The Protect College Sports Act cleared the US Senate on September 28, 2026, by a decisive 77–22 vote. As we discussed in our original alert, when the bill was introduced in the Senate in June 2026, and our subsequent August 2026 update on the changes made before the Senate’s planned recess vote, the bill’s momentum accelerated in late July when two of the largest collegiate athletic conferences endorsed a revised version of the legislation. That endorsement helped pave the way for a cloture motion filed by the Senate majority leader on August 5, 2026. Although the Senate recessed on August 7, 2026 without taking a final vote, delaying consideration until September, as we reported at the time, the bill ultimately passed upon the chamber’s return. Having now cleared the Senate, the bill advances to the House, where its prospects remain less certain.
The legislation has undergone significant revision since its introduction earlier this year. The Senate-passed version, however, remains largely unchanged from the version on which the Senate majority leader filed cloture in August. Most notably, the legislation continues to include a conditional antitrust safe harbor (Section 118), an antitrust exemption for the pooling of media rights (Section 202) and a per se prohibition on mergers involving major athletic conferences (Section 205).
What has changed from an antitrust perspective?
Revenue share cap
Compliance with the revenue share cap is one of the conditions institutions and associations must satisfy to claim the Section 118 antitrust safe harbor. The bill, as originally introduced, simply continued the revenue share cap after the expiration or termination of the “House” lawsuit1 settlement2 indefinitely, with no separate mechanism for institutions to pay above that cap.
The Senate-passed version adds an entirely new “retention fund” that did not exist before. Institutions may now spend up to US$22.5 million per year above the cap to retain their own current athletes (not to sign incoming recruits), plus an additional US$5 million for retaining athletes in women’s, Olympic and other non-revenue sports (Section 114).
Critically for antitrust purposes, it also changes how long the cap and the safe harbor’s compensation-related conditions last. Rather than continuing automatically and indefinitely as in the original bill, the cap and the new retention fund now sunset after nine years unless Congress affirmatively acts (Section 115).
Before that expiration, the House settlement defendants must notify Congress at least 180 days in advance (or within one day of early termination). Congress then has 30 calendar days to pass a joint resolution extending the cap, the retention fund or both. If Congress does not act, the compensation rule that institutions rely on to claim the safe harbor could lapse, potentially reopening antitrust exposure for enforcement of a cap that no longer has statutory backing.
Associated entities and the revenue share cap
Under Section 114, an intercollegiate athletic association is prohibited from restricting the ability of a student athlete to receive compensation (subject to the revenue share cap) from an institution, conference or “associated entity.” The scope of the “associated entity” definition matters for antitrust purposes because it determines both what compensation counts against the revenue share cap and what enforcement conduct against those entities is protected by the Section 118 safe harbor.
The bill as originally introduced and as reported out of committee, defined “associated entity” broadly enough to sweep in ordinary multimedia rights holders, sponsors and vendors. Therefore, legitimate arm’s-length commercial deals with those parties would have counted against the revenue share cap, and intercollegiate athletic associations would have been authorized under the safe harbor to enforce that cap against those ordinary commercial relationships.
The Senate-passed text instead adopts the House lawsuit settlement’s narrower definition, but adds a three-part certification requirement for multimedia rights holders, sponsors, apparel companies and vendors. Those entities must certify that the institution is not the source of the athlete’s compensation; the party actually funding the deal must separately certify that it is the true source of the funds and that the institution neither financed the agreement nor forgave amounts owed to finance it; and the institution itself, if required by a collegiate athletic association, must certify that it is not using the arrangement to circumvent the cap or to negotiate the athlete’s compensation. If these certifications cannot be made, the arrangement is treated as the type of institution-funded deal the revenue share cap is designed to reach.
Prohibition on conference mergers
Section 205 remains the most aggressive antitrust intervention—a per se prohibition on certain conference mergers and acquisitions. The original bill applied this per se rule to any conference reporting more than US$1 billion in annual revenue. The Senate-passed version lowers the revenue threshold to US$700 million, presumably sweeping in more than just the two largest conferences, and now splits the prohibition into two distinct prongs.
