Digital advertising affects everyone—from eerily accurate product recommendations to intrusive pop-ups on web pages, we’ve all had some experience with digital advertising. The tools and platform owned by Google that are used to display and transact those ads have been the subject of multiple litigations over the past few years. In one of those cases, a federal judge now faces the question of how to remedy Google’s illegal monopolies in the markets dominated by Google’s products.
In US, et al. v. Google LLC, the US Department of Justice and seventeen states (DOJ) filed a lawsuit alleging that Google illegally monopolized various markets for digital advertising technology (Ad Tech) and illegally tied together various Google Ad Tech products, among other conduct. The Court held a bench trial on liability in September 2024 and issued an opinion in April 2025 finding that Google illegally monopolized two markets.1 The parties began a remedies trial in September 2025, with closing arguments on November 21, 2025. The world now awaits this year’s second major decision on antitrust remedies against Google. While the parties agree that behavioral remedies (injunctions preventing Google from acting in certain ways) are necessary if the Court’s liability holding stands, they disagree about which behavioral remedies to enact and fundamentally disagree about whether structural remedies (such as, divestiture) are appropriate at all.
This article provides background on the case to date and analyzes the parties’ closing arguments in the remedies trial—focusing on their proposed remedies, identifying areas of agreement and disagreement, the Court’s focus and concerns and the next steps in this litigation.2
Background and analysis: The liability decision and remedies trial
Background on Ad Tech for “open-web display” ads
The Ad Tech “stack” refers to the set of software tools that connect website owners (publishers) offering advertising spaces or “inventory” to advertisers. Ad Tech tools match publishers to advertisers through transactions that occur nearly instantaneously as a webpage loads. The Ad Tech stack includes sell-side tools that publishers use to manage and sell ad inventory, buy-side tools that advertisers use to purchase ad inventory and ad exchanges that serve as intermediaries between advertisers’ ads and publishers’ inventory by facilitating real-time auctions. The claims in US, et al. v. Google LLC focused on open-web display ads which are graphical web ads (as opposed to ads in search results, mobile app ads and in-stream video ads) placed on the open web (rather than on walled garden websites that use their own tools to sell inventory directly to advertisers).
The liability decision: The Court found that Google is a monopolist
After a three-week bench trial on liability in the Eastern District of Virginia, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema issued her opinion on April 17, 2025. The Court found Google liable for the monopolization of the open-web display publisher ad server market and the open-web display ad exchange market, and for unlawfully tying its publisher ad server (DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP)) and ad exchange (AdX). Because the Court found that DOJ did not prove a relevant market for open-web display advertiser ad networks, the Court did not find liability as to that monopolization claim.
Google’s monopoly power in the relevant markets
In determining that there are distinct relevant antitrust markets for publisher ad servers and ad exchanges, the Court examined the particular purposes and features of each tool type that distinguish them from other Ad Tech tools. Publisher ad servers, the Court concluded, offer advanced features uniquely suited to managing and selling inventory for large publishers. The Court found that, by contrast, ad exchanges have the unique ability to collect and rank bids from multiple buy-side tools in milliseconds, as required by sophisticated publishers and advertisers.
The Court then held that Google has monopoly power in both relevant markets, considering, among other factors, DFP’s large share of the publisher ad server market and AdX’s maintenance of its 20 percent take rate and its large share of the ad exchange market. The Court rejected Google’s argument that all products existed as a part of a single online advertising market in which Google would have lower share.
Google’s anticompetitive conduct
The Court then found that Google acquired and preserved its monopoly power in both markets through a series of anticompetitive acts. In particular, the Court found that Google implemented a series of technical and policy restrictions for AdX and DFP that prevented publishers from receiving bids in real time from AdX unless they also used DFP. The Court noted that real-time access to AdX was particularly valuable to publishers “because of the unique advertising demand that AdX receives from the millions of advertisers who exclusively use [Google’s buy-side tool,] AdWords.” These restrictions, the Court found, constituted unlawful tying because they effectively forced publishers who wanted to gain real-time access to AdX to use DFP. The Court held that tying AdX and DFP violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act and, because it also contributed to Google’s maintenance and creation of monopoly power, violated Section 2.
The Court also found that Google introduced anticompetitive policies, practices and technology changes to its sell-side Ad Tech tools that decreased the products’ quality and protected its monopolistic position. These changes included (1) “First Look,” a policy that required publishers using DFP to offer AdX a first right of refusal for each impression; (2) “Last Look,” a feature in DFP that gave AdX the ability to see competing exchanges’ bids in an otherwise sealed auction before AdX would bid and (3) Unified Pricing Rules, a technical change that eliminated publishers’ ability to set higher price floors on AdX than on third-party exchanges. While it found that each of these conducts had anticompetitive effects, the Court noted that the Section 2 claims turned on whether Google’s conduct “when considered as a whole, harmed competition and therefore harmed consumers.”3
The remedies trial: How to address Google’s monopolization
In September 2025, the parties returned to the Alexandria courthouse for the remedies phase of the case. Both parties had proposed a number of remedies to address and reverse the effects of Google’s antitrust violations. Over the course of the 11-day trial, the Court heard testimony from 19 fact witnesses and seven experts regarding the necessity, effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed remedies. Among the fact witnesses for DOJ were representatives from major publishers, competitor Ad Tech companies and Google’s own employees (such as Google’s Vice President and Google’s General Manager for Display Ads). Google countered with multiple Google-employee witnesses and a publisher representative. Both parties put on expert economists and engineers.
