This article was co-authored with Maria Lai and Michelle Shearer.\

Takeaways

Automated decision-making (ADM) is not a future concept for government; instead, it is already embedded in the way services are delivered, from tax administration to border processing. As agencies move to scale decision-making through automation and AI, the legal and reputational stakes are rising just as quickly. Recent scrutiny of government systems has reinforced a simple point: automation may improve speed and consistency, but it must not displace fundamental public law obligations. Against this backdrop, agencies must ensure that automated processes are not only efficient, but lawful, transparent and fair. This article highlights the key legal considerations for Commonwealth entities seeking to harness automation while maintaining public trust.

ADM systems offer significant benefits for government agencies looking to do more with less. However, they introduce several key risks that must be carefully managed.

Key legal risks for automated administrative decision-making include:

  • Legal authority to automate: The use of ADM must be authorised by legislation. At least 64 pieces of Commonwealth legislation authorise ADM, creating a fragmented landscape. The Commonwealth has now identified the development of a framework to better regulate the use of automated decision-making within federal agencies as one of its whole-of-government AI safety priorities.1 Agencies should therefore expect increasing scrutiny of whether ADM systems are fair, accurate, transparent and properly authorised.
  • Bias: Care should be taken to ensure that the law is able to be accurately translated into code to avoid biased outcomes.
  • Transparency: The Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (FOI Act) obliges agencies to be transparent about their use of automated administrative decision-making and the types of personal information involved in these decisions. Reasons should accompany automated decisions – audit trails may assist with transparency. Human oversight in ADM is vital.
  • Privacy:  From 10 December 2026, agencies (and other APP entities) will be required to include information in their privacy policies about the kinds of personal information they use, and the types of decisions they make, using “computer programs” that could “reasonably be expected to significantly affect the rights or interests of an individual”. Entities should be undertaking the necessary work on this now.
  • Accountability: Care must be taken to ensure that ADM does not fetter a decision maker’s power to exercise their discretion.

The use of automated decision-making in government will only expand, particularly as artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities mature. For Commonwealth agencies, the key challenge is how to adopt automation responsibly. This requires embedding legal safeguards at every stage of the system lifecycle, including design, deployment and review, while maintaining clear lines of accountability and human oversight. Agencies that get this right will not only manage legal risk more effectively but also strengthen trust in government decision-making in an increasingly automated environment.

Overview of automated administrative decision-making

The work of government impacts the lives of individuals in a myriad of ways, including delivering services and payments to individuals, assessing and collecting taxes, and granting visas, amongst other things. Although ADM has been in use in the Australian public sector for over 30 years, its use by government agencies is becoming more widespread following recent technological developments. Current applications include automated facial recognition and document verification to process travellers at airports,2 and data-matching and rules-based systems to pre-fill and assess individual tax returns.3

Automating aspects of the administrative decision-making process comes with the promise of more efficient and consistent administrative processes, but also raises a number of risks which must be managed carefully. This article provides a high-level overview of some key issues surrounding the automation of administrative decision-making.

What is an administrative decision?

Before considering issues related to the automation of administrative decision-making, it is helpful to set out what kinds of “decisions” are “administrative” in character. First, a “decision” (in the sense used in administrative law) is a decision that is final or operative and determinative of the matter being considered.4 Second, in broad terms, an “administrative” decision is a decision that is made “in the exercise of statutory powers and functions, which is neither legislative nor judicial in character”.5 Administrative decisions are often distinguished from legislative decisions on the basis that “…legislative decisions determine the content of rules of general, usually prospective, application, whereas administrative decisions apply rules of that kind to particular cases.”6

What does automation mean in the context of administrative decision-making?

