The US Supreme Court recently issued Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, which clearly and unequivocally expands the reach of federal preemption to state failure to warn claims. The opinion, which is based on federal pesticide laws, has the potential to cut across multiple regulatory schemes and industries, including in food, over the counter drugs and cosmetics. The Court recognized that “[t]hose similar labeling preemption clauses reflect Congress’s judgment that the ability to sell a product throughout the country with a single label can be important to maintaining an efficient nationwide market.” Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068, 609 U.S. ___, 2026 WL 1825691, at *9 (June 25, 2026). Manufacturers of regulated products across these industries should revisit preemption in light of this decision.

FIFRA, Roundup and the Missouri Case

Congress enacted the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to create a uniform national framework for pesticide labeling. Under that framework, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must review and approve every pesticide label before the product may be sold. Once the EPA approves a label, the manufacturer must use that exact label unless the EPA subsequently approves or requires a change. A manufacturer that sells a pesticide with an unapproved label may face civil and criminal penalties under 7 U.S.C. §§ 136j(a)(1)(E) and 136l.

Roundup contains glyphosate. Under FIFRA, no pesticide may be sold in the United States unless it has been “registered” with the EPA—a regulatory process in which the agency evaluates the pesticide’s formula, potential adverse effects, testing data and proposed labeling before determining that the product “’will not generally cause unreasonable adverse effects’ on human health and the environment.” Durnell, 2026 WL 1825691, at *3 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D)). Over the five decades since the EPA first registered glyphosate-based pesticides and approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, the EPA has revisited that determination repeatedly. Each time, the EPA reached the same conclusion: the evidence does not support a finding that glyphosate causes cancer, and no cancer warning was warranted on Roundup’s label

John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri state court in 2019, alleging that approximately two decades of Roundup use had caused his non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, and that the product’s label should have carried a cancer warning. A jury agreed and awarded more than US$1 million in damages. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Missouri failure-to-warn duties and FIFRA’s misbranding standard “both require a pesticide manufacturer to adequately warn users of the potential dangers of using its product” and are therefore “fully consistent with” each other. Id. at *6 (quoting 707 S.W.3d 828, 832–33 (Mo. App. 2025). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a direct split among federal and state appellate courts over “whether FIFRA preempts a state tort claim based on Roundup’s lack of a cancer warning.” Id. at *6.

The Supreme Court’s ruling

The majority held that federal requirements include EPA-approved labels, not just statutory text. Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a seven-Justice majority, rejected the argument that FIFRA’s preemption clause reaches only the statute’s general misbranding standard in the abstract. Because the EPA’s registration process requires the agency to evaluate every proposed label and affirmatively determine that it contains adequate warnings and no misleading statements, the registration determination itself constitutes a federal “requirement” under FIFRA’s preemption clause. The Court stated: “[A]fter EPA has registered the pesticide and approved the label, the manufacturer is required to use that label. Subject to narrow exceptions not relevant here, the manufacturer may not change the label unless EPA subsequently approves a manufacturer’s proposed change or EPA itself requires a change to the label. . . . If a manufacturer does not use the EPA-approved label, it may be subject to civil and criminal penalties.” Id. at *4. Because federal law required Monsanto to sell Roundup with the label EPA approved—that is, without a cancer warning—“[t]hat Missouri-law requirement is ‘in addition to’ and ‘different from’ Monsanto’s federal-law labeling obligations.” Id. at *8.

The Court confirmed that state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements. Drawing on its precedents in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008), and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), the majority reiterated that failure-to-warn claims “are premised on common-law rules that qualify as labeling requirements because those rules set a standard for a product’s labeling.” Id. at *6 (quoting Bates, 544 U.S. at 446) (internal quotations omitted). As the Court explained, “the heart of [a] failure-to-warn claim . . . is that [the manufacturer] should have included [a] warning on its . . . labels.” Id. at 7. This equivalence between common-law tort duties and statutory labeling requirements is critical to the preemption analysis. Because state tort law effectively mandates the content of product labels, such duties are subject to FIFRA’s preemption clause prohibiting requirements “in addition to or different from” federal labeling obligations. The Court’s reaffirmation of this principle forecloses arguments that tort claims “parallel” federal law and therefore escape preemption.

