Overview

Prediction markets are at an inflection point, as illustrated by several significant developments.

  • The US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) have filed simultaneous federal lawsuits against the governors of Illinois, Connecticut and Arizona, asserting that state gambling laws are preempted by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) as applied to event contracts traded on CFTC-licensed exchanges.
  • The Third Circuit has affirmed a preliminary injunction preventing New Jersey from enforcing its gambling laws against Kalshi’s sports-related event contracts, holding that the CEA preempts state interference with CFTC-designated contract markets (DCMs).
  • The CFTC’s new Director of Enforcement has declared that “the era of regulation by enforcement is over” and announced five enforcement priorities, including insider trading in prediction markets and the illegal use of government information, as well as a new cooperation policy with a formal declination framework which will replace the current February 2025 policy.
  • The CFTC has published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (“ANPRM”) on prediction markets, signaling that formal rules governing event contracts are forthcoming.

Background

Prediction markets are exchanges on which participants buy and sell contracts based on the outcome of future events. Kalshi’s event contracts, for example, “identify an event with multiple possible outcomes, a payment schedule for those outcomes, and an expiration date,” with value determined by market forces.1 Customers can trade on predictions about political elections, sports outcomes, macroeconomic data, weather and various other topics.

Event contracts listed on CFTC-regulated DCMs are a type of “swap” as broadly defined by the CEA, which includes “any agreement, contract, or transaction” that “provides for any purchase, sale, payment or delivery... that is dependent on the occurrence, nonoccurrence or the extent of the occurrence of an event or contingency associated with a potential financial, economic or commercial consequence.”2

The CEA designates the CFTC as the federal agency with “exclusive jurisdiction” over futures, options, and swaps traded on federally regulated exchanges pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). As of the date of the recently filed complaints, at least eight CFTC-regulated DCMs have collectively self-certified more than 3,000 event contracts.3

Key highlights: The state-federal preemption conflict: An escalating battlefront

Third Circuit affirms preliminary injunction against New Jersey: KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty (April 6, 2026)

The most significant judicial development to date in the development of prediction markets is the Third Circuit’s April 6, 2026 decision affirming a preliminary injunction barring New Jersey from enforcing its gambling laws against Kalshi’s sports-related event contracts.4

Background

In December 2024, one of Kalshi’s competitors began offering event contracts on sports outcomes. A month later, Kalshi followed suit. Two months after that, New Jersey sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter asserting that its sports-related event contracts violate New Jersey’s constitution and gambling laws prohibiting betting on collegiate sports.5 Violations are punishable as fourth-degree crimes, subject to fines of up to US$100,000.6

The Third Circuit’s holding

The Third Circuit held that Kalshi demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on its claim that the CEA preempts applicable state law, that its sports-related event contracts are swaps traded on a CFTC-licensed DCM subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, and that the remaining preliminary injunction factors weighed in Kalshi’s favor.7

Field preemption

The court held that the CEA grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over “swaps... traded or executed on a [DCM],” which includes Kalshi’s sports-related event contracts.8 The CEA includes a limiting principle that it shall not supersede state laws applicable to transactions not “conducted on or subject to the rules of a registered entity;” however, this limiting principal does not apply because DCMs are registered entities.9

Conflict preemption

The court further held that allowing New Jersey to enforce its gambling laws would create an obstacle to executing the CEA by prohibiting a licensed DCM under exclusive CFTC jurisdiction from offering its contracts in the state, recreating “the patchwork that Congress replaced wholecloth by creating the CFTC.”10

Event contracts as swaps

The court found that Kalshi’s sports-related event contracts qualify as “swaps” under the CEA because they are traded on a CFTC-licensed DCM and depend on event outcomes “associated with a potential financial, economic or commercial consequence.”11 The court pointed to affected stakeholders such as sponsors, advertisers, television networks, franchises and local communities.12

Notable dissent

Judge Roth dissented, arguing that Kalshi’s sports-related offerings are “virtually indistinguishable from the betting products available on online sportsbooks, such as DraftKings and FanDuel.”13 The dissent contended that the majority failed to adequately account for the strong presumption against preemption in areas traditionally regulated by states.14 The dissent’s reasoning, and the potential circuit split it implies, is important context for assessing the durability of the preemption holding.15

Other courts

Other courts considering this question have also determined that Kalshi’s sports-related event contracts on its DCM are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.16

The CFTC and DOJ sue three states: Illinois, Connecticut and Arizona (April 2, 2026)

On April 2, 2026, the United States and the CFTC filed simultaneous complaints for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Northern District of Illinois, the District of Connecticut and the District of Arizona.17 The complaints advance nearly identical legal theories and represent a significant escalation of the federal government’s defense of CFTC exclusive jurisdiction over prediction markets.

