The Texas Business Court recently published two opinions further clarifying the contours of its jurisdiction. The Court remanded both cases.
In Charlotte Rogers Barrett v. Marcus T. Barrett, IV, et al., 2025 Tex. Bus. 37 Cause No. 25-BC04A-0013, the Business Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims for two reasons: (1) the Court did not have jurisdiction over matters arising out of Title 9 of the Property Code or estate matters, and (2) the parties did not agree to have the case heard by the Business Court, precluding supplemental jurisdiction under Tex. Gov’t Code § 25A.004(f).
In Reed v. Rook TX, LP, et al., 2025 Tex. Bus. 34 Cause No. 25-BC03A-0007, the Court reconsidered its jurisdiction after the plaintiff amended its petition in a manner apparently designed to divest the Business Court of jurisdiction. The Business Court made three holdings: (1) that the Court lacked supplemental jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not agree to the Court’s jurisdiction, (2) that the Court lacked qualified-transaction jurisdiction because the value of consideration at issue is determined at the time of the transaction, not upon the outcome, and the consideration here (purchase of a lottery ticket) was US$1, and (3) that the Court lacked trade-regulation jurisdiction because the alleged negligence per se claim sounded in tort law, not trade-regulation law.
Charlotte Rogers Barrett v. Marcus T. Barrett, IV, et al.
In Charlotte Rogers Barrett, the Plaintiff, beneficiary and current trustee of the Charlotte Rogers Barrett Trust (CRB Trust), sued defendant family members in their individual and former trustee capacities along with their connected LPs, LLCs and other companies in probate court. She alleged the Defendants breached fiduciary duties owed to her by making “self-serving investments of trust assets in family run business entities” that they controlled. The Plaintiff sought relief in six forms: (1) modification of the CRB Trust, (2) monetary damages to recoup trust loss, the profits Defendants gained through fiduciary duty breaches and the trust’s lost profits if the breaches hadn’t occurred, (3) judicial dissolution of a defendant LP, (4) attorney’s fees, (5) a declaration that the trustees could not use trust funds to pay for their expenses and attorney’s fees, and (6) a second declaration that Section 114.064 of the Property Code is the controlling statute for Defendants to recover their fees and expenses.
Defendant Marcus T. Barrett, IV removed the case to the Texas Business Court. He argued that the Business Court had jurisdiction under Sections 25A.004(b)(1), (2), (5), (7) and 25.A004(e) because (1) Plaintiff’s claims regarded the “governance and internal affairs of two of the corporate defendants”, (2) Plaintiff’s claims were derivative in nature, (3) Plaintiff alleged the Defendants in their business capacities breached fiduciary duties, (4) Plaintiff sought judicial dissolution of one of the corporate defendants and (5) Plaintiff requested declaratory relief.
The Court employed a statutory construction analysis of Section 25A.004 of the Texas Government Code. Based on Section 25A.004(g), the Court emphasized that without supplemental jurisdiction, the Court did not have jurisdiction over “the Estates Code” or “Chapter 53 and Title 9, Property Code.”
The Court agreed with the Plaintiff that each of her claims arose “directly out of Title 9 of the Property Code.” Subtitle B of Title 9 of the Property Code governs trust matters, which was before the Court. In her individual beneficiary and trustee capacities, Plaintiff raised claims against former trustee family members. Accordingly, her claims focused on the subject of trusts. Thus, the Business Court held it lacked supplemental jurisdiction because the Plaintiff did not agree to have her case heard by the Business Court.1
In conclusion, the Business Court remanded the case back to county probate court after finding it did not have jurisdiction over Title 9 of the Property Code or estate matters without supplemental jurisdiction.
Reed v. Rook TX, LP, et al.
In Reed v. Rook TX, LP, et al., Reed won US$7.5 million in the Lotto Texas jackpot on May 17, 2023. He brought suit against Rook TX, LP and other defendants for allegedly rigging the April 22, 2023 Lotto Texas to fraudulently claim a US$95 million jackpot. He alleged that if the April drawing hadn’t been rigged, he would have won US$88 million instead of only US$7.5 million.
