Introduction

The Capital Requirements Regulation 3 (CRR 3) is a key component of the European Union’s (EU) latest overhaul of the prudential rulebook for banks. Formally, it is Regulation (EU) 2024/1623, which amends the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013) to implement the final elements of the Basel III reforms in the EU. It revises requirements across credit risk, credit valuation adjustment (CVA) risk, operational risk, market risk and introduces the Basel “output floor”. It sits alongside a companion directive (CRD 6), Directive (EU) 2024/16191, which updates supervisory powers and related prudential governance.

Geopolitical risk

Neither the CRR 3 nor the CRD 6 introduce a new stand-alone Pillar capital charge labelled ‘geopolitical risk’. Instead, geopolitical risk is recognized and embedded in the new prudential framework in certain ways including:

  • Heightened prudential expectations around “geopolitical and trade risks”.
  • Impact on capital, exposures, and modelling under CRR 3.
  • The expansion of environmental, social and governance (ESG) risk requirements (including geopolitical drivers).

There are also certain indirect geopolitical components including the third country branch requirement.

This note examines these elements.

Heightened prudential expectations around “geopolitical and trade risks”

The CRD 6 amends the CRD 4 (Directive 2013/36/EU) in certain ways including by reinforcing the scope and intensity of the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP). Supervisors are expected to scrutinise how boards and senior management identify, measure and plan for forward‑looking risks, including those transmitted through geopolitics and trade (for example, supply‑chain disruption, sanctions exposure and cross‑border booking dependencies). The European Central Bank does not see geopolitical risk as a new risk but rather a cross-cutting risk driver that can have an impact on banks’ traditional risk categories.

The European Banking Authority’s (EBA) 2025 EU-wide stress test (the 2025 Stress Test) illustrated the supervisory focus: the adverse scenario was built around the escalation of geopolitical tensions and a turn towards protectionist trade policies, with knock‑on effects on energy and commodities and supply chains2. This is both a signal of supervisory priorities and - via the SREP - feeds into expectations for firms’ own internal capital/liquidity adequacy assessment processes (ICAAP / ILAAP) stress testing. Across the EBA's 2025 stress test results report and the accompanying Autumn 2025 Risk Assessment Report (RAR), there is a chain of reasoning running from geopolitical and geoeconomic risk drivers through to banks' projected loss profiles and, ultimately, to supervisory action via the SREP.

Capital, exposures and modelling

Geopolitical risk impacts the output floor, the revised credit‑risk framework, and the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) market‑risk framework. Shocks from sanctions, supply‑chain disruption, abrupt trade policy shifts can increase standardised risk weights, decline model inputs (probability of default / loss given default), and degrade market liquidity.

The 2025 Stress Test is a key source3, because it was conducted under a geopolitically driven adverse scenario and was the first exercise run under the new CRR 3 framework, which introduced the output floor. A key insight running from the test was that, while the output floor is not yet binding on a transitional basis, a severe geopolitical stress would inflate IRB credit risk RWA4, bringing institutions closer to or past the output floor threshold on a fully loaded basis, with material consequences for capital adequacy and the SREP. The results showed that under the adverse scenario's geopolitical narrative, the output floor was not binding for any bank on a transitional basis.  However, on a fully loaded basis (i.e. assuming the 72.5% floor was already in force), the output floor would start to bind some banks, resulting in larger aggregate RWAs.  The EBA reported that the fully loaded CRR 3 restatement reduced the aggregate Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio by approximately 129 basis points, of which around 110 basis points - roughly 85% - was attributable to the output floor.

The 2025 Stress Test also provides evidence that when geopolitical tensions and trade barriers intensify, banks’ credit risk measurably worsens, especially in export‑oriented and supply‑chain‑dependent sectors5. The exercise provided clear, quantified evidence that when geopolitical tensions and trade barriers intensify — as modelled in the adverse scenario — banks' credit risk measurably worsens, with total credit losses of EUR 394 billion and a 437 basis point capital depletion impact from credit risk alone. The sectoral analysis demonstrated that the impact on export-oriented and supply-chain-dependent sectors accounted for 39% of non-financial corporation exposures.