Illinois (United States and CFTC v. Pritzker)

The Illinois Gaming Board (IGB) issued cease-and-desist letters to three CFTC-regulated DCMs, asserting that it is “unlawful to knowingly establish, maintain, or operate an Internet site that permits a person to play a game of chance or skill for money or other thing of value, or that permits a person to make a wager upon the result of any sport, game, contest, political nomination, appointment or election via the Internet without an IGB-issued license.”18

Illinois has taken the position that event contracts, including sports-related event contracts listed on CFTC-regulated DCMs, are wagers rather than swaps, and may be offered only by firms licensed by the Illinois Gaming Board.19 The IGB threatened civil or criminal penalties for offering sports or political event contracts in Illinois without a state license.20

The companies targeted include Kalshi, NADEX (d/b/a Crypto.com), Polymarket US and Robinhood Derivatives LLC.21 The Illinois Gaming Board issued its cease-and-desist letter to Polymarket US on January 27, 2026, following earlier letters to Kalshi, Crypto.com and Robinhood in April 2025.22

The United States and the CFTC argue that Illinois’s actions intrude on the exclusive federal scheme Congress designed to oversee national swaps markets, and that the CEA preempts Illinois law as applied to event contracts traded on federally regulated exchanges.23

Connecticut (United States and CFTC v. Lamont)

Connecticut’s Director of Gaming issued cease-and-desist letters to two CFTC-regulated DCMs and one registered Futures Commission Merchant on the grounds that these companies are “conducting unlicensed online gambling, more specifically sports wagering, in Connecticut through its online sports event contracts” in violation of Connecticut General Statutes.24

Connecticut’s cease-and-desist letters alleged that sports event contracts “constitute sports wagering because they allow Connecticut residents to risk something of value for gain by an electronic wagering platform through the placement of wagers on the outcome of live sporting events or portions of a live sporting event.”25

The letters further assert that promoting unlicensed gambling services is an unfair trade practice violating the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) because it allows the entities to gain a competitive advantage over “appropriately licensed entities” by operating outside the state’s regulatory framework.26

Arizona (United States and CFTC v. Hobbs)

The Arizona situation is the most serious, as it is the only state to have filed criminal charges. On March 17, 2026, Arizona filed a 20-count criminal information against CFTC-registered DCM KalshiEX LLC, alleging that Kalshi operated an illegal gambling business without a license and engaged in “election wagering.”27

The charges include four counts of election wagering, covering event contracts on the 2028 presidential race, the 2026 Arizona gubernatorial race and Republican primary, and the 2026 Arizona Secretary of State race, and sixteen counts of betting and wagering, including bets on professional and college sports, proposition bets on individual player performance and whether the SAVE Act would become law.28

The CFTC brings the Arizona action in response to the State of Arizona’s filing of a criminal Information against a CFTC-regulated DCM for “doing precisely what is permitted under federal law.”29

All three complaints advance the same preemption arguments:

Express preemption

Congress explicitly preempted state regulation of commodity derivatives, vesting the CFTC with “exclusive jurisdiction” over all “accounts, agreement, and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery,” and has repeatedly expanded that jurisdiction, most recently to encompass “transactions involving swaps.”30

Field preemption

CEA § 2(a)(1)(A) makes plain that Congress intended the CEA to occupy the field of “accounts, agreements... and transactions involving swaps or contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery... traded or executed on a contract market.”31 When an instrument is trading on a CFTC-regulated market as a “swap” or “future,” state gambling laws do not apply.32

Conflict preemption (impossibility)

Compliance with both state regulations and the CEA is impossible because a DCM is required by federal law to provide “impartial access” to all eligible participants nationwide.33 If a state bans the contract, the DCM cannot fulfill that federal mandate.34

Conflict preemption (obstacle)

State gambling regulations as applied to DCMs also stand as an obstacle to the full purposes of Congress because state-by-state licensing, fees and compliance requirements would create the very “patchwork” Congress set out to prevent.35

CFTC enforcement priorities: Director Miller’s remarks at NYU Law (March 31, 2026)36

On March 31, 2026, David Miller, the new CFTC Director of Enforcement, delivered remarks at NYU Law School setting out the Division of Enforcement’s (Division) agenda under Chairman Selig. The remarks are significant both for what they prioritize and for what they signal about the CFTC’s posture toward prediction markets.

The five priority areas 37

The Division announced five enforcement priorities:

  1. Insider trading (including in the prediction markets);
  2. Market manipulation (with a focus on energy markets);
  3. Market abuse/disruptive trading (spoofing, wash trading, disruptive closing-period conduct);
  4. Retail fraud (Ponzi schemes, pig-butchering, AI-enabled fraud, impersonation); and
  5. Willful AML/KYC violations.

