Background

Investors committing capital to a jurisdiction are often concerned to know: if an investment goes wrong, is there an effective regime for recovering their investment, and do the courts have power to enforce that regime and sanction wrongdoers?1

In Australia, the answer is yes - Australia has a sophisticated and reliable insolvency regime and court system, and a strong corporate regulator.

A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia provides a useful illustration of the powers of Australian courts to prevent frustration of the court process.2 In Kitay as Liquidator of Disability Dr Pty Ltd v MIGWI (Kitay),3 Justice Hill confirmed the courts’ power to swiftly grant freezing orders over assets of former company directors, where there was a real danger that a potential judgment for insolvent trading may be unsatisfied and creditors left out of pocket.

The decision is consistent with the long-held approach of Australian courts to make orders preserving assets in the jurisdiction or restricting parties from dissipating assets, when a prospective judgment creditor has an arguable case4.

Below, we outline how Australia’s voidable transactions and insolvent trading regime works in practice, consider the test for freezing orders applied in Kitay, and identify key takeaways for investors, liquidators and funders.

Broad legislative power

Liquidators’ powers

In Australia, liquidators appointed to a company hold wide-ranging investigative and information-gathering powers under section 477 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act).

Specifically, liquidators have the statutory power to:

  1. inspect the books and records of the company5;
  2. bring legal proceedings in the name of, and on behalf of, the company; and
  3. otherwise do all things necessary to wind up the affairs of the company and distribute its property.7

Voidable transactions

Part 5.7B of the Act regulates the recovery of property or compensation for the benefit of creditors of an insolvent company. It gives a liquidator broad powers to investigate the company’s transactions, and seek repayment of transactions that prejudice creditors’ interests.

Section 588FE of the Act prescribes when transactions entered into by a company may be voidable by the liquidator.  They include:

  1. an insolvent or uncommercial transaction;
  2. an unfair preference given by the company to a creditor of the company; and
  3. an unfair loan to the company.

The transaction must also fall within a prescribed period of time set out in s588FE, typically ranging from 6 months to 10 years before the ‘relation back day’ (that is, the date of the filing of the winding up application or appointment of the insolvency practitioner) depending upon the type of transaction. A liquidator can apply for remedial court orders in respect of voidable transactions (s588FF).  If the court is satisfied that a transaction is voidable, the court may make orders (amongst others):

  1. directing a person to pay back the amount of the voidable transaction;
  2. directing a person to transfer back property the subject of a voidable transaction; and
  3. releasing or discharging security or a debt owing to a person in relation to a voidable transaction.

The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) can also seek court orders.

Insolvent trading

Section 588G of the Act, Australia's insolvent trading provision, is a powerful tool available to both a liquidator and to ASIC.

It imposes a positive duty on directors to prevent insolvent trading.  A director breaches section 588G if:

  1. they are a director when the company incurs a debt;
  2. the company is insolvent at that time, or becomes insolvent by incurring that debt;
  3. there are reasonable grounds to suspect insolvency; and
  4. the director fails to prevent the company from incurring the debt.

A director who fails to prevent the debt being incurred can be ordered to pay a monetary penalty, and pay compensation to the company equal to the loss suffered.

Directors can also be criminally liable if their failure was dishonest.

Insolvency at a point-in-time is often the hardest element to prove, but the Act gives liquidators a head start. Where a company fails to keep proper financial records, it is presumed to have been insolvent during that period. That presumption did much of the ‘heavy lifting’ in Kitay. The liquidator’s evidence was that the company failed to keep the financial records required under s286(1) of the Act, and kept two sets of management accounts that could not be reconciled. Under s588E of the Act, the company was therefore presumed to have been insolvent for more than 2 years.

Defences and safe harbour

Directors are not without protection. The Act provides statutory defences to a civil claim for insolvent trading, for example where a director had reasonable grounds to expect that the company was solvent.8

Directors may also rely on the ‘safe harbour’ provision in s588GA. It protects directors who are actively pursuing a course of action reasonably likely to lead to a better outcome for the company than immediate administration or liquidation.