In the context of administrative decision-making, “automation” refers to the use of computer systems to automate some or all of the decision-making process. Automated systems are diverse, ranging from:

  • “traditional rules-based systems (for example a system which calculates a rate of payment in accordance with a formula set out in legislation)…”;
  • “…more specialised systems which use automated tools to predict and deliberate, including through the use of machine learning”.7

The most common type of ADM currently utilised by Commonwealth agencies are simple rules-based expert systems,8 which automatically apply a series of pre-programmed rules written by humans.9 A well-known example of the use of expert systems in recent years is the Robodebt Scheme, which involved using automated data-matching to identify and recover welfare overpayments.

However, ADM can also include specialised systems that use automated tools to forecast and reason, such as machine learning (a form of AI10).

As Justice Melissa Perry stated:

“Governments currently rely primarily on pre-programmed rules-based automated systems, because wholly “autonomous” decision-making systems remain expensive and have yet to be perfected. However, as technology continues to improve and the use of “machine learning” (or algorithms, which learn from patterns in data) is increasingly adopted in the private and public sectors, we can expect machines to be used to make a greater number of qualitative assessments and recommendations, and even evaluative decisions.”11

These systems raise both overlapping and distinct issues in relation to administrative decision-making. In the following section, we outline some of the most common issues Commonwealth agencies may face in using ADM systems for administrative decision-making. This article focusses primarily on forms of ADM where rules are explicitly encoded in the system (expert systems), as opposed to being ‘found’ in training data, as is the case with AI systems based on machine learning.

Key issues and risks surrounding automation in administrative decision making

There are at least five significant issues and risks raised by the automation of administrative decision-making. These are legal authority to automate, bias and discrimination, lack of transparency, privacy issues, and issues around accountability and responsibility. In this section, we outline the nature of each risk, the relevant law, and what agencies and legal practitioners can do to mitigate and manage each risk.

The use of ADM to make administrative decisions is confined to circumstances where the power or authority to do so is provided for in legislation.12 As noted by Justice Melissa Perry, this is because of the principle of legality:

“….When it comes to the State, a positive justification is required for legal action affecting rights and interests…. Equally, if an automated system is being utilised to make part or all of a decision, the use of that system must be authorised by law.

It cannot be assumed that a statutory authority vested in a senior public servant which extends by implication to a properly authorised officer, will also extend to an automated system; nor that authority to delegate to a human decision-maker will permit “delegation” to an automated system. Authority to use such systems should be transparent and express.”13

Agencies must therefore ensure automated systems are designed so the system complies with the legislative authority for the relevant decision, as well as the authority to automate the decision.14

The legislative authorisation of ADM in administrative decision-making is fragmented, with at least 64 separate pieces of Commonwealth legislation authorising the use of ADM.15 This fragmentation has been criticised for creating inconsistency around which decisions should be automated, leaving gaps in safeguards, complicating oversight, and undermining legal certainty and public trust.16 In 2023, the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme recommended that the Commonwealth consider legislative reform to introduce a consistent legal framework for automation in government services,17 a project which has been taken up by the Attorney-General’s Department following a public consultation process.18 The Attorney General’s Department is progressing a whole of government reform agenda aimed at establishing a more consistent statutory and governance framework for ADM across the Commonwealth.

Since the consultation process concluded, there have been related developments.

The Commonwealth Ombudsman has recently recommended that across the whole of the APS, processes should be reviewed to determine whether there are sufficient safeguards covering the use of automated decision-making, signalling an expectation of systematic assurance rather than ad hoc compliance.19

In December 2025, the Australian Government released its National AI Plan (the Plan). The Plan confirmed that existing legal frameworks already apply to AI. The Plan explicitly stated that the government is focused on a consistent legal framework for supporting government use of ADM (which may include AI), in service delivery to the Australian public.20 Importantly, the Plan confirmed that Australia will not introduce standalone AI legislation in the near term, placing greater weight on agencies to ensure existing administrative law, privacy and accountability frameworks are applied rigorously to ADM systems.

