On April 30, 2026, the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS) announced a consent order with Delta Dental Insurance Company and Delta Dental of New York, Inc. (collectively, Delta Dental) for alleged violations of the NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation relating to the 2023 MOVEit cybersecurity incident. In the consent order, Delta Dental agreed to pay NYDFS US$2.25 million.

For those familiar with the 2023 MOVEit incident, you may recall that this was one of the largest supply-chain attacks in 2023. The CL0P extortion gang claimed it had the data of thousands of organizations around the world who use the MOVEit platform for secure file transfers. The exploitation stemmed from a critical “zero-day vulnerability,” meaning that the software vulnerability was unknown to the developer, Progress Software–and its customers–prior to its exploitation and before a security patch was made available.

Although numerous regulators have investigated Progress and victim organizations in connection with the MOVEit incident, this consent order marks one of the first fines imposed by a regulator for compliance failures stemming from this event.

Because the incident involved a zero-day vulnerability, it is perhaps unsurprising that NYDFS did not identify any specific security related failures by Delta Dental–as Delta Dental’s instance of the MOVEit platform was exploited prior to discovery of the security flaw.

Nevertheless, NYDFS concluded that Delta Dental’s failure to have adequate policies and procedures addressing periodic disposal of sensitive information, lack of an incident response policy, and failure to timely report the incident to NYDFS, all constituted violations of the NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation.

This consent order illustrates that, at least as NYDFS is concerned, technical security measures designed to protect your IT infrastructure, are not sufficient on their own to maintain a reasonable data security program. NYDFS continues to focus on:

  1. over-retention of personal information and nonpublic information, and
  2. timely notice to NYDFS even prior to the company having a complete understanding of the full scope of the incident, as critical compliance–and enforcement–areas.

Background

Like many companies, Delta Dental licensed the MOVEit software to facilitate file transfers, including files that included personal information. On May 31, 2023, the software licensor, Progress Software, published a security advisory about a zero-day vulnerability that could enable unauthorized actors to gain access to the software.1

On June 1, 2023, Delta Dental’s endpoint detection and response tool sent an alert of suspicious activity on the MOVEit tool. In addition, on the same day, Delta Dental identified the presence of a webshell on the MOVEit Transfer servers related to the vulnerability identified by the licensor.

As a result, Delta Dental “stopped access to MOVEit Transfers removed the malicious files, conducted an analysis of the MOVEit Transfer databases, deployed all patches and security updates provided by Progress to remediate the vulnerabilities and reset administrative passwords to MOVEit Transfer.” Delta Dental also began an internal investigation.

On June 2, 2023, NYDFS published an industry letter alerting covered entities to the MOVEit Transfer vulnerability. The guidance reminded the entities of their obligations to report to NYDFS within 72 hours of determining a cybersecurity event has occurred that either:

  1. requires notice to a governmental body or supervisory authority or
  2. has a “reasonable likelihood of materially harming any material part of the normal operation(s) of the Covered Entity.”

The notice stated that “DFS considers evidence of unauthorized access to information systems, such as webshell installation, even if there has been no malware deployed or data exfiltrated, a reportable Cybersecurity Event.”

On July 6, 2023, Delta Dental concluded that threat actors had gained access by exploiting the vulnerability on May 29 – 30, 2023 and stealing (or exfiltrating) files.

Delta Dental began a forensic review that concluded on November 27, 2023 that the threat actors had exfiltrated 60,000 files that included include Nonpublic Information (NPI) as defined by the Cybersecurity Regulation, including insureds’ personal information such as financial account information, Social Security numbers and patient health information.

Nearly six months after detecting suspicious activity on its MOVEit transfer platform, five months after confirming that data had been exfiltrated and approximately two weeks after the forensic investigation concluded, Delta Dental notified NYDFS of the cybersecurity event on December 15, 2023.

