Executive summary
Crypto businesses are seldom regulated as a single activity. Crypto is increasingly used in payments, settlement and financial services, including through merchant settlement, wallet services, fiat-to-crypto conversion, liquidity provision, cross-border transfers, stablecoin payments, crypto-linked cards and lending secured by digital assets. A customer may experience one seamless transaction, while behind it several legally distinct activities occur: customer assets may be safeguarded, crypto converted or traded, liquidity sourced, payment instructions transmitted, credit extended and value ultimately settled through banks, card networks or other payment infrastructure. In this briefing, “crypto” and “virtual assets” (VAs) are used broadly and interchangeably, and each jurisdiction applies its own statutory definitions.
The starting question is therefore not simply “do we need a crypto licence?” The more useful questions are: what happens to the customer’s money or crypto; who performs each function; from where and for whom; and on what legal basis? A crypto business rarely has a single regulatory perimeter. Instead, it has a chain of potentially regulated activities, often performed by different entities in different places.
For businesses operating across borders, those questions must then be tested against the regulatory perimeter of each relevant market. The answer may involve VA regulation, payments and stored value rules, lending, financial-crime requirements, sanctions, consumer protection, data regulation and insolvency law. Outsourcing a function to a licensed exchange, custodian, bank or payment provider does not necessarily resolve the regulatory position of the business itself.
We describe this as a transaction-first approach. In practice, five things need to be mapped, broadly in this order, with a further layer overlaid on top:
- the transaction, from customer onboarding to merchant settlement;
- the customer asset and the legal relationship with it;
- each potentially regulated activity performed across the transaction lifecycle;
- the jurisdictions connected with customers, marketing, personnel and infrastructure;
- the entity and partners responsible for each activity; and
- overlaid on all of these, the controls and counterparty expectations of regulators, banks, custodians and payment partners.
This has practical consequences for how businesses should approach regulation. Holding more licences, or choosing the most permissive jurisdiction, will not necessarily serve the business best. What matters is that the regulatory structure supports the business strategy: which regulated activities the group should carry out itself, which can sensibly be left to partners, which markets justify direct authorisation, and how to keep flexibility as products and regulation change.
A licence is not in itself a competitive advantage. The advantage comes from the operating model the licence makes possible. A coherent structure can widen the products and markets open to a business, strengthen its relationships with banks and institutional counterparties, and reduce the risk of costly restructuring later. A structure built around regulatory arbitrage, or a collection of unconnected licences, is likely to be harder to sustain as the business grows. Decisions about regulatory structure can therefore shape what the business can offer, how quickly it can expand and how far it depends on third parties. Regulatory architecture also matters at moments of corporate change. Regulatory position and licensing are likely to form part of investor, acquisition and listing diligence, and weaknesses identified at that stage can complicate a fundraising or exit, or require restructuring before an IPO.
This briefing presents a transaction-first framework for analysing those decisions before a product launch, market entry, fundraising or material change to the operating model. Crypto payments provide the principal transaction-flow lens, because they show most clearly how one customer experience can involve several distinct activities. Hong Kong is used as a running illustration because its developing activity-based framework shows how a single business model can engage several regulatory perimeters. The same methodology can be applied, with different legal outcomes, across other major crypto markets. It is intended to identify the strategic questions that boards and management should ask, not to substitute for jurisdiction-specific advice.
1. Start with the transaction, not the label
Descriptions such as “payment app”, “wallet”, “on-ramp”, “crypto lending”, “liquidity provider”, “crypto card” or “settlement platform” are commercially useful but do not determine the regulatory outcome. Regulatory classification commonly turns on the substance of the activities performed, rather than the commercial label attached to the product.
A stylised crypto payment might involve: customer → wallet or custodian → conversion or liquidity provider → payment or card infrastructure → merchant or counterparty settlement. Credit, lending or collateral arrangements may sit alongside that flow. At each link, ask who contracts with whom, who owns or controls the asset, who can cause it to move, who converts it, who assumes credit or settlement risk, who earns the fee or spread, and which jurisdiction the activity is connected with.
Tracing a transaction from beginning to end typically raises questions such as:
- How is the customer onboarded and in which jurisdiction?
- Who receives the customer’s fiat or crypto?
- Who controls the wallet or private keys?
- Who determines the conversion rate?
- Who executes or arranges a conversion?
- Who is responsible for, or entitled to, final settlement with merchants, counterparties or payment networks?
