In GTLK Malta Four Limited v Pola Maritime Limited & others [2026] EWHC 2514 (Comm), handed down on 2 October 2026, the Commercial Court granted summary judgment of more than US$40 million plus interest to a sanctions-affected owner against the guarantors of its bareboat charterer. The charterer had stopped paying hire once the owner's Russian state-owned parent was designated under EU, UK and US sanctions. It then served notices terminating the charters for breach of the owner’s quiet enjoyment covenant, arguing in the alternative that the charters had been frustrated.
The Court found that the hell or high water clause allocated the risk of losing use of the vessels to the charterer, that sanctions affecting payment suspend rather than discharge the obligation to pay, and that broadly drafted guarantee saving provisions would have preserved the guarantors' liability even if the charters had been frustrated or terminated.
Factual background
The claimant, GTLK Malta Four Limited (the Owner), is a Maltese subsidiary of the Russian state-owned JSC GTLK. It owned seven vessels (two floating cranes, three tugs and two barges), which it chartered to Pola Logistics Limited (the Charterer) on ten-year bareboat charters on amended BARECON 2001 terms (the Charters). The four defendants (the Guarantors) guaranteed the Charterer’s obligations, and indemnified the Owner, jointly and severally, under twelve materially identical joint deeds of guarantee and indemnity.
After Russia invaded Ukraine, JSC GTLK was designated under EU sanctions on 8 April 2022, which also caught the Owner. UK and US designations followed. The Charterer stopped paying hire immediately. On 1 September 2022 it served notices of termination, alleging that the Owner was in repudiatory breach (particularly of the clause 42 quiet enjoyment covenant), further or alternatively that the Charters were frustrated. The Owner rejected the notices.
The position then changed. The Owner’s Irish parent went into liquidation in May 2023, and licences followed from the UK’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) and the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The parties disagreed about the precise effect of the sanctions, but the Judge noted that their effect on the Charters was arguably abated, because payments under pre-existing contracts could now be made into blocked accounts.
The Owner never accepted that the Charters had come to an end and treated them as continuing. In February 2024, it served its own termination notices for the Charterer’s continued failure to pay hire, and demanded the Purchase Option Price which, under clause 46.2, became payable on termination for the Charterer’s default. In October 2024, it made demands under the guarantees. Nothing was paid and the Owner commenced proceeding against the Guarantors.
The issues
As this was a summary judgment application, the question on each issue was whether the Guarantors had a real prospect of success at trial. Four main issues arose:
- The construction issue: on their proper construction, did the guarantees apply even if the Charters had been frustrated or terminated?
- The termination issue: could the Guarantors show that the Charterer had validly terminated the Charters on 1 September 2022?
- The frustration issue: could the Guarantors show that the Charters were frustrated, or discharged by supervening illegality, in 2022?
- The suspension of hire issue: if the Charters survived, had the OFAC licence of September 2023 brought the suspended obligation to pay hire back into effect, so that hire was due and unpaid when the Owner terminated in February 2024?
The Judge dealt with the construction issue first, because if the Owner was right about the guarantees, the frustration and termination arguments would not matter. Behind all of this lay a dispute about what the Charters actually were. The Owner said they were finance charters, under which it had in substance lent the purchase price to the Charterer. The Guarantors said they were ordinary bareboat charters, the essence of which was the owner’s promise of quiet enjoyment in return for hire. The distinction mattered because, in a finance charter, an owner’s interest is purely economic – it is repaid through hire and has no real interest in using the vessel, which points towards a charterer bearing the risk of losing use.
Two clauses were at the heart of the case. Clause 38.10 (the “hell or high water” clause) made the obligation to pay hire “absolute irrespective of any contingency whatsoever”. That included any unavailability of the vessel "for any reason" and "any other cause which would or might but for this provision have the affect of terminating or in any way affecting any obligation of the Charterers". Clause 42.1 contained the Owner's covenant of quiet enjoyment. The Guarantors' counsel accepted that frustration only came into play if the Court rejected both sides’ case on these clauses.
The Court's decision
Nature of the Charters
The Judge agreed with the Owner, stating: "These were finance charters and this is at the heart of the way they allocate the risk of loss of use, especially through the 'hell or highwater' clause in clause 38.10". The documents had to be read together in their context as part of a wider suite of “Transaction Documents”.
This characterisation was significant because it informed the allocation of risk throughout the transaction documents, including both the hell or high water clause and the guarantees.
Clause 38.10: The hell or high water clause
The Guarantors argued that clause 38.10 did not apply once the Charters had been discharged, and that, in any event, it did not expressly allocate sanctions risk. The Judge noted that they offered no alternative reading of the clause. Although clause 38.10 did not mention sanctions, "its wording is in the broadest terms", and the Charters' definition of "Sanctions and Export Controls" contemplated sanctions being imposed on the owner. The Guarantors’ arguments had no real prospect of success as clause 38.10 allocated “the entirety of the risk of the unavailability or inability to use the Vessels to [the Charterer]".
The construction issue: Do the guarantees respond?
Under clause 2(c) of the guarantees, the Guarantors gave an indemnity, as an "independent and primary obligation", if any guaranteed obligation "is or becomes unenforceable, invalid or illegal”. Clause 5(f) preserved their liability notwithstanding "any unenforceability, illegality or invalidity” of any obligation under the Transaction Documents.
