Introduction

On 27 November 2025, following intense negotiations, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU reached provisional political agreement on two key legislative measures – the Payment Services Directive 3 (PSD3) and the Payment Services Regulation (PSR). A third legislative measure that was originally proposed at the same time as the PSD3, the Regulation on a Framework for Financial Data Access, is still in trilogue.

This briefing note summarises the key changes introduced by the PSD3 and PSR, considers EU/UK divergence, and outlines what firms should be thinking about as they prepare for the new EU legislation.

Background

The purpose of the PSD3 and PSR is to develop and maintain a single payment services market for the EU that provides the same level of consumer protection, efficiency, and innovation across all EU Member States.

The Payment Services Directive 2 (PSD2) currently constitutes the core component of the EU’s legal framework for retail payments. Adopted in 2015 and applicable since 2018 the PSD2 repealed the initial Payment Services Directive with the twofold objective of improving payment security and supporting competition and innovation through open banking.

In its review of PSD2, the European Commission (Commission) found that these objectives were not fully met. Key issues included imperfect open banking functioning, ongoing consumer fraud risks, and a continued preference among many consumers for cash payments. To address these shortcomings, the Commission put forward the 'payment services package' in June 2023, which included proposals for the PSD3 and the PSR.

In broad terms, the PSD3 updates the provisions relating to payment institutions and integrates e-money institutions as a sub-category of payment institutions, thereby repealing the second Electronic Money Directive (EMD2). It also clarifies certain definitions. The scope of PSD3 primarily covers access to payment service and e-money service activities by payment institutions.

The PSR sets out rules on the provision of payment services and e-money services, particularly as regards:

  • the transparency of conditions and information requirements for payment services providers (PSPs) and e-money service providers whenever a currency conversion service is offered at an ATM or prior to the initiation of the payment transaction; and
  • the rights and obligations of payment service and e-money service users, and of payment and EMS providers in relation to the provision of payment services and electronic money services.

Regulation for day‑to‑day conduct, a Directive for licensing and prudential matters

The PSR replaces most of PSD2’s conduct and market rules with a directly applicable instrument, removing transposition variability and limiting forum shopping. It governs transparency, user rights and liabilities, strong customer authentication (SCA), open banking access, access to payment systems, and operational and security requirements. The PSD3, by contrast, consolidates the licensing, prudential and supervisory framework for payment institutions and e‑money institutions, repealing the EMD2 and integrating electronic money institutions (EMIs) as a sub‑category of payment institutions. The Settlement Finality Directive is also amended to enable direct participation of payment institutions and EMIs in designated payment systems, a change of real competitive consequence in relation to the banks.

The combined effect is full harmonisation of conduct obligations across the EU, with national discretion limited largely to supervisory and authorisation processes under PSD3, subject to new timelines, technical standards and enhanced cooperation among Member State competent authorities (NCAs).

Fraud, liability and user redress: A decisive shift in risk allocation

The PSR materially re‑sets liability and redress to address escalating fraud typologies, particularly authorized push payment (APP) scams which have dramatically increased under the PSD2 framework. The Commission noted in its impact assessment that consumers still “lack confidence in payments” due to fraud risks. With this in mind the PSR seeks to strengthen consumer protection through tighter anti-fraud measures, harmonise rules across Member States (as a directly applicable Regulation) and address modern fraud tactics.

The key fraud prevention measures that the PSR introduces include:

  • Payee‑name/unique identifier verification. Providers must check whether the payee name matches the unique identifier (e.g., IBAN) for credit transfers not already covered under the instant payments regime. Where discrepancies are detected, the payer must be warned before authorisation; failure to notify shifts liability for misdirected funds to the payer’s provider. For consumers, the verification service will be free and must operate within seconds to avoid undue friction.
  • Impersonation and APP fraud. Where a fraudster manipulates a user by posing as their PSP, the transaction will be treated as unauthorised, triggering full reimbursement by the PSP provided the user reports the fraud to the police and notifies their PSP. This is a marked tightening relative to the PSD2’s framework, which did not allocate APP losses as effectively. The PSR also introduces a duty for electronic communications providers to cooperate with PSPs in fraud prevention, enabling telco‑financial sector coordination.
  • Transaction monitoring and data‑sharing. PSPs must operate risk‑sensitive, behavioural transaction‑monitoring mechanisms and may exchange specified personal data under structured fraud‑information sharing arrangements, subject to General Data Protection Regulation safeguards, data protection impact assessments and, where necessary, prior consultation with the supervisory authority. This creates an explicit legal basis to scale consortium fraud intelligence within the confines of data protection law.
  • SCA obligations are clarified and aligned with risk realities (see further below).
  • Downstream liability for enablers. Technical service providers and scheme operators that fail to support SCA within their role can face liability for resulting financial damage. Online platforms may be liable to PSPs that reimbursed defrauded customers if they were informed of fraudulent content and failed to remove it, complementing the Digital Services Act.