Defendants originally removed to the Business Court because Reed pleaded claims regarding the Defendants’ governance, governing documents and internal affairs, which fell within the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Section 25A.004(b)(2) of the Texas Government Code.2 Because Reed questioned Rook’s formation and the legitimacy of Rook’s purpose and operations, Reed’s claims related to governing documents and internal affairs. Accordingly, the Business Court found jurisdiction over Reed’s petition.
Reed then amended his petition four times. In the last petition, he omitted all previous allegations that would grant the Business Court jurisdiction under Section 25A.004(b)(2) and expressly disclaimed all such allegations, keeping only his “money had and received claim.” Defendants conceded in their response to Reed’s Motion to Remand that the Business Court no longer had jurisdiction under Section 25A.004(b)(2). This concession appears to have been important to the Business Court’s analysis as it does not consider jurisdiction under Section 25A.004(b)(2).3 Instead, the Defendants asserted new and different bases for jurisdiction over the amended petition.
In light of the concession and newly-pleaded jurisdictional bases, the Court held that Reed had divested the Business Court of jurisdiction.
As the new bases for jurisdiction, Defendants argued that the Court had (1) supplemental jurisdiction, (2) qualified-transaction jurisdiction or (3) trade-regulation jurisdiction under Sections 25A.004(f), (d)(1) and (b)(3), respectively. The Court quickly dismissed Defendants’ argument for supplemental jurisdiction, reasoning that it never had supplemental jurisdiction due to Reed’s ongoing objections to jurisdiction in the Business Court.
The Business Court also considered whether it had qualified-transaction jurisdiction under Section 25A.004(d)(1) based on Reed’s newly-added a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations. Defendants argued that Reed satisfied this definition by alleging that he should received US$88 million in the lottery. But the Business Court disagreed. The Business Court held that this was an even more speculative potential transaction than when it found against qualified-transaction jurisdiction in G-Force & Associates, Inc. v. Bloecher.4 Here, Reed’s claim was even more speculative. The Business Court also held that this potential transaction was not a qualified-transaction because the “‘aggregate value of the consideration” is to be “determined at the time of contracting,’”5 and Reed paid only US$1 Reed for the lottery ticket.
Finally, Reed asserted that the Defendants committed negligence per se under the Texas Lottery Act and Section 401.304 of the Administrative Code. The Business Court assumed without deciding that criminal statutes—Sections 466.307 and 466.3054 of the Texas Lottery Act—and Section 401.304 of the Administrative Code were trade-regulation laws. But even with this assumption, the Business Court held that its trade-regulation jurisdiction was not triggered because Reed’s negligence per se claim6 sought relief under tort law and not the Texas Lottery Act or the Texas Administrative Code.
In sum, the Business Court found it lacked jurisdiction over the amended petition based on the newly alleged jurisdictional arguments made by Defendants.
Conclusion
In sum, the Business Court remanded both Charlotte Rogers Barrett and Reed back to probate and district court, respectively, due to a lack of statutory jurisdiction, reflecting further clarification of the scope of the Business Court’s jurisdiction.
Footnotes
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When considering the capacity in which Plaintiff brought this suit, who Plaintiff sued and the crux of Plaintiff’s claims in light of the various sections of Title 9, it follows that each of Plaintiff’s claims arise directly out of Title 9 of the Property Code.
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Defendants also asserted the Business Court had supplemental jurisdiction under Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 25A.004(f) and (b)(7) for actions arising out of the Business Organizations Code. Because the Business Court found jurisdiction based on Section 25A.004(b)(2), they did not render opinion on whether they had jurisdiction under Sections 25A.004(f) or (b)(7).
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Supra n. 2 (“[T]he Rook defendants concede that this Court no longer has jurisdiction under Section 25A.004(b)(2), but they argue that the Court has jurisdiction under three other provisions of Section 25A.004 . . .”).
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2025 Tex. Bus. 18, 715 S.W.3d 778 (8th Div.) (holding that bids were not qualified transactions).
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Slant Operating, LLC v. Octane Energy Operating, LLC, 2025 Tex. Bus. 22, ¶ 31, 2025 WL 1483466 at *7 (8th Div.).
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Negligence per se is found when a defendant breaches a statute that establishes a duty the court recognizes.