The majority confirmed the clause reaches beyond pesticides. The Court stated that allowing Durnell’s claim to proceed “would affect more than FIFRA,” because “[t]he Medical Device Amendments and several other federal statutes across a range of industries contain similar or identical labeling preemption provisions. . . . Those similar labeling preemption clauses reflect Congress’s judgment that the ability to sell a product throughout the country with a single label can be important to maintaining an efficient nationwide market.” Id. at *9. The Court cited 21 U.S.C. §§ 678 (FMIA/meat); 467e (PPIA/poultry); 1052(b) (eggs); 379r(a)(2) (OTC drugs); 379s(a) (cosmetics); and 343-1(a)(2)-(4) (food) as statutes with “similar or identical” preemption provisions. Id.

Key takeaways****

State tort duties are labeling requirements

The Court reaffirmed that state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements for preemption purposes. Failure-to-warn claims “are premised on common-law rules that qualify as labeling requirements because those rules set a standard for a product’s labeling.” Id. at *6 (quoting Bates, 544 U.S. at 446) (internal quotations omitted). This equivalence is the foundational predicate for FIFRA preemption: when a plaintiff’s tort claim would require a manufacturer to include a warning on its label, that common-law duty operates as a state labeling requirement subject to FIFRA’s express preemption clause. See id.; see also Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).

Application to other regulatory regimes—including food and medical devices

In Durnell, the Court identified “several other federal statutes across a range of industries [that] contain similar or identical labeling preemption provisions.” Id. at *9 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 678 (meat), 1052(b) (eggs), 467e (poultry), 379s(a) (cosmetics), 379r(a)(2) (OTC drugs), and 343-1(a)(2)-(4) (food)) It recognized that “[t]hose similar labeling preemption clauses reflect Congress’s judgment that the ability to sell a product throughout the country with a single label can be important to maintaining an efficient nationwide market.” Id.

No “parallel claim” argument

The argument that a claim “parallels federal law,” which has been the most frequently accepted basis for denying preemption, is rejected. The majority held that framing a state tort claim as consistent with federal law’s general objectives “operates at far too high a level of generality and disregards the central and comprehensive role that EPA performs in making labeling determinations under FIFRA’s registration provisions.” Id. at *2. The relevant comparison is not between the general objectives of state and federal law, but between the specific content of the agency-approved label and the content the plaintiff’s claim would require.

New science does not prevent preemption

The Court rejected the argument that evolving scientific understanding could create an independent duty to warn outside the federal scheme. The majority held that “the theoretical possibility that EPA could (despite its representation otherwise) try to bring a misbranding enforcement action against a pesticide manufacturer on the theory that the EPA-approved and EPA-required label had in essence become misbranded over time due to new evidence does not deprive EPA’s registration decisions of their preemptive force.” Id. at *12. FIFRA provides its own mechanisms for addressing evolving science—including petition, cancellation and suspension proceedings—and private state-court litigation is not among them. See id. at *5, *12.

Agency decisions still matter

Following Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), some plaintiffs argued that post-Chevron principles diminish the weight courts must give agency labeling decisions. Durnell forecloses that argument. The Court explained that FIFRA “empowers EPA to ‘prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of [FIFRA],’ [ ], and expressly directs EPA to register pesticides and ‘determin[e]’ that the pesticide’s ‘labeling’ complies with FIFRA’s many specific requirements. Id. at *2. Where Congress expressly delegates to an agency the power to review and approve product labels—as FIFRA does for pesticides and the FDCA does for drugs and devices—Loper Bright has no bearing on the preemptive force of the agency’s resulting determinations.

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