On March 19, 2026, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, doing business as Major League Baseball (MLB), announced they had entered a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to establish a framework for dialogue, cooperation and information sharing in the interest of “protecting the integrity of professional baseball and the relating prediction markets.”1

The MOU is one in a series of actions taken by the CFTC in 2026 to assert its jurisdiction over event contracts, including those referencing sporting events.2

This client alert analyzes the MOU and discusses what it may mean for market participants, CFTC-Designated Contract Markets (DCMs) and sports organizations.

Background and context

Recent developments

The MOU comes in the wake of several other major developments impacting prediction markets over the past several weeks, including:

  • On February 23, 2026 six Senate Democrats issued a letter to CFTC Chairman Michael Selig urging the CFTC to prohibit prediction contracts that may correlate with or incentivize death, war, terrorism, assassination and other geopolitical outcomes.3
  • On February 25, 2026 the CFTC’s Enforcement Division issued an advisory following the release of two enforcement actions involving misuse of non‑public information and fraud in prediction markets.4
  • On March 12, 2026, the CFTC issued CFTC Letter No. 26-08 (the Prediction Markets Advisory), addressing the views of the staff (Staff) of the Commission’s Division of Market Oversight (DMO) on the listing and trading of event contracts on prediction markets.5
  • On March 12, 2026, the CFTC published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) soliciting comment on a broad range of prediction market regulatory issues, with comments due by April 30, 2026.6
  • On March 20, 2026, the First Judicial District Court in Nevada issued a temporary restraining order against the DCM KalshiEX LLC (Kalshi) in connection with the ongoing litigation between the platform and Nevada Gaming Control Board in Nevada v. Kalshi, halting sports, election and entertainment contracts, while on March 19 the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Kalshi’s emergency stay request.7

The evolution of prediction market regulation

Prediction markets are platforms on which participants may trade contracts tied to the occurrence or non-occurrence of future events. These contracts (referred to as “event contracts”) typically provide a payout based on whether the specified outcome occurs, with contract prices tied to the market’s assessment of the probability of such event. Prediction market contracts have been made with reference to a range of events, including political, financial, cultural and sporting events.8

The CFTC has engaged with event contracts since the 1990s.9 The CFTC’s core mission centers on promoting the integrity, resilience and vibrancy of the US derivatives markets. The agency oversees exchanges, clearing organizations and intermediaries, and exercises its regulatory authority to safeguard market participants and the public from fraud, manipulation and other abusive practices, while fostering open, competitive and financially sound markets. In a 2008 Concept Release, the CFTC noted that event contracts may be based on “varied” eventualities, including “the results of political elections, or the outcome of particular entertainment events,” and could be structured as “futures” or “options.”10

In June 2024, the prior CFTC administration published a proposed rulemaking that would have broadly identified political and sports-related event contracts as “contrary to the public interest,” effectively barring them from CFTC-regulated exchanges.11 However, the proposal was never finalized.

In February 2026, the CFTC, under the new Chairman, formally withdrew the proposed rulemaking, citing “various forms of state regulatory actions and litigation concerning the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction over event contract derivatives listed on designated contract markets.”12 In withdrawing the 2024 event contracts proposal, Chairman Selig stated that: “[t]he 2024 event contracts proposal reflected the prior administration’s frolic into merit regulation with an outright prohibition on political contracts ahead of the 2024 presidential election. The Commission is withdrawing that proposal and will advance a new rulemaking grounded in a rational and coherent interpretation of the Commodity Exchange Act that promotes responsible innovation in our derivatives markets in line with Congressional intent.”13

The Commission simultaneously withdrew CFTC Staff Advisory Letter No. 25-36, which had cautioned market participants that state enforcement actions “should be accounted for with appropriate contingency planning” and had noted that the CFTC had not “taken any official action” approving the listing for trading of sports-related event contracts on a DCM.14

Market developments

In parallel with these regulatory developments, a series of significant commercial partnerships between major sports leagues and prediction market platforms have emerged. In October 2025, the National Hockey League (NHL) entered into multi-year agreements with both Kalshi and Polymarket, each incorporating game integrity provisions.15 In November 2025, CME Group partnered with FanDuel to launch “FanDuel Predicts,” a platform for trading event contracts.16 In January 2026, Major League Soccer (MLS) announced a partnership with Polymarket focused on the League’s Cup and game integrity.17 Most recently, on March 19, 2026, MLB also announced a partnership designating Polymarket as MLB’s “Official Prediction Market Exchange,” a deal that includes access to official league data and marks, as well as an “integrity pact” with the CFTC to prevent market manipulation.18

The current regulatory vacuum left by the CFTC’s recent rule withdrawals and the rapid proliferation of commercial partnerships between sports leagues and prediction market platforms have now been addressed in a more structured manner through the issuance of the Prediction Markets Advisory, the ANPR and, most recently, the MOU.

