On June 3, 2026, the Eleventh Division of the Texas Business Court issued an order in the ongoing Tate Group Automotive, LLClitigation1 (Tate Group) finding that a chat log detailing inputs and outputs between a litigant and a generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) tool was protected by work-product privilege.
We recently examined several federal court decisions in civil and criminal proceedings that discussed attorney-client privilege and work-product protections around the use of GenAI tools. The Tate Group order is the first Texas Business Court decision to substantively weigh in on the privilege (or lack thereof) of AI chat logs and follows a growing trend of courts determining that AI chat logs can be protected by work-product privilege under certain circumstances. However, this order is particularly relevant because most prior orders addressing this issue were analyzed under the federal rules. Here, the court applied Texas’ attorney work-product rule, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5(a)(1), to the same question and revealed some differences between federal and Texas decisions addressing this issue.
This article:
- Summarizes the Tate Group order
- Discusses the suit and discovery dispute that led to the order
- Highlights the order’s analysis
- Compares the order to other case law relating to AI privilege
- Notes potential implications for litigants and lawyers
Summary of Tate Group order
- Under Texas rules, when a party discusses a case with an AI platform in preparation for litigation, the resulting chat log can be covered by work-product privilege pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5(a)(1).
- Disclosure (input) of otherwise privileged materials to an AI platform does not automatically waive that work-product privilege where the disclosure is not made to an adversary.
- Even if courts find the work-product privilege applies to those AI chat logs, they still may require litigants to disclose the existence of the logs, and what documents were disclosed to the AI platform.
The Tate Group lawsuit and the discovery dispute
The Tate Group litigation arises from a contract dispute between Tate Group Automotive (Tate Group) and its would-be business partners. Tate Group claimed that the defendants reneged on an agreement to finance Tate Group’s acquisition of several car dealerships, thereby breaching a contract between the parties. The defendants counterclaimed against the Tate Group and joined the group’s individual members, including Kris Tate, as third-party defendants.
Tate Group’s initial document production indicated that Kris Tate had fed responsive business documents into a GenAI tool. In November 2025, the defendants requested the production of the related chat logs. Tate Group produced some, but not all, of these logs, and withheld others on the basis of work-product privilege.
In a discovery-dispute letter to the court, the defendants argued that work-product privilege did not extend to these chat logs because Tate is not a lawyer. And even if he were, argued the defendants, Tate waived any potential privilege by communicating with a third party (in this case, the developer of the GenAI tool). To support this argument, the defendants cited United States v. Heppner (Heppner),2 a recent case in the Southern District of New York that we discussed previously that rejected a non-lawyer’s attempt to extend either attorney client or work-product protection to AI chat logs. Applying that argument to these facts, the defendants asked the court to order Tate to produce all of the materials that he fed into the GenAI tool and the resulting outputs.
Tate Group submitted a letter in response. Instead of Heppner, Tate cited Warner v. Gilbarco, Inc.3 (Warner), a recent decision in the Eastern District of Michigan that we’ve also analyzed, where the court extended work-product protections to GenAI prompts and outputs stemming from a pro se plaintiff’s use of a publicly available GenAI tool under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Tate countered the defendants’ waiver argument by emphasizing the Warner court’s determination that the GenAI platform developer is not really a third party; it is merely a tool. And, because the disclosure was to a tool, there was not a disclosure to a third party, much less disclosure to an adversary, and there was thus no waiver.
Privilege: Consider which work-product standard governs
Recent GenAI decisions have come out of federal criminal and civil proceedings, and this decision highlights that work-product protection may be assessed differently in different jurisdictions, and in civil versus criminal proceedings.
- Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 192.5(a)(1) clearly covers materials made “by or for a party.”4 As a result, the court concluded that work-product protection could be extended to Mr. Tate’s use of GenAI, even though he was not a lawyer or acting as his own counsel.
- Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(b)(3)’s formulation of the work-product rule similarly protects the work product of both a party and their counsel, as noted by both Warner and Morgan v. V2X, Inc. (Morgan). In Morgan, the court concluded that Rule 26(b)(3) offered work-product protection to a party’s use of GenAI, including his own mental impressions, and not merely the mental impressions of counsel, distinguishing Heppner as a criminal proceeding. While both cases involved pro se plaintiffs, Morgan specifically relies upon precedent and reading of the rule to conclude that a party’s mental impressions are protected under the rule, and the question was only whether the heightened protections under Rule 26(b)(3)(B) may apply as related to lawyers (which prohibits disclosure of lawyers’ mental impressions even where a party shows a substantial need for their opponent’s work product) because a pro se plaintiff acts as both party and counsel.
