Introduction
Commercial parties value certainty. Yet certainty can come at a cost: a fixed price or pricing model that is commercially acceptable to both sides at the time of contracting may become financially unsustainable if market conditions change or the customer’s use or reliance on the products or services changes over time.
To manage this risk, particularly when the contract at issue concerns software or services that are business-critical, customers are increasingly looking to incorporate price adjustment provisions into their long-term technology supply agreements. However, suppliers will seldom agree to lock-in pricing for more than a few years unless the deal is particularly strategic or their margin or business model can sustain the risk of increased operating costs.
Absent effective price adjustment provisions, customers find themselves in difficult positions come renewal time, particularly if they lack effective bargaining power or there are no arguments that can be made (effectively and without recourse to regulators) in relation to their supplier abusing any sort of dominant position. In this article, we explore issues that may arise in relation to price adjustment mechanisms from an English law perspective and discuss how careful drafting and the option to have recourse to a third-party determination can provide parties with the means to manage pricing risk and avoid lengthy and costly disputes in long-term supply arrangements.
Price adjustment/repricing provisions in technology contracts: Key challenges
There are many different types of price adjustment mechanisms in commercial contracts, ranging from the relatively simple (for example, an automatic price increase that takes place annually in line with a selected index) to the sophisticated (such as a mechanism by which prices are periodically benchmarked against a basket of similar goods and services, providing that prices ratchet up or down periodically where the requisite delta between current price and benchmarked price is demonstrated).
While these mechanisms are intended to provide predictability, in practice, they are increasingly becoming the sources of disputes, particularly where the language casts doubt on their meaning and enforceability or where they involve more than a simple mathematical calculation relating to undisputed input data. Below are some examples of repricing provisions commonly seen in technology contracts and some of the associated challenges. These challenges are often amplified in cross‑border arrangements, where parties can often have different expectations about how such mechanisms should operate and how “binding” they are.
- Index-linked increases: This is the most common form of price adjustment mechanism included in technology contracts. Standard supplier terms of access to cloud-based platforms, associated support and data services typically include unilateral rights for the supplier to adjust pricing on notice, often with effect from the next annual renewal cycle, with the ability for the customer to terminate if they do not accept the new pricing. The same applies to rate cards for professional services provided on a time and materials basis. Customers seeking pricing certainty will attempt to negotiate the following: (a) locking in the original pricing for an initial period; (b) limiting increases by frequency (for example, once annually); and (c) capping the amount of the increase by reference to an agreed index. Suppliers may request an agreed percentage above that index. Some suppliers request an exception to the cap in circumstances of “hyper-inflation” or unexpected conditions resulting in increased operating costs. Unless these exceptions are clearly defined, disputes can arise as to whether they have been triggered. Disputes can also arise if there is a lack of detail as to the repricing mechanism.
- Volume-based adjustments: Tiered pricing models are common, such as those based on the number of subscriptions/licences or transactions processed or on the amount of data storage required. They typically include automatic increases to the next tier where the thresholds are reached. Customers will seek to negotiate pro-rated increases where this happens during a subscription period and the right to downgrade to a lower tier if applicable. Difficulties arise where a contract includes agreed pricing for the tiers that are relevant at the time of contracting but omits agreed pricing for other tiers which then become relevant later because of changes in the number of subscriptions/licences or transactions processed, or changes in the amount of data storage required.
- Benchmarking: Benchmarking provisions are typically only included in strategic, high-value and complex technology deals. Unless they are comprehensive and specific, they create the potential for disputes, including about the identity of the benchmark, the scope of the comparative suppliers and services and, most importantly, whether a finding that that the agreed prices are above or below the benchmark results in an automatic price adjustment or an obligation to renegotiate pricing.
- Repricing triggers: In strategic deals with fixed pricing models, there may be repricing triggers based on customer uptake not reaching the anticipated volumes on which the supplier based its pricing. These provisions seldom specify the alternative pricing but trigger an obligation to renegotiate pricing (sometimes in good faith) and a right for the supplier to terminate the contract if new pricing is not agreed.
There may also be circumstances where, at the time of contracting, there is an intent to extend the agreement for a longer term, or to cover other product lines or features, but the parties are unable to agree specific pricing for the extended term or scope at the time of contracting. This often leads to the parties simply providing in the contract that the price of the relevant product or service is “to be agreed” after a specified number of years or when the new product line or features are added. The inclusion of bare agreements to agree in a price adjustment mechanism can have serious consequences.