The CFTC-MLB MOU

The MOU reflects a shared recognition by the CFTC and MLB that the integrity of professional baseball and the reliability of event contract markets referencing baseball are closely intertwined.19 This institutional alignment is reinforced by the Prediction Markets Advisory, which acknowledges that the CFTC “is actively discussing issues of settlement integrity with some relevant sports leagues and their governing bodies” and anticipates that “appropriate information sharing by these entities with the CFTC may lead to enhanced CFTC oversight capabilities.“20

The MOU establishes a framework for ongoing dialogue, cooperation and information exchange between the CFTC and MLB on matters of mutual concern, principally, the integrity of professional baseball and the event contract markets that reference it.21 Under the MOU, designated representatives of the CFTC and MLB are expected to meet at least monthly to identify and discuss issues that may affect the integrity of professional baseball or the related event contract markets.22

Importantly, the MOU is expressly non-binding. The MOU also makes clear that it does not limit or modify the CFTC’s independent authority and responsibility to enforce the CEA and its implementing regulations.23 Similarly, the MOU does not impose any affirmative obligation on either party to create, maintain or share information. All information sharing remains at each party’s sole discretion and must comply with applicable disclosure restrictions.24 The MOU establishes a detailed confidentiality framework governing information exchanged between the parties. Generally, the CFTC may use information received from MLB only in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the CEA, including its mission to promote the integrity, resilience and vibrancy of event contract markets.25 Conversely, MLB may use information received from the CFTC only for purposes of protecting the integrity of and public confidence in professional baseball.26

Relatedly, in the March 12, 2026 Prediction Markets Advisory, the CFTC made four specific recommendations for DCMs developing sports-related event contracts:

  1. Pre-self-certification engagement with relevant sports’ governing bodies when developing terms and conditions, compliance and market oversight programs
  2. Including in the product submission an explanation of whether the contract is consistent with the relevant league’s or governing body’s integrity standards
  3. Establishing information-sharing and data arrangements with the relevant sports integrity monitoring organization, and cooperating with league-run manipulation or insider trading investigations
  4. Relying on official data provided by the relevant league or governing body as the settlement source27

The Prediction Markets Advisory states that engagement with sports leagues “may further a DCM’s ability to comply with their obligations under DCM Core Principle 3 ... by enhancing access to information about the nature and dynamics of underlying events (for example, information about categories of individuals who should be restricted from trading in certain sports-related event contracts as an informed participant).”28 This effectively encourages DCMs to develop restricted participant lists analogous to those used in securities markets.

Implications for market participants

For Designated Contract Markets (DCMs)

The CFTC-MLB MOU as a model for league engagement

The CFTC-MLB MOU provides a practical template for league engagement with DCMs. As noted in the Prediction Markets Advisory, the CFTC retains authority to stay the listing of a self-certified contract under CEA Section 8a(7), and DMO Staff has indicated that “proactive engagement with DMO Staff and any relevant sports league or governing body may reduce the likelihood of Commission action.”29 The MOU illustrates what such proactive engagement looks like at the institutional level, and DCMs would be well-advised to consider analogous arrangements when developing sports-related event contracts.

The Prediction Markets Advisory characterizes DCMs as “front-line regulators” with “self-regulatory obligations for the contract markets they operate,” stating that DCMs should be “proactive, ensuring proper surveillance and oversight of trading in all of the products that they list, accounting for the particular characteristics and attributes of each product.”30 Notably, this framing tracks the Enforcement Division’s parallel statement that DCMs have “an independent duty pursuant to the core principles of the Act to maintain audit trails, conduct surveillance, and enforce rules against prohibited practices.”31

Product submission specificity

The Prediction Markets Advisory warns that “overly broad or general contract specifications may affect a DCM’s ability to analyze the compliance of the contract’s various permutations with the CEA and Commission regulations, including the contract’s susceptibility to manipulation.”32 Specifically, “[a] statement that a contract will settle based upon a consensus of yet-to-be-determined sources may not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of DCM Core Principle 3.”33 DCMs listing baseball-related event contracts should therefore look to MLB’s official data infrastructure, a resource that the CFTC-MLB MOU is designed to make more accessible through information sharing to satisfy the specificity requirements for product submissions.