The MOVEit platform included a retention setting allowing software licensees to set a retention period or ‘janitor’ to periodically clean up and delete files uploaded to folders within MOVEit. The software set the default retention period at 30 days, but enabled users to change that default, or even remove the retention setting–effectively permitting indefinite retention.

At the time of the cybersecurity event, Delta Dental had changed the default retention period from 30 days to 45 or 60 days and, in some instances, had removed the retention setting entirely for some folders.

As a result, at the time of the cybersecurity incident, NYDFS concluded that because Delta Dental had revised the default retention setting and in some cases removed those retention settings entirely, the majority of the stolen files that contained NPI were located within folders that had a longer retention period and contained files located on the MOVEit servers for more than 30 days.

NYDFS concluded that Delta Dental had no policies or procedures for requesting, reviewing or approving changes to folder retention settings. Importantly, Delta Dental could not provide a reasonable business justification why the MOVEit platform, a tool for transferring files from one organization to another, needed to retain files for longer than 30 days as it was not the location Delta Dental used to compile and process the files long-term.

Presumably, Delta Dental had copies of these same files in more secure locations within Delta Dental where they had been moved within the 30-day window.

In the consent order, NYDFS found that Delta Dental had violated the cybersecurity regulation in three ways:

  1. Failure to have policies and procedures for the secure disposal, on a periodic basis, of any Nonpublic Information (NPI) that is no longer necessary for business operations or for other legitimate business purposes
  2. Failure to implement and maintain a written policy that addresses incident response
  3. Failure to provide timely notice of Cybersecurity Events to NYDFS

Note that paragraph 49 of the consent order states that the order may not be used as an admission with respect to any other criminal or civil actions:

Except with regard to the enforcement of this Consent Order the Companies’ consent to the provisions of this Consent Order is not intended to bar, estop, waive, preclude or otherwise prevent the Companies from taking any position of law or fact or raising any defenses in any action taken by any federal or state agency or department or in any civil action brought by any party against the Companies.

NYDFS and Delta Dental agreed to settle the matter for a payment of US$2.25 million to NYDFS. As part of this settlement, and as is common in NYDFS consent orders, Delta Dental is prohibited from seeking tax credits, reimbursement or indemnification with respect to the penalty payment.

Our take: Incident response and notice requirements

At 72 hours, the NYDFS Cybersecurity Regulation has one of the shorter cybersecurity notice timeframes within the United States. Additionally, whereas some federal and state data breach notice requirements are tied to whether notice to individuals with respect to personal information impact is required, the Cybersecurity Regulation may require notice much earlier in the incident lifecycle even before the scope of the data affected is known, and even where no NPI or personal data is impacted, placing additional timing pressure to notify NYDFS in certain circumstances.

The regulation requires regulated entities to notify NYDFS regarding incidents that affect them, their affiliates, or their service providers where:

  1. notice is required to another government body (such as the SEC’s material disclosure requirement);
  2. the incident has a reasonable likelihood of materially harming any material part of the covered entity’s normal operations; or
  3. in ransomware incidents affecting a material part of the covered entity’s information systems.

Here, NYDFS concluded that Delta Dental’s notice to NYDFS on December 15, 2023 was untimely, and suggests that Delta Dental’s identification of the presence of a webshell on June 1, 2023 should have prompted timely notification, particularly in light of NYDFS’ June 2, 2023 industry letter published on its website alerting companies to the incident and providing guidance that webshell installation, even without evidence of malware or data theft, constitute a reportable event.

Although each cybersecurity incident operates on its own set of unique facts that may raise different reporting considerations, regulated companies should keep in mind that notice to NYDFS may be required early-on in the investigation, even before the forensic investigation concludes and the full scope of the impact may be known.

Our cybersecurity team is experienced in assessing these fact-specific circumstances, and reporting incidents to NYDFS where required.