- In Heppner, by contrast, the court found that a criminal defendant’s use of GenAI could not qualify for work-product protection where there was no indication the materials were prepared by an lawyer or at an lawyer’s direction, and so could not reflect his counsel’s mental impressions.
Even where courts agree that the work-product doctrine may apply, they must answer a second-level question: whether communicating with the GenAI tool in question (or making a disclosure to it) waives protection. Because the court in Heppner determined that the relevant logs were not privileged at the outset, it did not reach this question. But the Warner and Morgan courts decided that communicating with an AI tool, by itself, did not automatically waive privilege.
In Morgan, the court reached the same conclusion later cited in the Tate Group order: even if disclosure to AI is technically a disclosure to a third party, the AI platform is not the party’s adversary and, because of how AI platforms work, “it is highly unlikely the information will fall into the hands of an adversary.”5
The Texas Business Court’s perspective
The Texas Business Court adopted many of Tate’s arguments (and Warner’s and Morgan’s analysis) and determined that the relevant chat logs were privileged and should not be produced.
To reach that result, the court first determined whether work-product protection could apply to these chat logs under Texas law. The court determined the answer was yes. In the court’s view, the defendants’ citation of Heppner was not applicable as the federal rule was not at issue here; the Texas rule was.
In particular, the court focused on the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure that specify that the work-product protection applies to any “material prepared... in anticipation of litigation by or for a party or a party’s representatives.”6 Applying that rule here, the court determined that, although the materials at issue weren’t made by a lawyer, they were made by a party (Tate) and are therefore covered by Texas’s work-product protections.
The court then conducted that second-level analysis and decided that Tate’s disclosure of those materials to a GenAI tool did not waive work-product protection under Texas law. The court’s analysis did not seem to turn on whether the GenAI tool was a public or enterprise version; instead, the court cited favorably to Warner’s and Morgan’s focus on whether the inputs and material were disclosed to or could reasonably be obtained by an adversary and found that in this circumstance, Tate’s GenAI use did not constitute waiver.
The court agreed, however, that work-product protections did not extend to discovery materials submitted into the GenAI tool, including documents designated confidential and produced by the parties pursuant to their protective order. The court also encouraged the parties to negotiate amendments to the protective order to address the disclosure of confidential information in the context of GenAI tools and directed the parties to consider the Morgan case–which as we have previously examined, specifically discusses concerns around the disclosure of confidential information into GenAI tools that lack appropriate protections, indicating that there can still be issues with the use of GenAI tools even if the tool is used in a way that does not waive privilege.
Implications of Tate Group order
Litigants should be aware of three major implications from the Tate Group order.
First, if there is a dispute about privilege, the court the dispute is in matters. Not all privilege laws are the same, and there may be dispositive differences regarding whether AI chat logs are privileged based on the court analyzing the issue. Because of differences in the formulation of the work-product doctrine across federal and state laws and criminal and civil procedural rules, there may be instances where courts analyze almost identical fact patterns but reach different conclusions based on whether statements of non-lawyer parties can be covered by the work-product doctrine. That difference alone could be dispositive to a court’s decision. Of course, litigants may not yet know which jurisdiction(s) they anticipate litigation in when they or their counsel prepare work product.
Second, there seems to be a budding consensus building on some of the repeat issues in AI-privilege decisions, such as whether disclosure of materials or information to an AI platform should be treated as an automatic waiver of privilege (of the limited set of cases on record, most courts addressing the issue have said no). Morgan, Warner and the Tate Group order agree on this point, and parties may begin to lean on this new cache of authority to argue in other jurisdictions that privilege over their AI chat logs is not waived merely because a publicly available AI tool was used.
Third, the order gives a first look behind the curtain at how Texas courts may reason through GenAI issues and determine the applicability of privilege and work-product protections in the context of GenAI going forward. Litigants who may be subject to Texas rules should consider adjusting their internal policies and procedures to align with this order’s analysis and guidance.
Footnotes