The United States foreign investment review landscape has continued to evolve as the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has seen expansion in both the scope of its authorities and its enforcement capabilities. Although CFIUS’ statutory jurisdiction has changed relatively little since the implementation of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA), recent executive policy initiatives, regulatory reforms and enforcement actions reflect a broader conception of national security tied to economic security and heightened scrutiny of transactions involving strategically significant technologies, infrastructure and industries.

Major Recent Developments

Economic security as national security

The Trump administration’s February 2025 “America First Investment Policy” expressly declared that “economic security is national security.” While reaffirming the United States’ commitment to maintaining an open investment environment, the memorandum directs greater scrutiny of investments involving critical technologies, infrastructure, personal data, energy, agriculture and other strategic sectors, while also calling for streamlined treatment of qualifying investments from trusted allies through the US Department of the Treasury’s developing Known Investor Program (which is currently in a pilot phase).

The policy also signals possible future expansion of CFIUS authority, including over certain greenfield investments and emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI). Such expansion, however, would require new congressional legislation that is not currently pending. In any event, the policy, together with Assistant Secretary for Investment Security Chris Pilkerton’s emphasis on resilient supply chains and efficient investment review, reflects an increasingly strategic approach to foreign investment that extends beyond traditional defense technologies to domestic manufacturing capacity, supply chain resilience, and technological leadership.

The review of Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of US Steel illustrates this shift. On January 3, 2025, President Biden blocked the transaction after CFIUS was unable to resolve the outstanding national security concerns associated with foreign ownership of a major domestic steel producer and the resulting impact on US industrial capacity and supply chains. President Trump subsequently directed a de novo CFIUS review, and the transaction was ultimately permitted subject to an unusually expansive national security mitigation agreement, which included a novel “golden share” mechanism held by the US government, granting it veto power and rights over certain key business decisions that affect US Steel’s governance, manufacturing capacity and other matters with national security implications. The matter demonstrates that an investor’s domicile in a close US ally does not, standing alone, insulate a transaction from CFIUS scrutiny where strategically significant industrial assets are involved.

Expanded jurisdiction and enhanced enforcement

The Treasury Department has complemented this broader policy approach by strengthening CFIUS’ enforcement authorities. A November 2024 final rule expanded the Committee’s authority to compel information from transaction parties and third parties, clarified that CFIUS may request information relevant to any matter within its jurisdiction, established procedures and timelines governing mitigation discussions and responses, broadened subpoena authority where voluntary cooperation is not forthcoming and significantly increased the maximum civil monetary penalties for violations. These changes reflect the continued effort to modernize CFIUS’ enforcement framework by strengthening the committee’s ability to monitor compliance, investigate violations and ensure timely cooperation throughout review and after closing. Collectively, the amendments emphasize the idea that effective enforcement is an integral component of the CFIUS process, and that the Committee’s oversight extends beyond initial review and throughout the lifecycle of a covered transaction.

Recent enforcement actions further demonstrate the Treasury’s willingness to use these enhanced enforcement powers to ensure compliance with mitigation measures and other CFIUS obligations. According to CFIUS’ 2024 Annual Report to Congress, the Committee formally opened 76 non-notified inquiries during 2024 while continuing to monitor hundreds of mitigation agreements and assess civil penalties where appropriate.

Additionally, in February 2026, the US Department of Justice filed suit to enforce a presidential divestment order requiring Suirui Group to divest Jupiter Systems after the company failed to complete the required divestiture. The action highlights that CFIUS review does not necessarily end once a transaction closes and that parties should expect continued monitoring and enforcement of mitigation obligations.

AI infrastructure and data centers

The current administration is highly focused on AI infrastructure. Executive Order 14318, “Accelerating Federal Permitting of Data Center Infrastructure,” characterizes AI data centers and the infrastructure supporting them—including energy infrastructure, transmission systems, semiconductors, networking equipment, data storage systems and cloud infrastructure—as “technologies that are essential to national security, economic prosperity, and scientific leadership.” This, along with the administration’s AI Action Plan, reflects a broader policy emphasis on domestic AI infrastructure as a strategic national asset.

Transactions involving digital infrastructure are likely to receive heightened scrutiny, especially where they involve government customers, strategic computing capacity or critical infrastructure. As a result, these transactions increasingly warrant broader diligence that extends beyond cybersecurity to include customer relationships, operational control, infrastructure dependencies, government users and supply-chain considerations.

Continued focus on semiconductors

Semiconductor design and manufacturing remains a core area of CFIUS concern. As noted in CFIUS’ 2024 Annual Report to Congress, the Committee continues to focus on businesses involved in semiconductor manufacturing equipment, integrated circuit design and chip fabrication because of their importance to critical technologies and national security.

The January 2026 divestment order involving HieFo Corporation’s acquisition of portions of EMCORE illustrates this priority. The Treasury Department concluded that the transaction presented risks relating to EMCORE’s intellectual property, proprietary knowledge, technical expertise and domestic supply of indium-phosphide semiconductor chips. The transaction originated through CFIUS’ non-notified process, underscoring the Committee’s increasingly proactive review of completed transactions.

Conclusion

Recent developments reflect more than incremental procedural changes. Although FIRRMA’s statutory framework remains largely unchanged, CFIUS’ practical reach has expanded through broader national security priorities, enhanced enforcement authorities, and increasingly proactive review practices.

Accordingly, parties should evaluate CFIUS risk early in the transaction process. In addition to assessing jurisdiction and filing requirements, investors should consider whether a transaction implicates strategic manufacturing, AI infrastructure, semiconductor capabilities, supply-chain resilience, critical infrastructure or sensitive government relationships. Early identification of these issues will better position parties to structure transactions, anticipate mitigation measures and avoid costly delays or post-closing enforcement.

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Global rules on foreign direct investment
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