There are conditions, however. The safe harbour protects directors who act responsibly, but is not a refuge for those who ignore their obligations. In general, the safe harbour is only available if the company:

  1. is paying its employee entitlements; and
  2. is keeping its tax reporting obligations up to date (s588GA(4)).

The director must also cooperate with any later external administrator.  A director who does not allow the company’s books to be inspected cannot later rely on them as evidence to support a safe harbour defence (s588GB).

In Kitay, the liquidator’s evidence was that the company had never complied with its taxation obligations9, and the director was ‘uncooperative’ during the company’s administration10. On facts like those, the safe harbour is unlikely to offer much shelter.

Freezing orders

A freezing order is a powerful court mechanism, often used by liquidators to respond to the danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied.

The aim of a freezing order is to prevent frustration of the court’s process. Freezing orders are also known as asset preservation orders, or historically Mareva orders, originating from the seminal 1975 UK case of Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA [1980] 1 All ER 213.

Freezing orders in Australia are governed by harmonised rules and practice notes which have applied in the Federal Court of Australia and state and territory Supreme Courts for nearly 20 years, giving investors comfort about the approach Australian courts will take.

A court may make a freezing order against an actual or prospective judgment debtor if:

  1. the applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action in the court; and
  2. the Court is satisfied there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partially unsatisfied because of the judgment debtor or another person absconding, or the assets of the judgment debtor or another person will be removed from Australia or disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value.

Applications for freezing orders are typically made ex parte, that is, without notice to the respondent, as prior notice may prompt the respondent to move or dispose of their assets). An applicant must therefore make full and frank disclosure of all material facts to the court, including any possible defences known to the applicant.

In Walter Rau Neusser Oel Und Fett AG v Cross Pacific Trading Ltd11, Allsop J noted the party seeking orders must bring forward all material facts which the absent party would have tendered:

“…It means squarely putting the other side’s case, if there is one, by coherently expressing the known facts in a way such that the Court can understand, in the urgent context in which the application is brought forward, what might be said against the making of the orders. It is not for the Court to search out, organise and bring together what can be said on the respondents’ behalf….”12

The applicant must undertake to the court to pay any damage suffered by the respondent if the order is later held to have been unjustified (and disclose any potential inability to meet the undertaking).

The court can also make ancillary orders, requiring the respondents to provide details of their assets.

A freezing order typically permits the respondent to deal with their assets in the ordinary course of business, to pay bona fide business expenses, and may also permit the respondent to deal with assets to discharge contractual obligations entered into before the order was made (as was the case in Kitay).

Ex parte freezing orders are usually limited in time. The respondent will usually have an opportunity to be heard shortly after the order is made, and the applicant then bears the onus of satisfying the court that the order should continue.

The order can cease operating if the respondent pays a prescribed sum into court, or into a joint bank account, or provides security in an agreed sum.

Directors’ duties

Sections 180 to 184 of the Act sets out the statutory requirements for directors and officers of Australian companies (including, for instance, the duties to exercise care and diligence and act in good faith, in the best interests of the company and for a proper purpose).  Although not the focus of this article, these duties and ASIC’s active enforcement of them13, can provide further assurance for prospective investors.

The role of the litigation funder

Section 545 of the Act provides that a liquidator is not liable to incur expenses in relation to the winding up of a company, unless there is sufficient property available to the liquidator. Practically, a liquidator is not required to undertake the investigations referred to above, without the financial resources to do so.  Enter the litigation funder.

Litigation funding has been permitted in Australia since the High Court’s decision in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Limited14, and funders frequently support liquidators to pursue voidable transactions, when there is an opportunity for a commercial return on the investment.

The ability for liquidators to seek litigation funding was confirmed by the NSW Court of Appeal in Hall v Poolman15. The Court held there was no policy basis preventing liquidators entering into funding arrangements to share the fruits of litigation with a funder, provided that any necessary approval of creditors or the court is obtained, and the arrangements are consistent with the liquidator's statutory and other duties.

