The recent development of Exxon Mobil Corporation’s retail shareholder voting program has attracted attention among Canadian public issuers, with questions regarding potential opportunities and challenges for Canadian companies considering the feasibility of a similar initiative under the Canadian regulatory framework.

Exxon’s new retail voting program enables retail shareholders to provide standing voting instructions that their shares be voted at all future shareholder meetings in accordance with Exxon’s board recommendations. The program’s stated purpose is to reduce the burden on retail shareholders and enhance their participation in the company’s shareholder meetings. The obvious benefit to Exxon is to increase support from a group of shareholders that typically do not vote in large numbers. According to Exxon, while approximately 40 percent of its shareholder base consists of retail shareholders, only 25 percent of those shares are typically voted.

On September 15, 2025, the US Securities and Exchange Commission issued a no-action letter in response to Exxon’s request regarding its new retail voting program, allowing Exxon to proceed with the program for its 2026 AGM. Exxon is a New Jersey corporation.

Retail voting program design

  • Eligibility: The program is available to registered and beneficial retail shareholders. Beneficial holders would be able to opt in via their banks, brokers or plan administrators.
  • Opt-in choices: Retail shareholders may choose to provide standing voting instructions for all meeting matters, or for all matters other than contested director elections and major transactions such as mergers, acquisitions, or divestitures requiring shareholder approval. Either option would provide Exxon with the ability to rely on the standing voting instructions to amend its constating documents (other than in connection with a merger, an acquisition or a divestiture transaction but potentially in other significant ways) and vote against shareholder proposals, among other things.
  • Opt-out and overrides: Once registered, participants can opt out of the program at any time at no cost, which opt-out will be applied to all future meetings (other than an upcoming meeting for which proxy materials have already been filed at the time of the opt-out). For an upcoming meeting where the proxy materials have already been filed, participants can still override the program’s standing instruction votes by casting a vote at the meeting or by submitting a proxy.
  • Reminders: Once registered, participants will receive an annual reminder of their enrollment with instructions for opting out.
  • Administration: Exxon has engaged a vote processing agent to facilitate communications with intermediaries and shareholders and to provide the online portal used by shareholders to opt in or out.

Retail shareholders have also historically been underrepresented in shareholder votes in Canada. Could such a retail voting program succeed here?

  • Corporate and securities laws: While New Jersey and Delaware corporate statutes appear to permit shareholders to provide standing voting instructions, Canadian corporate statutes do not have the same concept. A key consideration is whether a standing voting instruction would constitute a “proxy” under Canadian corporate and securities law and whether a company’s invitation to participate in such a program would be deemed a “solicitation.” If the program were to constitute the solicitation of a proxy, there would be a number of hurdles under Canadian corporate and securities laws that limit the duration of validity of a proxy and require that specific documentation, including a management information circular, accompany the solicitation.

    Alternatively, it may be possible to take the position that standing voting instructions be considered an authorization granted by a shareholder under Canadian corporate law for the company to act as the shareholder’s personal representative or attorney to execute a proxy on its behalf. Under such a scenario, standing voting instructions themselves arguably would not be a “proxy” that would be subject to the durational rules governing the validity of proxies; only the proxy executed pursuant to those instructions would be so subject.

    However, given the broad definition of “solicitation” in Canadian corporate and securities legislation, which includes a communication to a shareholder “under circumstances that to a reasonable person will likely result in the giving of a proxy,” the communication inviting participation in a retail voting program could constitute a “solicitation” necessitating exemptive relief from the rules applicable to management proxy solicitations, as discussed below.
  • Minority shareholders considerations: Canadian securities legislation provides additional protections for minority shareholders when a corporation undertakes a transaction that presents a heightened risk of a conflict of interest, such as a related-party transaction, business combination, insider bid or issuer bid. It is difficult to predict how the securities regulatory authorities would view the validity of standing voting instructions in the context of such a transaction that is subject to a shareholder vote, but it would be important to consider in the context of establishing a retail voting program, including the design of the opt-in options.
  • Regulatory approval: Given the novel nature of the program and potential concerns under corporate and securities legislation, Canadian issuers may want to seek exemptive relief before implementing a retail voting program. Exxon applied for and received a “no-action” letter from the SEC. In the absence of a national securities regulator, Canadian issuers would have to seek exemptive relief from the applicable provincial regulator(s), in addition to considering the need for relief under the applicable corporate statute.
  • Infrastructure: Exxon’s program requires a backend portal through which shareholders may opt in and out, as well as the necessary service providers to support the program, including a vote processing agent. It is uncertain whether similar infrastructure will become available in Canada.

    In addition, given that a later vote cast by a participant (whether by proxy or at the meeting and whether by a registered or beneficial shareholder) is meant to override any previous standing voting instruction by that participant, mechanisms would need to be in place to prevent overvoting. Given existing issues with the Canadian proxy voting infrastructure and the accompanying risk of overvoting, layering a retail voting program on top of the existing infrastructure may prove problematic.
  • Shareholder base: While there is clear appeal for companies to put in place a program that will assist in securing shareholder support, Exxon’s program requires a relatively large and stable base of retail shareholders to work. For companies with a smaller base of retail shareholders or whose retail shareholder base has a high rate of turnover, such a program would not be worthwhile.

Exxon’s new retail shareholder voting program represents a novel approach to enhancing retail shareholder engagement, and its approval by the SEC through a no-action letter has sparked interest among Canadian companies.

While the program offers strategic benefits, including the potential to rebalance shareholder influence (e.g., as between institutional and retail shareholders), improve participation rates and protect against activist and dissident shareholder initiatives, its adoption in Canada would require careful navigation of legal and regulatory frameworks. Given Canada’s different legislative regulatory regimes, it would be prudent to engage in confidential discussions with the regulators before embarking on such a program.

While we are unlikely to see a similar retail shareholder voting program established in Canada during the 2026 proxy season, it remains to be seen whether the regulatory and infrastructure hurdles can be overcome for future shareholder meetings.

The author would like to thank Tashi Gonggazhaxi, articling student, for his contribution to preparing this legal update.

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2026 Proxy and continuous disclosure updates
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