- Is the customer paying in advance or receiving credit?
- Does any entity use, lend, stake or rehypothecate the customer’s assets?
- Which entity earns the spread, fee or interest?
- What happens if any entity or service provider becomes insolvent?
This functional mapping should then be tested against each potentially relevant regime, which may include VA, securities, payments and stored value, stablecoin, lending, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) and consumer-protection legislation.
Hong Kong illustration: a single product, such as a crypto-funded payment, lending or liquidity service, may engage the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO), the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (AMLO), the Stablecoins Ordinance, the Payment Systems and Stored Value Facilities Ordinance and, where credit is provided, the Money Lenders Ordinance. The precise analysis depends on the product design and transaction flow.
The same approach should be applied in every jurisdiction in which the business has customers, personnel, marketing activity, bank accounts, settlement arrangements or other material operations.
2. Determine what the customer actually owns
Depending on the governing law and the contractual and operational arrangements, customer crypto may potentially be characterised as property held through a custodial or trust arrangement, as an asset transferred outright in exchange for a contractual repayment obligation, or as property subject to security or title-transfer arrangements. The precise legal consequences are jurisdiction-specific. The distinction can determine not merely licensing, but who bears loss if the platform or custodian fails, whether assets can be reused, how collateral may be enforced and what the customer may recover in insolvency. Three broad analytical possibilities commonly arise.
| Structure | Indicative legal relationship | Principal issues |
| Custody or trust | The customer retains a proprietary or beneficial interest and the operator safeguards the assets or means of access | Segregation, identification of customer entitlements, private-key control, fiduciary duties, permitted use and insolvency treatment |
| Debtor-creditor | The operator receives ownership of the crypto and owes an obligation to return equivalent assets or value | Unsecured-creditor risk, balance-sheet treatment, disclosure, lending or deposit-like considerations and restrictions on use |
| Security arrangement | Crypto secures an obligation, such as a loan, credit facility or card balance | Nature of the security or title-transfer arrangement, governing law, control, perfection, enforcement and insolvency recognition |
These categories are not interchangeable. A business should not describe assets as “held on trust” unless its documentation and operating arrangements can support that conclusion.
Relevant questions may include:
- Are customer assets segregated on-chain, at the omnibus-wallet level or only in internal books and records?
- Can each customer’s entitlement be identified accurately and promptly?
- Who holds the private keys, key shares or authority to initiate a transfer?
- Can the business or a service provider lend, stake, pledge or otherwise use the assets?
- Are shortfalls allocated to the operator, the customer or a pool of customers?
- What rights does the customer have against a sub-custodian?
- Which law governs the proprietary analysis?
- How would the arrangement be treated in the insolvency of the operator or custodian?
Hong Kong illustration: Hong Kong’s proposed VA custodian regime focuses on entities that safeguard private keys or other instruments enabling the transfer of client VAs. The analysis is expected to turn on practical control over the transfer mechanism rather than the contractual label alone, with multi-party computation (MPC) and other custody models assessed by reference to actual control.
Technology does not by itself resolve the issue. MPC, multisignature arrangements and recovery mechanisms should be assessed by reference to who can, alone or together with others, cause customer assets to be transferred.
3. Map activities to regulatory perimeters
The perimeter is best analysed function by function. Many regulators are moving towards activity-based regulation, under which comparable activities and risks increasingly attract comparable regulatory treatment and regulatory consequences follow what a business does rather than what it calls itself. The modules below are not exhaustive, and the terminology differs between jurisdictions, but they capture many of the questions that commonly arise in crypto business models.
A. Exchange, dealing and intermediation
Key question: who executes, arranges, quotes, converts or introduces? Many regimes regulate not only the operation of a trading venue but also brokerage, dealing, arranging and other intermediation in VAs. A business that never describes itself as an exchange may still be carrying on a regulated dealing or arranging activity.
A crypto payment business should distinguish: (1) accepting crypto as consideration for its own goods or services;(2) converting customer crypto into fiat; (3) arranging a conversion through a third-party venue or liquidity provider; (4) quoting a price and dealing as principal; (5) matching or introducing buyers and sellers; (6) liquidating crypto collateral; and (7) transmitting payment or settlement instructions. Functions that appear together in the customer interface may have different regulatory consequences.
