Case review: non-assignment clauses and transferring the right to arbitrate by operation of law (Court of Appeal decision)

Introduction

Does a non-assignment clause that prohibits assignments “by any party to any third party, for any reason whatsoever” prevent an assignment (akin to subrogation) to an insurer where such assignment takes effect by operation of law? The Court of Appeal had to consider this question in the recent case of Dassault [2024] EWCA Civ 5. 

Overturning the High Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal found that the assignment in question did not fall foul of the non-assignment clause as the assignment had not been effected “by” a party because the transfer had occurred by operation of law. That being said, the judgment does not establish a general principle as to the relationship between non-assignment clauses and assignments arising by operation of law; rather the Court of Appeal’s decision was heavily focussed on the interpretation and the wording of the non-assignment clause in the contract.

Factual Background

Dassault Aviation SA (“Dassault”) had entered into an English law sale contract with Mitsui Bussan Aerospace Co., Ltd (“MBA”) for the sale of two maritime surveillance aircraft (the “Sale Contract”). MBA had agreed to onward sell those aircraft to the Japanese Coast Guard pursuant to a Japanese law governed contract (the “Sub-Sale Contract”). 

The Sub-Sale Contract provided for liquidated damages in case of delayed delivery of the aircraft to the Japanese Coast Guard. MBA had entered into a Japanese law contract of insurance with its insurer (the “Insurer”) to insure the risk of MBA being held liable to the Japanese Coast Guard for such late delivery (the “Insurance Contract”). 

The aircraft were delivered late by Dassault to MBA, which led to a consequent late delivery of the aircraft by MBA to the Japanese Coast Guard. MBA was therefore liable to pay liquidated damages to the Japanese Coast Guard under the Sub-Sale Contract. Following the payment of such damages, MBA claimed against the Insurer under the Insurance Contract and the Insurer paid out the insured amount to MBA. 

Under Japanese law (the law of the Insurance Contract), when an insurer pays out an insurance claim it is automatically assigned, by operation of statutory law, the assured’s rights of recovery against third parties in respect of that claim. Having been assigned MBA’s rights, the Insurer accordingly commenced (in its own name) ICC proceedings against Dassault, pursuant to the arbitration agreement found in the Sale Contract. 

Dassault challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim. It argued that the assignment to the Insurer was in breach of the non-assignment clause found in the Sale Contract, and that as a result the assignment was null and void. Accordingly, the Insurer was not entitled to rely on the arbitration agreement to bring its claim and the Tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction. In response, the Insurer contended that the non-assignment clause did not on its proper construction apply to an assignment effected by operation of law. Since the Insurer’s rights arose by operation of law, the Insurer contended that it was not an assignment caught by the non-assignment clause. 

The Tribunal considered the jurisdictional issue as a preliminary issue and the majority (Lord Collins of Mapesbury and Joe Smouha KC) found in the Insurer’s favour (Mr Crookdenden KC dissenting). Dassault challenged the Tribunal’s decision pursuant to section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996, bringing proceedings before the High Court. 

The High Court’s Decision

The High Court found in Dassault’s favour and ruled that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim. Mrs Justice Cockerill (the “Judge”) reached this decision by considering the two following issues: 

1. Was there a general rule/presumption under English law that transfers “by operation of law” would not fall foul of a prohibition on assignment clause (the “First Issue”)?
2. If there was no such rule, as a matter of interpretation of the Sale Contract, did the non-assignment clause prohibit the assignment of MBA’s rights to the Insurer, notwithstanding this was an assignment to an insurer akin to subrogation (the “Second Issue”)?

On the First Issue, the Judge took the view that the caselaw did not support the proposition that an assignment by “operation of law” would be outside the scope of a non-assignment clause. Instead, the Judge noted that the authorities (mainly old insolvency cases) supported a narrower distinction between transfers which can be said to be willing/voluntary (in the sense of consented to/ within the control of the transferor) and those which were truly unwilling/involuntary. On that basis, the Judge considered that a non-assignment clause could apply to an assignment with the sufficient “taint of voluntariness”. 