In post-trial briefs, the parties refined their remedies proposals based on the evidence presented and the insights they gleaned from Judge Brinkema as she posed questions to witnesses on the stand. The primary dispute centered on structural remedies; both parties agree that behavioral remedies are needed, though they remain far apart on what those should be.
How courts evaluate antitrust remedies
At closing arguments, both sides cited the same standard and four objectives in support of their competing proposed remedies. Under that standard, an antitrust remedy must (1) unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct, (2) terminate the illegal monopoly, (3) deny the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation and (4) ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in monopolization in the future.
DOJ’s proposal: Break up Google
DOJ seeks a mix of structural, behavioral and administrative remedies including divestiture of AdX, making DFP’s final auction logic open source and “if necessary” divestiture of the remainder of DFP. DOJ argued at closing that only a remedy that included divestiture would provide complete relief from Google’s monopolies. DOJ’s closing arguments focused on the necessity and feasibility of divestiture.
DOJ argued that behavioral remedies would burden governmental enforcers by requiring them to monitor Google’s activities in Ad Tech. Moreover, behavioral remedies would incentivize Google to “test the boundaries,” which would lead to further antitrust litigation or “mini-trials” on whether the Court’s order has been violated.
Instead, DOJ proposed that behavioral remedies should be implemented until structural remedies can take effect and then should be used to complement the structural remedies. They have also asked the Court to order Google to put its earnings from charging supracompetitive prices into an escrow account to be used to subsidize switching costs for publishers who choose to leave DFP and to share logic-improving data with an open-source auction logic server.
DOJ also addressed the feasibility of divestiture. DOJ argued that Big Tech software engineers routinely perform data migration similar to the migration required by the divestiture remedies. They restated their projected timelines, which included 15 months for the divestiture of AdX.
Google’s proposal: Injunctions are sufficient
In response, Google argued that DOJ failed to make a clear showing of a significant causal connection between the anticompetitive conduct and its monopoly power sufficient to warrant structural remedies. Accordingly, Google argued that structural remedies are “unnecessary and harmful,” as well as “technically unworkable.”4 Google further contended that these proposed divestitures would eliminate a competitor from the market and that a court has never ordered such a divestiture and elimination of a competitor in an analogous case.
Moreover, Google argued, the divestiture remedies are unworkable, time-consuming and likely to result in “broken technology.” Google noted that a divestiture buyer may be incapable or unwilling to operate its Ad Tech tools in a way that maintains their utility to consumers and preserves competition.
By contrast, Google argued, its proposed behavioral remedies would effectively remedy its antitrust violations and would go beyond what is necessary to address them. Google’s proposed remedies include making real-time bids from AdX available to third-party ad servers rivaling DFP, enjoining Unified Pricing Rules, First Look, and Last Look, sharing data files with publishers upon request and creating a server-to-server integration between DFP and Prebid (a header-bidding wrapper) that would allow DFP publishers to access demand sources, including AdX, through the non-Google-controlled Prebid auction. Google argued that these behavioral remedies would restore competition without the risks and delays associated with divestiture.
The Court’s questions on timing and divestiture buyers
The Court indicated that timing—specifically, how long it may take to implement a proposed remedy—may impact its decision: Judge Brinkema noted that “time is somewhat of the essence,” acknowledging that the Ad Tech landscape could change vastly in the coming years due to developments in artificial intelligence used for digital advertising. The Court pointed out that divestiture could not be implemented immediately (due to a likely appeal by Google), whereas behavioral remedies could be implemented more quickly. The Court also expressed interest in the process for finding a divestiture buyer for Google’s Ad Tech – a process that she noted may be time-consuming and require further antitrust analyses.
Remedies decision to come in 2026
During the November 2025 closing arguments, Judge Brinkema informed the parties and public that, while she and her clerks had already begun writing the remedies opinion, she still needed to decide the core issue of whether to order structural remedies.
Our team will monitor any updates, developments and the final order. For questions about Ad Tech generally, please contact our team.
Disclosure: The authors are counsel for the State of Texas in litigation against Google in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Footnotes
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US v. Google LLC, 778 F. Supp. 3d 797 (E.D. Va. 2025) (Liability Opinion).
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This client alert is provided for informational purposes only; the opinions expressed in this article, if any, are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the authors’ clients.
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Liability Opinion, 778 F. Supp. 3d 797, 857.
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Google LLC’s Post-Trial Remedies Brief at 16, 21, US v. Google LLC, No. 1:23-cv-00108-LMB-JFA (E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 2025).