Introduction

On March 12, 2026, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC or Commission) took two significant actions furthering the development of a regulatory framework for prediction markets:

Prediction Markets Advisory

The staff (Staff) of the Commission's Division of Market Oversight (DMO) issued CFTC Letter No. 26-08, a staff advisory (the Prediction Markets Advisory or the Advisory) addressed to Designated Contract Markets (DCMs) that details the DMO Staff’s current views on the regulations applicable to the listing and trading of event contracts on prediction markets.1 The Advisory notes that “while certain aspects of the advisory focus on sports-related event contracts, the core principle compliance and product listing requirements highlighted in the advisory apply equally to other categories of event contracts — and to derivative products more generally.”2

Proposed rulemaking

The CFTC published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) requesting comment on a broad range of issues relating to regulation of event contracts traded on prediction markets, including the application of statutory core principles, public interest determinations, inside information and cost-benefit considerations.3 Comments on the ANPRM are due by April 30, 2026.

Taken together, the Prediction Markets Advisory and the ANPRM signal the CFTC’s intent to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for prediction markets. This article analyzes the Prediction Markets Advisory and the ANPRM and the compliance implications for DCMs and market participants.

Regulatory background

Prediction markets are platforms on which participants may trade contracts tied to the occurrence or non-occurrence of future events. These contracts (referred to as event contracts) typically provide a payout based on whether the specified outcome occurs, with contract prices tied to the market’s assessment of the probability of such event. Prediction market contracts have been made with reference to a range of events, including political, financial, cultural and sporting events.

As prediction markets have expanded in scope and interest, their status under US law has increasingly attracted attention from regulators, policy makers and the public. In particular, as the events traded on prediction markets have evolved, their correlation to controversial subject matter such as war, death, assassination and terrorism, has raised public policy and national security concerns, while raising practical questions about the potential for insider trading where outcomes may be influenced by market participants.

The CFTC has engaged with event contracts for decades, beginning in 1992 with a no-action letter for the Iowa Electronic Markets.4 In a 2008 Concept Release, the CFTC noted that event contracts may be based on “varied” eventualities, including “the results of political elections, or the outcome of particular entertainment events,” and could be structured as “futures” or “options.”5

In June 2024, the prior CFTC administration published a proposed rulemaking that would have broadly identified political and sports‑related event contracts as “contrary to the public interest,” effectively barring them from CFTC‑regulated exchanges.6 However, the proposal was never finalized.

In February 2026, the CFTC formally withdrew the proposed rulemaking, citing “various forms of state regulatory actions and litigation concerning the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over event contract derivatives listed on designated contract markets.”7 The Commission simultaneously withdrew CFTC Staff Advisory Letter No. 25-36, which cautioned market participants that state enforcement actions “should be accounted for with appropriate contingency planning” and had noted that the CFTC had not “taken any official action” approving the listing for trading of sports-related event contracts on a DCM.8

The Prediction Markets Advisory

The Advisory opens with the recognition that prediction markets “are rapidly increasing in popularity with the American public” and that the Staff “believe[] it is important to encourage innovation and growth in these markets, within the federal oversight framework for Commission-registered derivatives exchanges set forth in the Commodity Exchange Act and Commission regulations.”9 While the Advisory “does not… create any new binding rules or regulations, or… amend existing rules or regulations,”10 DCMs should treat the Advisory as the benchmark by which DMO Staff will evaluate prediction markets’ compliance with applicable regulatory requirements in examinations, product reviews and potential enforcement referrals.11

“Event contract” as a “swap” under the CEA

The Prediction Markets Advisory notes that “event contract” is not a defined term in the CEA or the CFTC’s regulations.12 Instead, the Advisory describes event contracts as “a type of derivative contract, often a swap with a binary payoff structure, whose settlement is based on the outcome of an underlying occurrence or event.”13 The DMO Staff state that the definition of “swap” in CEA Section 1a(47), as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, is “deliberately broad,” and can “encompass event contracts within multiple sub-definitions,” including:

  • CEA Section 1a(47)(A)(i), which defines the term “swap,” in relevant part, to include agreements or transactions that constitute “option[s] of any kind that [are] for the purchase or sale, or based on the value, of 1 or more…quantitative measures, or other financial or economic interests or property of any kind.”14
  • CEA Section 1a(47)(A)(ii), which defines the term “swap,” to include agreements that provide “for any purchase, sale, payment, or delivery…that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic, or commercial consequence.”15

The Advisory specifically states that an event contract settled based on the outcome of a sporting event is “an agreement providing for a payment dependent on a future occurrence.”16 In addition, the Advisory notes that, depending on how a product is structured, an event contract may alternatively constitute a futures contract, including a futures contract on an “excluded commodity,” as defined in CEA Section 1a(19)(iv).17

Regulatory requirements applicable to event contracts offered by DCMs

In addition to clarifying the definitional treatment of event contracts under the CEA, the Prediction Markets Advisory details key elements of the existing regulatory framework applicable to event contracts under the CEA and CFTC Rules.