Subsequent Ministerial announcements indicate that ADM within federal agencies remains a specific focus of the Government’s AI safety agenda. On 20 July 2026, the Government identified the development of a framework to better regulate the use of ADM within federal agencies as one of its whole-of-government AI safety priorities. The stated objective is to support fair, accurate and transparent government decision-making, including where emerging technologies such as AI are used. This development reinforces the need for Commonwealth agencies to treat ADM governance not merely as a systems-design issue, but as an administrative law, privacy and accountability issue requiring clear legal authority, transparency, assurance and human responsibility.21

Bias, Error and Unreasonableness

Procedural fairness (or natural justice) requires that an administrative decision is free from bias, both actual and apprehended, and that an individual has the right to be heard.22

To demonstrate actual bias, one must show that a decision-maker is “so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented.”23

The legal test for apprehended bias contains two parts:

  • identifying what might lead a decision-maker to decide a matter other than on its legal and factual merits, and
  • showing a logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.24

Using certain ADM systems may lead to actual or apprehended bias.

Rules based expert systems rely on the rigid application of ‘if this then that’ logic and can therefore be suited to non-discretionary decisions.25 As the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme observed in its Final Report, that scheme “…involved a system of business rules with no ability to move outside of specific and defined action on the basis of the data received. It was extremely rigid; once the rules had been coded and set in place, the system itself would stay in place until the rules were changed by way of human intervention”.26 On the other hand, discretionary decision-making  refers to a decision-making process where the decision maker is allowed some latitude as to the choice of the decision to be made, which latitude may be considerable or quite narrow.27 Questions of pre-judgment or bias may arise where an expert system ADM is used to make discretionary decisions (as well as other issues such as invalid or improper exercise of power through the fettering of discretion of the decision-maker).28

The Commonwealth Ombudsman’s Better Practice Guide on Automated Decision Making, published in March 2025, recognises that ‘some data analytics techniques that support ADM such as automatic algorithms have the potential to create personal information with an inherent bias, that is discriminatory or that leads to inaccurate or unjustified results.’29 This is because AI infers patterns from existing data. If the training data contains embedded biases, the models are likely to replicate and reinforce those biases. In general, this type of bias may be mitigated, but not eliminated.

The impact of errors, biases and even unreasonableness in automated administrative decision-making processes is potentially much greater than in respect of decisions made by humans alone. First, unlike human decision-making, many forms of ADM rely on an explicit encoding of rules into a system.30 The process of encoding rules into a system may involve errors, ranging from typographical mistakes to inaccuracies in translating the law into code (such as occurs when the law is oversimplified or misunderstood).31

More fundamentally, there is a risk that “the relatively constrained vocabulary of computer code will not adequately reflect the nuances of statutory provisions”.32 Depending on the type of error, this could result in discrimination against certain groups, as well as errors which could amount to unreasonableness.

Thirdly, due to the consistent application of algorithms and the speed of ADM that allows for mass decision-making, any coding error that influences the outcome of decisions could have widespread effects – as was the case with the Robodebt Scheme. This means the impact of errors and biases in automated administrative decision-making processes is potentially much greater than in respect of decisions made by humans alone.

To minimise the risk of errors, lawyers experienced in statutory interpretation and administrative law should be involved early in the design process to ensure that statutory language is accurately translated into code. Care should be taken to ensure that any practical limitations of coding language or expert system logic do not result in questions being phrased in a biased or leading manner.

The risks of coding or other errors in ADM systems are also compounded by the existence of automation bias. This is the susceptibility of people to defer to and accept the outcomes of automated processes due to a perception that these processes are infallible.33 Automation bias may lead to inadequate review of automated steps in a decision-making process by the decision-maker, and may also dissuade affected individuals from seeking review of erroneous decisions. Accordingly, where ADM is used, there should be a clear path for those affected by decisions to seek review as recommended by the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme,34 and an internal process to ensure decision-makers exercise appropriate judgement about the output of ADM systems.

To satisfy the second element of procedural fairness, the right to be heard, individuals affected by a decision should be notified that ADM has been used and be provided with an opportunity to present their views on the information being used to make a decision.

