Introduction

In June 2026, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) rescinded its long-standing policy, commonly referred to as the "gag rule", prohibiting settling defendants from denying allegations in connection with CFTC enforcement actions.1

The change eliminates a key constraint on enforcement settlements and signals a meaningful shift in CFTC enforcement practice. Under the new rule, the Commission will:

  1. no longer require "neither-admit-nor-deny” commitments as a precondition to settlement
  2. decline to enforce similar provisions in existing settlements.2

Importantly, the rescission does not preclude the Commission from including "no-admit" provisions in settlement agreements; it simply removes the categorical requirement that settling parties refrain from denying the allegations. The change also has practical implications for the Commission's own public communications: under the prior regime, the CFTC could issue press releases and public statements characterizing allegations as established facts, while settling parties were contractually prohibited from responding. By removing the no-deny restriction, the policy change may temper that dynamic and afford settling parties greater ability to present their perspective publicly. This change brings the CFTC’s settlement practice into conformity with the SEC, which recently adopted the same practice, and most other federal agencies.

This legal update summarizes the rule and highlights practical considerations for market participants that have previously settled with the CFTC or may do so in the future.

Background

Since 1998, the CFTC has maintained a policy, codified in Appendix A to Part 10 of its Rules of Practice, under which the Commission would not accept a settlement if the respondent or defendant continued to deny the allegations or refused to accept findings of fact and conclusions of law.3

In practice, this resulted in settlements that typically included “neither-admit-nor-deny” provisions coupled with restrictions on public statements, effectively prohibiting settling parties from publicly denying the allegations or suggesting that the settlement lacked a factual basis. Notably, the Commission acknowledged in the final rule that it is not aware of any instance in which it has sought to enforce a no-deny provision or to reopen a settled matter based on a breach of such a provision.4

The June 2026 rule rescinds that policy in its entirety and removes Appendix A from the Commission’s regulations. 5

In rescinding the policy, the Commission cited several considerations, including:

  • The limited real-world enforcement of “no-deny” provisions
  • Practical challenges in policing public statements in the modern communications environment, in particular, the Commission noted that the proliferation of social media has blurred the line between public and private statements, as communications intended for a limited audience may nonetheless be visible to dozens or more individuals, making it difficult to determine whether a given statement constitutes a "public" denial triggering a breach of the settlement
  • Concerns that the no-deny restriction may create the incorrect impression that the Commission is seeking to shield itself from criticism, which—regardless of the Commission's actual intent—could undermine public confidence in the agency's commitment to transparency, openness and fair process
  • The absence of comparable constraints at most other federal agencies
  • A desire for greater flexibility to resolve enforcement actions efficiently6

The Commission also stated that it will not seek to enforce existing “neither-admit-nor-deny” provisions in previously settled matters, nor will it attempt to reopen cases based on alleged breaches of those provisions.7

Key takeaways

Elimination of the “no-deny” restriction:

  • The CFTC will no longer require settling parties to agree to refrain from denying the allegations as a condition of settlement. 8 This does not mean the Commission will affirmatively accept or endorse denials; rather, the no-deny language will no longer be a standard component of the settlement framework.

    Greater flexibility in settlement structure:

  • Under the prior policy, the Commission was categorically barred from settling with any party that wished to retain the ability to deny the allegations. That categorical prohibition has been removed, enabling the Commission to evaluate settlement terms, including the treatment of admissions and denials, 9 on a case-by-case basis rather than applying a one-size-fits-all restriction.

    Non-enforcement of legacy provisions:

  • The CFTC will not enforce existing “neither-admit-nor-deny” clauses or seek to reopen settled matters based on alleged violations of those provisions. 10

    Alignment with broader federal practice:

  • The change aligns the CFTC’s settlement approach more closely with other regulators and enforcement authorities11

    Potential for increased settlements:

  • By removing a barrier to agreement, the new policy may facilitate earlier resolution of enforcement actions and reduce litigation.

