Canada presses forward with further changes to defence procurement
Canada’s effort to reform defence procurement continues with the rollout of further legislation intended to overcome historic challenges in Canadian defence procurement through creating a public institution with greater commercial capacity and specialized expertise to acquire military capability, support industrial capacity and help implement defence industrial policy.
The Defence Investment Agency (DIA) was established in October 2025 as a special operating agency within Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC). In May 2026, the government introduced Bill C-31, a budget implementation bill that included a proposal to establish the DIA as a standalone statutory agency, separate from PSPC, under dedicated ministerial leadership. Bill C-31 remains before Parliament and has not been enacted.
On October 6, 2026, the government introduced a different model through Bill C-40, which would establish the Canadian Corporation for Defence Investment, continuing to operate as the DIA, as a Crown corporation within the National Defence portfolio. Bill C-40 was referred to the Standing Committee on National Defence on October 26, 2026, and remains subject to amendment before enactment.
Bill C-40, as currently envisaged, would leave responsibility for the Defence Production Act with the Minister of Government Transformation, Public Works and Procurement rather than transferring it to the DIA. It would not, however, preserve the status quo. The bill would expand the scope of the Defence Production Act to include national and economic security. It would also give the government wider powers to acquire goods and services, support strategic investments and maintain reserves of critical supplies.
The proposed framework may consolidate certain procurement and investment functions in the DIA, but other authorities would remain with the Minister of Government Transformation, Public Works and Procurement and other federal institutions. Procurement transactions may therefore continue to require coordination among the DIA, the responsible minister and other federal institutions.
From procurement agency to Crown corporation
The government of Canada has stated that the proposed Crown corporation model for the DIA is to provide greater operational and commercial flexibility while maintaining government oversight and approval powers. Its permanent structure and emphasis on specialized expertise may also support more commercially focused engagement with industry, but its effectiveness would nevertheless depend on clear boundaries between the DIA’s operational authority, DIA board oversight, ministerial direction and matters requiring government approval, so that oversight does not impede timely decision-making.
Under the proposed model, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) would retain responsibility for operational priorities, capability requirements and standards for acceptable deliveries of procured equipment, systems and other capabilities, while the DIA would undertake procurement, production and investment activities for their benefit, which could include financing or investing in industrial capacity to support DND and CAF defence needs.
This division of responsibilities may provide an opportunity to strengthen commercial discipline in defence procurement, provided that clear accountability and practical mechanisms for resolving disagreements between stakeholders and managing changes are established and operate together effectively.
Bill C-40 would provide the DIA with specified lending and advance-payment authorities, while separate amendments to the Defence Production Act would authorize the Minister of Government Transformation, Public Works and Procurement to enter into financial transactions for investment in the defence and national-security sectors. The proposed framework provides the DIA and the responsible minister with distinct procurement and investment authorities. This raises important questions:
- What financing or capacity constraints would these authorities be used to address?
- What criteria would govern strategic relevance, risk allocation, pricing, repayment, termination and, for equity and other financial instruments, divestment terms?
- How would the framework support critical sovereign capacity building while managing the risk that company-specific funding may be insufficiently connected to real defence requirements?
Commercial flexibility and public accountability
The government’s stated rationale for converting the DIA into a Crown corporation emphasizes greater operational and commercial flexibility as a means of accelerating procurement. That flexibility may be particularly relevant in procurements where operational urgency, security requirements, interoperability constraints, limited supplier markets or domestic-capacity objectives make open competition impractical or otherwise affect the available procurement approach.
In those circumstances, DIA’s governance framework would need to include safeguards against overpayment, insufficient public scrutiny and failure to deliver the necessary capability, including independent valuations, price and financing terms benchmarking, ministerial and board oversight, broad DIA contractual audit rights and other contractual protections related to delivery, cost and technical performance.
Implications for contractors investors and lenders
For defence companies, the DIA may become an important federal contracting counterparty and, through its proposed investment authorities, a potential source of strategic capital. Depending on their terms, government contracts, advance-payment arrangements or other financial support could improve the bankability of businesses and projects whose revenues depend on lengthy or uncertain procurement cycles.
These potential arrangements raise transaction questions. Contractors and capital providers will need to consider how loans, advances, investments and other financial arrangements available through the DIA may interact with senior debt, security interests, export controls and the contractual and statutory rights of the Crown.
Contractors should remain attentive to the legislative development and implementation of Bill C-40, particularly the allocation of procurement and investment responsibilities, decision-making authority and approval requirements among the DIA, responsible ministers and other federal institutions. An understanding of these institutional responsibilities and how they interact will inform engagement with the relevant government authorities at appropriate stages of the procurement process and assist contractors in navigating the procurement framework strategically.
Conclusion
Bill C-40 proposes more than faster contracting. It would create a new model for acquiring military equipment and investing in Canada’s defence industrial capacity. If implemented effectively, the model could help Canada respond more quickly to operational needs, build and strengthen critical domestic capabilities and supply chains and provide industry with a more commercially focused federal partner. Achieving those benefits will depend on clear responsibilities, sound decision-making and ensuring that greater flexibility remains tied to identified defence requirements, measurable results and responsible use of public funds.