Hong Kong illustration: alongside its existing regime for virtual asset trading platforms (VATPs) and the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) framework for licensed intermediaries conducting VA-related activities, Hong Kong has proposed a standalone VA dealing regime aligned closely with the SFO Type 1 (dealing in securities) framework. It may capture persons who make or offer to make arrangements for the acquisition or disposal of VAs or who induce such transactions. Brokerage, agency execution, over-the-counter (OTC) intermediation and payment-related conversion functions must therefore be examined carefully.
Proposed Hong Kong exemptions illustrate a wider point. The consultation conclusions contemplate possible exemptions (including for principal, intra-group and payment-for-goods transactions), but these should not be treated as final until legislation is published. An apparently similar transaction may be treated differently depending on whether the business acts for itself or for a customer, and any exemption must be tested against its precise statutory formulation.
B. Custody and safeguarding
Key question: who has practical authority to cause customer assets to move? As noted in section 2, custody analysis should identify every entity that has access to private keys, key shares, recovery credentials or transfer approvals.
Using a third-party custodian does not remove the need for analysis. The business should assess:
- whether it retains any joint or contingent transfer authority;
- the custodian’s licensing status and any sub-custody arrangements;
- segregation, wallet architecture and reconciliation;
- withdrawal and key-recovery governance; and
- insolvency treatment.
Hong Kong illustration: Hong Kong does not yet have a standalone VA custodian licence. The proposed regime is intended to establish one under the AMLO; at present, VA custody is principally carried on through associated entities of licensed VATPs and certain other regulated entities.
C. Stablecoins
Key question: is the business issuing, distributing, converting, safeguarding or merely accepting stablecoins? A payment business using stablecoins should distinguish between: (1) issuing a stablecoin; (2) offering or advertising a stablecoin; (3) distributing a stablecoin; (4) providing conversion, custody or transfer services; and (5) merely accepting a stablecoin as a means of payment.
The existence of a licensed or authorised stablecoin issuer does not automatically authorise every intermediary handling that stablecoin. Dealing, custody, advisory, portfolio management, payment and marketing questions must be considered separately.
Hong Kong illustration: the Stablecoins Ordinance has regulated specified stablecoin issuance since 1 August 2025, including certain issuance outside Hong Kong where the stablecoin references the Hong Kong dollar. Separate questions can arise for intermediaries dealing in, distributing, offering or otherwise providing services involving stablecoins.
D. Payment services and stored value
Key question: who receives value from the customer and undertakes to make the payment? Where a product stores monetary value or transmits funds, payment services, e-money or stored value regimes should be considered. The analysis depends on the statutory elements and the actual undertakings given, not simply whether the product is described as a card or wallet.
The involvement of crypto or stablecoins does not make payments legislation irrelevant; equally, a wallet holding crypto is not automatically a stored value or e-money product. The funding flow and the identity of the person undertaking to make payments should be analysed alongside, not in place of, the VAs, securities and lending analyses.
E. Credit and collateral
Key question: does the customer receive credit, who lends, and what happens to collateral? Credit may arise not only in crypto-backed loans, credit lines and margin facilities, but also in card or payment products, including where the customer’s payment obligation arises before crypto is converted or collateral is realised. Relevant questions include:
- who is the lender, and when the debt arises;
- whether interest or another charge is imposed and a lending, money-lending or consumer-credit licence is required;
- whether crypto is held under security or title transfer, and who may enforce or liquidate it; and
- whether the liquidation process constitutes VA dealing or arranging.
Liquidation of collateral should not automatically be characterised as an unregulated internal step. Its treatment may depend on whether the lender acts as principal, as agent or under a security or title-transfer arrangement, and on the scope of any applicable dealing regime and its exemptions.
Product economics can change regulatory characterisation. A feature designed to monetise dormant customer assets, offer yield or defer settlement may move an otherwise payments-focused model into lending, deposit-taking or investment regulation, which apply independently of any VA regime. “Earn”, “yield” and crypto-lending products therefore warrant careful analysis.
Hong Kong illustration: the Money Lenders Ordinance generally requires a person carrying on a money-lending business to hold a money lender’s licence unless an exemption applies, while taking deposits from the public is generally reserved to authorised institutions under the Banking Ordinance.
F. Securities and investment products
Key question: could the asset, a feature of the product or the service itself fall within securities, derivatives, collective-investment, investment-management or advisory regulation? Yield, staking or rewards features, margin or leverage, tokenised instruments and portfolio-type offerings can each shift the analysis away from pure payments. Recommendations, signals or automated tools presented as “education” or “information” may also amount to regulated advice depending on their substance.