Transparency

As noted in the Automated Decision Making – Better Practice Guide:

“Transparency is a key value of administrative law and critical for government accountability.  The underlying business rules of an automated system must be readily understandable and information about automated systems should be publicly available. People should be informed when automated systems are being used to make decisions that materially impact on their legal rights or other significant rights.”35

Transparency is essential both to reduce the risk of bias and discrimination, and to ensure that individuals affected by an ADM-supported decision can know that such a system was used, to understand the decision, and to challenge or seek review of the decision. In this respect, the type of system used will impact on transparency considerations.

For example, complex ADM systems involving AI do not rely on a fixed pre-determined set of rules and variables, complicating the task of transparency in decision-making. The manner in which such systems make decisions may not be comprehensible, even to their creators. This may make AI systems inappropriate for certain decision-making purposes.

In contrast, the decision-making process of rule based expert systems should be highly transparent, as an expert system applies a pre-determined set of rules and variables in the same way each time. This should mean that it is possible to trace how a decision was arrived at.36 However, in practice, transparency may be challenging for various reasons, for example:

  • a third-party developer of an ADM system may not wish to disclose confidential commercial information about the design and development of their system;
  • the reasons for a decision may refer to information that cannot be disclosed due to privacy or secrecy laws; and
  • providing the specific coding or algorithms of the ADM system may not be helpful, as it is unlikely that such information would be meaningful to the recipient or the broader community.37

To ensure an appropriate level of transparency, the design of administrative ADM systems should include clear audit trails and provide reasons to accompany decisions. Those reasons should also include mechanisms for review of the decision and should not be finalised without human oversight.

It is also worth noting the Robodebt Royal Commission’s recommendations that:

  • departmental websites should contain information advising that ADM is used and explaining in plain language how the process works;
  • business rules and algorithms should be made available, to enable independent expert scrutiny;38 and
  • a body to monitor and audit ADM, with the power to monitor and audit ADM processes with regard to their technical aspects and their impact in respect of fairness, the avoiding of bias, and client usability, should be established.39

A consistent theme across recent reviews is the need for stronger assurance mechanisms, including auditability of systems, independent scrutiny of algorithms, and clear internal governance over ADM outputs.  In January 2026, the Office of the Information Commissioner (OAIC) published a report40 of its desktop review of how transparent 23 Commonwealth agencies were about their use of ADM in decision-making processes.  The review considered whether a member of the public could find out if an agency was using ADM by searching the agency website.

The OAIC review found that:

  • only 17% disclosed that they use ADM in a decision-making process in their Information Publication Scheme (IPS);
  • 39% referred to ADM in their IPS information but did not confirm that they used it; and
  • 43% did not mention ADM in their IPS information;
  • No agency had any published guidelines or policies on ADM (therefore, the OAIC did not categorise any agency as meeting its “better practice” category).

The OAIC concluded that none of the agencies demonstrated practices to fully enliven the legislative intention in section 7A of the FOI Act to “…publish a range of information including information about what the agency does and the way it does it, as well as information dealt with or used in the course of its operations, some of which is called operational information.”41

The OAIC indicated it would update Part 13 – Information Publication Scheme of the FOI guidelines so that ADM is expressly included as an example of ‘operational information’.42

These findings signal a gap between legislative requirements and current agency practice.

Privacy

ADM systems inherently involve the processing of personal information at scale. It is therefore essential to ensure that individuals' data is handled lawfully, ethically, and securely, to mitigate risks of misuse, unauthorised access, or data breaches. This includes considering data collection, storage, processing, and sharing within automated decision-making workflows.

From 10 December 2026, amendments to the Australian Privacy Principles will come into effect. Relevantly, APP entities (which include Commonwealth agencies) will be required to include information about ADM in their privacy policies, where the following criteria are met:43

  • the entity has arranged for a computer program to make, or do a thing that is substantially and directly related to making a decision;
  • the decision could reasonably be expected to significantly affect the rights or interests of an individual; and
  • personal information about the individual is used in the operation of the computer program to make the decision, or to do the thing that is substantially and directly related to making the decision.