In practice, a liquidator will seek out a funder where:

  1. The company (in liquidation) does not have adequate resources to fund the prospective claims; and
  2. The liquidator (and its legal representatives) considers the claims are strong, and enforcement risk is minimal or manageable.

Litigation funding agreements are typically long-term agreements of more than 3 months. Thus, section s477(2B) of the Act requires a liquidator to obtain approval to enter into a litigation funding agreement on behalf of the company, from either the court, a committee of inspection, or from creditors.

The principles governing court approval under s 477(2B) were outlined by Gordon J in Stewart, in the matter of Newtronics Pty Ltd.16 Her Honour noted that the court does not simply ‘rubber stamp’ the liquidator’s proposed agreement, but should satisfy itself that there is:

  1. no error of law;
  2. no ground for suspecting bad faith or impropriety, and
  3. no real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator’s conduct.

In the case of funding agreements, Gordon J noted the importance of ensuring that the funder does not obtain a benefit disproportionate to the risk undertaken, or a ‘grossly excessive profit’.

Summary of Kitay

The facts in Kitay provide a useful example of some of the issues discussed above.

In 2025, the Federal Court appointed a liquidator to Disability Dr Pty Ltd (the company) for failing to pay tax liabilities and comply with a statutory demand issued by the Australian Taxation Office.

In February 2026, the liquidator commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, seeking orders under s 588FB, s 588FD and s 588G of the Act against the sole director of the company and the other shareholder (the defendants).

The defendants owned 3 properties in Western Australia.  On March 9, 2026, the liquidator observed that one of the defendants’ properties was advertised for sale and subject to an offer to purchase. Time was of the essence.

The liquidator applied for a freezing order the next day. The application was supported by three affidavits, and an undertaking as to damages. The application sought an urgent ex parte hearing. The court heard the application and made the freezing orders on March 12, 2026.

The entire process took three days from the liquidator finding the property advertised online, to orders being made.

General considerations

Her Honour noted that a freezing order is not security for judgment, or a substitute for methods of execution. Its purpose is to prevent frustration or abuse of the Court’s process. 17

The danger of the assets being dissipated or removed from the jurisdiction must be real and substantial, supported by evidence, and not mere assertion.  The fact that the assets can be moved out of the jurisdiction is not sufficient, there must be evidence indicating a danger of defaulting on a judgment if they are removed from the jurisdiction.18

The remedy is discretionary, and the court will consider the strength of the applicant’s case, the likelihood of frustration of a judgment, the balance of convenience and other factors when determining whether to make an order.

Element 1: A good arguable case

As noted above, the company’s failure to keep proper business records led to a presumption of insolvency.  The evidence also indicated that the company was in fact insolvent, having never complied with its taxation obligations.

The liquidator’s claim against the defendants was for approximately $1.4 million (out of a total debt of more than $1.8M), which included employee entitlements of $94,918 and $1,321,362 owed to the ATO.

Her Honour concluded that the evidence established a good arguable case against each of the defendants for insolvent trading.

Element 2: Risk of dissipation or removal of assets from the jurisdiction

The defendants’ act of placing the property on the market indicated that their assets may be dealt with or diminished in value.

The liquidator also pointed to other factors indicating a risk of removal:

  1. the director had been uncooperative and failed to fulfil his duties under the Act;19
  2. the director’s frequent international travel;20
  3. the defendants’ refusal to provide undertakings not to deal with their assets whilst the claims were being prosecuted;21 and
  4. the liquidator’s claims against the defendants included dishonesty involving the diversion of company money; and tax avoidance.22

Hill J concluded there was a risk that a prospective judgment would be wholly or partly unsatisfied because the defendants' assets might be removed from the jurisdiction or otherwise disposed of, dealt with, or diminished in value.23

Discretionary factors militating against a freezing order

For prospective applicants, Hill J noted the factors that weigh against relief, such as:

  1. delay in bringing the application24; and
  2. a lack of candour in the material placed before the court (as discussed above).

However, in this case there had been no delay between the liquidator becoming aware of the potential property sale, and filing the application.