Licensing is not the entire regulatory perimeter
A business that concludes that a particular activity does not require a financial services licence may nevertheless face AML/CFT, sanctions, travel-rule, transaction-monitoring, consumer-protection, data-privacy and financial-promotion requirements. Jurisdictions do not approach these issues identically, and their requirements often apply regardless of whether a licence is held.
4. Control the geographic footprint
A global website does not create a global licence. Territorial analysis typically turns on four questions: where is the customer; where is the service performed; where is it marketed; and where are the people and infrastructure that make the service happen?
Answering those questions usually requires a documented jurisdictional matrix covering customer residence and physical location, nationality or other sanctions-relevant connections, marketing channels and languages, app-store and website availability, IP-address and device-location data, bank, payment-processor and card-issuer locations, liquidity venues and custodians, local personnel and decision-makers, and restrictions on providing particular products. Geoblocking, customer attestations and contractual restrictions can support the framework, but none should be treated as conclusive in isolation; the effectiveness of the framework should be tested against actual onboarding, marketing and transaction data.
Businesses should be cautious about relying on “reverse solicitation” to serve customers in markets where they are not licensed. The concept is not universally available and, where recognised, its scope is jurisdiction- and regime-specific and may be interpreted narrowly. Customer-initiated contact should therefore not be assumed, without analysis, to eliminate local licensing or marketing risk. Regulators may consider the overall business activity, including targeted advertising, use of local influencers, referral arrangements, local-language content, search optimisation, events and follow-up communications. A business that relies on reverse solicitation as an ongoing distribution model, rather than for genuinely unsolicited and documented approaches, is unlikely to be on safe ground.
Hong Kong illustration: the AMLO already restricts the active marketing of VATP services to the Hong Kong public without a licence, and the proposed Hong Kong VA regimes are expected to impose similar restrictions on overseas providers of the relevant VA services. The relevant wording is regime-specific. For example, the Stablecoins Ordinance contains its own provisions concerning regulated stablecoin activities and holding out or active marketing. SFO guidance may be informative in some contexts, but should not be assumed to determine the interpretation of a separate statute.
Geography is also a strategic choice. Selecting a regulatory hub involves weighing the credibility and passporting value of a licence, the speed and predictability of authorisation, access to banking and talent, and alignment with target customer markets. Jurisdictions that appear permissive today may tighten tomorrow, and a licence from a less established regulator may carry limited weight with banks, institutional counterparties and other regulators. A durable market-entry strategy will therefore generally give more weight to regulatory credibility than to short-term regulatory arbitrage.
5. Build the entity and partner model
Once regulated functions have been identified, the strategic question changes from “what licences might apply?” to “which regulated capabilities should this business own?” For each capability, management has three broad choices: Own, Partner or Restrict.
- Own: obtain the licence and perform the function within the group. This offers control over product, customer relationship and economics, but brings regulatory capital, governance, personnel, systems, supervision and execution risk.
- Partner: have an appropriately regulated third party provide its own service. This offers speed and potentially lower initial regulatory investment, but creates dependency, margin leakage, concentration risk and reduced control over customer experience and product evolution.
- Restrict: do not offer the feature or enter the market until the business case supports the regulatory investment. This preserves optionality and avoids prematurely building expensive regulatory architecture, at the cost of delayed revenue and opportunity.
There is no single right answer, and the right answer may change as a business grows from launch to scale and, in time, begins serving institutional clients. Some businesses deliberately sequence the decision: they partner to launch, bring selected regulated activities in-house as they grow, and continue to use external providers where owning the activity adds little strategic value. Licensing is therefore better planned as a roadmap than treated as a one-off exercise. Whatever the approach, responsibility for each function should be clearly allocated across the group.
This is ultimately a capital-allocation decision. Obtaining the right regulatory permissions can require significant lead time, management attention and investment. Where those permissions enable strategically important products, markets or counterparty relationships, obtaining them early can give a business an advantage that competitors may not be able to replicate quickly, while a partner-dependent model can leave the business exposed if a partner exits the market or changes its risk appetite. A structure that solves only today’s launch can accumulate “regulatory debt”: dependencies and architectural constraints that become progressively more difficult to unwind as customers, products and jurisdictions are added. Boards should revisit the balance as the business scales, rather than treating the launch structure as permanent.