The information provided must include details about the kind of personal information used in making the decisions, and the kinds of decisions made by the computer program.44

These amendments represent the first regulation of ADM within the Privacy Act framework, requiring agencies to proactively identify relevant ADM processes and ensure their privacy settings, data inputs and disclosures are appropriately documented.  The OAIC intends to release guidance to assist entities to comply with the ADM transparency obligations by September 2026, and has sought feedback on an Issues Paper.45

In addition to the specific requirements for automated decisions, the other 13 APPs governing collection, use, disclosure, security, and access to personal information remain fully applicable where an ADM system handles personal information.46 Agencies should ensure that their systems are capable of, and do, comply with these privacy requirements.

The Government’s July 2026 AI consumer safety priorities also confirm that privacy reform remains central to the AI safety agenda. In particular, the Government has indicated that it will consult on a second tranche of privacy reform to strengthen, modernise and simplify Australia’s personal data protection laws, noting that a robust framework for personal data protection is crucial for both conventional and AI-driven services. For agencies using ADM, this underscores that compliance should not be limited to the forthcoming ADM-specific privacy policy disclosure requirements. It should also include a broader assessment of whether data collection, use, retention, security and governance settings remain appropriate for automated and AI-supported decision-making.

Accountability and Responsibility

Legislative provisions authorising ADM typically deem decisions made by computer programs to be decisions made by the relevant authorised officer.47 Agencies should ensure that their processes reflect this ultimate responsibility, namely that accountability for automated decisions remains with human decision makers, notwithstanding the increasing sophistication of the systems used to support or generate those decisions. Agencies must be aware that an automated output may be incorrect and be ready to review that output if a serious question arises.48

This emphasis on human accountability is consistent with the Government’s broader AI safety priorities, which seek to strengthen protections, increase accountability and support the safe adoption of AI within the Commonwealth Government itself. In practical terms, agencies should ensure that responsibility for ADM systems is not diffused across legal, policy, operational and technology teams in a way that makes it unclear who is accountable for the legality, fairness and accuracy of outcomes.

The use of a computer system to make administrative decisions that are discretionary in nature is more complex. Agencies must ensure that an ADM system is designed in a way to avoid the impermissible fettering of a decision-maker’s discretion.49 In this respect, the Commonwealth Ombudsman recommends that “agencies should avoid automating discretions until they have sought independent external legal advice” which considers whether a discretionary decision must be exercised personally by a decision-maker in the particular context.50

Conclusion

This article has provided a brief overview of some key issues and risks to keep in mind when designing and implementing ADM systems in the context of administrative decision-making.

There are undoubtedly benefits to automating some administrative decision-making. Key benefits may include speed, which may provide immediate certainty to individuals impacted by a decision-making process, as well as greater consistency in decision-making. However, as recent examples illustrate, the nature, speed and scale of the way ADM operates presents as a double-edged sword, in that any error will be replicated on a large scale and has the potential to adversely impact a significant proportion of the population.

While ADM adds novel considerations, care also needs to be taken to ensure continued adherence to fundamental administrative law concepts and public law principles, which apply regardless of whether automation is involved.

This article has indicated some of the main issues raised by ADM, which should be a focus of any review. Taking a lifecycle approach to safeguards can help address issues with automation before significant harm arises, lower the risk of major legal liabilities, and enable a fairer distribution of responsibility for identifying and resolving problems between the administering agency and the recipient of a decision.

Recent developments across government indicate a clear trajectory towards more structured oversight of ADM, including whole-of-government reform, increased regulatory scrutiny of transparency practices, the introduction of ADM-specific privacy obligations, and the Government’s July 2026 commitment to develop a framework to better regulate ADM within federal agencies. This is in addition to existing obligations requiring agencies to publish operational information.