The combined effect is to move appreciably more fraud loss away from consumers and onto PSPs and ecosystem actors, and to normalise proactive, privacy‑compliant information‑sharing. One of the most significant challenges for institutions is that their core systems may not be equipped to meet the real-time requirements imposed by the PSR. The verification of payee scheme is also challenging, particularly as the verification must be performed extremely quickly to avoid friction. Although operational discussions often refer to indicative timeframes of a few seconds, the PSR does not impose any precise numerical deadline. Instead, Recital 70 provides that the verification result should be delivered “within no more than a few seconds” from the moment the payer enters the payee information, ensuring that the process does not unduly delay the transaction. Legacy systems may not be up to the task and may require upgrading. Institutions will also need to update terms and conditions, strengthen fraud controls, adjust claims timelines, and revise vendor agreements, likely requiring significant resources and analytics investment.

Strong customer authentication

SCA remains mandatory for payer-initiated electronic payment transactions, access to payment accounts online, and any action through a remote channel that may imply a risk of payment fraud or other abuse. The PSR maintains the requirement that SCA must incorporate at least two of three authentication elements: knowledge (something only the user knows), possession (something only the user has), and inherence (something the user is). These elements must be independent, such that a breach of one does not compromise the reliability of the others.

A significant development is that SCA accessibility is elevated to a legal right: PSPs must offer at least one method suitable for customers without smartphones, with disabilities, or with low digital skills. This addresses concerns that smartphone-centric authentication flows have created barriers for certain user groups.

The treatment of Merchant‑Initiated Transactions (MITs) are further clarified by the PSR. SCA is required at the point of mandate set‑up but not for each subsequent transaction initiated by the merchant. MITs are aligned to direct debits on consumer protection measures, including refunds.

Stronger governance of SCA exemptions and transaction risk analysis is mandated via new regulatory technical standards from the EBA.

Where PSPs delegate SCA functions to third parties (such as digital wallet providers or payment gateways), this is explicitly classified as outsourcing, triggering compliance with the EBA guidelines on outsourcing arrangements and DORA requirements. The delegating PSP retains full liability for SCA failures and must maintain audit rights over the service provider.

Transparency, pricing and access to cash: Consumer‑facing conduct strengthened

The PSR tightens transparency across several fronts.

Charges and conversion. Providers must disclose all charges prior to initiation, including currency conversion at ATMs and point of sale, with estimated conversion charges presented consistently as a percentage mark‑up over the European Central Bank’s reference rate. Non‑transparent pricing methods, including manipulative value dating, are prohibited. The ban on surcharging is extended explicitly to credit transfers and direct debits in all EU currencies, removing interpretive divergences under the PSD2.

Access to cash. To mitigate cash access decline, retailers may provide cash withdrawals without purchase up to amounts set in the legislation (with Member State calibrations in the political outcome, e.g., between €100 and €150). Independent ATM deployers are brought clearly into scope for fee transparency and registration, without the requirement of a full payment licence  if they do not service payment accounts.

Customer support and dispute resolution. PSPs must provide access to human customer support (not solely chatbots) and must join alternative dispute resolution (ADR) schemes where a consumer opts for ADR. Complaint procedures must be accessible in the relevant Member State language. Publication of administrative sanctions for legal persons will be permitted to reinforce deterrence.