Build for regulatory optionality
A good regulatory structure supports today’s product and leaves room for the next one. An entity, licence or outsourcing arrangement built too tightly around the current transaction flow may later limit the products, markets or counterparties open to the business. Equally, applying for every possible permission at the outset can add capital and governance costs the business does not yet need. The aim is to keep regulatory optionality: a structure that works for the business now and offers realistic routes into the products and markets that matter to its growth plan. Regulatory optionality has value because strategic plans change faster than licence architecture. A business may enter a new market, add yield or credit, move from retail to institutional customers, acquire another platform or prepare for an exit. The regulatory structure should therefore be tested not only against today’s transaction map, but against the credible next stages of the business plan.
A common structure may include a holding company, locally regulated operating entities, a technology services company and separate entities for credit, custody or other higher-risk products. This is not a universal template. Additional entities can create governance, outsourcing, transfer-pricing and regulatory-coordination issues if the division of responsibility is unclear.
For each entity, document:
- the contracts it enters into;
- the assets and liabilities it assumes;
- the personnel making material decisions;
- the regulated activities it performs;
- the systems and data it controls;
- the revenue it receives;
- the functions it outsources; and
- the jurisdictions into which it markets.
Regulators may examine whether a licensed entity has sufficient governance, competence, controls and operational substance to conduct its business. A nominal local entity combined with decision-making and operations elsewhere is unlikely to provide a reliable foundation for a regulated business.
Intercompany agreements and customer-facing disclosures must also match the operating reality. If the terms identify one company as custodian but another company controls withdrawals, or if the regulated entity is presented as the service provider while an offshore affiliate performs the substantive activity, the documentation may increase rather than reduce risk.
A licence held elsewhere in the chain does not necessarily resolve the business’s own position
A licensed custodian, exchange, stablecoin issuer, bank or payment processor may address one function without addressing what the customer-facing business itself does. It also helps to distinguish three types of outsourcing, which are not necessarily equivalent legally: outsourcing technology (such as MPC infrastructure or wallet software); outsourcing performance of an operational function (such as know-your-customer (KYC) processing or transaction monitoring); and relying on a separately regulated service (such as execution by an exchange or custody by a licensed custodian).
The critical question is: is the third party performing its own regulated service, or performing part of your service on your behalf?
6. Design for regulatory and counterparty scrutiny
A viable operating model must pass three tests. Is it legally permissible? Will the regulator accept how it operates in practice? Will banks, custodians, card schemes and other critical counterparties support it? Passing only the first test may not produce a commercially viable business. Counterparties may impose standards more restrictive than the minimum legal position, so designing to the expectations of the most demanding critical counterparty, rather than the legal minimum, can be the more efficient strategy.
Connecting to the traditional financial system
However innovative the product, most crypto businesses ultimately need to connect with the traditional financial system: customer fiat must be received, merchants paid, operating expenses settled and reserves held, typically through banks, electronic money institutions, card schemes, acquirers and payment processors. Those institutions are themselves regulated and manage the financial-crime, sanctions and reputational risk presented by their customers. For many crypto businesses, access to this infrastructure can become a practical constraint on growth.
A legally permissible business model may therefore still be commercially fragile if it depends upon a small number of critical counterparties whose risk appetite may change. A partner that comes to view the business as an unacceptable risk may decline onboarding, impose limits, delay payments or terminate the relationship, which can disrupt customer withdrawals and merchant settlement.
Financial institutions typically expect to see a clear regulatory position for each account-holding entity, board-approved AML/CFT and sanctions frameworks, a credible source-of-funds narrative supported by on-chain analytics, segregation of customer and corporate funds, an adequately resourced compliance function and evidence that controls work in practice.
Building a credible control environment from the outset can strengthen a business’s ability to satisfy counterparty diligence, reduce remediation during onboarding and support more resilient banking and payment relationships. Maintaining more than one banking and settlement partner, with contingency arrangements for withdrawals and settlement, can also reduce the impact if a single relationship is lost. Viewed in this way, the policies and procedures that make a business “bankable” are part of its commercial infrastructure.
Counterparty diligence may also extend beyond strict legal requirements to information security, operational resilience, privacy, assurance and industry-standard controls, such as information-security, privacy and business-continuity management standards (for example, ISO/IEC 27001, ISO/IEC 27701 and ISO 22301). These standards are generally not legal requirements in themselves and are no substitute for regulatory compliance. What is expected will depend on the product and counterparty.