One of the visible aspects of geopolitics has been the fragmented timing of the implementation of the FRTB. The FRTB was designed as a globally harmonised market risk framework, but its rollout has not been synchronised. Some jurisdictions — such as Japan, Canada, and parts of Asia — are already live, whilst the EU is targeting 2027 and the UK, whilst implementing the majority of the Basel 3.1 standards  - including credit risk, operational risk, the new output floor, and reporting/disclosures -  on 1 January 2027, the introduction of the FRTB internal model approach is further delayed to 1 January 2028. The US timeline remains uncertain, with the federal banking agencies having only recently issued a revamped Basel III Endgame proposal in March 2026.

ESG

The CRR 3 does not introduce either ‘green supporting’ or ‘brown penalising’ capital factors. Instead, it focuses on transparency and comparability through Pillar 3 disclosures. It updates the disclosure mandate in Article 434a and the ESG disclosure provision in Article 449a.  Under CRR 26, detailed ESG Pillar 3 disclosures (Article 449a) were focused on large, listed institutions. The CRR 3 expands the scope of ESG risk disclosures beyond that narrow set, with the EBA noting7 that the Article 449a amendments extend ESG disclosure obligations to “all institutions”, subject to proportionality. ESG is also embedded in the CRD 6, which strengthens the supervisory review of ESG risks, calling for consistent ESG stress‑testing methodologies across the European Supervisory Authorities and links ESG trends to business model analysis and financial stability. In essence, the CRR 3 provides the disclosure mechanics (Pillar 3), while CRD 6 reinforces how supervisors incorporate ESG in Pillar 2.

Importantly, the ‘G’ in ‘ESG’ is also significantly upgraded under the CRD 6 although the changes are not focused on geopolitical risk as a distinct category. The directive strengthens the "fit and proper" assessment process in certain ways including establishing a suitability assessment process by regulators prior to appointments to the management body and chair of the supervisory function for “large institutions”, including globally systemically important banks and other systemically important entities. Also, CRD 6 sets out a new mandate for institutions to prepare, maintain, and update “individual statements” of roles and responsibilities alongside a “mapping of duties”, which covers all members of the management body, senior management, and key function holders.

Whilst these statements are designed to ensure accountability and clear allocation of responsibilities, they do not prescribe specific risk categories — including geopolitical risk — that must be covered. However, the collective suitability requirement under Article 91(7) of the CRD 4 (as amended by CRD 6) requires the management body as a whole to possess adequate collective knowledge, skills, and experience to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks.  The ECB's Guide to fit and proper assessments lists areas that collective suitability should generally cover, including "local, regional and global markets where applicable" and "the management of international and national groups and risks related to group structures where applicable". For an institution with significant cross-border operations or exposures to geopolitically sensitive regions, knowledge of geopolitical risk could reasonably be expected as part of the management body's collective understanding of the institution's main risks.

On the remuneration side, CRD 6 requires institutions to ensure that their remuneration policies and practices are consistent with and promote sound and prudent risk management, including specifically their risk appetite in terms of ESG risks. To the extent that geopolitical developments drive or amplify ESG risks, the risk committee should consider whether the remuneration system inadvertently incentivises excessive risk-taking in relation to those geopolitical exposures. Furthermore, the CRD 4 (as amended by CRD 6) provides that variable remuneration must be risk-adjusted at the point of award (ex-ante).  The EBA's Guidelines on Sound Remuneration Policies require that so-called "ex-ante risk adjustments" are applied when remuneration is awarded to consider the institution's risk profile.  Geopolitical risk could be factored in at this stage. A geopolitical event — such as the crystallisation of sanctions risk leading to significant losses, or a failure to anticipate and manage country risk in a conflict zone — could also trigger the malus and claw-back framework.

Indirect geopolitical component – third-country branches

The CRD 6’s third‑country branch (TCB) regime is an indirect geopolitics component because it translates cross‑border fragilities into concrete authorisation, capital/liquidity, reporting and structural measures inside the EU prudential perimeter.