Turning to the Second Issue, the Judge noted that an iterative process of interpretation had to be followed that gave due weight to the words and commercial purpose of the non-assignment clause, as well as the factual matrix and commercial common sense. The Judge noted that the wording of the non-assignment clause was intentionally broad with the only limitation imposed being the following words which required the assignment to be: “by any party to any third party” (emphasis added). That wording, the Judge reasoned, invited one to consider the cause of the assignment rather than the mechanism by which it took place – this, the Judge said, was in line with the approach outlined by the authorities. 

Since MBA had, amongst other things, chosen of its own volition to take out insurance, to do so under a system of non-English law which provided for assignment instead of subrogation, and to make a claim under that insurance, the Judge concluded that MBA had voluntarily caused the assignment, thereby falling provisionally within the scope of the wording of the non-assignment clause. 

The Judge then considered the context/commercial purpose indications. Whilst accepting the logic of the Insurer’s argument – that if an English subrogation is not caught by a non-assignment clause then it is inherently unlikely that the parties intended for the subrogation-equivalent of another legal system to be caught by such clause (not least because the only difference would be the name of the claimant on the arbitration documents) – she ultimately concluded that the context/commercial purpose indications were not weighty enough to displace the position indicated by a consideration of the words. 

The Judge accordingly held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim, but did so with an “unusual degree of hesitation”. The Insurer appealed the Judge’s findings on both issues.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

Overturning the Judge’s decision, the Court of Appeal (consisting of Sir Geoffrey Vos, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Coulson, and Lord Justice Phillips) unanimously held that the Tribunal did have jurisdiction to hear the Insurer’s claim. 

On the First Issue, following a close consideration of the authorities, the Court found that “the old insolvency cases d[id] not enunciate a general principle applicable to the interpretation of non-assignment clauses in commercial contracts.” Those cases simply turned on the nature of the insolvency under which the transfer in question took place. 

Turning to the Second Issue, that of interpretation, the Court noted that the words of the non-assignment clause were clear and unambiguous. The key words that had to be considered were the words: “by any party”. The Court of Appeal rejected the causal analysis taken by the High Court and Dassault, and noted that “[t]he correct question was whether the transfer was made by MBA, not whether the transfer was caused as a consequence of certain actions taken by MBA.” 

The Court of Appeal found that the non-assignment clause therefore prevented any assignment which was effected by a party to the sale contract, but not a transfer that was effected by operation of law. As it was common ground between the parties (and had been unanimously decided by the Tribunal) that MBA’s claims against Dassault had been assigned to the Insurer pursuant to Japanese statutory law, that was an assignment by operation of law and not within the scope of the non-assignment clause. 

The Court of Appeal considered that the meaning of the non-assignment clause was clear and unambiguous and that the High Court had erred in thinking that there were two possible meanings to the non-assignment clause. As such, it was not “necessary to consider whether the commercial matrix of fact points in favour of one of two possible meanings of [the clause]”, but the Court did note in obiter that it was “far from clear” that the non-assignment clause was intended to “catch transfers arising from insurance payouts, by whatever law those insurance contracts might be governed”. 

The Court of Appeal accordingly allowed the appeal and reinstated the Tribunal’s award. 

Dassault has sought permission to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Key Takeaways

The Court of Appeal’s decision should bring some comfort to insurers that an assignment to an insurer by operation of law is unlikely to fall foul of a prohibition on assignment clause. However, the Court did not go so far as to say that there is a general principle to that effect. Parties will therefore be well advised to closely scrutinise any non-assignment clauses and to ensure that they have been drafted in as clear terms as possible (given the Court of Appeal’s emphasis on the interpretation and wording of the individual clause).

Where the parties envisage insurance being taken out, an express carve out, if possible, should be provided in the non-assignment clause in favour of insurers. Furthermore, when insuring under a non-English law and seeking to rely on subrogation or analogous rights, parties should make enquiries as to the mechanism of transfer under that non-English law to ensure it does not fall foul of any non-assignment/transfer clause. 

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal’s rejection of the Judge’s causal analysis (voluntary vs involuntary) and its application to non-assignment clauses in commercial contracts is welcomed as it avoids an approach that would be replete with practical difficulties.  

The Appellant was represented by Zayba Drabu, Cloudesley Long, and Yiannis Charalambous of Norton Rose Fulbright LLP together with Chris Smith KC and Benjamin Joseph of Quadrant Chambers.

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