Restricted participant lists

The Prediction Markets Advisory recommends that DCMs look to “any league integrity standards or guidance around markets, contracts, and restricted or insider participants lists, in order to protect against manipulation and insider trading.”34 The CFTC-MLB MOU’s information-sharing framework creates a direct channel through which such lists and integrity standards can be communicated to the CFTC and indirectly informs DCMs’ compliance obligations.

For market participants (traders, trading firms)

Insider trading risk

The CFTC has signaled that it will aggressively pursue breaches of the market integrity provisions of the CEA  in connection with sports-related event contracts. CFTC Rule 180.1 prohibits manipulative or deceptive conduct in connection with commodity contracts, including misappropriation-based insider trading pursuant to CEA Section 6(c)(1) and CFTC Rules 180.1(a)(1) and (3). The ANPR further addresses cross-market manipulation risks and the application of CEA Section 4c(a)(3)-(4), which specifically prohibits federal government employees and officials from trading on MNPI acquired through their positions.35

Information flows and confidentiality

The MOU’s information-sharing provisions carry practical implications for individual market participants, particularly those who may become the subject of  “an active MLB integrity matter” of interest to the CFTC or MLB.36 By establishing a formal ongoing channel for the exchange of information between the two institutions, the MOU enhances the CFTC’s ability to identify and investigate potential misconduct. While information exchanged under the MOU is treated as confidential, it remains subject to applicable legal requirements, including federal and state legal process.37

For sports organizations and governing bodies

The CFTC-MLB MOU represents a significant shift in how sports organizations interact with financial regulators. While MLB is the first major sports league to formalize such a cooperative arrangement with the CFTC, the framework established by the MOU is broadly applicable across professional sports and could readily extend to other leagues, governing bodies for college athletics, motorsports and other competitive events referenced by prediction market contracts. Organizations that have not yet engaged with the CFTC should assess their regulatory exposure, particularly in light of the Prediction Markets Advisory‘s express encouragement of pre-certification engagement between DCMs and sports governing bodies.

Conclusion and takeaways

The following are the key takeaways from the CFTC-MLB MOU, the Prediction Markets Advisory and the ANPR for market participants:

  1. The MOU is non-binding but operationally significant. While the MOU does not impose legally enforceable obligations on either party or alter the CFTC’s independent enforcement authority, its practical significance should not be underestimated.38 The MOU creates a structured, ongoing channel for information sharing between the CFTC and MLB that will materially enhance the CFTC’s capacity to detect and pursue manipulation and insider trading in baseball-related event contract markets.
  2. DCMs are subject to heightened scrutiny. While the Prediction Markets Advisory does not create any new binding rules or regulations, DCMs should treat it as the benchmark by which DMO Staff will evaluate prediction markets’ compliance with applicable regulatory requirements in examinations, product reviews and potential enforcement referrals.39
  3. The ANPR signals comprehensive future rulemaking. The Prediction Markets Advisory and the ANPR signal that the Commission is contemplating the development of a comprehensive framework for prediction market regulation that could extend well beyond the existing Core Principle guidance articulated in the Advisory.40 Market participants and DCMs should pay particular attention to the ANPR’s questions regarding margin trading, gaming, inside information and the procedural mechanics of public interest determinations, as these areas present the greatest potential for substantive regulatory change.41
  4. Information shared under the MOU is subject to robust confidentiality protections, but also subject to legal process. The parties have committed to maintaining appropriate safeguards to protect the confidentiality of shared information, but these protections are not absolute and remain subject to applicable federal and state legal process.42
  5. April 30 comment deadline: Comments on the ANPR are due by April 30, 2026.43 All stakeholders with interests in the prediction markets space, including DCMs, market participants, sports organizations and technology platforms, should prioritize engaging with the rulemaking process.
  6. MOU as precedent for other sports leagues: The CFTC-MLB MOU is likely the first of several such institutional arrangements. Sports leagues and governing bodies that have not yet engaged with the CFTC regarding event contract markets should assess their regulatory exposure and consider whether proactive engagement is warranted, particularly in light of the Advisory’s express encouragement of pre-certification engagement between DCMs and sports governing bodies.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Press Release, CFTC, CFTC and MLB Sign Groundbreaking MOU (March 2026).

