The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the Court) recently issued two false-labeling decisions that reached opposite results but share a common theme: what information can courts reasonably expect consumers to understand when evaluating product labels?

In Brown v. Brita Products Company, 172 F.4th 1113 (9th Cir. 2026), the Court affirmed dismissal of a putative class action challenging representations appearing on Brita water-filter packaging. Just one month later, in Trammell v. KLN Enterprises, 176 F.4th 629 (9th Cir. 2026), the Court reversed dismissal of claims challenging representations that a licorice product was “naturally flavored” and “free of artificial colors and flavors.” Although the outcomes differed, the decisions collectively provide insight into how the Court may evaluate the role of additional disclosures and product information in future false-labeling cases.

In Brown, the plaintiff alleged that Brita’s water filters were marketed in a manner that would lead consumers to believe the products removed or reduced common hazardous contaminants to below laboratory-detectable levels. The Court rejected that theory, holding that no reasonable consumer would expect a low-cost consumer water filter to perform as the plaintiff alleged, particularly given the information available regarding the product’s capabilities and limitations.

The Court repeatedly emphasized the broader universe of information available to consumers. The Court observed that Brita disclosed that its products “reduce” contaminants rather than remove them entirely, identified the specific contaminants reduced and provided consumers with access to performance data sheets explaining the extent to which those contaminants were reduced. The Court further emphasized that “all of this readily accessible information” made the plaintiff’s alleged interpretation unreasonable.

The Court’s reliance on “readily accessible information” is significant. Rather than focusing exclusively on whether a disclosure explicitly appeared on the front or back label, the Court considered whether consumers had access to information that meaningfully explained the product’s capabilities and limitations. Here, consumers could access performance data sheets through a QR code on the back panel. Because consumers were provided with back-label disclosures identifying the contaminants at issue, as well as access through a QR code to performance data sheets explaining the extent of contaminant reduction, the Court concluded that a reasonable consumer would not have understood the product to perform as the plaintiff alleged.

The Court’s decision in Trammell highlights an important qualification to the Court’s reasoning in Brown. There, the plaintiff challenged representations that a licorice product was “naturally flavored” and “free of artificial colors and flavors.” The plaintiff alleged that laboratory testing revealed artificial DL-malic acid derived from petroleum-based sources, and thus the product contained an artificial flavor despite representations to the contrary.

Unlike in Brown, the Court concluded that the plaintiff plausibly alleged deception. The Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the product’s ingredient list defeated the claim. Although the ingredient list disclosed the presence of malic acid, the Court explained that malic acid can exist in both natural and artificial forms and that the ingredient list did not identify which form was present in the product.

The Court’s reasoning is particularly notable because it expressly focused on the limits of consumer knowledge. According to the Court, a reasonable consumer is not a chemist and cannot be expected to determine from an ingredient list whether a particular ingredient is natural or artificial. The Court similarly rejected arguments based on FDA regulatory classifications, explaining that the relevant inquiry is what a reasonable consumer understands—not what a regulatory expert in the food and beverage industry knows. Even if malic acid could be categorized as a flavor enhancer rather than a flavoring agent under FDA regulations, the Court concluded that a reasonable consumer could still be misled by a representation that a product contains no artificial flavors.

Viewed together, Brown and Trammell suggest that the Court’s analysis may be becoming less focused on the physical location of a disclosure and more focused on whether the information available to consumers actually communicates the relevant fact at issue. If Brown demonstrates a willingness to consider readily accessible product information when evaluating whether a plaintiff’s interpretation is objectively reasonable, Trammell confirms that courts will not assume consumers possess specialized scientific or regulatory knowledge necessary to decode an ingredient list. Thus, the question is not merely whether qualifying information appears somewhere on the package. Rather, courts are increasingly asking whether the information genuinely answers the question raised by the challenged representation and whether an ordinary consumer can reasonably be expected to understand it.

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