Implications for market participants

Market participants with prior CFTC settlements should consider the following implications of the Commission's decision not to enforce existing "no-deny" provisions. As a practical matter, individuals and entities that previously settled with the CFTC may now speak more freely in a range of important contexts, including responding to due diligence questionnaires, addressing follow-up questions in background checks and communicating with investors, counterparties and regulators, without risk that such statements will be treated as a breach of the settlement.

Market participants with prior CFTC settlements should consider the following implications of the Commission’s decision not to enforce existing “no-deny” provisions:

Reduced enforcement risk tied to public statements:

  • The Commission has indicated that it will not pursue breach claims or seek to reopen matters based on post-settlement denials.12

Reassessment of communications strategy:

  • Firms may revisit disclosure, investor communications and public messaging relating to prior settlements.
  • However, market participants should exercise caution in making public statements regarding prior settlements. Any public denial or characterization of a settled matter must be accurate and not misleading (it must not omit material facts that would give a materially different impression of the underlying conduct). Inaccurate or incomplete statements could give rise to new grounds for liability, including potential claims of fraud or misrepresentation. In addition, selectively denying certain allegations may be construed as an implicit admission of the allegations not denied. Firms should consult counsel before making any public statements regarding prior settlements.

Participants facing or anticipating future enforcement actions

The policy shift also carries significant forward-looking implications.

Expanded settlement options:

  • Firms may be able to resolve cases without agreeing to broad restrictions on public statements or implied acceptance of liability.

    Enhanced negotiating leverage:

  • The removal of the categorical no-deny prohibition provides additional room to negotiate settlement terms. However, the Commission may seek to offset this concession by taking a firmer position on other settlement terms, such as the amount of monetary sanctions, the scope of undertakings or the inclusion of admissions on specific factual or legal issues.

    Potentially faster and more efficient resolutions:

  • The Commission expressly emphasized resource conservation, certainty and efficient outcomes as key objectives of the policy change.13

    Coordination with parallel proceedings remains critical:

  • The Commission has noted that it may still seek admissions in cases involving parallel criminal proceedings or where liability has been established in other forums.14

    Revised internal compliance and litigation strategy:

  • In light of the new regime, firms should reassess their standard approach to CFTC settlement negotiations, including updating template consent language, revisiting escalation protocols for enforcement inquiries and evaluating whether prior settlement restrictions on public statements remain operative. Compliance teams should also coordinate with litigation counsel to ensure that settlement strategy reflects the expanded range of available outcomes.

Conclusion

The CFTC’s rescission of its “no-deny” settlement policy, represents a significant evolution in its enforcement framework, removing a constraint that shaped settlement negotiations for nearly three decades. By permitting defendants to settle without agreeing to refrain from denying allegations and by declining to enforce such provisions in legacy settlements, the Commission has meaningfully expanded flexibility for both staff and market participants.

Firms should evaluate both the retrospective implications for prior settlements and disclosures and the prospective impact on negotiation strategy and enforcement risk management. In many cases, the change is likely to make settlement a more attractive and efficient pathway for resolving CFTC enforcement actions.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Rescission of Policy Relating to the Acceptance of Settlements in Administrative and Civil Proceedings, 91 Fed. Reg. 34,570 (June 8, 2026).

  2. 2

    Id. at 34,571–72.

  3. 3

    Id. at 34,570.

  4. 4

    Id. at 34,571.

  5. 5

    Id. at 34,573.

  6. 6

    Id. at 34,571–72.

  7. 7

    Id. at 34,572.

  8. 8

    Id. at 34,570.

  9. 9

    Id. at 34,571–72.

  10. 10

    Id. at 34,572.

  11. 11

    Id. at 34,572.

  12. 12

    Id. at 34,572.

  13. 13

    Id. at 34,571–72.

  14. 14

    Id. at 34,572 n. 25.

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