Introduction

In 2024, the US Supreme Court handed down a bright-line rule in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P.: a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization cannot provide for a release of claims against a non-debtor without the consent of the affected non-debtor claimants.

Shortly thereafter, cases began testing the boundaries of where Purdue Pharma applies. For example, in Re Boy Scouts of America, 137 F.4th 126 (3rd Cir. 2025), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether settlement fund rules were unlawful because they functioned as a non-consensual thirdparty release. Other courts published decisions discussing what is meant by a “consensual” release.1 Most recently, courts have begun evaluating whether Purdue Pharma should apply outside of Chapter 1, specifically to proceedings under Chapter 15 or Chapter 7.

This article will explore these new developments, and the courts’ decisions not to extend the limitations of Purdue Pharma outside of the Chapter 11 arena.

The Application of Purdue Pharma in Chapter 15

Two recent cases have addressed the application of Purdue Pharma in the context of a Chapter 15 proceeding, concluding that Purdue Pharma does not apply and does not prohibit nonconsensual third-party releases. See In re Odebrecht Engenharia e Construção S.A. - Em Recuperação Judicial, 669 B.R. 457 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 2025), and In re Crédito Real, S.A.B. de C.V., SOFOM, E.N.R., 670 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Del. 2025). Both cases involved the foreign court as the “foreign main proceeding,” with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court being asked to either approve or enforce a final plan of reorganization (or foreign equivalent) containing a nonconsensual third-party release.

  • Purdue Pharma and the Chapter 11 “Catchall” Confirmation Provision.

Under Chapter 11, a bankruptcy court is empowered to confirm a plan of reorganization that discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before plan confirmation, unless this is prevented by the plan itself, the confirmation order of the bankruptcy court, or the Bankruptcy Code. Generally speaking, under Section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a discharge operates only for the benefit of the debtor against its creditors and does not affect the liability of any other entity.

The contents of any plan of reorganization in Chapter 11 proceedings are addressed in Section 1123(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. In Purdue Pharma, the Supreme Court analyzed the six subdivisions in Section 1123(b) to reach its conclusion that a non-consensual third-party release is not allowed in Chapter 11 plans. The Court reasoned that subsections 1-5 of Section 1123(b) allow a plan to “address claims and property belonging to a debtor or its estate”, or “modify the rights of creditors who hold claims against the debtor or its estate.” Subsection 6 is a catchall, allowing a bankruptcy court to “include any other appropriate provision [in a plan] not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.” The Supreme Court then interpreted this catchall as permitting provisions or relief in a Chapter 11 plan not otherwise listed in Section 1123, "so long as it involves debts of, or claims against, the debtor". A non-consensual third-party release of debts that are not part of or against the debtor or its estate thus cannot be released using the catchall.

  • Purdue Pharma and the “Catchall” Provisions of Chapter 15.

Both Odebrecht and Crédito Real addressed similar “catchall” provisions of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, holding that nonconsensual third-party releases approved by a foreign court in a Chapter 15 case are not prohibited by Purdue Pharma.

Odebrecht began its statutory analysis with Section 1521(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which enables a court to grant “any appropriate relief” so long as it is “necessary to effectuate the purpose of [Chapter 15] and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.” It then looked at Section 1507 of the Bankruptcy Code, which affords “additional assistance” so long as it is available under Chapter 15 or “other laws of the United States.” The text of both sections, the Odebrecht court held, permits the grant of a nonconsensual third-party release in support of a foreign debtor’s plan of reorganization.

The Crédito Real court was similarly asked to analyze the same two statutes and determine whether the “catchall” language found in both sections should be read the same as the “catchall” language that the Purdue Pharma court analyzed for Chapter 11 cases (Section 1123(b)). The Crédito Real court held that the Chapter 15 statutes were a distinct list of "limitations", meaning that the list is only the circumstances in which the court cannot grant relief. A prohibition on non-consensual third-party releases does not appear in those limitations.

  • The Importance of Chapter 15’s Purpose in Odebrecht and Crédito Real.

Both Odebrecht and Crédito Real involved detailed discussions of the underpinning for why Chapter 15 is different from Chapter 11. The purpose of Chapter 15 is to help carry out foreign bankruptcy proceedings that have some aspect that need a U.S. court’s attention. The buzzword for this is “comity,” traditionally defined as a principle permitting or encouraging federal courts to assist foreign and international governmental bodies to promote respect for foreign governments and encourage reciprocal assistance. Much ink has been spilled on interpreting this principle, but as Odebrecht and Crédito Real discuss, Chapter 15 is written to generally respect foreign bankruptcy proceedings in order to encourage foreign courts to recognize U.S. bankruptcy proceedings in return. This co-operation benefits the parties and courts by not injecting disputes between U.S. and foreign courts into the middle of bankruptcy proceedings if there is no good reason for doing so.

The Odebrecht and Crédito Real courts recognized that there would be a very good reason not to recognize a foreign proceeding or plan of reorganization if a foreign court was doing something that was “manifestly contrary” to U.S. public policy. Under the Bankruptcy Code, relief under Chapter 15 cannot be granted if it is manifestly contrary to public policy or violates a U.S. citizen's fundamental rights or procedural fairness. For something to be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy, the contested relief must impinge on some constitutional or statutory right.

