In Lunak Heavy Industries (UK) Ltd v Tyburn Film Productions Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1643, the Court of Appeal struck out an unjust enrichment claim because it could not be said that the defendants were enriched “at the expense of” the claimant, i.e. there was no transfer of value from the claimant to the defendants. On the facts, no “thing” had been transferred from the claimant.
The question of when a defendant's enrichment is at the expense of the claimant remains subject to uncertainties. However, this decision demonstrates that even though the law on unjust enrichment is still developing, courts can strike out claims that clearly have no real prospect of success.
Background
This case arose from the digital recreation of the late actor Peter Cushing OBE (Cushing) in the 2016 film, Rogue One: A Star Wars Story. Cushing famously portrayed Grand Moff Tarkin in the original Star Wars film in 1977.
Prior to his death in 1994, Cushing had entered into an agreement (the Letter Agreement) with Tyburn Film Productions Ltd (Tyburn), in connection with a planned television film, which was ultimately never produced. The Letter Agreement was entered into in contemplation of the possibility of Cushing’s death during the film’s production as he had a terminal illness.
The agreement contained two key provisions:
- Clause (e) permitted Tyburn to use special effects, computer-generated imagery (CGI), and other techniques to complete Cushing's performance in the television film.
- Clause (h) provided that if the television film was not produced, neither Cushing nor his estate would permit his likeness to be reproduced in any film without Tyburn's prior written consent.
In 2016, the film Rogue One was produced by Lunak Heavy Industries (UK) Limited (Lunak), using intellectual property owned by Lucasfilm Ltd LLC (Lucasfilm) (together, the Appellants). Lunak obtained permission from Cushing's estate to recreate his likeness digitally in Rogue One (the 2016 Agreement) by digitally altering the appearance of another actor.
Tyburn brought a claim against the executors of Cushing’s estate for breach of contract (breach of clause (h) of the Letter Agreement) and a claim against the Appellants in unjust enrichment. In the circumstances, Tyburn argued that it had been deprived of the value of being the first to digitally resurrect Cushing on screen.
Decision
The Appellants applied to strike out Tyburn’s claim against them. The lower courts refused the application on the basis that unjust enrichment cases are complex and fact-sensitive, particularly indirect benefit cases, and it could not be said that the claim was certain to fail or fanciful.
The Appellants appealed, arguing that there was no real prospect of Tyburn establishing that any enrichment of the Appellants was “at the expense of” Tyburn, which is a core requirement of an unjust enrichment claim.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck out Tyburn's claim for unjust enrichment.
Tyburn's primary case
Tyburn argued that the Appellants were directly enriched at its expense. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Investment Trust Companies v Revenue & Customs Commissioners [2017] UKSC 29 (ITC), Tyburn contended that:
- there was a direct transfer to the Appellants of the rights granted to Tyburn under the Letter Agreement; and
- those rights were akin to property rights because they impinged on the intellectual property rights of Cushing’s estate.
The Court of Appeal held there was no legal basis for Tyburn’s primary claim, essentially because no “thing” had been transferred from Tyburn to the Appellants. Looking at what Tyburn actually received under the Letter Agreement, the Court found that Tyburn did not hold any property rights capable of being transferred to the Appellants. Clause (e) simply gave Tyburn permission to use CGI and similar techniques to reproduce Cushing's likeness for one particular film. Clause (h) was a promise not to let anyone else use Cushing's likeness without Tyburn's consent.
Crucially, neither of these were "property rights"; they were merely contractual rights against Cushing’s estate. The estate always retained ownership of the underlying intellectual property rights in Cushing’s image. Nothing done between Cushing’s estate and the Appellants in 2016 resulted in anything at all being transferred from Tyburn to the Appellants.
Tyburn's secondary case
In the alternative, Tyburn argued that even if there was no direct transfer, the Appellants had been enriched at Tyburn’s indirect expense as the benefit received by the Appellants had come about through a series of “co-ordinated transactions”. This is where a series of linked dealings can together amount to a transfer of value from claimant to defendant, even without a direct transaction between them.
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. For transactions to be “co-ordinated”, they must be connected in some meaningful way. Here, the Letter Agreement and the 2016 Agreement were 23 years apart. The Letter Agreement for a horror documentary could not possibly have been made with the 2016 Rogue One deal in mind. More fundamentally, “co-ordinated transactions" require something of value to pass from the claimant to the defendant through the chain of dealings. Here, nothing of any relevance left Tyburn under the Letter Agreement; rather, it was the recipient of rights under that Agreement.
Finally, the Court of Appeal rejected Tyburn's argument based on cases characterised as "interceptive subtractions", where a defendant diverts a benefit that was heading towards the claimant. This argument failed for the same reason as the primary case above, i.e. that the rights granted to the Appellants in the 2016 Agreement belonged only to Cushing’s estate. The Appellants had not intercepted anything that belonged to, or was destined for, Tyburn.
Key takeaways
The Court of Appeal's decision offers valuable guidance on several fronts.
- Firstly, the judgment reinforces the principles set out in ITC regarding the “at the expense of the claimant” requirement in unjust enrichment claims; there must be something which amounts to a transfer of value from claimant to defendant. In this claim, contractual rights did not amount to property rights transferred from claimant to defendant and so this requirement was not satisfied. However, the Court of Appeal observed that “at the expense of” and “transfer of value” were both too general to serve as legal tests. The only guidance it gave, drawing on ITC, was that “in the first place, the defendant has received a benefit, and that the claimant has suffered a loss through the provision of this benefit, albeit that “loss” in this context does not have the meaning as in the law of damages but connotes the giving up of something of value through the provision of the benefit.” The question of when a defendant's enrichment is at the expense of the claimant remains subject to uncertainties.
- Secondly, the Court of Appeal provided important clarification regarding Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550. Both the Master and the Deputy Judge had relied on Lord Browne-Wilkinson's observation that it is “not normally appropriate to strike out” claims in “uncertain and developing” areas of law. The Court of Appeal made clear that this principle has its limits: where a claim is clearly unsustainable on the pleaded and agreed facts, courts should not shy away from summary determination merely because the broader legal area remains unsettled. Even though the law on unjust enrichment is still developing, courts can still strike out claims that clearly have no real prospect of success. The Court of Appeal was satisfied that even taking Tyburn's case at its highest, the claim could be determined on the pleaded and agreed facts as a matter of law, without the need for a trial.
- Thirdly, the judgment clarifies the narrow scope of the "co-ordinated transactions" exception to the direct transfer rule. For transactions to be treated as co-ordinated, and therefore treated as one overall transfer of value, there must be a meaningful connection between them. Here, the 23-year gap between the Letter Agreement and the 2016 Agreement, combined with the fact that the first agreement could not have anticipated the second, meant this exception could not apply.
This post was prepared by Kathy Williams, with thanks to Alex Jones for his assistance.