Public interest requirements–CEA Section 5c(c)(5)(C)

The Advisory reminds DCMs that CEA Section 5c(c)(5)(C) provides the CFTC with the authority to determine that an event contract is contrary to the public interest if the contract involves, among other things, assassination, war or terrorism. Any contract determined by the CFTC to be contrary to the public interest is prohibited from being listed or made available for clearing or trading on or through a registered entity.18

DCM Core Principles

The Prediction Markets Advisory reminds DCMs that they must comply with 23 statutory Core Principles established by the CEA, as well applicable requirements under Part 38 of the CFTC Rules, when listing event contracts for trading.

The Advisory identifies the following Core Principles as particularly relevant to the regulation of event contracts:

DCM Core Principle 3 and Appendix C Guidance: Contracts not readily susceptible to manipulation

The Advisory emphasizes that under DCM Core Principle 3, each DCM must only list for trading derivative contracts that are not readily susceptible to manipulation. Appendix C to Part 38 of the CFTC Rules (the Appendix C Guidance) establishes certain considerations for a DCM when designing a contract, and providing supporting documentation and data in connection with the submission of the contract to the CFTC. Among other things, the Appendix C Guidance identifies material considerations applicable to both price-based contracts and non-price-based contracts.

Accordingly, the Advisory encourages DCMs to consider whether certain categories of event contracts “create a heightened potential for manipulation or price distortion.”19 In particular, the Advisory notes that cash-settled contracts “may create an incentive to manipulate or artificially influence the data from which the cash-settlement price is derived or to exert undue influence on the cash-settlement price’s computation in order to profit on a position.”20

With respect to non-price-based contracts (the predominant structure for event contracts), the Advisory emphasizes that DCMs should evaluate:

  1. The nature and sources of the data comprising the cash-settlement calculation
  2. Computational procedures
  3. Mechanisms ensuring accuracy and reliability of any index value by reference to which the contract is settled
  4. The extent to which a third party has, or will adopt, “safeguards against unauthorized or premature release of the index value itself or any key data used in deriving the index value”21

Regarding sports-related event contracts, the Advisory states that sports-related event contracts “have often been shown to be consistent with DCM Core Principle 3 where the settlement outcome depends on the aggregate performance of multiple participants over an extended period of play,” as the breadth of such outcomes “reduces the ability of any single actor to manipulate the settlement value without material cost or substantial risk of detection.”22 However, sports-related event contracts that are subject to greater risk of manipulation or price distortion could include those that resolve or settle on the basis of:

  1. “Injuries to individual sports participants, unsportsmanlike conduct, or physical altercations between sports participants”
  2. Actions by a single individual or a small group of individuals, “such as officiating actions occurring during a sporting event”23

The Advisory encourages DCMs to consider the principles of the Appendix C Guidance regarding transparency, accuracy, reliability and impartiality when evaluating novel contracts and to engage with DMO Staff in the early phases of designing such contracts “to determine if any heightened manipulation or price distortion risks exist, and, if so, whether they may be mitigated with appropriate controls.”24

DCM Core Principle 4: Policies and procedures to prevent market manipulation and disruption

DCM Core Principle 4 requires that a DCM have the “capacity and responsibility to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of the delivery or cash settlement process, through market surveillance, compliance, and enforcement practices and procedures.”25

DCM Core Principle 12: Protection of markets and market participants

DCM Core Principle 12 requires a DCM to establish and enforce rules to protect markets and market participants from abusive practices and to promote fair and equitable trading.26

Product submission requirements

****The Advisory reminds DCMs that event contracts may be listed either (i) through written self-certification under CEA Section 5c(c)(1) and CFTC Rule 40.2 (requiring receipt by the CFTC at least one business day before listing) or (ii) through voluntarily seeking prior CFTC approval under CEA Sections 5c(c)(4)–(5) and CFTC Rule 40.3. As the Advisory notes, in each case, the DCM must submit an “explanation and analysis that is complete” with respect to compliance with the CEA and CFTC regulations, per CFTC Rule 40.2(a)(3)(v) (for self-certification, the analysis may be “concise”) or CFTC Rule 40.3(a)(4) (for prior CFTC approval, without the “concise” qualifier).27 The explanation must either be accompanied by supporting documentation or incorporate such documentation with appropriate citations and the DCM must provide, upon CFTC staff request, “additional evidence, information or data that demonstrates that the contract meets, initially or on a continuing basis, the requirements” of the CEA or the CFTC’s regulations or policies thereunder.28