Relying on earlier Court of Appeal authority concerning materially identical wording, which drew no distinction between invalidity from the outset and invalidity arising later, the Judge accepted the Owner’s construction, explaining that:
"The underlying commercial rationale here […] is that the joint guarantors bear the risks associated with the failure by Pola Logistics to repay the loan even if it cannot be enforced legally or practically against it.”
It followed that “even if there is an arguable case of frustration, it does not matter because the Joint Guarantees still respond”. The Judge reached the same conclusion on termination. The Guarantors argued that only accrued obligations survive termination, and that the guarantees could not be construed so as to give the Owner rights arising from its own wrong (here, its alleged repudiatory breach). The Judge found no support in the documents or the case law for a distinction between accrued and unaccrued obligations, and considered it inconsistent with the guarantee wording, the broad waiver of defences and the Guarantors’ liability as primary obligors. Once hire went unpaid, the Owner was entitled to terminate, and “the Defendants then stood in the shoes of Pola Logistics and were obliged to pay the Purchase Option Price under clause 46.2 of the Charter”. As to the own wrong (ex turpi causa) argument, the Judge held that this was really a question of construing clause 38.10, which expressly provides that the obligation to pay hire survives any cause which might otherwise terminate it. She also rejected the suggestion that these points were too fact-sensitive to be decided summarily, since the facts were not really in dispute.
The termination issue: clause 42 quiet enjoyment
Although the construction findings were enough to dispose of the application, the Judge also considered whether the Charterer had validly terminated. The Guarantors' reading of clause 42 moved between two positions: (1) an absolute guarantee against any disturbance, however caused, and (2) a narrower covenant against interference attributable to the Owner or its related entities. The Owner said the absolute reading was “commercially absurd”, since it would put the Owner in breach if, for example, the vessels were hijacked by pirates.
The Judge held that the Guarantors had no real prospect of establishing a breach, because “clause 42 does not extend the warranty to matters, the risk of which has been assumed under the Charters". It was therefore unnecessary to decide whether any breach was repudiatory.
For completeness, however, she observed (obiter) that the amendments to the standard BARECON form of clause 28(b) were intended to remove any common law right to terminate for breach and replace it with an indemnity.
The frustration issue
The Guarantors’ frustration case was that the Charters were frustrated as soon as the sanctions were imposed in 2022, because use of the vessels was lost for a potentially endless period or, alternatively, because of supervening illegality. The Owner accepted that whether the vessels could in fact be used could not be decided on a summary basis, but argued that frustration failed even on the Guarantors’ version of the facts. It relied on aircraft leasing authorities holding that a long-term dry lease, under which the lessor assumes very limited obligations (essentially only quiet possession) in return for rent, and the lessee assumes the commercial risks and rewards of operating the asset, is a challenging context in which to establish frustration.
The Owner argued that the same reasoning applied to a ten-year bareboat charter containing a clause like clause 38.10. The Guarantors could point to no authority in which a long-term charter had been frustrated at the very moment of the supervening event.
The Judge held that, although the sanctions affected the Charterer’s performance, they did not “radically alter the performance thereunder, at least not as at August 2022, when there were at least five years left to run”. The Charterer could also have exercised its option to purchase the vessels during the remaining term. This was a case in which the parties would have had to “wait and see” how long the sanctions would last. The Judge also held that supervening illegality suspends a payment obligation rather than frustrating the contract, and the Guarantors had no real prospect of arguing otherwise. In any event, since clause 38.10 allocated the risk of loss of use to the Charterer, it was common ground that there was no room for the doctrine of frustration to apply.
Outcome
The Judge concluded that the Guarantors had no real prospect of defending the claim, and that there was no other compelling reason for a trial. The prospect of better evidence on the "endlessness of the sanctions” emerging at trial was, in her view, remote or speculative. Given her findings on construction, the judgment does not separately determine the suspension of hire issue.
Key takeaways
The decision was made on a summary judgment application at first instance, and the underlying dispute between the Owner and the Charterer is the subject of separate arbitration proceedings. With that in mind, the following points emerge:
- The nature of the transaction matters. Whether a charter is a finance or operating charter can significantly affect how the court reads the allocation of risk, and the court is likely to construe the charter and guarantees together with the wider suite of transaction documents.
- Hell or high water clauses can allocate sanctions risk. A sufficiently broad absolute payment clause may place the risk of loss of use on the charterer or lessee even if it does not mention sanctions expressly. Here, once clause 38.10 was found to do so, the parties accepted that there was no room for frustration.
- Quiet enjoyment covenants must be read in context. Here, the covenant did not extend to risks the Charterer had assumed elsewhere in the Charters.
- Guarantee savings clauses can be effective. Indemnities against obligations becoming "unenforceable, invalid or illegal”, together with broad waivers of defences, may mean that guarantors remain liable even if the underlying contract is frustrated or terminated.
- Sanctions affecting payment may suspend rather than frustrate. Supervening illegality affecting a payment obligation suspends that obligation. On the facts here, sanctions imposed with at least five years of the Charters left to run did not frustrate them.
Further reading: GTLK Malta Four Limited v Pola Maritime Limited & others [2026] EWHC 2514 (Comm). The full judgment can be found here.