Introduction

The “kompetenz-kompetenz” doctrine provides that an arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to rule on its own jurisdiction. The competence principle, as it is sometimes known, is enshrined in Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) and is given the force of law in Australia by Sections 16(1) and 21 of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) (IAA).

On February 9, 2026, the Victorian Court of Appeal reaffirmed the competence principle in Oil Basins Ltd v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd [2026] VSCA 6. The Court of Appeal clarified that parties to an arbitration agreement governed by Australian law cannot contract out of the principle. Arbitration may be a creature of consent, but that consent cannot be wielded to strip arbitrators of the very authority conferred by the curial law.

Underlying dispute

This case relates to a long-running royalty dispute concerning the production of hydrocarbons in the Bass Strait, between the Australian mainland and Tasmania. The parties had entered into a settlement agreement in 1994 which established a methodology for calculating royalties in respect of the gross value of hydrocarbons produced. That agreement provided for disputes to be determined by arbitration seated in Melbourne.

A dispute arose concerning the treatment of depreciation and decommissioning costs in the royalty calculation. Oil Basins commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Victoria, seeking declarations that issues relating to depreciation and decommissioning costs were not arbitrable under the settlement agreement. Esso and the other producers applied for a stay of those proceedings under Section 7 of the IAA, which was granted by the primary judge. Oil Basins appealed.

Opposing stay of proceedings

In opposing the stay, Oil Basins invoked the choice-of-law clause in the settlement agreement, which provided that it was to be interpreted and applied in accordance with New York law. Oil Basins adduced expert evidence that, under New York law, parties to an arbitration agreement are presumed to have agreed that a court, not an arbitrator, will decide questions concerning the scope of the agreement, unless there is “clear and unmistakable” evidence to the contrary.

According to Oil Basins, because the settlement agreement contained no such clear evidence to the contrary, the effect of adopting New York law as the governing law was that a court, not an arbitral tribunal, should determine whether issues relating to the depreciation and decommissioning costs fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement. On that basis, Oil Basins argued that the proceeding did not involve a “matter capable of settlement by arbitration” within the meaning of Section 7(2)(b) of the IAA, and so the conditions for a stay had not been satisfied.

For their part, the producers submitted that despite the parties’ choice of New York law to govern substantive rights under the settlement agreement, their choice of Melbourne as the seat meant that Australian curial law determines whether arbitrators or the court had primary power to decide the arbitration agreement’s scope. The producers also argued that the arbitrator appointment agreement put beyond doubt that the arbitration was governed by the IAA, even if New York law was the proper law of the settlement agreement. Therefore, according to the producers, the parties’ choice of seat attracted the mandatory provisions of the Model Law, including Article 16.

Court of Appeal’s decision

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits (but allowed it on a question of indemnity costs). At the heart of its decision was the Court’s endorsement of the mandatory nature of the competence principle under Australian law.

The Court held that Article 16(1) of the Model Law, which provides that an arbitral tribunal “may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement,” has the force of law in Australia by virtue of Sections 16(1) and 21 of the IAA. The Court further observed that “there is limited provision in the IAA or the Model Law for the parties to an arbitration agreement to opt out of their application, and it does not extend to s 7(2), or to arts 8 or 16” ([82]). Those provisions, the Court emphasized, “have the force of law in Australia and parties who consent to arbitration are bound by these and other laws that govern commercial arbitration” ([82]).

The Court was careful to emphasize that its decision does not undermine consent in arbitration. Rather, in the Court’s words, it “identifies the consequence of such consent” ([82]). The Court explained that “the fact that parties to an arbitration agreement cannot exclude the operation of art 16(1) of the Model Law means that, despite the parties having agreed that a court, and not arbitrators, will determine the scope of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, the arbitrators retain that power pursuant to the competence principle” ([83]).

This finding was reinforced by the Court’s analysis of the legislative history of Section 21 of the IAA. Prior to 2010, parties could agree to opt out of the Model Law. However, following amendments in 2010 and 2015, Section 21 of the IAA now provides that the Model Law “covers the field” in respect of international commercial arbitrations conducted in Australia, removing the ability to exclude it.

The Court also made two further observations of practical significance:

  • The Court addressed the relationship between the parties’ choice of New York law and the mandatory operation of Australian arbitration legislation. The seat of arbitration was Melbourne and the curial law was accordingly Australian law. The Court held that, even accepting that the governing law clause applied New York law to the interpretation of the settlement agreement, this did not govern the competence principle which “applies by statute, not any provision of the agreement” ([107]).
  • The Court addressed the standard of review for stay applications, endorsing the “light touch” approach articulated by the Federal Court of Australia in Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Rinehart (2017) 257 FCR 442. Under that approach, a court need not make a final determination of the scope of an arbitration agreement on a stay application; rather, it is sufficient to form a “general view” as to whether the dispute has the requisite connection with the arbitration agreement. This approach gives appropriate weight to the tribunal’s authority and to the competence principle, whilst preserving the court’s supervisory role.

Conclusion

The decision in Oil Basins has important implications for drafting and enforcing arbitration agreements with an Australian seat. Most notably, parties cannot circumvent the competence principle by agreement. That doctrine is an unavoidable consequence of agreeing to arbitrate in Australia, not merely a default rule susceptible to contractual override.

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