Introduction

Consolidation—the merging of two or more arbitral proceedings into one—is a deceptively simple concept. In principle, it promises efficiency, consistency and cost savings. In practice, however, achieving consolidation depends on a patchwork of contractual provisions, institutional rules and national law that parties may have overlooked until a dispute is already underway. By that stage, the window for consolidation might have closed. This article examines where the key pressure points lie and what practitioners can do, at the drafting stage, to keep the option open.

Unlike court litigation, where judges typically have inherent or statutory powers to consolidate related cases, arbitration is rooted in party consent. That distinction shapes everything. A tribunal's authority to consolidate will generally depend on one or both of two sources: the relevant contracts and the relevant applicable law. So far as the contracts are concerned, these may include express consolidation clauses or may incorporate provisions for consolidation by reference to institutional rules. So far as the applicable law is concerned, relevant sources may include the law of the seat of the arbitration and the law governing the arbitration agreement itself. Questions about whether consolidation is permissible in principle, who may order consolidation and when, are matters typically governed by the law of the seat. Questions about the existence, scope or interpretation of a contractual consolidation mechanism will likely engage the law governing the arbitration agreement.

Express contractual provisions: The strongest foundation

A consolidation clause carefully drafted at the outset is the most reliable route. It provides a clear contractual mandate and reduces the scope for objection based on lack of consent. In multi-contract transactions, where disputes under one agreement may be closely connected to disputes under another, such clauses are particularly valuable. Parties can choose to have compatible arbitration agreements in each contract providing for consolidation or have an “umbrella” dispute resolution agreement which applies to each contract (and can reduce the risk of inconsistency between contracts). A well-drafted clause will specify the circumstances in which arbitrations can be consolidated, the mechanism for determining which tribunal hears the consolidated proceedings and how that tribunal is appointed. Without an express clause, parties may find themselves with limited recourse, especially in ad hoc arbitrations or in jurisdictions where legislation does not confer a default power to consolidate on the tribunal.

Institutional rules: A varied landscape

The major arbitral institutions now include consolidation provisions in their rules, but practitioners should not assume uniformity. The scope, timing and decision-maker vary significantly across regimes:

  1. ICC: Article 10 of the ICC Rules 2021 vests the consolidation power in the ICC Court, not the tribunal. This is a significant design choice: it means consolidation can be ordered before any tribunal has been constituted and can help to overcome objections based on the fact that parties to one arbitration may not have participated in the appointment of the tribunal in the arbitration into which it is consolidated. The ICC Court may consolidate where the parties agree, where all claims arise under the same arbitration agreement or agreements, or where claims arise under more than one agreement, provided that the arbitrations are between the same parties, the disputes relate to the same legal relationship, and the arbitration agreements are compatible.
  2. LCIA: The LCIA Rules 2020 take a different approach enabling consolidation either by the LCIA Court (which absent agreement by the parties can only take place if no arbitral tribunal has been formed) or by the tribunal (with the approval of the LCIA Court). The tribunal (or the LCIA Court, as applicable) may consolidate where all parties agree, or where the arbitrations are conducted under the LCIA Rules and have the same or compatible arbitration agreements and either the same parties or arise “out of the same transaction or series of related transactions.” A further constraint applies where a tribunal in the related proceeding has already been constituted: consolidation in those circumstances is only possible if both tribunals are composed of the same arbitrators (which can be difficult to achieve in practice, given timing, availability and the challenge for arbitrators of accepting multiple appointments for the same party).
  3. HKIAC: Under Article 28 of the HKIAC Rules 2024, the HKIAC itself exercises the consolidation power on application by a party, mirroring the ICC’s institutional model. Three triggers apply: party agreement; all of the claims in the arbitrations being made under the same arbitration agreement; or claims being made under more than one agreement where the arbitrations involve common questions of law or fact, the rights to relief arise out of the same transaction or series of related transactions, and the arbitration agreements are compatible. Proceedings are typically consolidated into the arbitration that was commenced first.
  4. SIAC: Rule 16 of the SIAC Rules 2025 bears some similarities to the LCIA model. The SIAC Court’s power to consolidate arises prior to the constitution of any tribunal, and is without prejudice to any party’s right to apply to the tribunal for consolidation. Rule 16.8 provides that a tribunal, once constituted, may order consolidation where all parties have agreed to consolidation, where all claims arise under the same arbitration agreement and the same tribunal has been constituted in each arbitration (or none in the other arbitrations) or where the arbitration agreements are compatible and the same tribunal has been constituted in each arbitration (or none in the other arbitrations).
  5. UNCITRAL: The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules contain no consolidation provisions at all—a notable gap, although one that reflects their orientation towards ad hoc arbitration.