Critically, the Advisory reminds DCMs that the CFTC retains authority to stay the listing of a self-certified contract pending CFTC proceedings for filing a false certification or pending a petition to alter or amend the contract terms and conditions under CEA Section 8a(7).29 DMO staff believes that “proactive engagement with DMO staff and any relevant sports league or governing body may reduce the likelihood of Commission action.”30

Practical considerations for DCMs listing for trading certain event contracts
  1. DCMs as front-line regulators: The Advisory characterizes DCMs as “front-line regulators” with “self-regulatory obligations for the contract markets they operate,” stating that DCMs should be “proactive, ensuring proper surveillance and oversight of trading in all of the products that they list, accounting for the particular characteristics and attributes of each product.”31 Notably, this framing tracks the Enforcement Division’s parallel statement that DCMs have “an independent duty pursuant to the core principles of the Act to maintain audit trails, conduct surveillance, and enforce rules against prohibited practices.”32

  2. Product submissions must be specific: The Advisory warns that “overly broad or general contract specifications may affect a DCM’s ability to analyze the compliance of the contract’s various permutations with the CEA and Commission regulations, including the contract’s susceptibility to manipulation.”33 Specifically, “[a] statement that a contract will settle based upon a consensus of yet-to-be-determined sources may not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of DCM Core Principle 3.”34 As noted above, DMO Staff expects product submissions to identify specific settlement data sources and assess their reliability, objectivity and manipulation resistance.35

  3. Particular challenges for sports-related event contracts: The Advisory highlights the unique integrity challenges of sports-related event contracts. DMO Staff note that the CFTC “is actively discussing issues of settlement integrity with some relevant sports leagues and their governing bodies” and anticipates that “appropriate information sharing by these entities with the CFTC may lead to enhanced CFTC oversight capabilities.”36 DMO staff make four specific recommendations for DCMs developing sports-related event contracts:

    1. Pre-self-certification engagement with relevant sports’ governing bodies when developing terms and conditions, compliance and market oversight programs
    2. Including in the product submission an explanation of whether the contract is consistent with the relevant league’s or governing body’s integrity standards
    3. Establishing information-sharing and data arrangements with the relevant sports integrity monitoring organization and cooperating with league-run manipulation or insider trading investigations
    4. Relying on official data provided by the relevant league or governing body as the settlement source37

    The Advisory further recommends that DCMs look to “any league integrity standards or guidance around markets, contracts, and restricted or insider participants lists, in order to protect against manipulation and insider trading.” DMO Staff states that engagement with sports leagues “may further a DCM’s ability to comply with their obligations under DCM Core Principle 3…by enhancing access to information about the nature and dynamics of underlying events (for example, information about categories of individuals who should be restricted from trading in certain sports-related event contracts as an informed participant).”38 This effectively encourages DCMs to develop restricted participant lists analogous to those used in securities markets.

  4. General prohibition on manipulative and deceptive conduct in connection with commodity contracts: The Advisory reminds DCMs and market participants that CFTC Rule 180.1 prohibits manipulative or deceptive conduct in connection with commodity contracts, including misappropriation-based insider trading pursuant to CEA Section 6(c)(1) and CFTC Rules 180.1(a)(1) and (3).39 The Advisory cross-references the Enforcement Division’s February 25, 2026 advisory and states that “[t]he Commission retains authority to investigate and bring civil enforcement actions related to any such activity."40

The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

Issued concurrently with the Prediction Markets Advisory, the ANPRM represents a distinct but complementary CFTC action. While the Prediction Markets Advisory articulates DMO Staff’s current interpretive views on existing DCM obligations, the ANPRM initiates a formal process to gather information that may inform future rulemaking with respect to prediction markets. The CFTC emphasized that it "may use the information and comments received from this Notice to inform potential future agency action, such as rulemaking, with respect to prediction markets."41

The ANPRM solicits public comment across six principal topic areas, each containing detailed sub-questions:

Core Principles and commission regulations

The ANPRM poses a total of 40 extensive questions regarding the application of DCM Core Principles to prediction markets, including:

  1. Impartial access and abusive trade practices under Core Principle 2
  2. Contract resolution criteria and dispute resolution procedures
  3. Manipulation susceptibility analysis under Core Principle 3, including whether existing rules for other exchange types are appropriate for prediction markets
  4. Market surveillance, compliance and enforcement under Core Principle 4
  5. Position limitations and accountability under Core Principle 5, including aggregation across similar event contracts
  6. Financial integrity under Core Principle 11, with particular attention to whether prediction markets should be permitted to offer trading on margin (a departure from the current fully-collateralized model) and, if so, what disclosure, calculation and risk management requirements should apply
  7. Operational risk under Core Principle 20
  8. The application of existing regulations to blockchain-based prediction markets

The ANPRM also solicits comment on DCO Core Principles, SEF Core Principles, swap data reporting, wash sales and disruptive trading practices.