The terms of the order

In making a freezing order, the value of the frozen assets must not exceed the maximum amount of the actual or prospective judgment.  Justice Hill noted that the value of the claim for insolvent trading far exceeded the likely net sale proceeds of the property.25

She therefore considered it appropriate to make a freezing order in connection with the property marketed for sale, ordering:

  1. the property not to be disposed of, dealt with or the value of the land diminished, other than to complete the sale of the property pursuant to any written contract for sale of the property entered into before the date of the Orders;
  2. the defendants were restrained from removing from Australia, disposing of, dealing with or diminishing the net sale proceeds of the property, up to certain monetary values.26

The message is clear for insolvency practitioners: if there is a real and substantial danger that the debtor will dispose of or dissipate assets, move quickly, and do not take shortcuts.

Conclusion

Investors (including litigation funders) carefully consider the maturity and reliability of a jurisdiction’s insolvency and court processes before moving capital into that jurisdiction.

In Australia, a secured lender has priority over other creditors and superior enforcement and realization rights over subordinated investors. That said, Australia’s insolvency and court processes provide a robust and efficient platform for asset preservation for unsecured creditors and litigation funders in a liquidation.

Kitay reinforces Australian courts’ long-held preparedness to swiftly freeze the assets of a director facing claims of insolvent trading and voidable transactions, to ensure the court’s processes are not subverted.  This is a powerful mechanism which may assist a liquidator to preserve the asset pool and achieve a return for creditors, and where the liquidation is funded, protect the funder’s claim to payment out of the proceeds.  Together, these elements make Australia an attractive jurisdiction for investors and litigation funders.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Michelle Isaac, Head of Knowledge, Norton Rose Fulbright Australia, Sam Howieson, Associate, Norton Rose Fulbright Australia and Elise Papadopoff, Associate, Norton Rose Fulbright Australia, in the research and preparation of this article.

  2. 2

    Other recent decisions relating to freezing orders include Saba v Aladjadjian [2025] NSWDC 203; Infant Food Company Pty Ltd v Willis Trading Ltd [2025] FCA 682; Golden Rain Development Pty Ltd v Owners of Strata Plan No 97938 [2026] NSWCA 135.

  3. 3

    Kitay as Liquidator of Disability Dr Pty Ltd -v- MIGWI [2026] WASC 131, Hill J at [10] to [15], [31].

  4. 4

    BGC Contracting Pty Ltd v WA Construction Hire Pty Ltd [2010] WASC 25, Rimex Wheel Pty Ltd v Wulff [2018] WASC 180.

  5. 5

    Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) S477(3).

  6. 6

    Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) S477(2)(a).

  7. 7

    Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) S477(2)(m).

  8. 8

    These defences do not apply to a criminal offence under s588G(3).

  9. 9

    Kitay [17]

  10. 10

    Kitay [24]

  11. 11

    [2005] FCA 955

  12. 12

    At [46].

  13. 13

    A recent notable case involving breach of directors’ duties arose in ASIC v Bekier [2026] FCA 196, where the Federal Court held that the CEO and General Counsel of Star Casino breached their duties under s180 of the Act and ordered them to pay substantial financial penalties. Norton Rose Fulbright acted for ASIC.

  14. 14

    (2006) 229 CLR 386

  15. 15

    [2009] NSWCA 64, (at [150])

  16. 16

    [2007] FCA 1375 [26] (Gordon J).

  17. 17

    Perdaman Chemicals & Fertilisers Pty Ltd v Griffin Coal Mining Co Pty Ltd [2011] WASC 188 [135]; Kitay [11].

  18. 18

    Kitay [24]

  19. 19

    Kitay [24]

  20. 20

    Kitay [24]

  21. 21

    Kitay [24]

  22. 22

    Kitay [25]

  23. 23

    Kitay [25]

  24. 24

    Zhen v Mo [2008] VSC 300 [30]; Kitay [26].

  25. 25

    Kitay [30]

  26. 26

    Kitay [31] and [2].

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