First, it hard‑wires an EU‑wide “gatekeeper” for cross‑border banking by requiring any third‑country undertaking that wishes to provide core banking services in a Member State to do so only via an authorised third‑country branch (or an EU subsidiary). “Core banking services” are expressly tied to Annex I of the CRD 4 (as amended by CRD 6) and cover, at a minimum, deposit‑taking, lending and guarantees/commitments (Annex I points 1, 2 and 6). The new TCB title in the directive then standardises the authorisation, classification and ongoing prudential conditions for those branches, including a two‑tier regime (Class 1/Class 2) with proportionate requirements such as capital endowment and liquidity for the more systemic Class 1 branches. In parallel, CRD 6 curtails cross‑border provision without a branch and limits what an authorised TCB may do outside its host Member State, while preserving a narrow reverse‑solicitation channel.

Second, it localises shock‑absorption by requiring a capital endowment to be held in eligible, readily available assets (with escrow and immediate‑use features) and, for Class 1 branches, liquidity requirements – ensuring losses or funding stresses transmitted via sanctions or market closures can be absorbed locally rather than relying on constrained head‑office support.

Third, it creates transparency and control over cross‑border dependencies through uniform reporting for both the branch and its head undertaking, together with prescriptive booking‑arrangement rules and a registry book of assets and liabilities—giving supervisors granular visibility of intra‑group funding channels, booking models and exposures to third‑country risks.

Fourth, at scale or where financial‑stability risks arise, it enables structural action: when all EU branches of a third‑country group reach EUR 40 billion of EU assets (or a single branch books EUR 10 billion), authorities assess systemic importance and may impose targeted measures up to and including subsidiarization, thereby pulling materially systemic third‑country operations fully within the EU prudential perimeter.

Conclusion

CRD 6 and CRR 3 embed geopolitics into the EU prudential regime not through a stand-alone capital charge, but across all three pillars. Geopolitical shocks concentrate credit losses in export-oriented and supply-chain-dependent sectors, inflate IRB credit-risk RWAs towards the output floor on a fully loaded basis and fragment the global rollout of the FRTB across jurisdictions, whilst the collective suitability obligation under Article 91(7) of the CRD 4 (as amended by CRD 6) and the new individual statements and mapping of duties embed geopolitical risk knowledge and personal accountability in boardroom governance. On remuneration, the ex-ante risk adjustment mechanism and the malus and claw-back framework ensure that the financial consequences of geopolitical mis-judgement are borne at the individual as well as the institutional level.

For firms, the breadth of the framework creates both risk and complexity. Meeting these requirements calls for a coordinated response spanning prudential regulation, corporate governance and employment law. Early and integrated advice is critical to ensuring that each element is addressed in a manner that is both technically compliant and strategically coherent. We would be happy to discuss how these changes affect your institution and to help you develop a practical implementation plan.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Specifically, Directive (EU) 2024/1619 — commonly known as CRD 6 — amends Directive 2013/36/EU, CRD 4.

  2. 2

    EBA 2025 EU-wide stress test methodological note.

  3. 3

    But note the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) framework was explicitly not applied in the 2025 Stress Test.

  4. 4

    IRB Credit Risk RWA (Internal Ratings-Based Risk-Weighted Assets) is a method under Basel capital standards where banks use internal, regulator-approved models to estimate the risk of their credit exposures. It calculates RWA based on bank-calculated inputs—specifically Probability of Default (PD) and Loss Given Default (LGD)—rather than standardized risk weights, allowing more tailored capital requirements.

  5. 5

    In the 2025 EU-wide stress test results the EBA does not use the label “export-oriented and supply-chain-dependent” sectors yet identifies the five sectors (manufacturing, transportation and storage, mining and quarrying, agriculture, wholesale and trade) as those recording the largest negative deviations in cumulative gross value added (GVA) under the adverse scenario. The EBA’s scenario anticipates that “more trade-intensive sectors and industries with high reliance on global value chains will experience the strongest decline in production”, with secondary effects from weaker domestic demand further impacting all sectors.

  6. 6

    The CRR 2 is Regulation (EU) 2019/876.

  7. 7

    Opinion on the application of the provisions relating to disclosures on ESG risks.pdf

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