As other regulators tighten data breach notice requirements, we expect companies will face increased pressure to notify regulators of cybersecurity incidents more quickly before all facts are known, which may place increased pressure on an already taxed incident response team responding to a live incident. These notice considerations should be reflected in the organization’s incident response policy and procedures.

Our take: Over-retention considerations

This consent order adds to the growing list of NYDFS enforcement actions we are tracking that have specifically focused on over-retention of nonpublic and personal information in recent years. NYDFS has:

  • Fined a claims adjuster and health insurance agent US$2 million for lack of an email retention policy and lack of multifactor authentication (MFA) in Outlook Web Access, identified in connection with a phishing-based cybersecurity incident. For companies taking lessons from the identified MFA gap, it should be noted that NYDFS recently expanded MFA requirements.
  • Fined a cryptocurrency exchange US$8 million for failure to conduct a risk assessment, lack of data classification policies and procedures, and for failure to establish policies for the periodic disposal of NPI, essentially allowing for indefinite retention, after repeated compliance failures identified in back-to-back audits.
  • Fined a life, accident, and health insurer US$4.5 million for seven violations of the Cybersecurity Regulation, including failure to establish a policy for periodic disposal of NPI in email, which allowed “old [email] data” to remain accessible to the unauthorized party in a cybersecurity incident.

Whereas previous enforcement actions have focused on indefinite retention generally across the organization for over-retention within email, this consent order specifically calls out the lack of a policy or procedure governing the review of retention settings in a file transfer platform where NPI was stored for more than 30 days, in excess of the default retention period. We do not take this consent order to mean that a retention period of longer than 30 days is not appropriate for a file transfer platform designed for short-term retention, but rather that the lack of any policy or procedure governing the review and modification of such retention settings violated Section 500.13 of the Cybersecurity Regulation governing the periodic disposal of NPI.

Nevertheless, given file transfer platforms are often used to satisfy short-term transfer needs and are typically not used for long-term storage of information with business value, we think it is instructive that NYDFS appeared concerned with the lack of retention review procedures to review and revise the default 30 day period even where the period may have been revised to 45 or 60-day periods.

Note it is unclear from the consent order whether Delta Dental’s removal of all retention settings from certain folders resulted in data significantly older than 60 days being retained on its MOVEit platform.

Moreover, as a practical matter, the more copies of a file that exist, the more likely that the file can be compromised and the less time a document exists in a transfer portal, the better. The NYDFS consent order does not mean that files must be immediately removed from transfer portals and stored in their proper place and then purged from the portal, but it does mean that companies are wise to have a clear process for storing their data in more secure environments and removing unnecessary data of these platforms. It is good cybersecurity and record-retention-by-design.

Even beyond the implications for NYDFS-covered entities, we have observed regulators, notably the FTC, similarly focus on over-retention of sensitive data in recent enforcement actions (often stemming from cybersecurity incidents and subsequent regulatory investigations).

This consent order should place regulated entities on notice that retention settings on systems that process NPI and personal data should not be left ungoverned. Companies should assess:

  • Whether they have retention settings on such platforms
  • Who has the authority to set and revise those settings
  • Whether existing retention settings essentially permit indefinite retention and over-retention
  • Provide guidance to relevant stakeholders on setting retention periods and reviewing and approving any changes.

In our experience, it is often easier for companies to implement retention procedures that allow for the periodic deletion of older data in file transfer platforms like MOVEit, because they are not typically designed or used for long-term retention, and are only needed as a transfer mechanism to share critical files that are then downloaded and stored elsewhere for ongoing work.

Implementing janitors on these platforms can significantly reduce cybersecurity risk by deleting old NPI and limiting the proliferation of unnecessary copies of NPI within the organization.

To address these issues, companies likely will need to collaborate with external counsel, IT, records management, and legal and compliance to develop or evaluate their retention policies in file transfer platforms.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Note while the Consent Order indicates this advisory was published on June 1, the original posting from Progress Software occurred on May 31, with remediation steps and indicators of compromise reported on June 1, 2023.

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