Whilst the transparency objectives are widely supported, implementing these requirements presents several practical difficulties for PSPs, banks, and merchants. For example, PSPs must provide currency conversion and fee information at the point of transaction initiation, requiring systems capable of delivering up-to-date exchange rates in real time. Disclosing ATM fees requires coordination across all ATM operators within a Member State, many of whom operate independently. Cross-border payments involve multiple parties, currencies, and regulatory regimes. Providing accurate cost and timing estimates for transfers outside the EU requires visibility into correspondent banking arrangements and intermediary fees, which may not always be available at initiation.

Limited network exclusion

The limited network exclusion (LNE) under PSD2 permitted certain payment instruments with restricted use to fall outside the Directive's scope. Under PSD2, the application of this exclusion varied across Member States, with some NCAs applying it broadly and others taking a more restrictive approach. To address this PSD3 retains the exclusion but the exclusion itself is more precisely defined. For example, the PSR specifies that to qualify for the exclusion, the payment instrument must be usable only within a "single limited network," narrowing the interpretation from the broader "limited network" language previously used. Also, while the €1 million threshold for notifying national authorities of LNE activities remains, the new rules harmonize how these thresholds are calculated. For firms currently relying on the LNE, the PSD3's clarifications may necessitate a reassessment of whether their activities remain within scope of the exclusion. In some cases, providers may need to seek authorisation as payment institutions.

Stronger supervision, consistent enforcement and product intervention powers

The PSR mandates more active, resourced national enforcement in open banking and conduct, with obligations to act “without delay” against non‑compliant interfaces and to ensure continuity of AIS/PIS access. NCAs must cooperate with data protection authorities where personal data processing is involved, and report data to the European Banking Authority (EBA) for EU‑level monitoring. The EBA will issue guidelines and technical standards across several domains, including transaction risk analysis, interface criteria, authorisation standards and cooperation templates, and is endowed with temporary product intervention powers to restrict or prohibit a payment or e‑money service or feature where it threatens users or market integrity and is not otherwise addressed.

The PSR places significantly greater demands on NCAs to actively monitor application programming interface (API) performance, respond to incident reports, and take swift supervisory action. Authorities will need the relevant technical expertise, staffing and IT infrastructure to meet these requirements effectively.

A further issue arises from the requirement to act "without delay" against non-compliant interfaces. This term is not defined, creating ambiguity as to what constitutes an acceptable response time. Many stakeholders have called on the EBA to provide further clarification.

The PSD3 imposes harmonised authorisation timelines (three months from complete application), updates initial capital for inflation (while preserving current thresholds for PIS‑only providers), aligns safeguarding rules and allows safeguarding at central banks where possible, enhances governance expectations (including alignment with the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)), and clarifies cross‑border supervision, including “triangular passporting” scenarios. EMIs become a sub‑category of PIs but retain distinct concepts such as redeemability; distributors of e‑money are explicitly recognised and regulated akin to agents. For firms with authorisations per the Regulation on markets in crypto assets (MiCA), a streamlined authorisation path for overlapping PSR/PSD3 activities is envisaged, subject to risk controls and service limitations.

The authorization timelines are intended to address a problem identified in an earlier EBA peer review, which noted that authorisations took an exceedingly long time and applicants were subject to inconsistent supervisory expectations across Member States. As with other authorization timelines, the clock only starts once a complete application has been submitted. As such there will be delays where incomplete applications have been submitted.

Whilst authorisations granted under PSD2 remain valid for 24 months (extendable to 30 months), firms will need to submit an application demonstrating compliance with the new PSD3 requirements including DORA alignment. Existing firms may therefore face a significant compliance exercise.

Integration of EMIs

One of the most significant structural changes under PSD3 is the integration of electronic money institutions as a sub-category of payment institutions. This effectively merges the regulatory frameworks previously contained in PSD2 and the EMD2, which is repealed. Existing EMIs do not automatically retain their current authorisation status. Instead, they will need to transition to the new framework through a grandfathering and re-authorisation process. Authorisations granted under EMD2 remain valid for 24 months after PSD3 enters into force, extendable to 30 months at the discretion of the NCA. Within the 24-month period, existing EMIs must submit an application demonstrating compliance with the PSD3 requirements applicable to the new "payment institution authorised to issue e-money" category. This includes updated governance arrangements, DORA-compliant ICT and business continuity frameworks, safeguarding policies aligned with PSD3, and any revised capital requirements.