Public interest determinations under CEA Section 5c(c)(5)(C)

The ANPRM seeks public comment specifically upon the factors the CFTC should consider in making a public interest determination under CEA Section 5c(c)(5)(C). The Commission asks how the public interests articulated in CEA Section 3 (including price discovery, market integrity, protection from fraud and promotion of responsible innovation) should inform such determinations. Notably, the ANPRM asks whether any elements of the former "economic purpose" test, which was repealed in 2000, should be revived in the public interest analysis. The Commission also seeks comment on the role of event contracts in hedging and price risk management as well as on the relationship between event contracts and insurance contracts.

Furthermore, the ANPRM addresses each of the five enumerated activities that may render an event contract contrary to the public interest:

  1. Activity unlawful under federal or state law, including how conflicts between state laws should be resolved
  2. Terrorism, including whether this category includes cyberterrorism
  3. Assassination
  4. War, including the distinction between war and civil unrest or political actions
  5. Gaming, which receives the most extensive treatment

With respect to gaming, the Commission asks whether the term is synonymous with gambling, what characteristics distinguish gaming from other activities, how various types of contests should be treated, what responsible gaming standards should be considered and how the demographics of market participants should inform the analysis. The ANPRM also asks about the factors relevant to determining whether a contract falls within the residual category of “other similar activity” determined by the CFTC to be contrary to the public interest under CEA Section 5c(c)(5)(C)(i)(VI).

The ANPRM also solicits comment on the procedural mechanics of the Commission's public interest determination, including:

  1. At what point in the listing process the determination may occur, including whether the Commission may act when a listing application is reasonably expected but not yet filed
  2. Whether elements of a public interest determination may be made with respect to a category of event contracts rather than a specific contract
  3. What it means for an event contract to "involve" a listed activity
  4. How the statutory 90-day deadline for final action should inform the Commission's procedures

Inside information

The ANPRM discusses the tension between informational efficiency and manipulation risk. The Commission questions whether there is public interest utility in allowing individuals with asymmetric information advantages to trade on prediction markets and whether the answer to this may vary depending upon the type of event. The ANPRM further addresses events under the control of a single individual or small group, cross-market manipulation risks and the application of CEA Section 6(c)(1) and CEA Section 4c(a)(3)–(4) –the latter of which specifically prohibits federal government employees and officials from trading on MNPI acquired through their positions.

Types of event contracts and other issues

The ANPRM asks fundamental classificatory questions, including whether event contracts should appropriately be classified as swaps or futures contracts, what idiosyncratic risks differentiate event contracts from other derivative instruments and whether any event contracts fall outside the statutory definition of "excluded commodity.” The Commission also solicits comment on the cost-benefit considerations under CEA Section 15(a), antitrust considerations under CEA Section 15(b) and the impact of potential rule changes on small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Implications for market participants and DCMs

Taken together, the Prediction Markets Advisory and the ANPRM signal that the Commission is contemplating the development of a comprehensive framework for prediction market regulation that could extend well beyond the existing Core Principle guidance articulated in the Advisory. DCMs should carefully analyze the Prediction Markets Advisory when seeking to list an event contract for trading. Furthermore, market participants and DCMs should pay particular attention to the ANPRM’s questions regarding margin trading, gaming, inside information and the procedural mechanics of public interest determinations, as these areas present the greatest potential for substantive regulatory change from the prevailing regulatory regime. Moreover, DCMs and other market participants should consider whether listed event contracts may be security-based swaps or other instruments subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.42

Footnotes

  1. 1

    See CFTC Letter No. 26-08, Prediction Markets Advisory (March 12, 2026).

  2. 2

    See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFTC, Prediction Markets 91 Fed. Reg. 12516 (March 16, 2026).

  3. 3

    See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFTC, Prediction Markets, 91 FED. REG. 12516 (March 16, 2026).

  4. 4

    See Letter of Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, CFTC Division of Trading and Markets, to George R. Neumann, Professor of Economics, The University of Iowa, Regarding Iowa Presidential Stock Market (Feb. 5, 1992) (reviewing a university-operated futures market for presidential election and corporate earnings contracts).