The first prong applies to any “covered conference”—a conference whose primary athletic revenue is derived from the sale or transfer of media rights relating to intercollegiate football—that reported more than US$700 million in revenue. A covered conference meeting that threshold cannot merge with or acquire the assets or media rights of (1) another conference that independently qualifies as a “covered conference” (regardless of that other covered conference’s own revenue, since any pre-enactment conference that has not itself reported more than US$700 million is separately excluded from the prohibition altogether), or (2) a “covered institution.” For six years after enactment, “covered institution” means an institution that competed in such a US$700-million-plus conference at any point in the preceding three years; after that six-year period, the test tightens further to look only at whether the institution is currently a member of a covered conference, with no lookback at all. The merger or acquisition is prohibited only if it would leave the resulting conference with less than 75 percent of all FBS institutions. In practice, it is unlikely that any realistic merger would come anywhere close to 75 percent of FBS institutions, so this prong works as a near-total ban on mergers by or between the largest conferences.
The second prong is a new addition and considerably clearer: a covered conference may still acquire a non-covered institution’s assets or media rights, but only if doing so keeps the covered conference’s total membership at 20 institutions or fewer.
The bill also adds a provision absent from the original bill, barring any entity, such as a private equity firm, from merging or acquiring the media rights of a covered institution to assemble an entirely new conference or association, closing a structural loophole for breakaway leagues.
Pooling of media rights
The bill also amends the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 to extend its antitrust exemption to intercollegiate athletics (Section 202). Under Section 203 of both the original bill and Senate-passed version, institutions and conferences can form a “covered entity” to pool and sell their media rights, provided that 75 percent of current FBS institutions agree to participate.
That threshold remains the key condition for the antitrust exemption; without it, pooling and jointly selling media rights would otherwise implicate the antitrust laws. Section 203, however, confirms that participation in the covered entity is voluntary: no institution or conference can be compelled to join, and no institution eligible for membership may be refused an invitation to join. Because the two largest conferences together hold a substantial number of institutions, their participation decisions will likely determine whether the exemption ever becomes operative.
What are other notable changes?
Beyond the changes discussed above, several other key provisions distinguish the Senate-passed text from the bill as originally introduced.
The most significant addition is an entirely new title that did not exist in the original bill. Title III establishes the “HBCU Sports Media and Connectivity Program” (Sections 301–307), under which the Department of Commerce will award grants to historically Black colleges and universities to support long-term improvements to broadband, information technology and media infrastructure, including infrastructure for the production, transmission and distribution of live coverage of intercollegiate athletic events. The bill authorizes US$180 million annually in grants from 2027 to 2032.
Several other noteworthy provisions appear in the Senate-passed version that were not in the original bill. For example, the bill now adds protections for women’s and Olympic sports by requiring that institutions maintain their overall number of roster spots and scholarships across those sports at 2024–2025 levels (Section 125). The bill also adds a new saving clause confirming that nothing in Title I overrides, modifies or amends Title IX (Section 127), and includes a federal policy statement that institutions should prioritize American students when selecting student athletes and awarding roster spots and athletic scholarships (Section 128).
These provisions do not carry the same antitrust safe-harbor consequences as the compensation, associated-entity, media rights and merger provisions discussed above, but institutions, conferences and historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) should track them as the bill moves to the House.
What are the next steps?
With the Senate having passed the bill, institutions and conferences should not wait for House action to begin preparing. Priorities include benchmarking enforcement rules against the Section 118 safe-harbor conditions, reviewing multimedia rights arrangements against the narrowed “associated entity” definition and the three-part certification requirement and building the retention fund’s nine-year sunset into long-term budgeting. Institutions and conferences should also weigh any realignment plans against Section 205’s tightened merger restrictions, including the revised 20-institution cap and the shortened, sunsetting lookback period.
HBCUs should also watch for Title III implementation guidance if the bill is ultimately enacted, and institutions subject to Section 125 should confirm their non-revenue sports roster and scholarship levels meet the 2024–2025 baseline it requires them to maintain. We are continuing to monitor the bill’s path through the House and will provide a further alert once its fate becomes clearer.
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