Those expectations translate into controls under four broad headings:
- Customer and geographic controls: risk-based due diligence, beneficial ownership verification, source-of-funds and source-of-wealth procedures where appropriate, sanctions and politically exposed person (PEP) screening, and IP, device and location controls, including controls addressing VPN or other location-masking techniques.
- Financial-crime and blockchain controls: wallet-address screening, blockchain analytics, risk-based transaction monitoring (including rapid or unusual VA-to-VA or VA-to-fiat conversion), suspicious transaction reporting and information-sharing with trading venues, custodians and other regulated partners.
- Safeguarding and operational resilience: wallet and key governance (including key generation, backup and recovery), segregation and reconciliation, transfer approval thresholds, withdrawal controls and address whitelisting, employee-access controls, incident response and business continuity.
- Governance and outsourcing: board and senior-management accountability, new-product approval, regulatory-change monitoring, due diligence on critical service providers with service-level and audit rights, and orderly exit and asset-return plans.
The required control environment follows from the legal and operational model. A business should therefore resist selecting controls from a generic “crypto compliance” checklist before it has identified who performs each regulated function and who bears each risk. Responsibility should not disappear when a function is outsourced.
7. Ten questions for the board
Before approving a launch, market entry, fundraising or a material change to the operating model, the board should be satisfied that management can answer the following:
- Who legally owns customer crypto at each stage of the transaction, and who is able to move it?
- Which entity converts crypto into fiat or another VA, and is it dealing as principal, executing or arranging?
- Does a payment balance or other stored value arise, and who undertakes to make the payment?
- Does anyone extend credit, and what happens to crypto collateral on default?
- Could any feature of the product be characterised as an investment, securities or advisory service?
- Which entities, people and systems are connected with each relevant jurisdiction, and where is the product marketed?
- Which regulated activities are important enough for the business to carry out itself, which is it comfortable relying on third parties to provide, and could it withstand the loss of a key banking or settlement partner?
- Which AML/CFT, sanctions, travel-rule and consumer-protection obligations apply even where no licence is required?
- Does the current regulatory structure support the products and markets in the business’s three-year plan, or will growth require the group to be restructured?
- If a regulator, bank or investor asked for the transaction map tomorrow, would the contracts, technology and actual operations tell the same story?
Conclusion: regulation as architecture
For global crypto businesses, regulatory strategy can no longer be separated from business strategy. Product design determines regulatory exposure; regulatory exposure influences entity structure and market access; entity structure determines which licences must be owned or accessed through partners; and that architecture, in turn, affects banking, investment, resilience and the ability to scale.
The aim should be neither to hold as many licences as possible nor to find the lightest-touch jurisdiction, but to put in place a regulatory structure that supports the commercial strategy and leaves room for future growth.
That requires more than identifying licences jurisdiction by jurisdiction. It requires the transaction flow, customer-asset analysis, regulatory perimeter, territorial footprint, entity model, contracts, technology and controls to tell the same legal and operational story.
Regulatory perimeters will also continue to move. Hong Kong illustrates the direction of travel: stablecoin issuance is already regulated under a dedicated statutory regime, while standalone regulatory regimes have been proposed for VA dealing, custody, advisory and management. The businesses best positioned to respond will be those that treat regulatory architecture as a continuing board-level workstream, rather than a one-time licensing opinion undertaken immediately before launch.
That work starts with a clear map of the transaction.
How we can help
The difficult cases rarely arise where one activity maps neatly to one licence. They arise at regulatory interfaces: when custody becomes dealing; when a payment balance acquires characteristics of stored value; when collateral enforcement becomes execution; when an outsourced function remains attributable to the customer-facing business; or when a global product crosses a territorial marketing perimeter. Those interfaces are highly dependent on the precise contractual and operational facts.
Norton Rose Fulbright works with boards, management teams and investors of crypto and payments businesses and financial institutions to translate these questions into regulatory architecture: mapping transaction flows and regulatory interfaces, determining which capabilities should be owned or accessed through partners, designing licensing and market-entry roadmaps, and aligning entity, customer-asset and operating models across jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, the European Union under the Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCA), the United Kingdom, Singapore and the United States. The earlier that architecture is tested against the business plan, the greater the scope to address regulatory constraints before they limit product design, banking, investment or expansion.
This briefing is general information only and does not constitute legal advice. The application of licensing and other regulatory requirements depends on the particular facts, transaction flow and jurisdictions involved. Proposed regimes referred to above, including the proposed Hong Kong licensing regimes, remain subject to legislation and implementing requirements as at the date of this briefing.