The table below summarizes the latest published statistics on consolidation applications, showing that the majority of applications have been granted by the relevant institutions:

Institution Applications received Applications granted
LCIA 40 39 (the other was superseded)
HKIAC 14 12
SIAC 107 (of which 104 were filed before the tribunal was constituted) 66 (65 by the SIAC Court and 1 by the relevant tribunal)

The picture that emerges from this comparison is more nuanced than a simple institutional divide. While the ICC and HKIAC vest the consolidation power exclusively in the institution, both the LCIA and SIAC provide routes to consolidation through the tribunal. Pre-tribunal consolidation is available, in different forms, under all four institutional frameworks. The practical differences therefore lie in the specific triggers, the identity of the decision-maker at each stage of proceedings, and the constraints that apply, such as the LCIA’s requirement for identical tribunal composition where a tribunal in the related proceeding has already been formed.

The UNCITRAL gap is worth particular attention. Parties who have adopted these rules and find themselves in related but separate proceedings have no institutional route to consolidation. Their only options are agreement between the parties in the relevant contract(s) or (less likely) when the dispute arises or reliance on the applicable national arbitration legislation which, as discussed below, may not help. For multi-party, multi-contract transactions, if the UNCITRAL Rules are adopted, an express consolidation clause is a necessity.

The procedural law dimension

Institutional rules do not operate in a vacuum. The procedural law governing the arbitration can expand or constrain the parties’ ability to consolidate and must be considered alongside both the rules and the contract. The position under English law illustrates the point well: Section 35 of the Arbitration Act 1996 permits a tribunal to consolidate only where the parties agree. In London‑seated cases, therefore, the route to consolidation will depend heavily on whether the parties have agreed a consolidation clause or have, by incorporating institutional rules, conferred the relevant power.

In practice, these three sources of authority—contract, institutional rules and national law—interact in ways that can either support or undermine a consolidation strategy. A well-crafted contractual clause may supplement the institutional rules; institutional rules may fill gaps where the contract is silent, and national legislation sets the outer boundaries of what is permissible. Practitioners who focus on only one leg of this framework risk being caught short when the matter of consolidation actually arises.

Why consolidate? Efficiency and consistency

The case for consolidation rests on two pillars: consistency and efficiency. Both are well understood but worth restating briefly as they also inform the strength of any application to consolidate:

  • When disputes arise from the same transaction or related transactions, the underlying facts often overlap. The same events, documents and witnesses may be relevant to each case. Yet tribunals are not bound by one another’s findings. If parallel proceedings run separately before different panels, there is a real risk of contradictory findings on the same factual matrix. Consolidation addresses this directly by placing all related disputes before a single tribunal, ensuring the evidence is weighed together and outcomes are consistent.
  • A single consolidated arbitration avoids the obvious costs of duplication: multiple tribunals, overlapping pleadings, repeated document production, and duplicated witness and expert evidence. It also eliminates the procedural drag of managing parallel proceedings on separate timelines with different hearing dates. A single timetable brings clarity and can materially reduce both cost and time.

The other side: Why consolidation is resisted

If consolidation is so beneficial, why is it so often resisted? Two recurring objections deserve particular attention: the impact on party-appointed tribunals and the consent question. Underlying these objections, and often the real reason for objecting, is the resisting party’s overall case strategy.

  • The right to nominate an arbitrator is a defining feature of the arbitral process, and parties (and some national laws) guard it closely. Consolidation can disrupt this. When separate proceedings are merged after tribunals have been appointed, one tribunal necessarily loses its mandate, and the parties in that arbitration may find themselves before a panel they neither selected nor had any input in composing. The sense of disenfranchisement is real, even where the consolidated tribunal is otherwise well-qualified, and it remains one of the most frequently invoked objections to consolidation. Including a detailed mechanism for the appointment of the tribunal for consolidated proceedings in the arbitration agreement can help overcome this issue. For example, the mechanism may have different routes for appointment depending on whether one or more tribunals have already been appointed, providing for both the appointment and the recusal of arbitrators as applicable.
  • A related objection is consent. Where consolidation is ordered under institutional rules rather than an express contractual clause, a party may argue that it never agreed to have its dispute heard alongside another. While the parties have agreed to incorporate the institutional rules, the relevant decision-maker’s power is still discretionary, and it may be more persuaded that express, tailored provisions negotiated between the parties indicate a strong intention to consolidate related disputes.