Together, these developments reinforce that agencies must move beyond ad hoc implementation and adopt a systematic, lifecycle approach to the governance of ADM, one that addresses legal authority, explainability, privacy, assurance, review rights and human accountability from the outset.

Additional resources

Footnotes

  1. 1

    Senator the Hon Tim Ayres, the Hon Michelle Rowland MP, the Hon Anika Wells MP, the Hon Amanda Rishworth MP, the Hon Dr Andrew Charlton MP and the Hon Dr Andrew Leigh MP, ‘AI consumer safety priorities’ (Media Release, 20 July 2026) AI consumer safety priorities.

  2. 2

    Australian Border Force, “SmartGates” (https://www.abf.gov.au/entering-and-leaving-australia/smartgate) (accessed 15 December 2025).

  3. 3

    Australian Taxation Office, ‘Data Matching’ (https://www.ato.gov.au/about-ato/commitments-and-reporting/information-and-privacy/data-and-analytics/data-matching) (accessed 15 December 2025).

  4. 4

    Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, 337 (Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ agreeing). While there are also issues associated with the automation of administrative actions not amounting to “decisions”, they are outside the scope of this article.

  5. 5

    Encyclopaedic Australian Legal Dictionary (online at 10 November 2025) ‘decision of an administrative character’.

  6. 6

    RG Capital Radio Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Authority, Wilcox, Branson and Lindgren JJ [2001] FCA 855, [43].

  7. 7

    Commonwealth Ombudsman, “Better Practice Guide: Automated Decision Making” (March 2025), 7.

  8. 8

    Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Automated Decision-Making by Government (Consultation Paper, November 2024), 7.

  9. 9

    Monika Zalnieriute, Lyria Bennett Moses and George Williams, ‘Automating Government Decision-making: Implications for the Rule of Law’ [2021] UNSW Law Research Series 40, 5.

  10. 10

    The Commonwealth Government’s Policy for the Responsible Use of AI in Government adopts the OECD definition of AI: “An AI system is a machine-based system that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments. Different AI systems vary in their levels of autonomy and adaptiveness after deployment.”

  11. 11

    Justice Melissa Perry, ‘The Future of Administrative Discretions', (Commonwealth Law Conference, 24 February 2023).

  12. 12

    Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Automated Decision-Making by Government (Consultation Paper, November 2024), 8.

  13. 13

    Justice Melissa Perry, ‘iDecide: Digital Pathways to Decision, Law Council of Australia, 2019 CPD Immigration Law Conference, a revised version of iDecide, Administrative Decision-Making in the Digital World’ (2017) 91(1) Australian Law Journal 29, 31.

  14. 14

    See Commonwealth Ombudsman, “Better Practice Guide: Automated Decision Making” (March 2025), 15.

  15. 15

    Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Automated Decision-Making by Government (Consultation Paper, November 2024), 5.

  16. 16

    Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Automated Decision-Making by Government (Consultation Paper, November 2024).

  17. 17

    Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme (Final Report, July 2023), 488 (Recommendation 17.1).

  18. 18

    See ‘Automated Decision-Making Reform’, Attorney-General’s Department (Web Page, 28 February 2025) https://consultations.ag.gov.au/integrity/adm/.

  19. 19

    Commonwealth Ombudsman, “What if the computer is wrong? A short report under section 15 of the Ombudsman Act 1976” (September 2025), 2.

  20. 20

    Australian Government, National AI Plan 2005 (December 2025), 26.

  21. 21

    As above, see footnote 1.

  22. 22

    Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476; (2003) 72 ALD 1; (2003) 195 ALR 24; (2003) 77 ALJR 454; (2003) 24(2) Leg Rep 2; [2003] HCA 2, [25] (Gleeson CJ).

  23. 23

    Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507; (2001) 65 ALD 1; (2001) 178 ALR 421; (2001) 75 ALJR 679; (2001) 22(6) Leg Rep 2; [2001] HCA 17, [72] (Gleeson CJ and Gummow J).