MiCA

The relationship between MiCA and the PSD3/PSR arises because certain crypto-asset activities -particularly those involving e-money tokens (EMTs) or payment-related crypto services - may fall within the scope of both regimes.

The most significant practical challenge is determining which EMT activities constitute "payment services" requiring a PSD3 licence in addition to MiCA authorisation. A No-Action Letter (NAL) issued by the EBA in 2025 and subsequent Opinion of 12 February 2026 reduced the scope of activities requiring dual authorisation, but two-licence outcomes remain necessary for certain business models. The EBA’s NAL introduced a transition period ending on 2 March 2026, during which crypto‑asset service providers (CASPs) could continue certain EMT‑related activities without full PSD2 authorisation while the EU prepares for PSR/PSD3.

The EBA's Opinion sets out three clear supervisory outcomes for EMT-related services that qualify as payment services post 2 March 2026:

  • CASPs with existing PSD2 authorisation. Where a CASP has already obtained PSD2 authorisation as a payment institution or electronic money institution, or operates via an authorised PSP, it may continue EMT payment services within that permission. For such authorised activity, NCAs will not prioritise supervision or enforcement of several PSD2 elements—including safeguarding of EMTs—whilst insisting on compliance with SCA for accessing qualifying custodial wallets and initiating EMT transfers, fraud reporting, and cumulative own-funds calculations. The 2026 Opinion reiterates this "de-prioritisation" approach first set out in the NAL.
  • CASPs with pending PSD applications. A CASP that has submitted a complete PSD application may be permitted to continue EMT payment services after 2 March 2026—including on a cross-border basis—provided certain conditions are met. These conditions include that the NCA has received all Article 5 PSD2 dossier items, there are no material MiCA or anti-money laundering infringements, and the NCA’s preliminary view is that approval is likely "very shortly". Importantly, whilst the application is pending, the CASP must cease marketing the EMT payment service and must not onboard new clients. NCAs should coordinate any restrictions with the MiCA supervisor.
  • CASPs without authorisation or pending applications. In all other cases, NCAs will require CASPs to cease EMT payment services and offboard affected clients, coordinating with MiCA and enforcement authorities as necessary.

Operational resilience and data protection: Continuous control discipline

The PSR’s operational and security measures embed transaction monitoring, incident management, SCA outsourcing governance and fraud education duties into continuous control disciplines closely aligned with DORA. Where SCA elements are provided by third parties, outsourcing agreements are mandatory, with the payer’s PSP retaining full liability and audit rights. The PSR also specifies a substantial public interest basis for processing special categories of personal data where necessary to provide payment services and comply with the regulation, with clear technical and organisational safeguards. For compliance, this clarifies permissible fraud‑prevention data uses and reduces uncertainty that has chilled collaborative controls.

As regards SCA outsourcing governance, the issuer must conduct thorough due diligence on the technical service provider beforehand. Detailed written agreements will also be required defining the scope of the delegated function, roles and responsibilities, service level agreements, and exit plans etc. The agreement must also grant the delegating institution and its regulators unrestricted rights of access and audit.

Timelines and transition

At the time of writing, it is generally expected that, following technical work, the PSD3 and PSR will be published in the Official Journal towards the end of Q2 2026.

The PSR enters into application 18 months after its entry into force, with the payee‑name/unique identifier verification obligation and corresponding liability applying 24 months after entry into force to allow system changes. PSD3 requires Member States to transpose within 18 months of entry into force; certain SFD amendments enabling direct system participation have a shorter six‑month transposition and application period to accelerate competitive neutrality. As mentioned above, existing payment institution/EMI licences are grandfathered for a defined period, subject to timely re‑authorisation under PSD3.

These dates place 2026 at the centre of the transition period for most core obligations, aligning with broader operational changes driven by the instant credit transfers regime, DORA “business‑as‑usual” expectations, and the maturation of A2A (account to account) and wallet ecosystems.