The overarching theme is that “the era of regulation by enforcement is over.” The Division intends to focus on fraud, abuse and manipulation rather than using enforcement as a policy-making tool.

Insider trading in the prediction markets

This is perhaps the most practically significant announcement for prediction market participants. Director Miller addressed what he characterized as a widespread but mistaken belief that insider trading law does not apply to prediction markets.

Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA and CFTC Rule 180.1 were modeled after Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5 and extend insider trading prohibitions to commodity, futures and swap markets. Because event contracts are swaps, these provisions apply directly to the prediction markets.38

The applicable theory

The CFTC will apply the misappropriation theory, under which liability attaches when an individual: (i) possesses material non-public information (MNPI); (ii) misappropriates that information by trading on it or tipping in breach of a duty of trust and confidence owed to the source; and (iii) does so with scienter. The classical (corporate insider) theory is unlikely to apply under the CEA, but the misappropriation theory does.39

Practical examples cited by Director Miller40

  • A person with an employment relationship with the subject of a prediction market contract (such as a YouTuber whose channel is the subject of a contract) who trades while holding MNPI about their own channel.
  • A team trainer with advanced knowledge of a player injury who trades on that information in breach of a duty of confidentiality.
  • Government employees, including members of Congress, who trade on MNPI about government action, subject to prosecution under Section 4c(a)(4) of the CEA (the “Eddie Murphy Rule”).

The Limits

The prohibition applies only to misappropriated MNPI. Participants who trade on information they rightfully possess, including superior research, judgment or analysis, are not in breach of any duty and are free to trade.

New cooperation policy advisory

Miller also announced the Division will shortly issue a new Staff Advisory on Cooperation, rescinding the current February 2025 policy. Key features include:41

Declination framework

Parties who:

  1. self-report promptly,
  2. cooperate fully and
  3. remediate fully, including committing to ongoing reporting and following disgorgement guidelines will, absent aggravating circumstances, receive a clear path to a formal declination.

Aggravating circumstances

Conduct involving pervasive intentional or reckless behavior by ownership or senior-most management, or recidivist activity involving intentional or reckless conduct, may preclude eligibility.

Self-reporting standard

Self-reports will be eligible even when the party needs more time to investigate but will not be eligible where the information is already public or where the party knows or suspects an imminent disclosure from a whistleblower, another government agency, an SRO investigation or a press report.

Binary cooperation

Miller said cooperation is described as binary “like jumping into a lake; you’re either in a hundred percent or you’re out.” Full cooperation requires disclosing all relevant non-privileged information, making personnel available for interviews, preserving all records including ephemeral messages and continuing to report.

Remediation

Full restitution to injured parties, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, discipline of relevant employees (including those with supervisory authority), and demonstrable changes to compliance programs are all required.

Pending regulatory developments

This litigation and enforcement activity is unfolding against a backdrop of active rulemaking. On March 16, 2026, the CFTC published an ANPRM soliciting public comments on prediction markets,42 covering questions including the scope and public interest implications of “gaming” and “sports competition.”

The CFTC also recently published an advisory letter to DCMs on prediction markets and event contracts (CFTC Letter No. 26-08, Mar. 12, 2026).43

These regulatory actions signal that the CFTC intends to provide additional clarity and stability to the prediction markets through formal rulemaking rather than through ad hoc enforcement, consistent with Director Miller’s stated rejection of “regulation by enforcement.”44

What this means for our clients

The convergence of federal litigation, a landmark circuit court decision, new enforcement priorities and forthcoming rulemaking creates a complex but increasingly coherent regulatory picture. Clients should consider the following:

For designated contract markets and futures commission merchants

  • The Third Circuit’s decision and the three federal complaints strongly support the proposition that CFTC jurisdiction is exclusive and that state cease-and-desist letters are preempted as applied to CFTC-regulated DCM activity. Nonetheless, the Arizona criminal prosecution illustrates that state enforcement risk, including criminal risk, is real and immediate.
  • DCMs and FCMs should carefully document their CFTC self-certification and compliance posture to demonstrate that their event contracts have been properly certified under federal law.
  • The Third Circuit dissent, and the coalition of 34 states plus the District of Columbia and Northern Mariana Islands filing amicus briefs in favor of state authority, signals that this litigation may ultimately require Supreme Court resolution.

For prediction market participants (traders and platforms)

  • Insider trading law applies to prediction markets. Participants who hold MNPI arising from a relationship of trust and confidence whether as an employee, contractor, government official or other fiduciary, and trade on that information face CFTC enforcement action, civil litigation and potentially criminal referral.
  • Market participants should review their information-handling policies and trading protocols and ensure that any MNPI barriers are clearly established and enforced.
  • Government employees, Congressional staff and executive branch employees should be particularly attentive given the CFTC’s stated intent to police the use of government information in the prediction markets.

