The Privy Council also rejected an argument that conscious awareness is required to preserve the distinction between misrepresentation and non-disclosure claims. These can be distinguished by the defendant’s conduct rather than the claimant’s mental state.

The claim ultimately failed on limitation grounds.

Key takeaways

The Privy Council expressly stated that its conclusion applies to the law of England as well as to Bermuda.

The key points arising out of the judgment are:

  1. No requirement for conscious awareness: a claimant with a deceit claim does not need to prove that they were consciously aware of a representation being made at the time of acting.
  2. Reliance comprises two elements: neither “reliance in belief” nor “reliance in action” require contemporaneous conscious thought.
  3. Implied representations: conduct that induces a false belief can give rise to liability even where the claimant did not explicitly consider the representation.
  4. Causation focus: the key question is whether the defendant’s conduct caused the claimant to hold a false belief and to act upon it.
  5. Pleading implications: claimants are no longer required to plead conscious awareness.
  6. Technology: the Privy Council expressly acknowledged that misrepresentations may be made to machines rather than people. Where a system is designed to act automatically on input data, a person who knowingly inputs false data can be liable for deceit even if no human decision maker was consciously aware of the representation when the system responded. The requirement under the test is therefore satisfied by showing anticipatory reliance. The judgment opens the door to increased scrutiny of automated and algorithmic decision-making systems. Businesses will need to consider how they mitigate this risk going forward.
  7. A rise in deceit claims? This decision may lead to an increase in deceit claims. In particular, the decision is likely to have an impact on claims brought against banks and financial services providers, where claims stem from advice being provided rather than express statements. There may be a resurgence in the types of claims which have previously been defeated on awareness grounds (e.g., LIBOR and benchmark manipulation claims and mis-selling).

In addition, the decision may improve the prospects of certain shareholder claimants in securities litigation under s.90A and Schedule 10A Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 who allege they suffered loss because of misleading information in certain documents published by the issuer. In Allianz v Barclays PLC [2024] EWHC 2710 (Ch), the Court held that passive investors such as tracker funds who did not read the published information when deciding to buy, sell or hold a particular security could not satisfy the requirement of reliance in s.90A. It was not sufficient that the published information misled the market as a whole, causing the share price to become distorted, and they were influenced by that distorted market price when making their investment decision. This Privy Council decision potentially strengthens the position of these claimants as it confirms that reliance does not require conscious awareness of any representation; it is sufficient for the claimant to show that the defendant’s conduct caused the claimant to adopt a false belief and the claimant acted on it.

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