“Bare agreements to agree” are generally not enforceable under English law
While each case must of course be decided on its own facts, so-called “bare agreements to agree” are generally not enforceable under English law, because they are too uncertain to give rise to binding obligations. Absent there being an objective method or escalation path in place to break a deadlock, simple price adjustment provisions such as these are simply “kicking the can down the road” and therefore often fail. In these circumstances, unless the customer agrees to pay a price that is ultimately acceptable to the supplier (bearing in mind that the customer may, at this point, be entirely dependent on the supplier to operate and/or deliver services to its customers), a clause that was intended to provide certainty can have the unintended consequence of bringing what was meant to be a long-term commercial relationship to an abrupt and sometimes acrimonious end.
Misplaced reliance on implied duties or the imposition of a “reasonable price”
Contracting parties sometimes assume that a provision indicating that a price is to be re-agreed/re-assessed in the future will not cause any problems because, if there is a deadlock, the courts:
- May imply a duty of good faith, which their counter-party must act in accordance with, and which will therefore ultimately result in a price being agreed.
- May themselves make a finding as to what is a reasonable price.
Such an assumption can be misplaced.
Obligations of good faith are generally not implied into contracts under English law
Under English law, obligations of good faith are generally not implied into contracts unless specific circumstances are met. Even where parties have agreed to agree or agreed to negotiate, there is no broad safety net of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Indeed, obligations of good faith can generally only be implied:
- Where the contract is a so-called “relational contract” (see Bates v Post Office Ltd (No.3: Common Issues) [2019] EWHC 606 (QB)).
- It is otherwise necessary for such a term to be implied in fact because it is necessary to do so to give the contract business efficacy (which is a rarity when commercial parties are involved), and only where the imposition of a duty of good faith is not expressly precluded by the language of the contract itself.
While there is no exhaustive list of criteria for determining whether a contract is “relational,” such contracts will tend to be long-term and necessarily involve close collaboration, communication and cooperation between the parties.
Even where there is an implied (or even express) obligation of good faith in a contract, how far would a breach of it take the innocent party in practice? While an obligation to negotiate in good faith to agree a future price may, depending on the relationship between the parties, impose enough commercial pressure to have the negotiations carry on amicably to a successful conclusion, the legal remedies for a breach of an obligation to negotiate in good faith may only go so far, and are not likely to result in a price being imposed by a court.
Statutory reasonable price provisions do not help where parties intended to agree a future price
Under English law, when a contract is silent as to the price of goods or services, there is statutory provision for the implication of a reasonable price (Section 8(2) of the Sales of Goods Act 1979, in the case of goods, and Section 15(1) of the Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982, in the case of services).
While these provisions seem, and can be, helpful, they do not assist where:
- The parties have expressly addressed pricing in their agreement.
- The drafting shows that at the time of entering into the agreement, the parties intended to agree to a revised price in the future.
(See for example the discussion in J Aviation Ltd v Pool Aviation Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 163).
Drafting for certainty: How to future-proof price-adjustment mechanisms
To overcome the issues discussed above, parties are turning increasingly “to the maths” and:
- Incorporating objective measures or clear standards into their price adjustment provisions.
- Devising formulas or methods by which the future price is to be set.
While these approaches can and do work, difficulties can arise where:
- Worked examples in contract pricing schedules illustrating how the mechanism will work in practice are left out or are too limited, leading to unanswered questions about how the mechanism will work in particular scenarios.
- It transpires that the formula agreed was not appropriate because it failed to take into account some change in product use or market conditions that the parties did not contemplate at the time.
Parties may therefore consider including in their pricing adjustment provisions the ability for the parties to have recourse to an independent party to determine what the price should be if it cannot be agreed. Drafting in this recourse can:
- Assist a court in determining that the pricing adjustment provision is binding.
- If properly drafted, ensure that, if the parties are unable to agree a price, there is a swift, private and relatively cost-effective way for the price to be determined—one which ultimately takes into consideration the customer’s use of the product and service and all relevant market conditions without the costly litigation price tag.
Issues can arise if the third-party determination clause is not properly drafted, or is not drafted to be final and binding, and in this respect, parties should take care to ensure that any agreed determination clause is clear in its scope, fits with the agreement as a whole and does not cut across how the general dispute escalation procedure of the contract operates. Further difficulties can also arise where it is unclear who the relevant third-party should be, or how that third-party is to be agreed or be appointed if the parties cannot agree.
Key takeaways
Commercial parties wanting certainty and long-term stability in their technology contracts should approach pricing adjustment mechanisms with care. They should:
- Not rely on the vagaries of implied terms.
- Ensure their pricing adjustment mechanisms are both flexible and legally enforceable.
- Anticipate and draft for the resolution of a dispute concerning price adjustments at the outset.
Addressing a potential pricing deadlock at the drafting stage is key. Not only will this approach likely avoid the costly and disruptive consequences of a dispute down the track, but having an agreed mechanism in place to break any deadlock may prove essential in maintaining business-critical supply relationships.