Key divergences from PSD2

The PSD3 and PSR decisively move beyond PSD2 on several axes:

  • Instrument: Conduct rules shift from directive to regulation, eliminating divergent transposition and curbing forum shopping. Open banking obligations are made more granular, enforceable and supported by contingency measures.
  • Liability: APP/impersonation fraud reimbursement is normalised; liability attaches for failure to notify payee‑name/identifier mismatches; scheme operators and technical providers can be liable for SCA failures. PSD2’s framework did not pin APP losses with this clarity.
  • Open banking: Dedicated interfaces with performance parity are mandatory; prohibited obstacles are enumerated; permissions dashboards are introduced; broader clarity on account information service data re‑use (via licensed entities) is established; the fallback model is replaced with a structured contingency and supervisory mechanism.
  • Consumer protection: Surcharging prohibitions are extended; currency conversion transparency is standardised; access to cash via retail cash‑outs is enabled; human support and ADR participation become mandatory.
  • Supervisory powers: Harmonised authorisation timelines and standards; enhanced cross‑border supervisory cooperation; EBA product intervention powers; more robust sanction transparency; structured data reporting to the EBA.
  • Inclusion and accessibility: SCA must be accessible beyond smartphones; PSPs must undertake fraud education for customers and staff; transaction monitoring requirements are more explicit and risk‑based.

Anticipated market impacts

For banks and ASPSPs, the open banking interface regime, permissions dashboards, payee‑name verification and enhanced SCA/monitoring will require multi‑year investment in API platforms, identity and name‑matching engines, behavioural analytics and customer experience redesign. Loss allocation changes will increase fraud‑related provisions and necessitate tighter controls on exception handling. Prudential and governance expectations also increase, including safeguarding diversification and DORA alignment, but the overall effect is a more bank‑neutral competitive field.

For merchants and platforms, enhanced fraud refunds and IBAN/name verification reduce exposure to misdirected payments and customer harm, while obligations on device manufacturers may widen practical access to wallets and account to account options at checkout. Surcharging limitations and currency transparency simplify pricing communication. Retailers offering cash withdrawals gain a clear legal basis to do so without purchase, improving footfall and cash access in areas underserved by ATMs.

For consumers and SMEs, the net effect is stronger protection, clearer pricing, and easier control over data sharing. Users benefit from faster, clearer redress via ADR and more consistent treatment across the EU. Accessibility provisions should reduce exclusion resulting from digital‑only SCA designs.

Practical priorities for 2026 readiness

Legal and compliance teams need to sequence implementation around the following milestones:

  • Map PSR obligations against current PSD2 and national transposition artefacts to identify gaps eliminated by direct applicability, and re‑draft customer‑facing documents to reflect new redress, liability and transparency standards.
  • Initiate name‑matching capability programmes to meet the 24‑month deadline, including vendor assessment and customer journey integration.
  • Upgrade open banking interfaces to meet performance parity, documentation, testing and reporting duties, and design permissions dashboards with standardised notifications and real‑time updates.
  • Revisit access to accounts policies for non‑bank clients, implementing the new refusal‑reasoning protocols and appeal pathways, and assess opportunities for direct participation in designated systems.
  • Strengthen transaction monitoring and SCA governance, ensure availability of non‑smartphone SCA methods, and conduct the required Data Protection Impact Assessments for fraud‑data sharing consortia.
  • Review SCA exemption frameworks and transaction risk analysis capabilities in light of forthcoming EBA regulatory technical standards.
  • For existing EMIs, plan the transition to the "payment institution authorised to issue e-money" category, including preparation of re-authorisation applications and updated governance documentation.
  • For CASPs offering or planning to offer payment-related services, map activities against both MiCA and PSD3/PSR requirements and engage early with NCAs on dual authorisation.
  • Assess whether activities currently conducted under the limited network exclusion remain within scope or require authorisation under the clarified LNE criteria.
  • Align authorisation and safeguarding policies with PSD3, taking advantage of central bank safeguarding where viable and preparing for harmonised authorisation timelines and governance expectations.

The EU’s payments package is not simply an incremental update to PSD2 - it is a wholesale rebalancing of the payments value chain towards consistent access, robust user protection, and fair competition. Its legal architecture and substantive rules are calibrated to deliver a secure, data‑driven, and device‑agnostic retail payments market.

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