Beyond these principled objections, consolidation is also resisted for tactical reasons, though these are unlikely to be articulated openly. Examples include:

  • Delay strategies: A respondent facing claims under multiple contracts may prefer to keep proceedings separate as part of a delay strategy. Parallel arbitrations on different timelines can defer the day of reckoning, buying time before an enforceable award is rendered.
  • Tribunal composition: A party may wish to preserve a tribunal composition it perceives as favorable in one proceeding, knowing that consolidation would dissolve that panel in favor of another. For example, a black letter law approach may be most suitable for some claims, whilst others may benefit from more commercial or technically minded arbitrators.
  • Document disclosure: Confidentiality concerns can also be weaponized—a party may resist consolidation to prevent commercially sensitive material from one arbitration being disclosed to parties in a related, but distinct dispute.
  • Divide and conquer: Keeping claims siloed can prevent an opponent from weaving a cohesive narrative that draws strength from the totality of the parties’ dealings, making each claim appear narrower and weaker in isolation.
  • Settlement: Separate proceedings create separate settlement dynamics. A party may prefer to pick off smaller claims on favorable terms while contesting larger ones. This is a strategy that becomes harder to execute once everything is before a single tribunal.

None of these motivations will feature in a party’s formal submissions, but they are a routine part of the tactical calculus and practitioners should be alive to them, whether their clients are pursuing or resisting consolidation.

Planning ahead: What to include in a consolidation clause

The strongest consolidation strategies are built at the drafting stage, rather than improvised once a dispute has crystallized. Practitioners advising on multi-party, multi-contract transactions should consider three key questions:

  1. What does the procedural law permit? Some jurisdictions, such as England, impose significant constraints on consolidation absent party agreement. The procedural law sets the outer boundary of what is achievable.
  2. How do the chosen institutional rules approach consolidation? As the comparison above illustrates, the scope and mechanics differ materially. A consolidation clause can supplement or tailor the institutional framework but only if it is drafted with that framework in mind.
  3. Are there related contracts? If so, consolidation clauses must be drafted consistently across the suite of agreements or an umbrella agreement used. Inconsistent provisions—different seats, different institutional rules, or conflicting consolidation mechanisms—can fatally undermine the very strategy they are intended to support.

Conclusion: Consolidation favors the prepared

Parties who assume that consolidation will be readily available for related disputes are likely to be disappointed. Those who invest in clearly drafted consolidation clauses, ensure consistency across related agreements and select institutional rules that support their strategy will be far better positioned when the moment arrives. That said, whether consolidation is worth pursuing will still depend on the degree of connection between the disputes, which is a matter to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Where consolidation is unavailable or undesirable, alternative mechanisms available under institutional rules can achieve similar objectives. Article 9 of the ICC Rules and Article 29 of the HKIAC Rules 2024 permit claims arising out of or in connection with more than one contract to be made in a single arbitration (subject to certain conditions). Rule 15 of the SIAC Rules 2025 treats a single notice of arbitration issued in respect of more than one arbitration agreement as being an application to consolidate.

Once proceedings are underway, joinder provisions in each of the ICC Rules, the HKIAC Rules, the SIAC Rules, the LCIA Rules and the UNCITRAL Rules (joinder being the only multi-party mechanism available under the UNCITRAL framework) allow additional parties to be brought into an existing arbitration. Some institutions also provide for the concurrent or coordinated conduct of related arbitrations before the same tribunal: Article 30 of the HKIAC Rules, Rule 17 of the SIAC Rules and Article 22A of the LCIA Rules each allow a tribunal to align procedural steps across separate arbitrations. These mechanisms avoid the tribunal-composition and consent objections that consolidation can attract, while still enabling practical efficiencies and reducing the risk of inconsistent outcomes.

Issue 24

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