Even if non-consensual third-party releases are not allowed in Chapter 11 reorganizations, the Odebrecht and Crédito Real courts held, they are not “manifestly contrary” to U.S. public policy. Both cases noted Purdue Pharma has explicit language that says “[b]oth sides of [the] policy debate may have their points.” The Odebrecht court interpreted this sentence to mean that since the policy arguments go both ways on whether to allow nonconsensual third-party releases, the releases are not “manifestly contrary” to U.S. public policy (which would require a more explicit violation of a constitutional or statutory right). The Crédito Real court for its part stated Congress has authorized nonconsensual third-party releases in another context before, and the Supreme Court has explicitly said that it could do so again in the context of chapter 11 if it so desired. Therefore, lack of specific availability in U.S. courts does not equate to manifest contrariness to U.S. public policy.

The catchall section in Chapter 11 that the Supreme Court analyzed in Purdue Pharma, and forms the basis for its disallowance of non-consensual third-party releases in Chapter 11 plans, does not exist in Chapter 15. The point of a Chapter 15 proceeding is to provide a means for carrying out a valid foreign court’s reorganization plan or order, so long as it does not manifestly contradict U.S. Policy – which a nonconsensual third-party release does not. So long as a non‑consensual third-party release is allowed in the foreign jurisdiction and was obtained in a fair proceeding with the same fundamental protections that litigants would receive in a U.S. Court, it is likely that a nonconsensual third-party release will be upheld in a Chapter 15 proceeding.

The Application of Purdue Pharma in Chapter 7

The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida recently considered whether Purdue Pharma applied in a Chapter 7 case, and held that it did not because of the purpose underlying Chapter 7. In In re Commercial Express, Inc., 670 B.R. 573, 587 (Bankr. M.D.Fla., 2025), the Chapter 7 trustee sought to liquidate two insurance policies which were assets of the estate. The insurance companies which issued the policies sought to limit their liability to future claims against the policies by seeking from the Bankruptcy Court what were in essence bar orders preventing any future, arguably non-consenting, creditor from making such claims. The U.S. Trustee objected, claiming that the bar orders were essentially non-consensual third-party releases. The Commercial Express court overruled the U.S. Trustee’s objection and permitted both of the policies to be liquidated as requested.

For one of the policies, the chapter 7 trustee entered into a settlement agreement providing that, in exchange for a bar order and release, the insurance company would pay the estate a stated amount under an MCS-90 endorsement representing the “best day” recovery under that endorsement. Approval of the settlement was sought pursuant to Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits a court to enter “any order necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of [the Code].” The U.S. Trustee objected, arguing that Purdue Pharma had explicitly held that Section 105(a) alone cannot justify the imposition of what is, in essence, nonconsensual third-party releases because Section 105(a) serves only to “carry out” authorities expressly conferred elsewhere in the Code.

The Commercial Express court rejected that argument, finding that in a Chapter 7 proceeding, there was another provision of the Bankruptcy Code that allowed the entering of such an order: Section 704(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which directs a Chapter 7 trustee to “reduce to money the property of the estate.” By combining Sections 105(a) and 704(a), the court found, a Chapter 7 trustee may effectively grant a nonconsensual third-party release by combining it with a liquidation of the asset because the trustee "has" to liquidate the estate under Section 704(a). Accordingly, and notwithstanding Purdue Pharma, when coupled with Section 704(a), Section 105(a) provides the authority for a court to approve any order necessary and appropriate for the trustee to be able to fulfill their mandate.

The second policy at issue in Commercial Express was liquidated by having the insurer buy back its own policy from the estate pursuant to Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, thereby eliminating the parties who could make a claim against the policy in the future. Section 363(f) expressly authorizes “sales free and clear of any interest if such interest is in bona fide dispute” or “if the holder of the interest could be compelled in a [court] proceeding to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.” In other words, if the sale is approved free and clear of all interests, then any third-party that might have a claim against the insurance policy would be barred from asserting it in the future. The U.S. Trustee objected, claiming that the sale constituted an impermissible nonconsensual third-party bar order prohibited by Purdue Pharma.

The Commercial Express court approved the sale over the U.S. Trustee’s objection, noting that multiple other courts have recognized that bar orders are still permitted “when necessary to a sale or settlement concerning property of the estate.” Further, the court found that Purdue Pharma does not concern Section 363 sales of estate property, and does not prevent a court from entering a bar order to effect a sale of estate property where it is necessary for the sale of estate property.

Conclusion

US Courts are still grappling with how Purdue Pharma’s explicit bar on non-consensual third-party releases should be construed.  As described above, recent cases have held it does not apply in Chapter 15 cases where the non-consensual release is provided in a reorganization plan approved in the foreign jurisdiction pursuant to a fair proceeding. This is because there is a different catchall provision in Chapter 15, and because the purpose of Chapter 15 is to assist with foreign actions.  It also is inapplicable in Chapter 7 because a trustee is required to liquidate the assets of the estate, providing the justification for entering a bar order if it is necessary for the liquidation of an estate asset.  Finally, multiple courts have held that entering a bar order to effect a Section 363(f) sale of an estate asset in a Chapter 7 context does not violate Purdue Pharma, at least “when necessary” to monetize a debtor’s insurance policies.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Blanchard, Jason, Opt-in or Opt-Out? The Ongoing Debate Over Consensual Third-Party Releases in US Chapter 11 cases, International Restructuring Newswire, April 2024.

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