For all clients

  • The new cooperation policy creates a meaningful opportunity for parties who discover misconduct to receive favorable treatment, including a formal declination. Early self-reporting, robust cooperation and thorough remediation are the prerequisites.
  • The ANPRM represents an opportunity to shape the regulatory framework for prediction markets. Clients with interests in these markets as operators, intermediaries or significant traders should consider submitting comments.

This legal update is intended to provide general information about legal developments. It does not constitute legal advice and does not create a lawyer-client relationship. The law may vary depending on applicable jurisdiction and individual circumstances.

Footnotes

  1. 1

    KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-1922, slip op. at 2 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2026).

  2. 2

    Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 2, 2026) at page 9.

  3. 3

    Id. at page 2.

  4. 4

    KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-1922, slip op. at 1-2 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2026).

  5. 5

    Id. at 2-3.

  6. 6

    N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12A-11(c), 2C:43-2.

  7. 7

    Id. at 1-2, 16-17.

  8. 8

    7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A); Flaherty, slip op. at 10-12.

  9. 9

    7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)(B)(i); see also 7 U.S.C. § 1a(40)(A).

  10. 10

    Flaherty, slip op. at 13; See also Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 977 F.2d 1147, 1156 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that state laws “directly affect[ing] trading on or the operation of a futures market” are conflict preempted by the CEA).

  11. 11

    7 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)(1)(A), 1a(47)(A)(ii); Flaherty, slip op. at 7-8.

  12. 12

    Id. at 8.

  13. 13

    Flaherty, slip op. at 21 (Roth, J., dissenting).

  14. 14

    Id. at 21-22.

  15. 15

    Id. at 28-41.

  16. 16

    See Kalshiex LLC v. Orgel, including decisions in the Middle District of Tennessee No. 3:26-CV-00034, 2026 WL 474869, at 7 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2026) (“The court finds that Kalshi is likely to succeed on the Northern District of California, merits because sports event contracts are ‘swaps’ and conflict preemption applies.”); Blue Lake Rancheria v. Kalshi Inc., No. 3:25-cv-6162, 2025 WL 3141202, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“Plaintiffs have not shown the District of New Jersey Court has jurisdiction to decide whether Kalshi’s event contracts violate the [Act]. That decision belongs to the [CFTC], which has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over its contract markets.”); KalshiEX LLC v. Flaherty, No. 25-cv-02152, 2025 WL 1218313, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 28, 2025).

  17. 17

    See Complaint, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Lamont, No. 3:26-cv-00498 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1; Complaint, United States v. Hobbs, No. [TBD] (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  18. 18

    Complaint ¶ 6, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  19. 19

    Id. ¶ 7.

  20. 20

    Id.

  21. 21

    Complaint ¶¶ 59, 61-65, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  22. 22

    Id. ¶ 61, 63-65.

  23. 23

    Id. ¶ 3.

  24. 24

    Complaint ¶ 6, United States v. Lamont, No. 3:26-cv-00498 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1; see also id. ¶ 60.

  25. 25

    Id. ¶ 61.

  26. 26

    Id. ¶ 63.

  27. 27

    Complaint ¶ 2, United States v. Hobbs, No. [TBD] (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1; see also Arizona v. KalshiEX LLC, No. CR 2026-173-001 (Superior Ct. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2026).

  28. 28

    Complaint ¶ 2, United States v. Hobbs, No. [TBD] (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  29. 29

    Id. ¶ 2.

  30. 30

    7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A); see, e.g., Complaint ¶ 70, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  31. 31

    7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).

  32. 32

    See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 72, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  33. 33

    17 C.F.R. § 38.151(b).

  34. 34

    See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 75, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  35. 35

    See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012); see also, e.g., Complaint ¶ 76, United States v. Pritzker, No. 1:26-cv-03659 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2026), ECF No. 1.

  36. 36

    David I. Miller, Dir. of Enf’t, CFTC, Remarks at NYU Law School: CFTC Enforcement Priorities, Insider Trading in the Prediction Markets, and Cooperation with the CFTC (Mar. 31, 2026).

  37. 37

    Id.

  38. 38

    Id.

  39. 39

    Id.

  40. 40

    Id.

  41. 41

    Id.

  42. 42

    See CFTC advances regulatory framework for prediction markets, Norton Rose Fulbright (March 2026).

  43. 43

    Id.

  44. 44

    David I. Miller, Dir. of Enf’t, CFTC, Remarks at NYU Law School: CFTC Enforcement Priorities, Insider Trading in the Prediction Markets, and Cooperation with the CFTC (Mar. 31, 2026).

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