  2. 2

    See M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  3. 3

    See M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  4. 4

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  5. 5

    CFTC Letter No. 26-08, Prediction Markets Advisory (March 12, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, S. Souchet, and M. Melbourn, CFTC advances regulatory framework for prediction markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  6. 6

    See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFTC, Prediction Markets 91 Fed. Reg. 12516 (March 16, 2026) (“ANPR”); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, S. Souchet, and M. Melbourn, CFTC advances regulatory framework for prediction markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  7. 7

    Nevada Gaming Control Board, Nevada Gaming Control Board Granted TRO Against Kalshi, Nevada Gaming Control Board (March 20, 2026); Order Denying Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3, State of Nevada, ex rel. Nevada v. KalshiEx, LLC, No. 26-1304 (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2026).

  8. 8

    See M. Highman, S. Ariyan, S. Souchet, and M. Melbourn, CFTC advances regulatory framework for prediction markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  9. 9

    See Letter of Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, to George R. Neumann, Professor of Economics, The University of Iowa, Regarding Iowa Presidential Stock Market (Feb. 5, 1992) (reviewing a university-operated futures market for presidential election and corporate earnings contracts).

  10. 10

    Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, CFTC, Event Contracts, 73 Fed. Reg. 25669 (May 7, 2008).

  11. 11

    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFTC, Event Contracts, 89 Fed. Reg. 48968 (June 10, 2024).

  12. 12

    Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Withdraws Event Contracts Rule Proposal and Staff Sports Event Contracts Advisory (Feb. 4, 2026).

  13. 13

    Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Withdraws Event Contracts Rule Proposal and Staff Sports Event Contracts Advisory (Feb. 4, 2026).

  14. 14

    See CFTC Letter No. 25-36, p. 2 and n.4 (Sept. 30, 2025).

  15. 15

    NHL announces landmark multiyear partnerships with Kalshi, Polymarket

  16. 16

    FanDuel and CME Group Unveil New Prediction Markets Platform to Launch in December

  17. 17

    Soccer United Marketing and Polymarket Announce Multi-Year Partnerships with Major League Soccer and Leagues Cup

  18. 18

    Press release: MLB names Polymarket exclusive Prediction Market Exchange partner and signs agreement with CFTC to establish integrity framework

  19. 19

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  20. 20

    MOU, Art. I, ¶ 1.

  21. 21

    MOU, Art. I, ¶ 1.

  22. 22

    MOU, Art. II, ¶ 5.

  23. 23

    MOU, Art. II, ¶ 4.

  24. 24

    MOU, Art. III, ¶ 6.

  25. 25

    MOU, Art. III, ¶ 7.

  26. 26

    MOU, Art. III, ¶ 8.

  27. 27

    MOU, Art. V, ¶ 15.

  28. 28

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  29. 29

    See CFTC Letter No. 25-36, p. 6 (Sept. 30, 2025).

  30. 30

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  31. 31

    CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see CEA § 8a(7), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  32. 32

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see CEA § 8a(7), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  33. 33

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  34. 34

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  35. 35

    CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see CEA § 8a(7), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  36. 36

    MOU, Art. III, ¶ 9.

  37. 37

    CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see CEA § 8a(7), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  38. 38

    CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see CEA § 8a(7), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026); see CEA § 6(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 9(1); CFTC Rules 180.1(a)(1) and (3), 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1(a)(1), (3).

  39. 39

    ANPR at 12516 et seq.; NRF Client Alert at 6–7; see CEA § 4c(a)(3)–(4), 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(3)–(4).

  40. 40

    MOU, Art. III, ¶¶ 8, 12.

  41. 41

    MOU, Preamble.

  42. 42

    MOU, Art. I, ¶ 2.

  43. 43

    CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see CEA § 8a(7), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(7); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

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