  5. 5

    See Request for Public Comment, CFTC, Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, 73 FED. REG. 25669 (May 7, 2008).

  6. 6

    See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CFTC, Event Contracts, 89 Fed. Reg. 48968 (June 10, 2024).

  7. 7

    See Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rules, CFTC, Event Contracts; Withdrawal of Proposed Regulatory Action, 91 Fed. Reg. 5386, 5387 (Feb. 6, 2026). In withdrawing the CFTC’s 2024 event contracts proposal, CFTC Chairman Selig stated that: “The 2024 event contracts proposal reflected the prior administration’s frolic into merit regulation with an outright prohibition on political contracts ahead of the 2024 presidential election. The Commission is withdrawing that proposal and will advance a new rulemaking grounded in a rational and coherent interpretation of the Commodity Exchange Act that promotes responsible innovation in our derivatives markets in line with Congressional intent.” See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Withdraws Event Contracts Rule Proposal and Staff Sports Event Contracts Advisory (Feb. 4, 2026).

  8. 8

    See CFTC Letter No. 25-36, p. 2 and n.4 (Sept. 30, 2025).

  9. 9

    Advisory at 1.

  10. 10

    See Advisory at 6 (“This advisory is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law by any party in any matter. This advisory does not provide any no-action position with respect to a recommendation by any division that the Commission initiate an enforcement action for failure to comply with the [Commodity Exchange Act] or Commission regulations. Further, this advisory is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to create any new binding rules or regulations, or to amend existing rules or regulations. This advisory represents only the views of DMO and does not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or of any other division or office of the Commission.”).

  11. 11

    Prediction Markets Advisory at 6.

  12. 12

    Prediction Markets Advisory at 2.

  13. 13

    Id.

  14. 14

    See id.; 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(i).

  15. 15

    See id.; 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47)(A)(ii).

  16. 16

    See id.

  17. 17

    See id. The term “excluded commodity” is defined under CEA Section 1a(19) as: “(i) ‘‘(i) an interest rate, exchange rate, currency, security, security index, credit risk or measure, debt or equity instrument, index or measure of inflation, or other macroeconomic index or measure; (ii) any other rate, differential, index, or measure of economic or commercial risk return, or value that is—(I) not based in substantial part on the value of a narrow group of commodities not described in clause (i); or (II) based solely on one or more commodities that have no cash market; (iii) any economic or commercial index based on prices, rates, values, or levels that are not within the control of any party to the relevant contract, agreement, or transaction; or (iv) an occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency (other than a change in the price, rate, value, or level of a commodity not described in clause (i)) that is—(I) beyond the control of the parties to the relevant contract, agreement, or transaction; and (II) associated with a financial, commercial, or economic consequence.” See 7 U.S.C. § 1a(19).

  18. 18

    See Prediction Markets Advisory at 2; 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C).

  19. 19

    See Prediction Markets Advisory at 4.

  20. 20

    See Prediction Markets Advisory at 3-4.

  21. 21

    Id.

  22. 22

    Id. at 5.

  23. 23

    Id. at 4.

  24. 24

    Id. at 3-4.

  25. 25

    See 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(4); Subpart E of Part 38 of the CFTC Rules (17 C.F.R. §§ 38.250-.258).

  26. 26

    See 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(12); Subpart M of Part 38 of the CFTC Rules (17 C.F.R. §§ 38.650-.651).

  27. 27

    See Advisory at 4 and nn.20-23.

  28. 28

    Id. at 4-5.

  29. 29

    Id. at 6.

  30. 30

    Id. at 6.

  31. 31

    Id. at 1.

  32. 32

    See CFTC, Advisory on Enforcement Authority Over Event Contracts, 2 (Feb. 26, 2026); see also M. Highman, S. Ariyan, and M. Melbourn, Congress and CFTC Signal Heightened Oversight of Prediction Markets, Norton Rose Fulbright Client Alert (March 2026).

  33. 33

    Id. at 5.

  34. 34

    Id. at n.26.

  35. 35

    Id. at 4-5.

  36. 36

    Id. at 5.

  37. 37

    Id. at 5.

  38. 38

    Id. at 5-6.

  39. 39

    Id. at 3.

  40. 40

    Id. at 6.

  41. 41

    ANPRM at 12516.

  42. 42

    The CFTC stated in the ANPRM that “[a]lthough the event contracts listed on CFTC-registered DCMs and SEFs are swaps or futures contracts subject to the jurisdiction of the CFTC, other event contracts referencing events associated with potential financial, economic or commercial consequences may be security-based swaps or other instruments subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC.” See ANPRM at 12517 and n. 17.

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