  24. 24

    Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; (2000) 63 ALD 577; (2000) 176 ALR 644; (2000) 75 ALJR 277; (2000) 21(20) Leg Rep 13; [2000] HCA 63, [8] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

  25. 25

    Anna Huggins, ‘Addressing Disconnection: Automated Decision-Making, Administrative Law and Regulatory Reform’ (2021) 44(3) UNSW Law Journal 1048, 1060-1.

  26. 26

    Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme (Final Report, July 2023) vol 2, 472 (internal citations omitted).

  27. 27

    As Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Hayne JJ explained in Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 201 CLR 194 at 294-205.

  28. 28

    Justice Melissa Perry, ‘iDecide: Administrative Decision-Making in the Digital World’ (2017) 91(1) Australian Law Journal 29, 33.

  29. 29

    Commonwealth Ombudsman, “Better Practice Guide: Automated Decision Making” (March 2025), 26.

  30. 30

    For the purposes of this article, automation is primarily concerned with expert systems, where rules are explicitly encoded, as opposed to being ‘found’ in training data (as is the case with systems based on machine learning).

  31. 31

    Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Automated Decision-Making by Government (Consultation Paper, November 2024) 10.

  32. 32

    Anna Huggins, ‘Addressing Disconnection: Automated Decision-Making, Administrative Law and Regulatory Reform’ (2021) 44(3) UNSW Law Journal 1048, 1053.

  33. 33

    Anna Huggins, ‘Addressing Disconnection: Automated Decision-Making, Administrative Law and Regulatory Reform’ (2021) 44(3) UNSW Law Journal 1048, 1068.

  34. 34

    Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme (Final Report, July 2023) 488 (Recommendation 17.1).

  35. 35

    Commonwealth Ombudsman, “Better Practice Guide: Automated Decision Making” (March 2025), 42.

  36. 36

    Monika Zalnieriute, Lyria Bennett Moses and George Williams, ‘Automating Government Decision-making: Implications for the Rule of Law’ [2021] UNSW Law Research Series 40, 9-10.

  37. 37

    See e.g., Monika Zalnieriute, Lyria Bennett Moses and George Williams, ‘Automating Government Decision-making: Implications for the Rule of Law’ [2021] UNSW Law Research Series 40, 10; Commonwealth of Australia, Use of Automated Decision-Making by Government (Consultation Paper, November 2024), 17.

  38. 38

    Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme (Final Report, July 2023), 488 (Recommendation 17.1).

  39. 39

    Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme (Final Report, July 2023), 488 (Recommendation 17.2).

  40. 40

    Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Automated decision-making and public reporting under the Freedom of Information Act’ (21 January 2026).

  41. 41

    Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Automated decision-making and public reporting under the Freedom of Information Act’ (21 January 2026) [32].

  42. 42

    At the time of writing, this does not appear to have been completed.

  43. 43

    Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) clause 88 (new APP1.7).

  44. 44

    Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) s 2(1) and schedule 1 items 87, 88.

  45. 45

    Further information in relation to this can be found here: https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/a2769c39/oaic-consults-on-the-new-automated-decision-making-transparency-obligation

  46. 46

    For further information about the APPs, please refer to the link to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner’s ‘Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines’ under the ‘Additional Resources’ section below. The Guidelines were updated on 3 October 2025 to reflect changes to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) made by the Privacy and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2024 (Cth). Chapter 1 contains high level information about the forthcoming requirement to include information about automated decisions in a privacy policy.

  47. 47

    See eg Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) s 6A; Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 495A and 495B; Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) ss 48 and 49.

  48. 48

    Commonwealth Ombudsman, “What if the computer is wrong? A short report under section 15 of the Ombudsman Act 1976” (September 2025), 2.

  49. 49

    Commonwealth Ombudsman’s “Better Practice Guide: Automated Decision Making” (March 2025), 28-29.

  50. 50

    Ibid, 16.

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